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Michael I. Jordan

Publications and source records attributed to Michael I. Jordan.

At least 145 records · Page 8Linked to original sources

Accelerating Inexact HyperGradient Descent for Bilevel Optimization

We present a method for solving general nonconvex-strongly-convex bilevel optimization problems. Our method -- the \emph{Restarted Accelerated HyperGradient Descent} (\texttt{RAHGD}) method -- finds an $ε$-first-order stationary point of the objective with $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(κ^{3.25}ε^{-1.75})$ oracle complexity, where $κ$ is the condition number of the lower-level objective and $ε$ is the desired accuracy. We also propose a perturbed variant of \texttt{RAHGD} for finding an $\big(ε,\mathcal{O}(κ^{2.5}\sqrtε\,)\big)$-second-order stationary point within the same order of oracle complexity. Our results achieve the best-known theoretical guarantees for finding stationary points in bilevel optimization and also improve upon the existing upper complexity bound for finding second-order stationary points in nonconvex-strongly-concave minimax optimization problems, setting a new state-of-the-art benchmark. Empirical studies are conducted to validate the theoretical results in this paper.

math.OC↗

Evaluating and Incentivizing Diverse Data Contributions in Collaborative Learning

For a federated learning model to perform well, it is crucial to have a diverse and representative dataset. However, the data contributors may only be concerned with the performance on a specific subset of the population, which may not reflect the diversity of the wider population. This creates a tension between the principal (the FL platform designer) who cares about global performance and the agents (the data collectors) who care about local performance. In this work, we formulate this tension as a game between the principal and multiple agents, and focus on the linear experiment design problem to formally study their interaction. We show that the statistical criterion used to quantify the diversity of the data, as well as the choice of the federated learning algorithm used, has a significant effect on the resulting equilibrium. We leverage this to design simple optimal federated learning mechanisms that encourage data collectors to contribute data representative of the global population, thereby maximizing global performance.

cs.GT↗

Federated Conformal Predictors for Distributed Uncertainty Quantification

Conformal prediction is emerging as a popular paradigm for providing rigorous uncertainty quantification in machine learning since it can be easily applied as a post-processing step to already trained models. In this paper, we extend conformal prediction to the federated learning setting. The main challenge we face is data heterogeneity across the clients - this violates the fundamental tenet of exchangeability required for conformal prediction. We propose a weaker notion of partial exchangeability, better suited to the FL setting, and use it to develop the Federated Conformal Prediction (FCP) framework. We show FCP enjoys rigorous theoretical guarantees and excellent empirical performance on several computer vision and medical imaging datasets. Our results demonstrate a practical approach to incorporating meaningful uncertainty quantification in distributed and heterogeneous environments. We provide code used in our experiments https://github.com/clu5/federated-conformal.

cs.LG↗

The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design

We study the hidden-action principal-agent problem in an online setting. In each round, the principal posts a contract that specifies the payment to the agent based on each outcome. The agent then makes a strategic choice of action that maximizes her own utility, but the action is not directly observable by the principal. The principal observes the outcome and receives utility from the agent's choice of action. Based on past observations, the principal dynamically adjusts the contracts with the goal of maximizing her utility. We introduce an online learning algorithm and provide an upper bound on its Stackelberg regret. We show that when the contract space is $[0,1]^m$, the Stackelberg regret is upper bounded by $\widetilde O(\sqrt{m} \cdot T^{1-1/(2m+1)})$, and lower bounded by $Ω(T^{1-1/(m+2)})$, where $\widetilde O$ omits logarithmic factors. This result shows that exponential-in-$m$ samples are sufficient and necessary to learn a near-optimal contract, resolving an open problem on the hardness of online contract design. Moreover, when contracts are restricted to some subset $\mathcal{F} \subset [0,1]^m$, we define an intrinsic dimension of $\mathcal{F}$ that depends on the covering number of the spherical code in the space and bound the regret in terms of this intrinsic dimension. When $\mathcal{F}$ is the family of linear contracts, we show that the Stackelberg regret grows exactly as $Θ(T^{2/3})$. The contract design problem is challenging because the utility function is discontinuous. Bounding the discretization error in this setting has been an open problem. In this paper, we identify a limited set of directions in which the utility function is continuous, allowing us to design a new discretization method and bound its error. This approach enables the first upper bound with no restrictions on the contract and action space.

cs.GT↗

Online Learning in a Creator Economy

The creator economy has revolutionized the way individuals can profit through online platforms. In this paper, we initiate the study of online learning in the creator economy by modeling the creator economy as a three-party game between the users, platform, and content creators, with the platform interacting with the content creator under a principal-agent model through contracts to encourage better content. Additionally, the platform interacts with the users to recommend new content, receive an evaluation, and ultimately profit from the content, which can be modeled as a recommender system. Our study aims to explore how the platform can jointly optimize the contract and recommender system to maximize the utility in an online learning fashion. We primarily analyze and compare two families of contracts: return-based contracts and feature-based contracts. Return-based contracts pay the content creator a fraction of the reward the platform gains. In contrast, feature-based contracts pay the content creator based on the quality or features of the content, regardless of the reward the platform receives. We show that under smoothness assumptions, the joint optimization of return-based contracts and recommendation policy provides a regret $Θ(T^{2/3})$. For the feature-based contract, we introduce a definition of intrinsic dimension $d$ to characterize the hardness of learning the contract and provide an upper bound on the regret $\mathcal{O}(T^{(d+1)/(d+2)})$. The upper bound is tight for the linear family.

cs.GT↗

Online Learning in Stackelberg Games with an Omniscient Follower

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

cs.LG↗

Byzantine-Robust Federated Learning with Optimal Statistical Rates and Privacy Guarantees

We propose Byzantine-robust federated learning protocols with nearly optimal statistical rates. In contrast to prior work, our proposed protocols improve the dimension dependence and achieve a tight statistical rate in terms of all the parameters for strongly convex losses. We benchmark against competing protocols and show the empirical superiority of the proposed protocols. Finally, we remark that our protocols with bucketing can be naturally combined with privacy-guaranteeing procedures to introduce security against a semi-honest server. The code for evaluation is provided in https://github.com/wanglun1996/secure-robust-federated-learning.

cs.LG↗

Evaluating Sensitivity to the Stick-Breaking Prior in Bayesian Nonparametrics (Rejoinder)

One can typically form a local robustness metric for a particular problem quite directly, for Markov chain Monte Carlo applications as well as optimization problems such as variational Bayes. However, we argue that simply forming a local robustness metric is not enough: the hard work is showing that it is useful. Computability, interpretability, and the ability of a local robustness metric to extrapolate well, are more important -- and often more difficult to establish -- than mere computation of derivatives.

stat.ME↗

Solving Constrained Variational Inequalities via a First-order Interior Point-based Method

We develop an interior-point approach to solve constrained variational inequality (cVI) problems. Inspired by the efficacy of the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) method in the single-objective context, we generalize ADMM to derive a first-order method for cVIs, that we refer to as ADMM-based interior-point method for constrained VIs (ACVI). We provide convergence guarantees for ACVI in two general classes of problems: (i) when the operator is $ξ$-monotone, and (ii) when it is monotone, some constraints are active and the game is not purely rotational. When the operator is, in addition, L-Lipschitz for the latter case, we match known lower bounds on rates for the gap function of $\mathcal{O}(1/\sqrt{K})$ and $\mathcal{O}(1/K)$ for the last and average iterate, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first presentation of a first-order interior-point method for the general cVI problem that has a global convergence guarantee. Moreover, unlike previous work in this setting, ACVI provides a means to solve cVIs when the constraints are nontrivial. Empirical analyses demonstrate clear advantages of ACVI over common first-order methods. In particular, (i) cyclical behavior is notably reduced as our methods approach the solution from the analytic center, and (ii) unlike projection-based methods that zigzag when near a constraint, ACVI efficiently handles the constraints.

stat.ML↗

Finding Regularized Competitive Equilibria of Heterogeneous Agent Macroeconomic Models with Reinforcement Learning

We study a heterogeneous agent macroeconomic model with an infinite number of households and firms competing in a labor market. Each household earns income and engages in consumption at each time step while aiming to maximize a concave utility subject to the underlying market conditions. The households aim to find the optimal saving strategy that maximizes their discounted cumulative utility given the market condition, while the firms determine the market conditions through maximizing corporate profit based on the household population behavior. The model captures a wide range of applications in macroeconomic studies, and we propose a data-driven reinforcement learning framework that finds the regularized competitive equilibrium of the model. The proposed algorithm enjoys theoretical guarantees in converging to the equilibrium of the market at a sub-linear rate.

econ.GN↗

A Statistical Analysis of Polyak-Ruppert Averaged Q-learning

We study Q-learning with Polyak-Ruppert averaging in a discounted Markov decision process in synchronous and tabular settings. Under a Lipschitz condition, we establish a functional central limit theorem for the averaged iteration $\bar{\boldsymbol{Q}}_T$ and show that its standardized partial-sum process converges weakly to a rescaled Brownian motion. The functional central limit theorem implies a fully online inference method for reinforcement learning. Furthermore, we show that $\bar{\boldsymbol{Q}}_T$ is the regular asymptotically linear (RAL) estimator for the optimal Q-value function $\boldsymbol{Q}^*$ that has the most efficient influence function. We present a nonasymptotic analysis for the $\ell_{\infty}$ error, $\mathbb{E}\|\bar{\boldsymbol{Q}}_T-\boldsymbol{Q}^*\|_{\infty}$, showing that it matches the instance-dependent lower bound for polynomial step sizes. Similar results are provided for entropy-regularized Q-learning without the Lipschitz condition.

stat.ML↗

Parallelizing Contextual Bandits

Standard approaches to decision-making under uncertainty focus on sequential exploration of the space of decisions. However, \textit{simultaneously} proposing a batch of decisions, which leverages available resources for parallel experimentation, has the potential to rapidly accelerate exploration. We present a family of (parallel) contextual bandit algorithms applicable to problems with bounded eluder dimension whose regret is nearly identical to their perfectly sequential counterparts -- given access to the same total number of oracle queries -- up to a lower-order ``burn-in" term. We further show these algorithms can be specialized to the class of linear reward functions where we introduce and analyze several new linear bandit algorithms which explicitly introduce diversity into their action selection. Finally, we also present an empirical evaluation of these parallel algorithms in several domains, including materials discovery and biological sequence design problems, to demonstrate the utility of parallelized bandits in practical settings.

stat.ML↗

First-Order Algorithms for Nonlinear Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

We consider the problem of computing an equilibrium in a class of \textit{nonlinear generalized Nash equilibrium problems (NGNEPs)} in which the strategy sets for each player are defined by equality and inequality constraints that may depend on the choices of rival players. While the asymptotic global convergence and local convergence rates of algorithms to solve this problem have been extensively investigated, the analysis of nonasymptotic iteration complexity is still in its infancy. This paper presents two first-order algorithms -- based on the quadratic penalty method (QPM) and augmented Lagrangian method (ALM), respectively -- with an accelerated mirror-prox algorithm as the solver in each inner loop. We establish a global convergence guarantee for solving monotone and strongly monotone NGNEPs and provide nonasymptotic complexity bounds expressed in terms of the number of gradient evaluations. Experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of our algorithms in practice.

math.OC↗

Learning Equilibria in Matching Markets from Bandit Feedback

Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. Classical notions of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik, 1971) are unfortunately of limited value in the learning setting, given that preferences are inherently uncertain and destabilizing while they are being learned. To bridge this gap, we develop a framework and algorithms for learning stable market outcomes under uncertainty. Our primary setting is matching with transferable utilities, where the platform both matches agents and sets monetary transfers between them. We design an incentive-aware learning objective that captures the distance of a market outcome from equilibrium. Using this objective, we analyze the complexity of learning as a function of preference structure, casting learning as a stochastic multi-armed bandit problem. Algorithmically, we show that "optimism in the face of uncertainty," the principle underlying many bandit algorithms, applies to a primal-dual formulation of matching with transfers and leads to near-optimal regret bounds. Our work takes a first step toward elucidating when and how stable matchings arise in large, data-driven marketplaces.

cs.LG↗

Competition, Alignment, and Equilibria in Digital Marketplaces

Competition between traditional platforms is known to improve user utility by aligning the platform's actions with user preferences. But to what extent is alignment exhibited in data-driven marketplaces? To study this question from a theoretical perspective, we introduce a duopoly market where platform actions are bandit algorithms and the two platforms compete for user participation. A salient feature of this market is that the quality of recommendations depends on both the bandit algorithm and the amount of data provided by interactions from users. This interdependency between the algorithm performance and the actions of users complicates the structure of market equilibria and their quality in terms of user utility. Our main finding is that competition in this market does not perfectly align market outcomes with user utility. Interestingly, market outcomes exhibit misalignment not only when the platforms have separate data repositories, but also when the platforms have a shared data repository. Nonetheless, the data sharing assumptions impact what mechanism drives misalignment and also affect the specific form of misalignment (e.g. the quality of the best-case and worst-case market outcomes). More broadly, our work illustrates that competition in digital marketplaces has subtle consequences for user utility that merit further investigation.

cs.GT↗

Meta-Analysis of Randomized Experiments with Applications to Heavy-Tailed Response Data

A central obstacle in the objective assessment of treatment effect (TE) estimators in randomized control trials (RCTs) is the lack of ground truth (or validation set) to test their performance. In this paper, we propose a novel cross-validation-like methodology to address this challenge. The key insight of our procedure is that the noisy (but unbiased) difference-of-means estimate can be used as a ground truth ``label" on a portion of the RCT, to test the performance of an estimator trained on the other portion. We combine this insight with an aggregation scheme, which borrows statistical strength across a large collection of RCTs, to present an end-to-end methodology for judging an estimator's ability to recover the underlying treatment effect as well as produce an optimal treatment "roll out" policy. We evaluate our methodology across 699 RCTs implemented in the Amazon supply chain. In this heavy-tailed setting, our methodology suggests that procedures that aggressively downweight or truncate large values, while introducing bias, lower the variance enough to ensure that the treatment effect is more accurately estimated.

stat.ME↗

Projection Robust Wasserstein Distance and Riemannian Optimization

Projection robust Wasserstein (PRW) distance, or Wasserstein projection pursuit (WPP), is a robust variant of the Wasserstein distance. Recent work suggests that this quantity is more robust than the standard Wasserstein distance, in particular when comparing probability measures in high-dimensions. However, it is ruled out for practical application because the optimization model is essentially non-convex and non-smooth which makes the computation intractable. Our contribution in this paper is to revisit the original motivation behind WPP/PRW, but take the hard route of showing that, despite its non-convexity and lack of nonsmoothness, and even despite some hardness results proved by~\citet{Niles-2019-Estimation} in a minimax sense, the original formulation for PRW/WPP \textit{can} be efficiently computed in practice using Riemannian optimization, yielding in relevant cases better behavior than its convex relaxation. More specifically, we provide three simple algorithms with solid theoretical guarantee on their complexity bound (one in the appendix), and demonstrate their effectiveness and efficiency by conducing extensive experiments on synthetic and real data. This paper provides a first step into a computational theory of the PRW distance and provides the links between optimal transport and Riemannian optimization.

cs.LG↗

Optimal variance-reduced stochastic approximation in Banach spaces

We study the problem of estimating the fixed point of a contractive operator defined on a separable Banach space. Focusing on a stochastic query model that provides noisy evaluations of the operator, we analyze a variance-reduced stochastic approximation scheme, and establish non-asymptotic bounds for both the operator defect and the estimation error, measured in an arbitrary semi-norm. In contrast to worst-case guarantees, our bounds are instance-dependent, and achieve the local asymptotic minimax risk non-asymptotically. For linear operators, contractivity can be relaxed to multi-step contractivity, so that the theory can be applied to problems like average reward policy evaluation problem in reinforcement learning. We illustrate the theory via applications to stochastic shortest path problems, two-player zero-sum Markov games, as well as policy evaluation and $Q$-learning for tabular Markov decision processes.

math.ST↗