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Mashrur Chowdhury

Publications and source records attributed to Mashrur Chowdhury.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Structured Driving-State Narratives for Small Language Model-Based GNSS Spoofing Detection

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) depend on reliable Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) positioning. However, spoofed GNSS signals can induce plausible but incorrect vehicle states. This study develops a small language model (SLM)-based framework for detecting and classifying GNSS spoofing attacks by comparing vehicle behaviors independently derived from GNSS and other sensing sources. The framework converts independent driving states from GNSS and other sensing sources into structured semantic narratives that are provided to an SLM for spoofing detection and attack classification. The performance of the SLM-based framework is compared with large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on identical training data and evaluated on the same test set. The evaluation considers five classes: no attack, overshoot attack, stopped attack, turn-by-turn attack, and wrong-turn attack. The framework is also evaluated with geographically unseen field data collected in Clemson, South Carolina, United States. Experimental results indicate that the evaluated SLMs achieve performance similar to the LLMs, achieving an average accuracy of 96.99%, precision of 99.05%, recall of 95.59%, and F1-score of 97.18%. In terms of computational efficiency and resource utilization, the SLMs demonstrate advantages over the LLMs by requiring lower inference latency and less GPU memory during both fine-tuning and inference. Evaluation using field data collected in a geographically distinct location further demonstrated its efficacy. The presented framework can detect and classify GNSS spoofing attacks in real-time while requiring relatively low computational and memory resources, and is therefore suitable for deployment on resource-constrained vehicular computing platforms.

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Digital Twin-Based Intrusion Detection for Vehicle Powertrain CAN Bus Systems

Existing automotive intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for the Controller Area Network (CAN) largely target discrepancies in message timing, frequency, or sequencing and cannot detect attacks that preserve these properties while manipulating the payload. Digital twins (DTs) have been used to emulate CAN traffic and generate attack scenarios for IDS evaluation, but their use for intrusion detection remains unexplored. This study develops a DT-based IDS that jointly models physical relationships among decoded powertrain signals and identifies attacks through residuals between predicted and observed behavior. A shared-encoder LSTM DT was trained on 17 decoded signals from a real Hyundai/Kia CAN log to jointly predict seven numeric and two categorical gear signals over a 24-step window. A timestep is flagged when a residual exceeds a calibrated threshold, while adaptive rollout protects the twin's input history from sustained contamination. Four attacks (plateau, continuous drift, masquerade, and gear masquerade) were evaluated against the twin and a range-and-plausibility baseline. The DT outperformed the baseline across all attacks, achieving detection rates of 94.6% for continuous drift and 89.2% for masquerade, while the baseline detected almost none of the fabricated payload attacks. These results demonstrate that learning coupled vehicle dynamics enables detection of stealthy payload manipulations that preserve normal CAN communication patterns. False positive rates reached 39.6%, highlighting the need for improved robustness under sustained attacks. The DT-based IDS shows promise for detecting stealthy payload-level CAN attacks that preserve normal communication patterns, supporting behavior-based cybersecurity for connected and automated vehicles.

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Treating Statewide CORS Networks as Spatially Distributed Sensors for GNSS Integrity Monitoring under Unintentional and Deliberate Threats

State departments of transportation (DOTs) in the United States increasingly rely on statewide continuously operating reference station (CORS) networks to support high-precision Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)-based positioning and timing for intelligent transportation systems. These networks also provide continuous observations that can support regional GNSS integrity monitoring. This study develops and demonstrates a framework that treats a statewide CORS network as a spatially distributed sensor system for identifying unintentional (environmental) and intentional (cyber) interference when GNSS measurements deviate from expected spatial patterns. We develop a graph-based Network Consistency Framework (NCF) that evaluates each station against its spatial neighborhood using four metrics: neighborhood residual, spatial gradient, residual, and graph smoothness. These metrics are combined into a Network Consistency Index (NCI). The framework is demonstrated using two consecutive days of four-constellation observations from 50 stations in the Alabama DOT-maintained CORS network, using changes in vertical total electron content (ΔVTEC) and the Rate of TEC Index (ROTI) as spatially coherent observables. The framework quantified network-wide spatial consistency and identified localized anomalies. Detected anomalies indicate stations whose observations deviated from the surrounding regional network, signaling potential integrity issues. Determining whether anomalies result from receiver faults, localized interference, spoofing, or other causes requires further investigation. This study introduces statewide CORS networks as regional GNSS integrity observatories and presents the NCF and NCI for graph-based spatial integrity monitoring. Transportation agencies can implement the framework using existing CORS observations to monitor network integrity and identify localized anomalies.

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Deployment Feasibility Analysis of Post-Quantum Digital Signatures in Safety-Critical C-V2X Communication for Urban Mobility Scenario

The transition from the classical ECDSA to PQC creates substantially larger authentication payloads for safety-critical C-V2X sidelink communication. This study determines which NIST post-quantum signature algorithms are compatible with the current SAE J3161 deployment profile and quantifies their communication-level effects. A transport-block feasibility analysis was performed using IEEE 1609.2 secured-message structures, SAE J3161 radio parameters, and the signature and public-key sizes of ECDSA P-256, Falcon-512, Dilithium-2, and SPHINCS+. Falcon-512, the only post-quantum candidate that fit the applicable transport-block constraints, was compared with ECDSA P-256 through full-stack C-V2X PC5 Mode 4 co-simulation. The evaluation covered 24 scenarios spanning six traffic levels-of-service with line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight propagation. PDR and end-to-end latency were evaluated at a roadside unit receiver. Dilithium-2 and SPHINCS+ exceeded the available transport-block capacity, whereas Falcon-512 remained physically feasible. Falcon-512 maintained mean latency near 52 ms and 95th-percentile latency within 97-98 ms, but met the 90% packet-delivery threshold only at traffic level-of-service A, under line-of-sight propagation. ECDSA met the threshold through traffic level-of-service C. Neither algorithm met the threshold under non-line-of-sight propagation. The study provides a standards-grounded cross-layer evaluation that identifies both algorithm feasibility and traffic-dependent deployment boundaries for post-quantum signatures on C-V2X Mode 4 sidelink. The results show that spectrum efficiency, rather than cryptographic computation time, is the primary deployment constraint. They support standards development concerning payload structure, resource allocation, certificate transmission, and migration strategies for quantum-resistant vehicular communication.

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Fast Object Removal Attacks on Safety-Critical Video-based Perception Systems

By leveraging data from video-based perception systems, intelligent transportation systems (ITS) support safety-critical applications that improve road safety. However, adversaries may manipulate video frames to compromise downstream perception modules, causing failures in safety-critical functions and increasing risks to vulnerable road users. This paper presents a novel attack model and an end-to-end framework for near-real-time targeted object removal attack on a video-based safety-critical system. The end-to-end attack pipeline consists of four stages: localizing targets in each frame, retrieving coherent patches from earlier frames, blending them using context-aware alpha compositing, and reconstructing attacked frames. Experiments at an intersection on the South Carolina Connected Vehicle Testbed (SC-CVT) show that reconstructed frames have high global similarity to the originals, with frame-level Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) above 40 dB and Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM) above 0.996. Using the YOLO-based detector, the attack reduces object detections by up to 97.59% and achieves a frame-level attack success rate of 94.48%. Across the evaluated detectors and frame resolutions, the mean execution time ranges from 0.074 to 0.172 seconds per frame on GPU hardware, indicating near-real-time performance in testing. The forensic evaluation using several pretrained tamper-detection models shows limited ability to distinguish reconstructed from authentic frames. The findings suggest that video-based perception is vulnerable to stealthy object removal attacks that can degrade the performance of safety-critical applications by reducing object detectability. These findings can help develop mitigation strategies against adversarial object removal attacks that threaten safety-critical applications, such as vision-based pedestrian safety systems.

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Development of Vision-Language Model-based GNSS Spoofing Detection for Autonomous Vehicle Navigation

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) depend on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for localization and navigation, making them vulnerable to spoofing attacks that can covertly redirect vehicles or induce unsafe maneuvers. In this paper, we develop the first Vision-Language Model (VLM)-based framework for GNSS spoofing detection for autonomous vehicles by fusing front-camera visual data with in-vehicle sensor readings (e.g., speed, acceleration, yaw rate) against GNSS-derived maneuvers. Our approach introduces a three-stage fine-tuning process that first grounds visual cues, and then calibrates sensor data within a shared semantic space to detect discrepancies between predicted and GNSS-derived maneuvers across three attack scenarios. We also generated an independent real-world dataset by driving an instrumented vehicle on public roads in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, equipped with time-synchronized GNSS, IMU, and camera logs to validate cross-regional generalization of our fine-tuned model on unseen data from training data. On this dataset, we then generated intelligent spoofing attacks, including trajectory mirroring with road-network snapping for wrong-turn attacks, position freezing for overshoot scenarios, and drift generation for stop attacks. On this validation dataset, the zero-shot VLMs baseline F1-score ranges from 23% to 32%, whereas our fine-tuned model achieves an F1-score ranging from 94% to 95%. Results show that our VLM-based approach correctly classified every wrong-turn and stop attacks, and attains 88%-93% accuracy for overshoot attacks. Furthermore, we introduce an adaptive inference policy that reduces VLM invocations to 14% (~86% computational reduction) and yields 65ms-73ms per 4s window. These results point to a practical, on-road layer of defense that complements signal-level integrity checks with the use of VLMs.

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Fuzz'EMup: Leveraging EM Side-Channel Emanation to Guide Black-Box Embedded Firmware Fuzzing

As IoT and embedded devices proliferate across various domains, securing their firmware has become critical. Fuzzing offers a systematic approach to uncovering vulnerabilities in firmware, and coverage feedback can improve its effectiveness by guiding exploration. However, many devices make coverage information impossible to obtain by preventing firmware extraction, instrumentation, or accurate emulation; in such cases, testers are left with only inefficient black-box fuzzing. In this paper, we present an approach that leverages electromagnetic (EM) side-channel emanations to guide firmware fuzzing in purely black-box settings. However, turning raw EM measurements into reliable guidance is challenging: EM traces are noisy, and timing jitter causes corresponding features in different traces to shift in time. We address these challenges by combining frequency band selection based on the activity-to-idle signal contrast with dynamic time warping to align per-input traces and detect sustained divergence, while maintaining scalability by organizing executions in a tree structure based on their divergence times. We evaluate our approach on four real firmware targets and demonstrate that EM-derived feedback enhances path exploration, yielding higher code coverage than unguided fuzzing.

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Robust hardware Trojan detection leveraging dual-domain features and stacked ensemble learning

Cyber-physical systems rely on integrated circuits (ICs), making them vulnerable to hardware Trojans that can remain dormant until triggered, causing functional disruption or information leakage. Detecting these stealthy attacks is challenging because they introduce only subtle changes in circuit behavior. We present a golden-chip-free hardware Trojan detection framework that combines time-domain and frequency-domain features extracted from side-channel power traces. The framework evaluates six artificial intelligence models, including random forest, gradient boosting, naive Bayes, deep neural network, long short-term memory, and graph neural network, and integrates them using a stacked ensemble classifier. Evaluation on the AES-Trojan benchmark demonstrates that the proposed ensemble consistently outperforms the individual baseline models, achieving a macro-averaged ROC-AUC of 0.987. The results show that combining dual-domain feature extraction with stacked ensemble learning enables accurate and robust detection of hardware Trojans directly from side-channel emissions without requiring a trusted reference IC.

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In-Vehicle Digital Twin-Based Collision Warning Framework with Sybil Attack Detection

Connected Vehicles (CVs) rely extensively on communication technologies to enable data-driven predictive analyses for enhancing performance and safety. These communication channels can be exploited by adversaries to launch cyberattacks such as Sybil attacks, which could threaten both safety-critical and mobility applications, leaving CVs vulnerable and putting human lives at risk. As CV deployment continues to expand, the need to detect and mitigate cyberattacks in real-time becomes increasingly urgent. This study presents an in-vehicle Digital Twin (DT)-based collision warning framework with built-in capabilities for Sybil attacks detection. The framework integrates a Temporal Convolutional Network (TCN) for learning temporal dependencies in vehicle trajectory data and Hierarchical Navigable Small World (HNSW) algorithms for efficient similarity-based classification. Our framework is evaluated on real-world Sybil attack data, collected through field experiments. The framework achieved accuracy, recall, and F1 scores of 0.984, 1.00, and 0.944, respectively, in detecting Sybil-generated fake vehicles. During the safety evaluation, the framework reduced the mean Time Exposed Time-To-Collision (TET) and mean Time Integrated Time-To-Collision (TIT) of near-collision events by 88% and 72%, respectively. Furthermore, real-world feasibility evaluation shows that the framework conformed to the standardized maximum allowable latency for safety applications and operated well within the capacity of modern processors -- demonstrating the promise of an in-vehicle DT-based framework as an attack mitigation mechanism against Sybil attacks for next-generation CVs.

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Real-World Evaluation of Protocol-Compliant Denial-of-Service Attacks on C-V2X-based Forward Collision Warning Systems

Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) technology enables low-latency, reliable communications essential for safety applications such as a Forward Collision Warning (FCW) system. C-V2X deployments operate under strict protocol compliance with the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) and the Society of Automotive Engineers Standard (SAE) J2735 specifications to ensure interoperability. This paper presents a real-world testbed evaluation of protocol-compliant Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks using User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flooding and oversized Basic Safety Message (BSM) attacks that 7 exploit transport- and application-layer vulnerabilities in C-V2X. The attacks presented in this study transmit valid messages over standard PC5 sidelinks, fully adhering to 3GPP and SAE J2735 specifications, but at abnormally high rates and with oversized payloads that overload the receiver resources without breaching any protocol rules such as IEEE 1609. Using a real-world connected vehicle 11 testbed with commercially available On-Board Units (OBUs), we demonstrate that high-rate UDP flooding and oversized payload of BSM flooding can severely degrade FCW performance. Results show that UDP flooding alone reduces packet delivery ratio by up to 87% and increases latency to over 400ms, while oversized BSM floods overload receiver processing resources, delaying or completely suppressing FCW alerts. When UDP and BSM attacks are executed simultaneously, they cause near-total communication failure, preventing FCW warnings entirely. These findings reveal that protocol-compliant communications do not necessarily guarantee safe or reliable operation of C-V2X-based safety applications.

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Understanding the Risks of Asphalt Art to the Reliability of Vision-Based Perception Systems

Artistic crosswalks featuring asphalt art, introduced by different organizations in recent years, aim to enhance the visibility and safety of pedestrians. However, their visual complexity may interfere with surveillance systems that rely on vision-based object detection models. In this study, we investigate the impact of asphalt art on pedestrian detection performance of a pretrained vision-based object detection model. We construct realistic crosswalk scenarios by compositing various street art patterns into a fixed surveillance scene and evaluate the model's performance in detecting pedestrians on asphalt-arted crosswalks under both benign and adversarial conditions. A benign case refers to pedestrian crosswalks painted with existing normal asphalt art, whereas an adversarial case involves digitally crafted or altered asphalt art perpetrated by an attacker. Our results show that while simple, color-based designs have minimal effect, complex artistic patterns, particularly those with high visual salience, can significantly degrade pedestrian detection performance. Furthermore, we demonstrate that adversarially crafted asphalt art can be exploited to deliberately obscure real pedestrians or generate non-existent pedestrian detections. These findings highlight a potential vulnerability in urban vision-based pedestrian surveillance systems, and underscore the importance of accounting for environmental visual variations when designing robust pedestrian perception models.

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DisPatch: Disarming Adversarial Patches in Object Detection with Diffusion Models

Object detection is fundamental to various real-world applications, such as security monitoring and surveillance video analysis. Despite their advancements, state-of-the-art object detectors are still vulnerable to adversarial patch attacks, which can be easily applied to real-world objects to either conceal actual items or create non-existent ones, leading to severe consequences. In this work, we introduce DisPatch, the first diffusion-based defense framework for object detection. Unlike previous works that aim to "detect and remove" adversarial patches, DisPatch adopts a "regenerate and rectify" strategy, leveraging generative models to disarm attack effects while preserving the integrity of the input image. Specifically, we utilize the in-distribution generative power of diffusion models to regenerate the entire image, aligning it with benign data. A rectification process is then employed to identify and replace adversarial regions with their regenerated benign counterparts. DisPatch is attack-agnostic and requires no prior knowledge of the existing patches. Extensive experiments across multiple detectors demonstrate that DisPatch consistently outperforms state-of-the-art defenses on both hiding attacks and creating attacks, achieving the best overall mAP@0.5 score of 89.3% on hiding attacks, and lowering the attack success rate to 24.8% on untargeted creating attacks. Moreover, it strikes the balance between effectiveness and efficiency, and maintains strong robustness against adaptive attacks, making it a practical and reliable defense method.

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Hidden Risks of Unmonitored GPUs in Intelligent Transportation Systems

Graphics processing units (GPUs) power many intelligent transportation systems (ITS) and automated driving applications, but remain largely unmonitored for safety and security. This article highlights GPU misuse as a critical blind spot, showing how unmanaged GPU workloads silently degrade real-time performance, demonstrating the need for stronger security measures in ITS.

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GAN-Based Single-Stage Defense for Traffic Sign Classification Under Adversarial Patch

Computer vision plays a critical role in ensuring the safe navigation of autonomous vehicles (AVs). An AV perception module facilitates safe navigation. This module enables AVs to recognize traffic signs, traffic lights, and various road users. However, the perception module is vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which can compromise its accuracy and reliability. One such attack is the adversarial patch attack (APA), an attack in which an adversary strategically places a specially crafted sticker on an object to deceive object classifiers. Such an APA can cause AVs to misclassify traffic signs, leading to catastrophic incidents. To enhance the security of an AV perception system against APAs, this study develops a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)-based single-stage defense strategy for traffic sign classification. This approach is tailored to defend against APAs across different classes of traffic signs, without prior knowledge of a patch's design, and is effective against patches of varying sizes. In addition, our single-stage defense is computationally efficient, requiring significantly lower computation time than existing multi-stage defenses, making it suitable for real-time deployment in autonomous driving systems. Compared to a classifier without any defense mechanism, our experimental analysis demonstrates that the defense strategy presented in this paper improves our classifier's accuracy under APA conditions by up to 90% considering the traffic sign classes considered in this study. and overall classification accuracy is enhanced by 55% for all traffic signs considered in this study. Our defense strategy is model agnostic, making it applicable to any traffic sign classifier, regardless of the underlying classification model.

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Quantum-Inspired Weight-Constrained Neural Network: Reducing Variable Numbers by 100x Compared to Standard Neural Networks

Although quantum machine learning has shown great promise, the practical application of quantum computers remains constrained in the noisy intermediate-scale quantum era. To take advantage of quantum machine learning, we investigate the underlying mathematical principles of these quantum models and find that the quantum neural network with amplitude encoding is equivalent to a weight-constrained neural network. Motived by this discovery, we develop a classical weight-constrained neural network. We find that this approach can reduce the number of variables in a classical neural network by a factor of 135 while preserving its accuracy. In addition, we develop a dropout method to enhance the robustness of quantum machine learning models, which are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks. This technique can also be applied to improve the adversarial robustness of the classical weight-constrained neural network, which is essential for industry applications, such as self-driving vehicles. Our work offers a novel approach to reduce the complexity of large classical neural networks, addressing a critical challenge in machine learning.

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Post-Quantum Cryptography for Intelligent Transportation Systems: An Implementation-Focused Review

As quantum computing advances, the cryptographic algorithms that underpin confidentiality, integrity, and authentication in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) face increasing vulnerability to quantum-enabled attacks. To address these risks, governments and industry stakeholders are turning toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a class of algorithms designed to resist adversaries equipped with quantum computing capabilities. However, existing studies provide limited insight into the implementation-focused aspects of PQC in the ITS domain. This review addresses that gap by evaluating the readiness of vehicular communication and security standards for adopting PQC. It examines in-vehicle networks and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) interfaces, and investigates vulnerabilities at the physical implementation layer of cryptographic hardware and embedded platforms, primarily exposure to side-channel and fault injection attacks. The review identifies thirteen research gaps: non-PQC-ready standards; constraints in embedded implementation and hybrid cryptography; interoperability and certificate-management barriers; a lack of real-world PQC deployment data in ITS; and physical-attack vulnerabilities in PQC-enabled vehicular communication. We present several future research directions, including updating vehicular communication and security standards, optimizing PQC for low-power devices, enhancing interoperability and certificate-management frameworks for PQC integration, conducting real-world evaluations of PQC-enabled communication and control functions across ITS deployments, and strengthening defenses against AI-assisted physical attacks. A phased roadmap is presented that aligns PQC deployment with regulatory, performance, and safety requirements, thereby guiding the secure evolution of ITS in the quantum computing era.

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On the Feasibility of Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption for Intelligent Transportation Systems

Many Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) applications require strong privacy guarantees for both users and their data. Homomorphic encryption (HE) enables computation directly on encrypted messages and thus offers a compelling approach to privacy-preserving data processing in ITS. However, practical HE schemes incur substantial ciphertext expansion and communication overhead, which limits their suitability for time-critical transportation systems. Hybrid homomorphic encryption (HHE) addresses this challenge by combining a homomorphic encryption scheme with a symmetric cipher, enabling efficient encrypted computation while dramatically reducing communication cost. In this paper, we develop theoretical models of representative ITS applications that integrate HHE to protect sensitive vehicular data. We then perform a parameter-based evaluation of the HHE scheme Rubato to estimate ciphertext sizes and communication overhead under realistic ITS workloads. Our results show that HHE achieves orders-of-magnitude reductions in ciphertext size compared with conventional HE while maintaining cryptographic security, making it significantly more practical for latency-constrained ITS communication.

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Security Analysis of Integer Learning with Errors with Rejection Sampling

At ASIACRYPT 2018, a digital attack based on linear least squares was introduced for a variant of the learning with errors (LWE) problem which omits modular reduction known as the integer learning with errors problem (ILWE). In this paper, we present a theoretical and experimental study of the effectiveness of the attack when applied directly to small parameter ILWE instances found in popular digital signature schemes such as CRYSTALS-Dilithium which utilize rejection sampling. Unlike other studies which form ILWE instances based on additional information obtained from side-channel attacks, we take a more direct approach to the problem by constructing our ILWE instance from only the obtained signatures. We outline and introduce novel techniques in our simulation designs such as modular polynomial arithmetic via matrices in $\mathbb{R}$, as well as algorithms for handling large sample sizes efficiently. Our experimental results reinforce the proclaimed security of signature schemes based on ILWE. We additionally discuss the implications of our work and digital signatures as a whole in regards to real-world applications such as in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS).

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