arXiv subjects

Milind Tambe

Publications and source records attributed to Milind Tambe.

139 records · Page 8Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

Artificial Intelligence for Social Good

The Computing Community Consortium (CCC), along with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), co-sponsored a public workshop on Artificial Intelligence for Social Good on June 7th, 2016 in Washington, DC. This was one of five workshops that OSTP co-sponsored and held around the country to spur public dialogue on artificial intelligence, machine learning, and to identify challenges and opportunities related to AI. In the AI for Social Good workshop, the successful deployments and the potential use of AI in various topics that are essential for social good were discussed, including but not limited to urban computing, health, environmental sustainability, and public welfare. This report highlights each of these as well as a number of crosscutting issues.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2018

Melding the Data-Decisions Pipeline: Decision-Focused Learning for Combinatorial Optimization

Creating impact in real-world settings requires artificial intelligence techniques to span the full pipeline from data, to predictive models, to decisions. These components are typically approached separately: a machine learning model is first trained via a measure of predictive accuracy, and then its predictions are used as input into an optimization algorithm which produces a decision. However, the loss function used to train the model may easily be misaligned with the end goal, which is to make the best decisions possible. Hand-tuning the loss function to align with optimization is a difficult and error-prone process (which is often skipped entirely). We focus on combinatorial optimization problems and introduce a general framework for decision-focused learning, where the machine learning model is directly trained in conjunction with the optimization algorithm to produce high-quality decisions. Technically, our contribution is a means of integrating common classes of discrete optimization problems into deep learning or other predictive models, which are typically trained via gradient descent. The main idea is to use a continuous relaxation of the discrete problem to propagate gradients through the optimization procedure. We instantiate this framework for two broad classes of combinatorial problems: linear programs and submodular maximization. Experimental results across a variety of domains show that decision-focused learning often leads to improved optimization performance compared to traditional methods. We find that standard measures of accuracy are not a reliable proxy for a predictive model's utility in optimization, and our method's ability to specify the true goal as the model's training objective yields substantial dividends across a range of decision problems.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2018

On the Inducibility of Stackelberg Equilibrium for Security Games

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is widely acknowledged and justified by the assertion that the defender can often induce the attacker to choose a preferred action by making an infinitesimal adjustment to her strategy. Unfortunately, in security games with resource assignment constraints, the assertion might not be valid; it is possible that the defender cannot induce the desired outcome. As a result, many results claimed in the literature may be overly optimistic. To remedy, we first formally define the utility guarantee of a defender strategy and provide examples to show that the utility of SSE can be higher than its utility guarantee. Second, inspired by the analysis of leader's payoff by Von Stengel and Zamir (2004), we provide the solution concept called the inducible Stackelberg equilibrium (ISE), which owns the highest utility guarantee and always exists. Third, we show the conditions when ISE coincides with SSE and the fact that in general case, SSE can be extremely worse with respect to utility guarantee. Moreover, introducing the ISE does not invalidate existing algorithmic results as the problem of computing an ISE polynomially reduces to that of computing an SSE. We also provide an algorithmic implementation for computing ISE, with which our experiments unveil the empirical advantage of the ISE over the SSE.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Decentralized dynamic task allocation for UAVs with limited communication range

We present the Limited-range Online Routing Problem (LORP), which involves a team of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with limited communication range that must autonomously coordinate to service task requests. We first show a general approach to cast this dynamic problem as a sequence of decentralized task allocation problems. Then we present two solutions both based on modeling the allocation task as a Markov Random Field to subsequently assess decisions by means of the decentralized Max-Sum algorithm. Our first solution assumes independence between requests, whereas our second solution also considers the UAVs' workloads. A thorough empirical evaluation shows that our workload-based solution consistently outperforms current state-of-the-art methods in a wide range of scenarios, lowering the average service time up to 16%. In the best-case scenario there is no gap between our decentralized solution and centralized techniques. In the worst-case scenario we manage to reduce by 25% the gap between current decentralized and centralized techniques. Thus, our solution becomes the method of choice for our problem.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2018

Mitigating the Curse of Correlation in Security Games by Entropy Maximization

In Stackelberg security games, a defender seeks to randomly allocate limited security resources to protect critical targets from an attack. In this paper, we study a fundamental, yet underexplored, phenomenon in security games, which we term the \emph{Curse of Correlation} (CoC). Specifically, we observe that there are inevitable correlations among the protection status of different targets. Such correlation is a crucial concern, especially in \emph{spatio-temporal} domains like conservation area patrolling, where attackers can surveil patrollers at certain areas and then infer their patrolling routes using such correlations. To mitigate this issue, we propose to design entropy-maximizing defending strategies for spatio-temporal security games, which frequently suffer from CoC. We prove that the problem is \#P-hard in general. However, it admits efficient algorithms in well-motivated special settings. Our experiments show significant advantages of max-entropy algorithms over previous algorithms. A scalable implementation of our algorithm is currently under pre-deployment testing for integration into FAMS software to improve the scheduling of US federal air marshals.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Practical Scalability for Stackelberg Security Games

Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) have been adopted widely for modeling adversarial interactions. With increasing size of the applications of SSGs, scalability of equilibrium computation is an important research problem. While prior research has made progress with regards to scalability, many real world problems cannot be solved satisfactorily yet as per current requirements; these include the deployed federal air marshals (FAMS) application and the threat screening (TSG) problem at airports. Further, these problem domains are inherently limited by NP hardness shown in prior literature. We initiate a principled study of approximations in zero-sum SSGs. Our contribution includes the following: (1) a unified model of SSGs called adversarial randomized allocation (ARA) games that allows studying most SSGs in one model, (2) hardness of approximation results for zero-sum ARA, as well as for the sub-problem of allocating federal air marshal (FAMS) and threat screening problem (TSG) at airports, (3) an approximation framework for zero-sum ARA with provable approximation guarantees and (4) experiments demonstrating the significant scalability of up to 1000x improvement in runtime with an acceptable 5% solution quality loss.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Video Labeling for Automatic Video Surveillance in Security Domains

Beyond traditional security methods, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become an important surveillance tool used in security domains to collect the required annotated data. However, collecting annotated data from videos taken by UAVs efficiently, and using these data to build datasets that can be used for learning payoffs or adversary behaviors in game-theoretic approaches and security applications, is an under-explored research question. This paper presents VIOLA, a novel labeling application that includes (i) a workload distribution framework to efficiently gather human labels from videos in a secured manner; (ii) a software interface with features designed for labeling videos taken by UAVs in the domain of wildlife security. We also present the evolution of VIOLA and analyze how the changes made in the development process relate to the efficiency of labeling, including when seemingly obvious improvements did not lead to increased efficiency. VIOLA enables collecting massive amounts of data with detailed information from challenging security videos such as those collected aboard UAVs for wildlife security. VIOLA will lead to the development of new approaches that integrate deep learning for real-time detection and response.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2017

Activating the "Breakfast Club": Modeling Influence Spread in Natural-World Social Networks

While reigning models of diffusion have privileged the structure of a given social network as the key to informational exchange, real human interactions do not appear to take place on a single graph of connections. Using data collected from a pilot study of the spread of HIV awareness in social networks of homeless youth, we show that health information did not diffuse in the field according to the processes outlined by dominant models. Since physical network diffusion scenarios often diverge from their more well-studied counterparts on digital networks, we propose an alternative Activation Jump Model (AJM) that describes information diffusion on physical networks from a multi-agent team perspective. Our model exhibits two main differentiating features from leading cascade and threshold models of influence spread: 1) The structural composition of a seed set team impacts each individual node's influencing behavior, and 2) an influencing node may spread information to non-neighbors. We show that the AJM significantly outperforms existing models in its fit to the observed node-level influence data on the youth networks. We then prove theoretical results, showing that the AJM exhibits many well-behaved properties shared by dominant models. Our results suggest that the AJM presents a flexible and more accurate model of network diffusion that may better inform influence maximization in the field.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2016

Pilot Testing an Artificial Intelligence Algorithm That Selects Homeless Youth Peer Leaders Who Promote HIV Testing

Objective. To pilot test an artificial intelligence (AI) algorithm that selects peer change agents (PCA) to disseminate HIV testing messaging in a population of homeless youth. Methods. We recruited and assessed 62 youth at baseline, 1 month (n = 48), and 3 months (n = 38). A Facebook app collected preliminary social network data. Eleven PCAs selected by AI attended a 1-day training and 7 weekly booster sessions. Mixed-effects models with random effects were used to assess change over time. Results. Significant change over time was observed in past 6-month HIV testing (57.9%, 82.4%, 76.3%; p < .05) but not condom use (63.9%, 65.7%, 65.8%). Most youth reported speaking to a PCA about HIV prevention (72.0% at 1 month, 61.5% at 3 months). Conclusions. AI is a promising avenue for implementing PCA models for homeless youth. Increasing rates of regular HIV testing is critical to HIV prevention and linking homeless youth to treatment.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2016

Using Social Networks to Aid Homeless Shelters: Dynamic Influence Maximization under Uncertainty - An Extended Version

This paper presents HEALER, a software agent that recommends sequential intervention plans for use by homeless shelters, who organize these interventions to raise awareness about HIV among homeless youth. HEALER's sequential plans (built using knowledge of social networks of homeless youth) choose intervention participants strategically to maximize influence spread, while reasoning about uncertainties in the network. While previous work presents influence maximizing techniques to choose intervention participants, they do not address three real-world issues: (i) they completely fail to scale up to real-world sizes; (ii) they do not handle deviations in execution of intervention plans; (iii) constructing real-world social networks is an expensive process. HEALER handles these issues via four major contributions: (i) HEALER casts this influence maximization problem as a POMDP and solves it using a novel planner which scales up to previously unsolvable real-world sizes; (ii) HEALER allows shelter officials to modify its recommendations, and updates its future plans in a deviation-tolerant manner; (iii) HEALER constructs social networks of homeless youth at low cost, using a Facebook application. Finally, (iv) we show hardness results for the problem that HEALER solves. HEALER will be deployed in the real world in early Spring 2016 and is currently undergoing testing at a homeless shelter.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2015

Learning Adversary Behavior in Security Games: A PAC Model Perspective

Recent applications of Stackelberg Security Games (SSG), from wildlife crime to urban crime, have employed machine learning tools to learn and predict adversary behavior using available data about defender-adversary interactions. Given these recent developments, this paper commits to an approach of directly learning the response function of the adversary. Using the PAC model, this paper lays a firm theoretical foundation for learning in SSGs (e.g., theoretically answer questions about the numbers of samples required to learn adversary behavior) and provides utility guarantees when the learned adversary model is used to plan the defender's strategy. The paper also aims to answer practical questions such as how much more data is needed to improve an adversary model's accuracy. Additionally, we explain a recently observed phenomenon that prediction accuracy of learned adversary behavior is not enough to discover the utility maximizing defender strategy. We provide four main contributions: (1) a PAC model of learning adversary response functions in SSGs; (2) PAC-model analysis of the learning of key, existing bounded rationality models in SSGs; (3) an entirely new approach to adversary modeling based on a non-parametric class of response functions with PAC-model analysis and (4) identification of conditions under which computing the best defender strategy against the learned adversary behavior is indeed the optimal strategy. Finally, we conduct experiments with real-world data from a national park in Uganda, showing the benefit of our new adversary modeling approach and verification of our PAC model predictions.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2015

Security Games with Information Leakage: Modeling and Computation

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy -- an issue we refer to as information leakage -- is a significant concern in practical applications. While previous research on patrolling games has considered the attacker's real-time surveillance, our settings, therefore models and techniques, are fundamentally different. More specifically, after describing the information leakage model, we start with an LP formulation to compute the defender's optimal strategy in the presence of leakage. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that a key subproblem to solve this LP (more precisely, the defender oracle) is NP-hard even for the simplest of security game models. We then approach the problem from three possible directions: efficient algorithms for restricted cases, approximation algorithms, and heuristic algorithms for sampling that improves upon the status quo. Our experiments confirm the necessity of handling information leakage and the advantage of our algorithms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Stackelberg vs. Nash in Security Games: An Extended Investigation of Interchangeability, Equivalence, and Uniqueness

There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program deployed at LAX Airport and the IRIS program in use by the US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). The foundational assumption for using Stackelberg games is that security forces (leaders), acting first, commit to a randomized strategy; while their adversaries (followers) choose their best response after surveillance of this randomized strategy. Yet, in many situations, a leader may face uncertainty about the follower's surveillance capability. Previous work fails to address how a leader should compute her strategy given such uncertainty. We provide five contributions in the context of a general class of security games. First, we show that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection problem. Second, under a natural restriction on security games, any Stackelberg strategy is also a Nash equilibrium strategy; and furthermore, the solution is unique in a class of security games of which ARMOR is a key exemplar. Third, when faced with a follower that can attack multiple targets, many of these properties no longer hold. Fourth, we show experimentally that in most (but not all) games where the restriction does not hold, the Stackelberg strategy is still a Nash equilibrium strategy, but this is no longer true when the attacker can attack multiple targets. Finally, as a possible direction for future research, we propose an extensive-form game model that makes the defender's uncertainty about the attacker's ability to observe explicit.

cs.GT↗