arXiv subjects

Matteo Escudé

Publications and source records attributed to Matteo Escudé.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Misperception and informativeness in statistical discrimination

We study the interplay of information and prior (mis)perceptions in a Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type model of statistical discrimination in the labor market. We decompose the effect on average pay of an increase in how informative observables are about workers' skills into a non-negative instrumental component, reflecting increased surplus due to better matching of workers with tasks, and a perception-correcting component capturing how extra information diminishes the importance of prior misperceptions about the distribution of skills in the worker population. We sign the perception-correcting term: it is non-negative (non-positive) if the population was ex-ante under-perceived (over-perceived). We then consider the implications for pay gaps between equally-skilled populations that differ in information, perceptions, or both, and identify conditions under which improving information narrows pay gaps.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Covert learning and disclosure

I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably worsening the meaning of the messages she sends. This force substantially disciplines equilibrium beliefs and behavior: the receiver is maximally skeptical of what the sender claims and learns all discovered information. I exploit these equilibrium properties to characterize the sense in which the sender benefits from her claims being more verifiable, showing that this is akin to increasing her commitment power. Finally, I identify sender- and receiver-optimal falsification environments.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

Statistical discrimination and statistical informativeness

We study the link between Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type statistical discrimination and familiar notions of statistical informativeness. Our central insight is that Blackwell's Theorem, suitably relabeled, characterizes statistical discrimination in terms of statistical informativeness. This delivers one-half of Chambers and Echenique's (2021) characterization of statistical discrimination as a corollary, and suggests a different interpretation of it: that discrimination is inevitable. In addition, Blackwell's Theorem delivers a number of finer-grained insights into the nature of statistical discrimination. We argue that the discrimination-informativeness link is quite general, illustrating with an informativeness characterization of a different type of discrimination.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

Slow persuasion

What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question in a dynamic model in which a 'sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a decision-maker takes an action in each period. Using a novel 'viscosity' dynamic programming principle, we characterise the sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information provision relative to unconstrained persuasion. The gap can be substantial, but closes as the constraint slackens. Contrary to unconstrained persuasion, less-than-full information may be provided even if players have aligned preferences but different prior beliefs.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2020

Strictly strategy-proof auctions

A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is 'essentially for free'.

econ.TH↗