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Michael I. Jordan

Publications and source records attributed to Michael I. Jordan.

At least 91 records · Page 5Linked to original sources

An Overview of Large Language Models for Statisticians

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as transformative tools in artificial intelligence (AI), exhibiting remarkable capabilities across diverse tasks such as text generation, reasoning, and decision-making. While their success has primarily been driven by advances in computational power and deep learning architectures, emerging problems -- in areas such as uncertainty quantification, decision-making, causal inference, and distribution shift -- require a deeper engagement with the field of statistics. This paper explores potential areas where statisticians can make important contributions to the development of LLMs, particularly those that aim to engender trustworthiness and transparency for human users. Thus, we focus on issues such as uncertainty quantification, interpretability, fairness, privacy, watermarking and model adaptation. We also consider possible roles for LLMs in statistical analysis. By bridging AI and statistics, we aim to foster a deeper collaboration that advances both the theoretical foundations and practical applications of LLMs, ultimately shaping their role in addressing complex societal challenges.

stat.ML↗

Gradient Equilibrium in Online Learning: Theory and Applications

We present a new perspective on online learning that we refer to as gradient equilibrium: a sequence of iterates achieves gradient equilibrium if the average of gradients of losses along the sequence converges to zero. In general, this condition is not implied by, nor implies, sublinear regret. It turns out that gradient equilibrium is achievable by standard online learning methods such as gradient descent and mirror descent with constant step sizes (rather than decaying step sizes, as is usually required for no regret). Further, as we show through examples, gradient equilibrium translates into an interpretable and meaningful property in online prediction problems spanning regression, classification, quantile estimation, and others. Notably, we show that the gradient equilibrium framework can be used to develop a debiasing scheme for black-box predictions under arbitrary distribution shift, based on simple post hoc online descent updates. We also show that post hoc gradient updates can be used to calibrate predicted quantiles under distribution shift, and that the framework leads to unbiased Elo scores for pairwise preference prediction.

cs.LG↗

Conformal Prediction Sets with Improved Conditional Coverage using Trust Scores

Standard conformal prediction offers a marginal guarantee on coverage, but for prediction sets to be truly useful, they should ideally ensure coverage conditional on each test point. Unfortunately, it is impossible to achieve exact, distribution-free conditional coverage in finite samples. In this work, we propose an alternative conformal prediction algorithm that targets coverage where it matters most--in instances where a classifier is overconfident in its incorrect predictions. We start by dissecting miscoverage events in marginally-valid conformal prediction, and show that miscoverage rates vary based on the classifier's confidence and its deviation from the Bayes optimal classifier. Motivated by this insight, we develop a variant of conformal prediction that targets coverage conditional on a reduced set of two variables: the classifier's confidence in a prediction and a nonparametric trust score that measures its deviation from the Bayes classifier. Empirical evaluation on multiple image datasets shows that our method generally improves conditional coverage properties compared to standard conformal prediction, including class-conditional coverage, coverage over arbitrary subgroups, and coverage over demographic groups.

cs.LG↗

Learning Dynamic Mechanisms in Unknown Environments: A Reinforcement Learning Approach

Dynamic mechanism design studies how mechanism designers should allocate resources among agents in a time-varying environment. We consider the problem where the agents interact with the mechanism designer according to an unknown Markov Decision Process (MDP), where agent rewards and the mechanism designer's state evolve according to an episodic MDP with unknown reward functions and transition kernels. We focus on the online setting with linear function approximation and propose novel learning algorithms to recover the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism over multiple rounds of interaction. A key contribution of our approach is incorporating reward-free online Reinforcement Learning (RL) to aid exploration over a rich policy space to estimate prices in the dynamic VCG mechanism. We show that the regret of our proposed method is upper bounded by $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ and further devise a lower bound to show that our algorithm is efficient, incurring the same $Ω(T^{2 / 3})$ regret as the lower bound, where $T$ is the total number of rounds. Our work establishes the regret guarantee for online RL in solving dynamic mechanism design problems without prior knowledge of the underlying model.

cs.LG↗

Unravelling in Collaborative Learning

Collaborative learning offers a promising avenue for leveraging decentralized data. However, collaboration in groups of strategic learners is not a given. In this work, we consider strategic agents who wish to train a model together but have sampling distributions of different quality. The collaboration is organized by a benevolent aggregator who gathers samples so as to maximize total welfare, but is unaware of data quality. This setting allows us to shed light on the deleterious effect of adverse selection in collaborative learning. More precisely, we demonstrate that when data quality indices are private, the coalition may undergo a phenomenon known as unravelling, wherein it shrinks up to the point that it becomes empty or solely comprised of the worst agent. We show how this issue can be addressed without making use of external transfers, by proposing a novel method inspired by probabilistic verification. This approach makes the grand coalition a Nash equilibrium with high probability despite information asymmetry, thereby breaking unravelling.

cs.GT↗

Delegating Data Collection in Decentralized Machine Learning

Motivated by the emergence of decentralized machine learning (ML) ecosystems, we study the delegation of data collection. Taking the field of contract theory as our starting point, we design optimal and near-optimal contracts that deal with two fundamental information asymmetries that arise in decentralized ML: uncertainty in the assessment of model quality and uncertainty regarding the optimal performance of any model. We show that a principal can cope with such asymmetry via simple linear contracts that achieve 1-1/e fraction of the optimal utility. To address the lack of a priori knowledge regarding the optimal performance, we give a convex program that can adaptively and efficiently compute the optimal contract. We also study linear contracts and derive the optimal utility in the more complex setting of multiple interactions.

cs.LG↗

Active-Dormant Attention Heads: Mechanistically Demystifying Extreme-Token Phenomena in LLMs

Practitioners have consistently observed three puzzling phenomena in transformer-based large language models (LLMs): attention sinks, value-state drains, and residual-state peaks, collectively referred to as extreme-token phenomena. These phenomena are characterized by certain so-called "sink tokens" receiving disproportionately high attention weights, exhibiting significantly smaller value states, and having much larger residual-state norms than those of other tokens. These extreme tokens give rise to various challenges in LLM inference, quantization, and interpretability. We elucidate the mechanisms behind extreme-token phenomena. First, we show that these phenomena arise in very simple architectures -- transformers with one to three layers -- trained on a toy model, the Bigram-Backcopy (BB) task. In this setting, we identify an active-dormant mechanism, where attention heads become sinks for specific input domains while remaining non-sinks for others. Our theoretical analysis of the training dynamics reveals that these phenomena are driven by a mutual reinforcement mechanism. Building on these insights, we propose strategies to mitigate extreme-token phenomena during pretraining, including replacing softmax with ReLU and Adam with SGD. Next, we extend our analysis to pretrained LLMs, including Llama and OLMo, showing that many attention heads exhibit a similar active-dormant mechanism as in the BB task, and that the mutual reinforcement mechanism also governs the emergence of extreme-token phenomena during LLM pretraining. Our results reveal that many of the static and dynamic properties of extreme-token phenomena predicted by the BB task align with observations in pretrained LLMs.

cs.LG↗

Dimension-free Private Mean Estimation for Anisotropic Distributions

We present differentially private algorithms for high-dimensional mean estimation. Previous private estimators on distributions over $\mathbb{R}^d$ suffer from a curse of dimensionality, as they require $Ω(d^{1/2})$ samples to achieve non-trivial error, even in cases where $O(1)$ samples suffice without privacy. This rate is unavoidable when the distribution is isotropic, namely, when the covariance is a multiple of the identity matrix, or when accuracy is measured with respect to the affine-invariant Mahalanobis distance. Yet, real-world data is often highly anisotropic, with signals concentrated on a small number of principal components. We develop estimators that are appropriate for such signals$\unicode{x2013}$our estimators are $(\varepsilon,δ)$-differentially private and have sample complexity that is dimension-independent for anisotropic subgaussian distributions. Given $n$ samples from a distribution with known covariance-proxy $Σ$ and unknown mean $μ$, we present an estimator $\hatμ$ that achieves error $\|\hatμ-μ\|_2\leq α$, as long as $n\gtrsim\mathrm{tr}(Σ)/α^2+ \mathrm{tr}(Σ^{1/2})/(α\varepsilon)$. In particular, when $\pmbσ^2=(σ_1^2, \ldots, σ_d^2)$ are the singular values of $Σ$, we have $\mathrm{tr}(Σ)=\|\pmbσ\|_2^2$ and $\mathrm{tr}(Σ^{1/2})=\|\pmbσ\|_1$, and hence our bound avoids dimension-dependence when the signal is concentrated in a few principal components. We show that this is the optimal sample complexity for this task up to logarithmic factors. Moreover, for the case of unknown covariance, we present an algorithm whose sample complexity has improved dependence on the dimension, from $d^{1/2}$ to $d^{1/4}$.

cs.LG↗

Relying on the Metrics of Evaluated Agents

Online platforms and regulators face a continuing problem of designing effective evaluation metrics. While tools for collecting and processing data continue to progress, this has not addressed the problem of "unknown unknowns", or fundamental informational limitations on part of the evaluator. To guide the choice of metrics in the face of this informational problem, we turn to the evaluated agents themselves, who may have more information about how to measure their own outcomes. We model this interaction as an agency game, where we ask: "When does an agent have an incentive to reveal the observability of a metric to their evaluator?" We show that an agent will prefer to reveal metrics that differentiate the most difficult tasks from the rest, and conceal metrics that differentiate the easiest. We further show that the agent can prefer to reveal a metric "garbled" with noise over both fully concealing and fully revealing. This indicates an economic value to privacy that yields Pareto improvement for both the agent and evaluator. We demonstrate these findings on data from online rideshare platforms.

cs.GT↗

Enhancing Feature-Specific Data Protection via Bayesian Coordinate Differential Privacy

Local Differential Privacy (LDP) offers strong privacy guarantees without requiring users to trust external parties. However, LDP applies uniform protection to all data features, including less sensitive ones, which degrades performance of downstream tasks. To overcome this limitation, we propose a Bayesian framework, Bayesian Coordinate Differential Privacy (BCDP), that enables feature-specific privacy quantification. This more nuanced approach complements LDP by adjusting privacy protection according to the sensitivity of each feature, enabling improved performance of downstream tasks without compromising privacy. We characterize the properties of BCDP and articulate its connections with standard non-Bayesian privacy frameworks. We further apply our BCDP framework to the problems of private mean estimation and ordinary least-squares regression. The BCDP-based approach obtains improved accuracy compared to a purely LDP-based approach, without compromising on privacy.

cs.LG↗

Optimal Design for Reward Modeling in RLHF

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a popular approach to align language models (LMs) with human preferences. This method involves collecting a large dataset of human pairwise preferences across various text generations and using it to infer (implicitly or explicitly) a reward model. Numerous methods have been proposed to learn the reward model and align a LM with it. However, the costly process of collecting human preferences has received little attention and could benefit from theoretical insights. This paper addresses this issue and aims to formalize the reward training model in RLHF. We frame the selection of an effective dataset as a simple regret minimization task, using a linear contextual dueling bandit method. Given the potentially large number of arms, this approach is more coherent than the best-arm identification setting. We then propose an offline framework for solving this problem. Under appropriate assumptions - linearity of the reward model in the embedding space, and boundedness of the reward parameter - we derive bounds on the simple regret. Finally, we provide a lower bound that matches our upper bound up to constant and logarithmic terms. To our knowledge, this is the first theoretical contribution in this area to provide an offline approach as well as worst-case guarantees.

cs.LG↗

Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design

We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a fairness constraint that guarantees a minimum average allocation for each group. We begin by studying the static case ($T=1$) and establish that the optimal mechanism involves two types of subsidization: one that increases the overall probability of allocation to all buyers, and another that favors the groups which otherwise have a lower probability of winning the item. We then extend our results to the dynamic case by characterizing a set of recursive functions that determine the optimal allocation and payments in each round. Notably, our results establish that in the dynamic case, the seller, on the one hand, commits to a participation bonus to incentivize truth-telling, and on the other hand, charges an entry fee for every round. Moreover, the optimal allocation once more involves subsidization, which its extent depends on the difference in future utilities for both the seller and buyers when allocating the item to one group versus the others. Finally, we present an approximation scheme to solve the recursive equations and determine an approximately optimal and fair allocation efficiently.

cs.GT↗

ROOT-SGD: Sharp Nonasymptotics and Near-Optimal Asymptotics in a Single Algorithm

We study the problem of solving strongly convex and smooth unconstrained optimization problems using stochastic first-order algorithms. We devise a novel algorithm, referred to as Recursive One-Over-T SGD (ROOT-SGD), based on an easily implementable, recursive averaging of past stochastic gradients. We prove that it simultaneously achieves state-of-the-art performance in both a finite-sample, nonasymptotic sense and an asymptotic sense. On the non-asymptotic side, we prove risk bounds on the last iterate of ROOT-SGD with leading-order terms that match the optimal statistical risk with a unity pre-factor, along with a higher-order term that scales at the sharp rate of $O(n^{-3/2})$ under the Lipschitz condition on the Hessian matrix. On the asymptotic side, we show that when a mild, one-point Hessian continuity condition is imposed, the rescaled last iterate of (multi-epoch) ROOT-SGD converges asymptotically to a Gaussian limit with the Cramér-Rao optimal asymptotic covariance, for a broad range of step-size choices.

math.OC↗

Safety vs. Performance: How Multi-Objective Learning Reduces Barriers to Market Entry

Emerging marketplaces for large language models and other large-scale machine learning (ML) models appear to exhibit market concentration, which has raised concerns about whether there are insurmountable barriers to entry in such markets. In this work, we study this issue from both an economic and an algorithmic point of view, focusing on a phenomenon that reduces barriers to entry. Specifically, an incumbent company risks reputational damage unless its model is sufficiently aligned with safety objectives, whereas a new company can more easily avoid reputational damage. To study this issue formally, we define a multi-objective high-dimensional regression framework that captures reputational damage, and we characterize the number of data points that a new company needs to enter the market. Our results demonstrate how multi-objective considerations can fundamentally reduce barriers to entry -- the required number of data points can be significantly smaller than the incumbent company's dataset size. En route to proving these results, we develop scaling laws for high-dimensional linear regression in multi-objective environments, showing that the scaling rate becomes slower when the dataset size is large, which could be of independent interest.

cs.LG↗

Valid Inference After Causal Discovery

Causal discovery and causal effect estimation are two fundamental tasks in causal inference. While many methods have been developed for each task individually, statistical challenges arise when applying these methods jointly: estimating causal effects after running causal discovery algorithms on the same data leads to "double dipping," invalidating the coverage guarantees of classical confidence intervals. To this end, we develop tools for valid post-causal-discovery inference. Across empirical studies, we show that a naive combination of causal discovery and subsequent inference algorithms leads to highly inflated miscoverage rates; on the other hand, applying our method provides reliable coverage while achieving more accurate causal discovery than data splitting.

stat.ME↗

A Primal-Dual Approach to Solving Variational Inequalities with General Constraints

Yang et al. (2023) recently showed how to use first-order gradient methods to solve general variational inequalities (VIs) under a limiting assumption that analytic solutions of specific subproblems are available. In this paper, we circumvent this assumption via a warm-starting technique where we solve subproblems approximately and initialize variables with the approximate solution found at the previous iteration. We prove the convergence of this method and show that the gap function of the last iterate of the method decreases at a rate of $O(\frac{1}{\sqrt{K}})$ when the operator is $L$-Lipschitz and monotone. In numerical experiments, we show that this technique can converge much faster than its exact counterpart. Furthermore, for the cases when the inequality constraints are simple, we introduce an alternative variant of ACVI and establish its convergence under the same conditions. Finally, we relax the smoothness assumptions in Yang et al., yielding, to our knowledge, the first convergence result for VIs with general constraints that does not rely on the assumption that the operator is $L$-Lipschitz.

stat.ML↗

Defection-Free Collaboration between Competitors in a Learning System

We study collaborative learning systems in which the participants are competitors who will defect from the system if they lose revenue by collaborating. As such, we frame the system as a duopoly of competitive firms who are each engaged in training machine-learning models and selling their predictions to a market of consumers. We first examine a fully collaborative scheme in which both firms share their models with each other and show that this leads to a market collapse with the revenues of both firms going to zero. We next show that one-sided collaboration in which only the firm with the lower-quality model shares improves the revenue of both firms. Finally, we propose a more equitable, *defection-free* scheme in which both firms share with each other while losing no revenue, and we show that our algorithm converges to the Nash bargaining solution.

cs.GT↗

Incentivizing High-Quality Content in Online Recommender Systems

In content recommender systems such as TikTok and YouTube, the platform's recommendation algorithm shapes content producer incentives. Many platforms employ online learning, which generates intertemporal incentives, since content produced today affects recommendations of future content. We study the game between producers and analyze the content created at equilibrium. We show that standard online learning algorithms, such as Hedge and EXP3, unfortunately incentivize producers to create low-quality content, where producers' effort approaches zero in the long run for typical learning rate schedules. Motivated by this negative result, we design learning algorithms that incentivize producers to invest high effort and achieve high user welfare. At a conceptual level, our work illustrates the unintended impact that a platform's learning algorithm can have on content quality and introduces algorithmic approaches to mitigating these effects.

cs.GT↗