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Mark Braverman

Publications and source records attributed to Mark Braverman.

At least 73 records · Page 4Linked to original sources
arXiv2014

Contracting Experts With Unknown Cost Structures

We investigate the problem of a principal looking to contract an expert to provide a probability forecast for a categorical event. We assume all experts have a common public prior on the event's probability, but can form more accurate opinions by engaging in research. Various experts' research costs are unknown to the principal. We present a truthful and efficient mechanism for the principal's problem of contracting an expert. This results in the principal contracting the best expert to do the work, and the principal's expected utility is equivalent to having the second best expert in-house. Our mechanism connects scoring rules with auctions, a connection that is useful when obtaining new information requires costly research.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2014

Truthful Mechanisms for Competing Submodular Processes

Motivated by applications to word-of-mouth advertising, we consider a game-theoretic scenario in which competing advertisers want to target initial adopters in a social network. Each advertiser wishes to maximize the resulting cascade of influence, modeled by a general network diffusion process. However, competition between products may adversely impact the rate of adoption for any given firm. The resulting framework gives rise to complex preferences that depend on the specifics of the stochastic diffusion model and the network topology. We study this model from the perspective of a central mechanism, such as a social networking platform, that can optimize seed placement as a service for the advertisers. We ask: given the reported demands of the competing firms, how should a mechanism choose seeds to maximize overall efficiency? Beyond the algorithmic problem, competition raises issues of strategic behaviour: rational agents should not be incentivized to underreport their budget demands. We show that when there are two players, the social welfare can be $2$-approximated by a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism. Our mechanism is defined recursively, randomizing the order in which advertisers are allocated seeds according to a particular greedy method. For three or more players, we demonstrate that under additional assumptions (satisfied by many existing models of influence spread) there exists a simpler strategyproof $\frac{e}{e-1}$-approximation mechanism; notably, this second mechanism is not necessarily strategyproof when there are only two players.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2013

Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare

We investigate computational and mechanism design aspects of scarce resource allocation, where the primary rationing mechanism is through waiting times. Specifically we consider allocating medical treatments to a population of patients. Each patient needs exactly one treatment, and can choose from $k$ hospitals. Hospitals have different costs, which are fully paid by a third party ---the "payer". The payer has a fixed budget $B$, and each hospital will have its own waiting time. At equilibrium, each patient will choose his most preferred hospital given his intrinsic preferences and the waiting times. The payer thus computes the waiting times so that at equilibrium the budget constraint is satisfied and the social welfare is maximized. We first show that the optimization problem is NP-hard, yet if the budget can be relaxed to $(1+ε)B$ for an arbitrarily small $ε$, then the optimum under budget $B$ can be approximated efficiently. Next, we study the endogenous emergence of waiting time from the dynamics between hospitals and patients, and show that there is no need for the payer to explicitly enforce the optimal waiting times. Under certain conditions, all he need is to enforce the amount of money he wants to pay to each hospital. The dynamics will always converge to the desired waiting times in finite time. We then go beyond equilibrium solutions and investigate the optimization problem over a much larger class of mechanisms containing the equilibrium ones as special cases. With two hospitals, we show that under a natural assumption on the patients' preference profiles, optimal welfare is in fact attained by the randomized assignment mechanism, which allocates patients to hospitals at random subject to the budget constraint, but avoids waiting times. Finally, we discuss potential policy implications of our results, as well as follow-up directions and open problems.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2013

Tight Bounds for Set Disjointness in the Message Passing Model

In a multiparty message-passing model of communication, there are $k$ players. Each player has a private input, and they communicate by sending messages to one another over private channels. While this model has been used extensively in distributed computing and in multiparty computation, lower bounds on communication complexity in this model and related models have been somewhat scarce. In recent work \cite{phillips12,woodruff12,woodruff13}, strong lower bounds of the form $Ω(n \cdot k)$ were obtained for several functions in the message-passing model; however, a lower bound on the classical Set Disjointness problem remained elusive. In this paper, we prove tight lower bounds of the form $Ω(n \cdot k)$ for the Set Disjointness problem in the message passing model. Our bounds are obtained by developing information complexity tools in the message-passing model, and then proving an information complexity lower bound for Set Disjointness. As a corollary, we show a tight lower bound for the task allocation problem \cite{DruckerKuhnOshman} via a reduction from Set Disjointness.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2013

Search using queries on indistinguishable items

We investigate the problem of determining a set S of k indistinguishable integers in the range [1,n]. The algorithm is allowed to query an integer $q\in [1,n]$, and receive a response comparing this integer to an integer randomly chosen from S. The algorithm has no control over which element of S the query q is compared to. We show tight bounds for this problem. In particular, we show that in the natural regime where $k\le n$, the optimal number of queries to attain $n^{-Ω(1)}$ error probability is $Θ(k^3 \log n)$. In the regime where $k>n$, the optimal number of queries is $Θ(n^2 k \log n)$. Our main technical tools include the use of information theory to derive the lower bounds, and the application of noisy binary search in the spirit of Feige, Raghavan, Peleg, and Upfal (1994). In particular, our lower bound technique is likely to be applicable in other situations that involve search under uncertainty.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2012

On the Convergence of the Hegselmann-Krause System

We study convergence of the following discrete-time non-linear dynamical system: n agents are located in R^d and at every time step, each moves synchronously to the average location of all agents within a unit distance of it. This popularly studied system was introduced by Krause to model the dynamics of opinion formation and is often referred to as the Hegselmann-Krause model. We prove the first polynomial time bound for the convergence of this system in arbitrary dimensions. This improves on the bound of n^{O(n)} resulting from a more general theorem of Chazelle. Also, we show a quadratic lower bound and improve the upper bound for one-dimensional systems to O(n^3).

cs.DS↗
arXiv2012

A discrepancy lower bound for information complexity

This paper provides the first general technique for proving information lower bounds on two-party unbounded-rounds communication problems. We show that the discrepancy lower bound, which applies to randomized communication complexity, also applies to information complexity. More precisely, if the discrepancy of a two-party function $f$ with respect to a distribution $μ$ is $Disc_μf$, then any two party randomized protocol computing $f$ must reveal at least $Ω(\log (1/Disc_μf))$ bits of information to the participants. As a corollary, we obtain that any two-party protocol for computing a random function on $\{0,1\}^n\times\{0,1\}^n$ must reveal $Ω(n)$ bits of information to the participants. In addition, we prove that the discrepancy of the Greater-Than function is $Ω(1/\sqrt{n})$, which provides an alternative proof to the recent proof of Viola \cite{Viola11} of the $Ω(\log n)$ lower bound on the communication complexity of this well-studied function and, combined with our main result, proves the tight $Ω(\log n)$ lower bound on its information complexity. The proof of our main result develops a new simulation procedure that may be of an independent interest. In a very recent breakthrough work of Kerenidis et al. \cite{kerenidis2012lower}, this simulation procedure was the main building block for proving that almost all known lower bound techniques for communication complexity (and not just discrepancy) apply to information complexity.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2012

Nash Equilibria in Perturbation Resilient Games

Motivated by the fact that in many game-theoretic settings, the game analyzed is only an approximation to the game being played, in this work we analyze equilibrium computation for the broad and natural class of bimatrix games that are stable to perturbations. We specifically focus on games with the property that small changes in the payoff matrices do not cause the Nash equilibria of the game to fluctuate wildly. For such games we show how one can compute approximate Nash equilibria more efficiently than the general result of Lipton et al. \cite{LMM03}, by an amount that depends on the degree of stability of the game and that reduces to their bound in the worst case. Furthermore, we show that for stable games the approximate equilibria found will be close in variation distance to true equilibria, and moreover this holds even if we are given as input only a perturbation of the actual underlying stable game. For uniformly-stable games, where the equilibria fluctuate at most quasi-linearly in the extent of the perturbation, we get a particularly dramatic improvement. Here, we achieve a fully quasi-polynomial-time approximation scheme: that is, we can find $1/\poly(n)$-approximate equilibria in quasi-polynomial time. This is in marked contrast to the general class of bimatrix games for which finding such approximate equilibria is PPAD-hard. In particular, under the (widely believed) assumption that PPAD is not contained in quasi-polynomial time, our results imply that such uniformly stable games are inherently easier for computation of approximate equilibria than general bimatrix games.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2012

Finding Endogenously Formed Communities

A central problem in e-commerce is determining overlapping communities among individuals or objects in the absence of external identification or tagging. We address this problem by introducing a framework that captures the notion of communities or clusters determined by the relative affinities among their members. To this end we define what we call an affinity system, which is a set of elements, each with a vector characterizing its preference for all other elements in the set. We define a natural notion of (potentially overlapping) communities in an affinity system, in which the members of a given community collectively prefer each other to anyone else outside the community. Thus these communities are endogenously formed in the affinity system and are "self-determined" or "self-certified" by its members. We provide a tight polynomial bound on the number of self-determined communities as a function of the robustness of the community. We present a polynomial-time algorithm for enumerating these communities. Moreover, we obtain a local algorithm with a strong stochastic performance guarantee that can find a community in time nearly linear in the of size the community. Social networks fit particularly naturally within the affinity system framework -- if we can appropriately extract the affinities from the relatively sparse yet rich information from social networks, our analysis then yields a set of efficient algorithms for enumerating self-determined communities in social networks. In the context of social networks we also connect our analysis with results about $(α,β)$-clusters introduced by Mishra, Schreiber, Stanton, and Tarjan \cite{msst}. In contrast with the polynomial bound we prove on the number of communities in the affinity system model, we show that there exists a family of networks with superpolynomial number of $(α,β)$-clusters.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2012

Noise vs computational intractability in dynamics

Computation plays a key role in predicting and analyzing natural phenomena. There are two fundamental barriers to our ability to computationally understand the long-term behavior of a dynamical system that describes a natural process. The first one is unaccounted-for errors, which may make the system unpredictable beyond a very limited time horizon. This is especially true for chaotic systems, where a small change in the initial conditions may cause a dramatic shift in the trajectories. The second one is Turing-completeness. By the undecidability of the Halting Problem, the long-term prospects of a system that can simulate a Turing Machine cannot be determined computationally. We investigate the interplay between these two forces -- unaccounted-for errors and Turing-completeness. We show that the introduction of even a small amount of noise into a dynamical system is sufficient to "destroy" Turing-completeness, and to make the system's long-term behavior computationally predictable. On a more technical level, we deal with long-term statistical properties of dynamical systems, as described by invariant measures. We show that while there are simple dynamical systems for which the invariant measures are non-computable, perturbing such systems makes the invariant measures efficiently computable. Thus, noise that makes the short term behavior of the system harder to predict, may make its long term statistical behavior computationally tractable. We also obtain some insight into the computational complexity of predicting systems affected by random noise.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2011

Information Equals Amortized Communication

We show how to efficiently simulate the sending of a message M to a receiver who has partial information about the message, so that the expected number of bits communicated in the simulation is close to the amount of additional information that the message reveals to the receiver. This is a generalization and strengthening of the Slepian-Wolf theorem, which shows how to carry out such a simulation with low amortized communication in the case that M is a deterministic function of X. A caveat is that our simulation is interactive. As a consequence, we prove that the internal information cost (namely the information revealed to the parties) involved in computing any relation or function using a two party interactive protocol is exactly equal to the amortized communication complexity of computing independent copies of the same relation or function. We also show that the only way to prove a strong direct sum theorem for randomized communication complexity is by solving a particular variant of the pointer jumping problem that we define. Our work implies that a strong direct sum theorem for communication complexity holds if and only if efficient compression of communication protocols is possible.

cs.IT↗
arXiv2011

Inapproximability of NP-Complete Variants of Nash Equilibrium

In recent work of Hazan and Krauthgamer (SICOMP 2011), it was shown that finding an $\eps$-approximate Nash equilibrium with near-optimal value in a two-player game is as hard as finding a hidden clique of size $O(\log n)$ in the random graph $G(n,1/2)$. This raises the question of whether a similar intractability holds for approximate Nash equilibrium without such constraints. We give evidence that the constraint of near-optimal value makes the problem distinctly harder: a simple algorithm finds an optimal 1/2-approximate equilibrium, while finding strictly better than 1/2-approximate equilibria is as hard as the Hidden Clique problem. This is in contrast to the unconstrained problem where more sophisticated algorithms, achieving better approximations, are known. Unlike general Nash equilibrium, which is in PPAD, optimal (maximum value) Nash equilibrium is NP-hard. We proceed to show that optimal Nash equilibrium is just one of several known NP-hard problems related to Nash equilibrium, all of which have approximate variants which are as hard as finding a planted clique. In particular, we show this for approximate variants of the following problems: finding a Nash equilibrium with value greater than $η$ (for any $η>0$, even when the best Nash equilibrium has value $1-η$), finding a second Nash equilibrium, and finding a Nash equilibrium with small support. Finally, we consider the complexity of approximate pure Bayes Nash equilibria in two-player games. Here we show that for general Bayesian games the problem is NP-hard. For the special case where the distribution over types is uniform, we give a quasi-polynomial time algorithm matched by a hardness result based on the Hidden Clique problem.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2010

Matching with Couples Revisited

It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In particular we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2010

Computability of Brolin-Lyubich Measure

Brolin-Lyubich measure $λ_R$ of a rational endomorphism $R:\riem\to\riem$ with $°R\geq 2$ is the unique invariant measure of maximal entropy $h_{λ_R}=h_{\text{top}}(R)=\log d$. Its support is the Julia set $J(R)$. We demonstrate that $λ_R$ is always computable by an algorithm which has access to coefficients of $R$, even when $J(R)$ is not computable. In the case when $R$ is a polynomial, Brolin-Lyubich measure coincides with the harmonic measure of the basin of infinity. We find a sufficient condition for computability of the harmonic measure of a domain, which holds for the basin of infinity of a polynomial mapping, and show that computability may fail for a general domain.

math.DS↗
arXiv2010

Pebbles and Branching Programs for Tree Evaluation

We introduce the Tree Evaluation Problem, show that it is in logDCFL (and hence in P), and study its branching program complexity in the hope of eventually proving a superlogarithmic space lower bound. The input to the problem is a rooted, balanced d-ary tree of height h, whose internal nodes are labeled with d-ary functions on [k] = {1,...,k}, and whose leaves are labeled with elements of [k]. Each node obtains a value in [k] equal to its d-ary function applied to the values of its d children. The output is the value of the root. We show that the standard black pebbling algorithm applied to the binary tree of height h yields a deterministic k-way branching program with Theta(k^h) states solving this problem, and we prove that this upper bound is tight for h=2 and h=3. We introduce a simple semantic restriction called "thrifty" on k-way branching programs solving tree evaluation problems and show that the same state bound of Theta(k^h) is tight (up to a constant factor) for all h >= 2 for deterministic thrifty programs. We introduce fractional pebbling for trees and show that this yields nondeterministic thrifty programs with Theta(k^{h/2+1}) states solving the Boolean problem "determine whether the root has value 1". We prove that this bound is tight for h=2,3,4, and tight for unrestricted nondeterministic k-way branching programs for h=2,3.

cs.CC↗
arXiv2009

Sorting from Noisy Information

This paper studies problems of inferring order given noisy information. In these problems there is an unknown order (permutation) $π$ on $n$ elements denoted by $1,...,n$. We assume that information is generated in a way correlated with $π$. The goal is to find a maximum likelihood $π^*$ given the information observed. We will consider two different types of observations: noisy comparisons and noisy orders. The data in Noisy orders are permutations given from an exponential distribution correlated with π(this is also called the Mallow's model). The data in Noisy Comparisons is a signal given for each pair of elements which is correlated with their true ordering. In this paper we present polynomial time algorithms for solving both problems with high probability. As part of our proof we show that for both models the maximum likelihood solution $π^{\ast}$ is close to the original permutation $π$. Our results are of interest in applications to ranking, such as ranking in sports, or ranking of search items based on comparisons by experts.

cs.DS↗