arXiv subjects

Matthew Cashman

Publications and source records attributed to Matthew Cashman.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Safe Collective Expression with Social Assurance Contracts

Controversial views often go unspoken because of fears of retaliation. Speaking up one at a time may encourage others to join in, but retaliation against early participants can stop that cascade before a group large enough to protect itself forms. However, a sufficiently large group could speak up safely if only they spoke up together. A Social Assurance Contract collects endorsements of a controversial view in private and publishes them only when the group is large enough to protect itself. Such contracts can tunnel under the barrier that stops public cascades, forming coalitions that one-by-one public organizing cannot reach.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2026

Conditional Disclosure as a Coordination Device

People with controversial views may stay silent rather than speak out alone, though in a large enough group they could speak safely together. A social assurance contract makes disclosure conditional: signed commitments of support stay private until enough people have signed for it to be safe to publish. In contrast, a survey can measure hidden support but cannot protect anyone who acts on it. I derive the contract's exact advantage over speaking openly - and when that advantage disappears: it can turn a few people who would speak alone into a larger coalition.

econ.GN↗