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Max Klimm

Publications and source records attributed to Max Klimm.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Approximation Algorithms for Discounted Graph Search with Norm Objectives

We introduce a unified framework for classical search and routing problems, including pathwise search, expanding search, the minimum spanning tree problem, and the traveling salesperson problem. The framework is based on two parameters. The first is a discount factor $\alpha \in [0,1]$: the first traversal of an edge incurs its full cost, whereas each subsequent traversal incurs only an $\alpha$-fraction of this cost. For a path starting at a designated root vertex, the $\alpha$-latency of a vertex is the discounted cost accumulated until the vertex is first visited. The second parameter is a norm parameter $p\geq 1$. The objective is to find a root-starting path that visits all vertices and minimizes the $p$-norm of the resulting vector of $\alpha$-latencies. The model interpolates between several well-studied objectives. For $p=1$ and $\alpha=1$, it recovers pathwise search; for $p=1$ and $\alpha=0$, it recovers expanding search. As $p$ tends to infinity, the objective converges to a makespan-type criterion. At the endpoints $\alpha=1$ and $\alpha=0$, this limiting objective corresponds to TSP-type and MST-type behavior, respectively. For $p=1$, we give polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithms for all $\alpha\in[0,1]$, matching the best known guarantees for expanding search at $\alpha=0$ and pathwise search at $\alpha=1$. For general $p\geq 1$, we obtain a randomized constant-factor approximation algorithm and a derandomized pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm with the same guarantee.

cs.DS

Submodular Welfare Maximization with Budget Constraints in the Random-Order Model

We study an online item-allocation problem with budgets and a submodular objective. A set of $m$ agents is known in advance, and each agent $j$ has a known budget. A set of $n$ items arrives over time in a uniformly random order. When item $i$ arrives, its cost $c_{i,j}$ for each agent $j$ is revealed, and the algorithm must irrevocably assign $i$ to an agent without violating any budget constraint. The goal is to maximize a monotone submodular function defined over all possible assignments $[n] \times [m]$. At the time of decision, the algorithm has only oracle access to this submodular function restricted to items seen so far. This model subsumes welfare maximization with submodular valuations, agent-specific item costs, and agent-specific budgets. We measure the performance of an algorithm by its competitive ratio, i.e., the worst-case ratio between the algorithm's expected value and that of the offline optimum, which knows all item costs and the full submodular function in advance. Prior work only considered the case of a single agent and achieved a $1/54.4$-competitive algorithm. We generalize and improve this result to a polynomial-time $\alpha$-competitive algorithm with $\alpha \approx 1/14.85$ for an arbitrary number of agents. We also study the special case in which all item costs and all budgets equal $1$, which yields an online submodular matching problem. Prior work achieved a polynomial $1/9.66$-competitive algorithm for this problem; we improve this to a factor of $1/6.86$. Both our algorithms rely on repeatedly computing $(1 - 1/e)$-approximations of the multilinear extensions of offline variants of the subproblems. If super-polynomial runtime is allowed, these subproblems can be solved optimally, and our competitive ratios improve by this factor.

cs.DS

Approximating the Network Design Problem for Potential-Based Flows

We develop efficient algorithms for a fundamental network design problem arising in potential-based flow models, which are central to many energy transport networks (e.g., hydrogen and electricity). In contrast to classical network flow problems, the nonlinearities inherent in potential-based networks introduce significant new challenges. We address these challenges through intricate reductions to classical combinatorial optimization problems, such as (constrained) shortest path problems, enabling the application of well-established algorithmic techniques to compute exact and approximate solutions efficiently. Finally, we complement these algorithmic results with matching complexity results concerning the hardness and non-approximability of the considered problem variants.

cs.DM

Faster Symmetric Rendezvous on Four or More Locations

In the symmetric rendezvous problem, two players follow the same (randomized) strategy to visit one of $n$ locations in each time step $t=0,1,2,\dots$. Their goal is to minimize the expected time until they visit the same location and thus meet. A canonical strategy due to Anderson and Weber is known to be optimal for $n=2$ and $n=3$, but whether it remains optimal for larger values of $n$ has been an open question since 1990. We show that it does not remain optimal: for any finite $n\geq 4$, we construct an explicit symmetric strategy that achieves a strictly smaller expected meeting time than the Anderson--Weber strategy. In the Anderson--Weber strategy players stay at a dedicated home location for $n-1$ steps with a certain probability $\theta$ and with the remaining probability tour all non-home locations in a random order. Our improving strategy introduces carefully chosen correlations between consecutive tours of the non-home locations. The construction is uniform in $n$ and is guided by a graph-theoretic view in which tours correspond to permutations and meetings to edges in the complement of the derangement graph. By exploiting the clique structure of this graph we obtain a correlated strategy that improves on the Anderson--Weber strategy. For $n=4$, we give an exact expression for the improvement; for any $n\geq 5$, we obtain a lower bound on the expected improvement of $\frac{483(1-\theta)^6}{(n-1)^8}$, where $\theta \in [0,1)$ is the probability of staying at the home location. The graph-theoretic framework we introduce may be useful more widely in the design and analysis of correlated strategies for rendezvous.

math.OC

When to Identify Is to Control: On the Controllability of Combinatorial Optimization Problems

Consider a finite ground set $E$, a set of feasible solutions $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{E}$, and a class of objective functions $\mathcal{C}$ defined on $X$. We are interested in subsets $S$ of $E$ that control $X$ in the sense that we can induce any given solution $x \in X$ as an optimum for any given objective function $c \in \mathcal{C}$ by adding linear terms to $c$ on the coordinates corresponding to $S$. This problem has many applications, e.g., when $X$ corresponds to the set of all traffic flows, the ability to control implies that one is able to induce all target flows by imposing tolls on the edges in $S$. Our first result shows the equivalence between controllability and identifiability. If $X$ is convex, or if $X$ consists of binary vectors, then $S$ controls $X$ if and only if the restriction of $x$ to $S$ uniquely determines $x$ among all solutions in $X$. In the convex case, we further prove that the family of controlling sets forms a matroid. This structural insight yields an efficient algorithm for computing minimum-weight controlling sets from a description of the affine hull of $X$. While the equivalence extends to matroid base families, the picture changes sharply for other discrete domains. We show that when $X$ is equal to the set of $s$-$t$-paths in a directed graph, deciding whether an identifying set of a given cardinality exists is $\Sigma\mathsf{_2^P}$-complete. The problem remains $\mathsf{NP}$-hard even on acyclic graphs. For acyclic instances, however, we obtain an approximation guarantee by proving a tight bound on the gap between the smallest identifying sets for $X$ and its convex hull, where the latter corresponds to the $s$-$t$-flow polyhedron.

cs.DS

Impartial Selection with Predictions

We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true opinion about the eligibility of others to influence their own chances of selection. Impartial mechanisms circumvent this issue by guaranteeing that the selection of an agent is independent of the nominations cast by that agent. Previous research has established strong bounds on the performance of impartial mechanisms, measured by their ability to approximate the number of nominations for the most highly nominated agents. We study to what extent the performance of impartial mechanisms can be improved if they are given a prediction of a set of agents receiving a maximum number of nominations. Specifically, we provide bounds on the consistency and robustness of such mechanisms, where consistency measures the performance of the mechanisms when the prediction is accurate and robustness its performance when the prediction is inaccurate. For the general setting where up to $k$ agents are to be selected and agents nominate any number of other agents, we give a mechanism with consistency $1-O\big(\frac{1}{k}\big)$ and robustness $1-\frac{1}{e}-O\big(\frac{1}{k}\big)$. For the special case of selecting a single agent based on a single nomination per agent, we prove that $1$-consistency can be achieved while guaranteeing $\frac{1}{2}$-robustness. A close comparison with previous results shows that (asymptotically) optimal consistency can be achieved with little to no sacrifice in terms of robustness.

cs.GT

Incremental-Decremental Maximization

We introduce a framework for incremental-decremental maximization that captures the gradual transformation or renewal of infrastructures. In our model, an initial solution is transformed one element at a time and the utility of an intermediate solution is given by the sum of the utilities of the transformed and untransformed parts. We propose a simple randomized and a deterministic algorithm that both find an order in which to transform the elements while maintaining a large utility during all stages of transformation, relative to an optimum solution for the current stage. More specifically, our algorithms yield competitive solutions for utility functions of bounded curvature and/or generic submodularity ratio, and, in particular, for submodular functions, and gross substitute functions. Our results exhibit that incremental-decremental maximization is substantially more difficult than incremental maximization.

cs.DS

Carbon Pricing in Traffic Networks

Traffic is a significant source of global carbon emissions. In this paper, we study how carbon pricing can be used to guide traffic towards equilibria that respect given emission budgets. In particular, we consider a general multi-commodity flow model with flow-dependent externalities. These externalities may represent carbon emissions, entering a priced area, or the traversal of paths regulated by tradable credit schemes. We provide a complete characterization of all flows that can be attained as Wardrop equilibria when assigning a single price to each externality. More precisely, we show that every externality budget achievable by any feasible flow in the network can also be achieved as a Wardrop equilibrium by setting appropriate prices. For extremal and Pareto-minimal budgets, we show that there are prices such that all equilibria respect the budgets. Although the proofs of existence of these particular prices rely on fixed-point arguments and are non-constructive, we show that in the case where the equilibrium minimizes a convex potential, the prices can be obtained as Lagrange multipliers of a suitable convex program. In the case of a single externality, we prove that the total externality caused by the traffic flow is decreasing in the price. For increasing, continuous, and piecewise affine travel time functions with a single externality, we give an output-polynomial algorithm that computes all equilibria implementable by pricing the externality. Even though there are networks where the output size is exponential in the input size, we show that the minimal price obeying a given budget can be computed in polynomial time. This allows the efficient computation of the market price of tradable credit schemes. Overall, our results show that carbon pricing is a viable and (under mild assumptions) tractable approach to achieve all feasible emission goals in traffic networks.

cs.GT

Generalized Assignment and Knapsack Problems in the Random-Order Model

We study different online optimization problems in the random-order model. There is a finite set of bins with known capacity and a finite set of items arriving in a random order. Upon arrival of an item, its size and its value for each of the bins is revealed and it has to be decided immediately and irrevocably to which bin the item is assigned, or to not assign the item at all. In this setting, an algorithm is $\alpha$-competitive if the total value of all items assigned to the bins is at least an $\alpha$-fraction of the total value of an optimal assignment that knows all items beforehand. We give an algorithm that is $\alpha$-competitive with $\alpha = (1-\ln(2))/2 \approx 1/6.52$ improving upon the previous best algorithm with $\alpha \approx 1/6.99$ for the generalized assignment problem and the previous best algorithm with $\alpha \approx 1/6.65$ for the integral knapsack problem. We then study the fractional knapsack problem where we have a single bin and it is also allowed to pack items fractionally. For that case, we obtain an algorithm that is $\alpha$-competitive with $\alpha = 1/e \approx 1/2.71$ improving on the previous best algorithm with $\alpha = 1/4.39$. We further show that this competitive ratio is the best-possible for deterministic algorithms in this model.

cs.DS

Valid Cuts for the Design of Potential-based Flow Networks

The construction of a cost minimal network for flows obeying physical laws is an important problem for the design of electricity, water, hydrogen, and natural gas infrastructures. We formulate this problem as a mixed-integer non-linear program with potential-based flows. The non-convexity of the constraints stemming from the potential-based flow model together with the binary variables indicating the decision to build a connection make these programs challenging to solve. We develop a novel class of valid inequalities on the fractional relaxations of the binary variables. Further, we show that this class of inequalities can be separated in polynomial time for solutions to a fractional relaxation. This makes it possible to incorporate these inequalities into a branch-and-cut framework. The advantage of these inequalities is lastly demonstrated in a computational study on the design of real-world gas transport networks.

math.OC

Packing a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic Agents

This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knapsack constraint. The items, however, are controlled by strategic agents who aim to maximize the total value of their items in the knapsack. This is a natural setting, e.g., when agencies select projects for funding, companies select products for sale in their shops, or hospitals schedule MRI scans for the day. A mechanism governing the packing of the knapsack is strategyproof if no agent can benefit from hiding items controlled by them to the mechanism. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof and $\alpha$-approximate in the sense that they always approximate the maximum value of the knapsack by a factor of $\alpha \in [0,1]$. First, we give a deterministic mechanism that is $\frac{1}{3}$-approximate. For the special case where all items have unit density, we design a $\frac{1}{\phi}$-approximate mechanism where $1/\phi \approx 0.618$ is the inverse of the golden ratio. This result is tight as we show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism with a better approximation exists. We further give randomized mechanisms with approximation guarantees of $1/2$ for the general case and $2/3$ for the case of unit densities. For both cases, no strategyproof mechanism can achieve an approximation guarantee better than $1/(5\phi -7)\approx 0.917$.

cs.GT

Impartial Selection Under Combinatorial Constraints

Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the selection of each agent is independent of the nominations cast by that agent. This paper initiates the study of impartial selection problems where the nominations are weighted and the set of agents that can be selected is restricted by a combinatorial constraint. We call a selection mechanism $\alpha$-optimal if, for every instance, the ratio between the total sum of weighted nominations of the selected set and that of the best feasible set of agents is at least $\alpha$. We show that a natural extension of a mechanism studied for the selection of a single agent remains impartial and $\frac{1}{4}$-optimal for general independence systems, and we generalize upper bounds from the selection of multiple agents by parameterizing them by the girth of the independence system. We then focus on independence systems defined by knapsack and matroid constraints, giving impartial mechanisms that exploit a greedy order of the agents and achieve approximation ratios of $\frac{1}{3}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$, respectively, when agents cast a single nomination. For graphic matroids, we further devise an impartial and $\frac{1}{3}$-optimal mechanism for an arbitrary number of unweighted nominations.

cs.GT

Bicriterial Approximation for the Incremental Prize-Collecting Steiner-Tree Problem

We consider an incremental variant of the rooted prize-collecting Steiner-tree problem with a growing budget constraint. While no incremental solution exists that simultaneously approximates the optimum for all budgets, we show that a bicriterial $(\alpha,\mu)$-approximation is possible, i.e., a solution that with budget $B+\alpha$ for all $B \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ is a multiplicative $\mu$-approximation compared to the optimum solution with budget $B$. For the case that the underlying graph is a tree, we present a polynomial-time density-greedy algorithm that computes a $(\chi,1)$-approximation, where $\chi$ denotes the eccentricity of the root vertex in the underlying graph, and show that this is best possible. An adaptation of the density-greedy algorithm for general graphs is $(\gamma,2)$-competitive where $\gamma$ is the maximal length of a vertex-disjoint path starting in the root. While this algorithm does not run in polynomial time, it can be adapted to a $(\gamma,3)$-competitive algorithm that runs in polynomial time. We further devise a capacity-scaling algorithm that guarantees a $(3\chi,8)$-approximation and, more generally, a $\smash{\bigl((4\ell - 1)\chi, \frac{2^{\ell + 2}}{2^{\ell}-1}\bigr)}$-approximation for every fixed $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$.

cs.DS

Impartial Rank Aggregation

We study functions that produce a ranking of $n$ individuals from $n$ such rankings and are impartial in the sense that the position of an individual in the output ranking does not depend on the input ranking submitted by that individual. When $n \geq 4$, two properties concerning the quality of the output in relation to the input can be achieved in addition to impartiality: individual full rank, which requires that each individual can appear in any position of the output ranking; and monotonicity, which requires that an individual cannot move down in the output ranking if it moves up in an input ranking. When $n \geq 5$, monotonicity can be dropped to strengthen individual full rank to weak unanimity, requiring that a ranking submitted by every individual must be chosen as the output ranking. Mechanisms achieving these results can be implemented in polynomial time. Both results are best possible in terms of their dependence on $n$. The second result cannot be strengthened further to a notion of unanimity that requires agreement on pairwise comparisons to be preserved.

cs.GT

Information Design for Congestion Games with Unknown Demand

We study a novel approach to information design in the standard traffic model of network congestion games. It captures the natural condition that the demand is unknown to the users of the network. A principal (e.g., a mobility service) commits to a signaling strategy, observes the realized demand and sends a (public) signal to agents (i.e., users of the network). Based on the induced belief about the demand, the users then form an equilibrium. We consider the algorithmic goal of the principal: Compute a signaling scheme that minimizes the expected total cost of the induced equilibrium. We concentrate on single-commodity networks and affine cost functions, for which we obtain the following results. First, we devise a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for the case that the demand can only take two values. It relies on several structural properties of the cost of the induced equilibrium as a function of the updated belief about the distribution of demands. We show that this function is piecewise linear for any number of demands, and monotonic for two demands. Second, we give a complete characterization of the graph structures for which it is optimal to fully reveal the information about the realized demand. This signaling scheme turns out to be optimal for all cost functions and probability distributions over demands if and only if the graph is series-parallel. Third, we propose an algorithm that computes the optimal signaling scheme for any number of demands whose time complexity is polynomial in the number of supports that occur in a Wardrop equilibrium for some demand. Finally, we conduct a computational study that tests this algorithm on real-world instances.

cs.GT

Optimizing Throughput and Makespan of Queuing Systems by Information Design

We study the optimal provision of information for two natural performance measures of queuing systems: throughput and makespan. A set of parallel links is equipped with deterministic capacities and stochastic travel times where the latter depend on a realized scenario. A continuum of flow particles arrives at the system at a constant rate. A system operator knows the realization of the scenario and may (partially) reveal this information via a public signaling scheme to the flow particles. Upon arrival, the flow particles observe the signal issued by the system operator, form an updated belief about the realized scenario, and decide on a link to use. Inflow into a link exceeding the link's capacity builds up in a queue that increases the travel time on the link. Dynamic inflow rates are in a Bayesian dynamic equilibrium when the expected travel time along all links with positive inflow is equal at every point in time. We provide an additive polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) that approximates the optimal throughput by an arbitrary additive constant $\epsilon>0$. The algorithm solves a Langrangian dual of the signaling problem with the Ellipsoid method whose separation oracle is implemented by a cell decomposition technique. We also provide a multiplicative fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) that does not rely on strong duality and, thus, allows to compute also the optimal signals. It uses a different cell decomposition technique together with a piece-wise convex under-estimator of the optimal value function. Finally, we consider the makespan of a Bayesian dynamic equilibrium which is defined as the last point in time when a total given value of flow leaves the system. Using a variational inequality argument, we show that full information revelation is a public signaling scheme that minimizes the makespan.

cs.GT

Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection

We give new bounds for the single-nomination model of impartial selection, a problem proposed by Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica, 2013). A selection mechanism, which may be randomized, selects one individual from a group of $n$ based on nominations among members of the group; a mechanism is impartial if the selection of an individual is independent of nominations cast by that individual, and $\alpha$-optimal if under any circumstance the expected number of nominations received by the selected individual is at least $\alpha$ times that received by any individual. In a many-nominations model, where individuals may cast an arbitrary number of nominations, the so-called permutation mechanism is $1/2$-optimal, and this is best possible. In the single-nomination model, where each individual casts exactly one nomination, the permutation mechanism does better and prior to this work was known to be $67/108$-optimal but no better than $2/3$-optimal. We show that it is in fact $2/3$-optimal for all $n$. This result is obtained via tight bounds on the performance of the mechanism for graphs with maximum degree $\Delta$, for any $\Delta$, which we prove using an adversarial argument. We then show that the permutation mechanism is not best possible; indeed, by combining the permutation mechanism, another mechanism called plurality with runner-up, and some new ideas, $2105/3147$-optimality can be achieved for all $n$. We finally give new upper bounds on $\alpha$ for any $\alpha$-optimal impartial mechanism. They improve on the existing upper bounds for all $n\geq 7$ and imply that no impartial mechanism can be better than $76/105$-optimal for all $n$; they do not preclude the existence of a $(3/4-\varepsilon)$-optimal impartial mechanism for arbitrary $\varepsilon>0$ if $n$ is large.

cs.GT

Incremental Maximization via Continuization

We consider the problem of finding an incremental solution to a cardinality-constrained maximization problem that not only captures the solution for a fixed cardinality, but also describes how to gradually grow the solution as the cardinality bound increases. The goal is to find an incremental solution that guarantees a good competitive ratio against the optimum solution for all cardinalities simultaneously. The central challenge is to characterize maximization problems where this is possible, and to determine the best-possible competitive ratio that can be attained. A lower bound of $2.18$ and an upper bound of $\varphi + 1 \approx 2.618$ are known on the competitive ratio for monotone and accountable objectives [Bernstein et al., Math. Prog., 2022], which capture a wide range of maximization problems. We introduce a continuization technique and identify an optimal incremental algorithm that provides strong evidence that $\varphi + 1$ is the best-possible competitive ratio. Using this continuization, we obtain an improved lower bound of $2.246$ by studying a particular recurrence relation whose characteristic polynomial has complex roots exactly beyond the lower bound. Based on the optimal continuous algorithm combined with a scaling approach, we also provide a $1.772$-competitive randomized algorithm. We complement this by a randomized lower bound of $1.447$ via Yao's principle.

cs.DS