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Mingwei Yang

Publications and source records attributed to Mingwei Yang.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Anti-Kibble-Zurek behavior driven by dichotomous Markov noise in a quantum Ising chain: Generalized stochastic resonance in the defect density

The anti-Kibble-Zurek behavior may arise under noise, adding a noise-induced contribution to the defect density beyond the conventional Kibble-Zurek term. Most investigations of such behavior have so far been restricted to Gaussian noise. For Gaussian colored noise (GCN), the power spectrum dictates a monotonic variation of this term with the correlation time. Here, we focus on dichotomous Markov noise (DMN), a prototypical non-Gaussian colored noise, in the quantum Ising chain. We show that the noise-induced defect density, taken as the response function, exhibits generalized stochastic resonance: it is nonmonotonic in the correlation time, growing in the fast-noise regime and decreasing in the slow-noise regime. This resonance stems from the anomalous AKZ behavior in the slow-noise regime, where the DMN-induced trend is nonmonotonic, in contrast to the monotonic GCN case. The underlying mechanism lies in the sparse realizations of DMN in the slow-noise regime, a feature not captured by the power spectrum. Our work thereby reveals a fundamental distinction between Gaussian and non-Gaussian noises in the nonequilibrium critical quench dynamics of the quantum Ising chain.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

Optimal analysis of Greedy for stochastic online Euclidean matching: flat torus to the rescue

We study online metric matching with $n$ servers and $n$ requests, all sampled independently and uniformly from $[0,1]^d$. We analyze the Greedy algorithm, which matches each arriving request to its closest available server. Despite its strong empirical performance, non-trivial bounds on Greedy's competitive ratio were previously known only for $d = 1$, where it is $O(1)$-competitive [BFP23]. We prove that Greedy is $O(1)$-competitive for every fixed $d\geq3$ and has competitive ratio $Θ(\sqrt{\log n})$ for $d=2$. Our proof first analyzes Greedy on the flat torus and then transfers the resulting estimates to the cube.

cs.DS↗

When do token systems stabilize? Compatibility constraints and community structure

Token systems support repeated service exchange without monetary transfers, but their viability depends on the stability of token balances. We study token systems with compatibility constraints among agents. A requester is randomly sampled in each period, and only a few randomly sampled agents are available to provide service. We establish a necessary and sufficient condition for stability and show that the minimum-token rule, which selects the available provider with the lowest token balance, achieves the optimal stability region. We then apply this stability criterion to a random token system generated from stochastic block models with uniformly sampled requesters. We tightly characterize the stability regime by identifying two obstructions to stability: insufficient service opportunities for a group of communities or for an individual agent.

cs.GT↗

Optimal regret for dynamic matching with static priorities

We study centralized two-way dynamic matching markets in which agents arrive stochastically over time and wait in queues associated with their types. We focus on static priority policies that assign each agent type a fixed ranking over its neighbors and make online matching decisions using only queue availability. We propose the General Priority ($\mathbf{GP}$) policy, which builds on the Tree Priority ($\mathbf{TP}$) policy introduced in [KAG25]. Under the general position gap condition, $\mathbf{GP}$ selects matches using a nondegenerate optimal basic solution of the fluid relaxation. It prioritizes children over parents within trees and consistently gives clockwise neighbors priority over counterclockwise neighbors on each cycle. We establish the optimal all-time regret scaling $O(ε^{-1})$ for $\mathbf{GP}$ on general two-way matching networks, where the general position gap $ε$ measures the fluid relaxation's distance from degeneracy. In particular, this resolves the conjecture by [KAG25] on the optimal $ε$-dependence for $\mathbf{TP}$.

cs.DS↗

Optically Writable Atomic Vapor Memory as a Substrate for Optical Reservoir Computing

We present an optical random access memory (ORAM) based on warm cesium (Cs) atomic vapor and demonstrate its operation as the physical substrate of a reservoir computer. Information is stored in the hyperfine population distribution of a Cs ensemble via optical pumping and retrieved through differential probe absorption. Spatial multiplexing via acousto-optic deflection provides eight addressable memory rails able to store up to 3.8 bits of information per rail. Employing this platform as a temporally multiplexed reservoir, we achieve a kernel rank ($\mathrm{KR}= 8.8 \pm 0.4$), and a minimum bit error rate of $0.02 \pm 0.01$ on the Exclusive-or (XOR) benchmark. We find the limited memory lifetime constrains the achievable temporal depth, encouraging further research into fast addressable memories. This constitutes the first demonstration of a free-space, optically writable atomic RAM as a substrate in an optical reservoir computing system.

physics.atom-ph↗

Field re-entrant superconductivity in Eu-doped infinite-layer nickelates

Intertwined superconducting and magnetic orders may give rise to exotic quantum phases, including field-induced and re-entrant superconductivity. However, such magnetism-enhanced superconductivity has remained elusive in superconductors with higher transition temperatures. While infinite-layer nickelates represent a new class of unconventional superconductors, the impact of rare-earth magnetism on superconducting properties remains largely unexplored. Here, we show that Eu-doped infinite-layer nickelate Sm$_{0.95-x}$Ca$_{0.05}$Eu$_x$NiO$_2$ exhibits a magnetic-field-induced re-entrant superconducting phase in the Eu-rich over-doped regime. Zero-resistance transport and high-field diamagnetic screening confirm the superconducting nature of this phase, which emerges after the initial suppression of low-field superconductivity and remains robust across a broad range of temperatures, fields and field orientations. In the same doping range, we observe nonlinear Hall transport and hysteretic magnetoresistance, indicating the unconventional nature of the re-entrant behaviour. While partially consistent with a compensation mechanism between the Eu-derived exchange field and the applied field, our data reveal pronounced deviations from this model at the highest-doping levels. Our findings establish infinite-layer nickelates as a fertile platform for exploring magnetically driven high-field superconductivity in strongly correlated oxides.

cond-mat.supr-con↗

Smoothed Analysis of Online Metric Matching with a Single Sample: Beyond Metric Distortion

In the online metric matching problem, $n$ servers and $n$ requests lie in a metric space. Servers are available upfront, and requests arrive sequentially. An arriving request must be matched immediately and irrevocably to an available server, incurring a cost equal to their distance. The goal is to minimize the total matching cost. We study this problem in the Euclidean metric $[0, 1]^d$, when servers are adversarial and requests are independently drawn from distinct distributions that satisfy a mild smoothness condition. Our main result is an $O(1)$-competitive algorithm for $d \neq 2$ that requires no distributional knowledge, relying only on a single sample from each request distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to achieve an $o(\log n)$ competitive ratio for non-trivial metrics beyond the i.i.d. setting. Our approach bypasses the $Ω(\log n)$ barrier introduced by probabilistic metric embeddings: instead of analyzing the embedding distortion and the algorithm separately, we directly bound the cost of the algorithm on the target metric of a simple deterministic embedding. We then combine this analysis with lower bounds on the offline optimum for Euclidean metrics, derived via majorization arguments, to obtain our guarantees.

cs.DS↗

Bosonic phases across the superconductor-insulator transition in infinite-layer samarium nickelate

Superconductivity arises from the global phase coherence of Cooper pairs. Modulation of phase coherence leads to quantum phase transitions, serving as an important tool for studying unconventional superconductivity. Here, we demonstrate bosonic phases across the superconductor-insulator transition in infinite-layer nickelate superconducting films by the control of spatially periodic network patterns. Magnetoresistance oscillations with a periodicity of h/2e provide direct evidence of 2e Cooper pairing in nickelates. The phase transition is predominantly driven by enhanced superconducting fluctuations, and Cooper pairs are involved in charge transport across the transition. Notably, we observe two types of anomalous metallic phases, emerging respectively at finite magnetic fields and down to zero magnetic field. They can be characterized by bosonic excitations, suggesting the dynamic roles of vortices in the ground states. Our work establishes nickelates as a key platform for investigating the rich landscape of bosonic phases controlled via the phase coherence of Cooper pairs.

cond-mat.supr-con↗

Online Metric Matching: Beyond the Worst Case

We study the online metric matching problem. There are $m$ servers and $n$ requests located in a metric space, where all servers are available upfront and requests arrive one at a time. Upon the arrival of a new request, it needs to be immediately and irrevocably matched to an available server, resulting in a cost of their distance. The objective is to minimize the total matching cost. When servers are adversarial and requests are independently drawn from a known distribution, we reduce the problem to a more tractable setting where servers and requests are all independently drawn from the same distribution. Applying our reduction, for $[0, 1]^d$ with various choices of distributions, we achieve improved competitive ratios and nearly optimal regret in both balanced and unbalanced markets. In particular, we give $O(1)$-competitive algorithms for $d \geq 3$ in both balanced and unbalanced markets with smooth distributions. Our algorithms improve on the $O((\log \log \log n)^2)$ competitive ratio of Gupta et al. (ICALP'19) for balanced markets in various regimes, and provide the first positive results for unbalanced markets. Moreover, when servers and requests are all adversarial, and a prediction of request locations is provided, we present a general framework for transforming an arbitrary algorithm that does not use predictions into an algorithm that leverages predictions. The transformation applies the given algorithm in a black-box manner, and the performance of the resulting algorithm degrades smoothly as the prediction accuracy deteriorates while preserving the worst-case guarantee.

cs.DS↗

Incentive Analysis of Collusion in Fair Division

We study fair division problems with strategic agents capable of gaining advantages by manipulating their reported preferences. Although several impossibility results have revealed the incompatibility of truthfulness with standard fairness criteria, subsequent works have circumvented this limitation through the incentive ratio framework. Previous studies demonstrate that fundamental mechanisms like Maximum Nash Welfare (MNW) and Probabilistic Serial (PS) for divisible goods, and Round-Robin (RR) for indivisible goods achieve an incentive ratio of $2$, implying that no individual agent can gain more than double his truthful utility through manipulation. However, collusive manipulation by agent groups remains unexplored. In this work, we define strong group incentive ratio (SGIR) and group incentive ratio (GIR) to measure the gain of collusive manipulation, where SGIR and GIR are respectively the maximum and minimum of the incentive ratios of corrupted agents. Then, we tightly characterize the SGIRs and GIRs of MNW, PS, and RR. In particular, the GIR of MNW is $2$ regardless of the coalition size. Moreover, for coalition size $c \geq 1$, the SGIRs of MNW and PS, and the GIRs of PS and RR are $c + 1$. Finally, the SGIR of RR is unbounded for coalition size $c \geq 2$. Our results reveal fundamental differences of these three mechanisms in their vulnerability to collusion.

cs.GT↗

Enhanced Superconductivity and Mixed-dimensional Behaviour in Infinite-layer Samarium Nickelate Thin Films

Rare-earth infinite-layer nickelates represent an emerging class of unconventional superconductors, with materials synthesis largely limited to early lanthanide compounds. Here, we report the synthesis and characterization of phase-pure superconducting samarium-based infinite-layer nickelate thin films, including the first demonstration of Sm$_{1-x}$Sr$_x$NiO$_2$, along with co-doped variants incorporating europium and calcium. These films, grown on LSAT (001) substrates, exhibit coherent lattice structures up to $\sim$ 9 nm thickness with minimal stacking faults. The co-doped compounds achieve a record-small $c$-axis parameter of 3.26 Å and display remarkable superconducting transition temperatures up to 32.5 K. These results establish a clear correlation between decreasing $c$-axis parameter and increasing critical temperature across different rare-earth systems. In addition, angle-dependent magnetoresistance investigations reveal the existence of a hybrid mixture of 2D and 3D superconductivity in this novel system with enhanced coupling between the rare-earth 5d and Ni 3d orbitals, confirmed by resonant inelastic X-ray scattering experiments. As the concentration of Eu increases, the system exhibits a clear tendency towards 3D superconductivity. Furthermore, we observe distinctive negative magnetoresistance in the europium-containing samples. These findings advocate clear materials design principles for higher transition temperatures and exotic physics in infinite-layer nickelate superconductors through structural engineering of the rare-earth site.

cond-mat.supr-con↗

Thermoelectricity evidence for quantum criticality in clean infinite-layer nickelate films

We investigate the Seebeck coefficient ($S$) in infinite-layer nickelate films with different disorder levels. The disordered NdNiO$_{2}$ film exhibits a flat $S/T$ curve, whereas cleaner samples display a logarithmic divergence with decreasing temperature, followed by a pronounced ``hump'' near 25 K. These distinct behaviors reveal a disorder-driven transition from band-structure-dominated transport to quantum-critical-dominated transport. Below the ``hump'' temperature, four-fold symmetry breaking is observed in the in-plane angular magnetoresistance, indicating the presence of short-range antiferromagnetic order in parent infinite-layer nickelate films. Furthermore, the logarithmic divergence in $S/T$ is also observed in a clean superconducting Sm$_{0.73}$Ca$_{0.05}$Eu$_{0.22}$NiO$_{2}$ film, where it coexists with linear-in-temperature resistivity over the same temperature range. These findings demonstrate the existence of quantum criticality over a wide doping range in clean infinite-layer nickelate films, similar to cuprates, which highlights the central role of antiferromagnetic spin correlations in their superconducting pairing mechanisms.

cond-mat.supr-con↗

When is Truthfully Allocating Chores no Harder than Goods?

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. When items are goods, numerous positive and negative results are known regarding the fairness and efficiency guarantees achievable by truthful mechanisms, whereas our understanding of truthful mechanisms for chores remains considerably more limited. In this paper, we discover various connections between truthful good and chore allocations, greatly enhancing our understanding of the latter via tools from the former. For indivisible chores with two agents, by leveraging the observation that a simple bundle-swapping operation transforms several properties for goods including truthfulness to the corresponding properties for chores, we characterize truthful mechanisms and derive tight guarantees of various fairness notions achieved by truthful mechanisms. Moreover, for homogeneous divisible chores, by generalizing the above transformation to an arbitrary number of agents, we characterize truthful mechanisms with two agents, show that every truthful mechanism with two agents admits an efficiency ratio of $0$, and derive a large family of strictly truthful, envy-free (EF), and proportional mechanisms for an arbitrary number of agents. Finally, for indivisible chores with an arbitrary number of agents having bi-valued cost functions, we give an ex-ante truthful, ex-ante Pareto optimal, ex-ante EF, and ex-post envy-free up to one item mechanism, improving the best guarantees for bi-valued instances by prior works.

cs.GT↗

The Incentive Guarantees Behind Nash Welfare in Divisible Resources Allocation

We study the problem of allocating divisible resources among $n$ agents, hopefully in a fair and efficient manner. With the presence of strategic agents, additional incentive guarantees are also necessary, and the problem of designing fair and efficient mechanisms becomes much less tractable. While there are flourishing positive results against strategic agents for homogeneous divisible items, very few of them are known to hold in cake cutting. We show that the Maximum Nash Welfare (MNW) mechanism, which provides desirable fairness and efficiency guarantees and achieves an incentive ratio of $2$ for homogeneous divisible items, also has an incentive ratio of $2$ in cake cutting. Remarkably, this result holds even without the free disposal assumption, which is hard to get rid of in the design of truthful cake cutting mechanisms. Moreover, we show that, for cake cutting, the Partial Allocation (PA) mechanism proposed by Cole et al. (EC'13), which is truthful and $1/e$-MNW for homogeneous divisible items, has an incentive ratio between $[e^{1 / e}, e]$ and when randomization is allowed, can be turned to be truthful in expectation. Given two alternatives for a trade-off between incentive ratio and Nash welfare provided by the MNW and PA mechanisms, we establish an interpolation between them for both cake cutting and homogeneous divisible items. Finally, we study the optimal incentive ratio achievable by envy-free cake cutting mechanisms. We first give an envy-free mechanism for two agents with an incentive ratio of $4 / 3$. Then, we show that any envy-free cake cutting mechanism with the connected pieces constraint has an incentive ratio of $Θ(n)$.

cs.GT↗

Contextual Decision-Making with Knapsacks Beyond the Worst Case

We study the framework of a dynamic decision-making scenario with resource constraints. In this framework, an agent, whose target is to maximize the total reward under the initial inventory, selects an action in each round upon observing a random request, leading to a reward and resource consumptions that are further associated with an unknown random external factor. While previous research has already established an $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ worst-case regret for this problem, this work offers two results that go beyond the worst-case perspective: one for the worst-case gap between benchmarks and another for logarithmic regret rates. We first show that an $Ω(\sqrt{T})$ distance between the commonly used fluid benchmark and the online optimum is unavoidable when the former has a degenerate optimal solution. On the algorithmic side, we merge the re-solving heuristic with distribution estimation skills and propose an algorithm that achieves an $\widetilde{O}(1)$ regret as long as the fluid LP has a unique and non-degenerate solution. Furthermore, we prove that our algorithm maintains a near-optimal $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret even in the worst cases and extend these results to the setting where the request and external factor are continuous. Regarding information structure, our regret results are obtained under two feedback models, respectively, where the algorithm accesses the external factor at the end of each round and at the end of a round only when a non-null action is executed.

cs.LG↗

Fair and Almost Truthful Mechanisms for Additive Valuations and Beyond

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among $n$ strategic agents. It is well-known that truthfulness is incompatible with any meaningful fairness notions. We bypass the strong negative result by considering the concept of incentive ratio, a relaxation of truthfulness quantifying agents' incentive to misreport. Previous studies show that Round-Robin, which satisfies envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), achieves an incentive ratio of $2$ for additive valuations. In this paper, we explore the incentive ratio achievable by fair mechanisms for various classes of valuations besides additive ones. We first show that, for arbitrary $ε> 0$, every $(\frac{1}{2} + ε)$-EF1 mechanism for additive valuations admits an incentive ratio of at least $1.5$. Then, using the above lower bound for additive valuations in a black-box manner, we show that for arbitrary $ε> 0$, every $ε$-EF1 mechanism for cancelable valuations admits an infinite incentive ratio. Moreover, for subadditive cancelable valuations, we show that Round-Robin, which satisfies EF1, achieves an incentive ratio of $2$, and every $(φ- 1)$-EF1 mechanism admits an incentive ratio of at least $φ$ with $φ= (1 + \sqrt{5}) / 2 \approx 1.618$. Finally, for submodular valuations, we show that Round-Robin, which satisfies $\frac{1}{2}$-EF1, admits an incentive ratio of $n$.

cs.GT↗

Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors: Strategic Equivalence and Structural Properties

In today's online advertising markets, it is common for advertisers to set long-term budgets. Correspondingly, advertising platforms adopt budget control methods to ensure that advertisers' payments lie within their budgets. Most budget control methods rely on the value distributions of advertisers. However, due to the complex advertising landscape and potential privacy concerns, the platform hardly learns advertisers' true priors. Thus, it is crucial to understand how budget control auction mechanisms perform under unassured priors. This work answers this problem from multiple aspects. We consider the unassured prior game among the seller and all buyers induced by different mechanisms in the stochastic model. We restrict the parameterized mechanisms to satisfy the budget-extracting condition, which maximizes the seller's revenue by extracting buyers' budgets as effectively as possible. Our main result shows that the Bayesian revenue-optimal mechanism and the budget-extracting bid-discount first-price mechanism yield the same set of Nash equilibrium outcomes in the unassured prior game. This implies that simple mechanisms can be as robust as the optimal mechanism under unassured priors in the budget-constrained setting. In the symmetric case, we further show that all these five (budget-extracting) mechanisms share the same set of possible outcomes. We further dig into the structural properties of these mechanisms. We characterize sufficient and necessary conditions on the budget-extracting parameter tuple for bid-discount/pacing first-price auctions. Meanwhile, when buyers do not take strategic behaviors, we exploit the dominance relationships of these mechanisms by revealing their intrinsic structures.

cs.GT↗

Fairly Allocating (Contiguous) Dynamic Indivisible Items with Few Adjustments

We study the problem of dynamically allocating $T$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with the restriction that the allocation is fair all the time. Due to the negative results to achieve fairness when allocations are irrevocable, we allow adjustments to make fairness attainable with the objective to minimize the number of adjustments. For restricted additive or general identical valuations, we show that envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) can be achieved with no adjustments. For additive valuations, we give an EF1 algorithm that requires $O(mT)$ adjustments, improving the previous result of $O(nmT)$ adjustments, where $m$ is the maximum number of different valuations for items among all agents. We further impose the contiguity constraint on items such that items are arranged on a line by the order they arrive and require that each agent obtains a consecutive block of items. We present extensive results to achieve either proportionality with an additive approximate factor (PROPa) or EF1, where PROPa is a weaker fairness notion than EF1. In particular, we show that for identical valuations, achieving PROPa requires $Θ(nT)$ adjustments. Moreover, we show that it is hopeless to make any significant improvement for either PROPa or EF1 when valuations are nonidentical. Our results exhibit a large discrepancy between the identical and nonidentical cases in both contiguous and noncontiguous settings. All our positive results are computationally efficient.

cs.GT↗