arXiv subjects

Minyu Feng

Publications and source records attributed to Minyu Feng.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Coordinated incentives in AI-generated misinformation governance

With the rapid diffusion of AI-generated content, AI-driven misinformation is becoming increasingly pervasive and difficult to govern, undermining information credibility and social trust. This study models the strategic interdependence among a government regulator, an AI enterprise, and users through a three-party evolutionary game that incorporates heterogeneous rewards and punishments. From the resulting replicator equations, we characterize the evolutionary stability of competing governance and production strategies. The analysis indicates that neither unilateral regulation nor market incentives alone can effectively curb misinformation. Instead, an evolutionarily stable regime of real-information production arises only when regulatory rewards and punishment intensity, enterprise reputation loss, and user adoption incentives collectively surpass critical thresholds. The findings highlight the need for coordinated and adaptive policy mixes that align regulatory instruments with enterprise behavior and user uptake while managing governance costs.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Performance appraisal promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games

In real organizations, performance appraisal serves as an important means of evaluating employees' work outcomes and behaviors, while performance pay directly links compensation to the evaluation results. However, in traditional spatial public goods games, the total payoff of a group is equally distributed among all participants without considering individual differences in contributions, an approach that ignores the heterogeneity of individual efforts. To overcome this limitation, we propose a spatial public goods game model based on performance appraisal, in which individual payoffs are divided into two parts: an equally distributed component and a performance-weighted component. Specifically, each individual receives scores from its neighboring groups, and the individual's reputation is dynamically updated by accumulating these scores, which further modulates the fitness function during strategy imitation. Extensive numerical simulation results demonstrate that the performance appraisal mechanism significantly promotes the emergence of cooperative behavior. The reputation reinforcement mechanism amplifies this positive effect by creating fitness advantages for high-reputation individuals. These findings suggest that incorporating performance appraisal into payoff allocation helps mitigate social dilemmas and promote collective cooperation.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Information-Epidemic Dynamics in Cyber-Physical Systems: A Hypergraph Framework with Interpersonal Relationships

Understanding how information propagation affects epidemic dynamics has become an emerging topic of interest. However, the influence of interpersonal relationship heterogeneity on information acquisition and disease transmission has been largely overlooked. In this work, we introduce a hypergraph structure for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) with two distinct layers. The upper layer, referred to as the cyber layer, consists of a mixed hypergraph, capturing both pairwise propagation and higher-order diffusion of epidemic-related information. The lower layer, referred to as the physical layer, employs a Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) process to capture epidemic spreading. This work introduces an adaptive perception-protection mechanism based on Jaccard similarity, which accounts for interpersonal heterogeneity. In this mechanism, individuals receive information based on their relationships with neighbors and take protective measures accordingly. We analyze the impact of interpersonal relationships and the adoption of neighborhood-based self-protection strategies on epidemic dynamics. Furthermore, we conduct a theoretical analysis based on the Microscopic Markov Chain Approach (MMCA), analytically derive the outbreak threshold, and confirm the results with extensive Monte Carlo (MC) simulations. The results show that stronger interpersonal relationships can promote information propagation, significantly increase the threshold for epidemic outbreaks, and effectively suppress the scale of the epidemic. The study provides theoretical support for designing epidemic control strategies considering interpersonal heterogeneity and improves the understanding of epidemic spreading on hypergraphs.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Adaptive Epidemic Dynamics on Hypergraphs with Group-Level Immunization and Rewiring

Understanding how higher-order social structures shape epidemic spreading requires models that couple group interactions with adaptive behavior. We introduce an adaptive simplicial susceptible-infected-susceptible (s-SIS) model on d-uniform hypergraphs, where both node states and hyperedge activity co-evolve in response to local infection pressure. Hyperedges represent group interactions of fixed size and dynamically reduce their activity through a feedback mechanism in highly infected environments. Within this framework, we design two classes of hyperedge-level interventions: (i) risk-driven immunization, combining spontaneous, activity-based isolation with targeted deactivation guided by hyperedge infection pressure, and (ii) structural rewiring, which reconstructs group structures either randomly or via degree-preferential attachment. By extending the microscopic Markov chain approximation to higher-order interactions, we derive analytical conditions for the existence and stability of both endemic and disease-free stationary states. Our analysis shows that adaptive hyperedge feedback can induce discontinuous phase transitions, nonlinear epidemic thresholds, and bistable regimes in which sufficiently high initial prevalence drives the system to a disease-free equilibrium. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations support the theory and confirm that targeted immunization and degree-preferential rewiring substantially suppress epidemic prevalence, outperforming random strategies. These results demonstrate that higher-order interactions and adaptive group-level responses fundamentally reshape epidemic bifurcations and suggest principles for designing effective intervention policies in complex social systems.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Payoff-Driven Coevolution and Oscillatory Dynamics in Hypergraph

We study a coevolutionary public goods game on a dynamic hypergraph, where an individual's payoff directly determines the number of hyperedges it can join. In the proposed mechanism, nodes adjust their participation according to the group payoffs of hyperedges, and hyperedges that remain occupied only by defectors for a sufficiently long time collapse and are rebuilt by selecting new members based on the current payoffs of nodes. This adaptive rule captures the performance-driven reorganization of group interactions in evolving collective systems. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we show that the cooperation fraction and average hyperdegree may converge to steady states with stochastic fluctuations or exhibit persistent oscillations, depending on the parameter regime. The steady-state outcomes are strongly nonmonotonic with respect to the structural adaptation parameters: cooperation is sustained only when the rate of link formation is properly balanced. If structural adaptation is too fast, frequent contacts between cooperators and defectors destroy cooperative clusters; if it is too slow, cooperators lack sufficient structural support to expand. This differs from the conventional expectation in static settings that larger benefit parameters always facilitate cooperation. We further introduce spectral entropy to quantify the regularity of the oscillatory dynamics and identify limit-cycle behavior in the phase space in certain regimes. These results suggest that adaptive higher-order restructuring can both promote and destabilize cooperation, offering insight into oscillatory cooperation and recurrent prosperity-decline cycles in real group-structured systems.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Rumor Propagation and Supervision during Confrontation: An Importance-Driven SIRQS Network Model

The societal impact of rumor spreading is becoming increasingly severe; yet, current research remains relatively one-sided, typically focusing on either rumor propagation or rumor control while neglecting the confrontational and dynamically evolving relationship between them. To address this gap, we propose a novel confrontation framework for rumor modeling. We extend the classical Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible (SIRS) model into an Ignorant-Spreader-Stifler-Vigilant-Ignorant (SIRQS) framework by introducing a vigilant state and a confrontation mechanism, thereby capturing subtle differences in individual states during rumor propagation and in their confrontational behavior toward supervisors. At the same time, supervisors patrol the network through random walks guided by node propagation importance, enabling targeted monitoring of rumor spreaders and individuals with a high risk of spreading rumors. Using a microscopic Markov chain approach, we further characterize heterogeneous node behavior and individual differences, and couple the propagation and supervision processes to model node-state transition patterns. We conduct simulations on networks with three different sizes, various topologies, and a real-world network. The results show that the supervision subject, the preference effects associated with the number of supervisors, and the confrontation mechanism are key factors in supervision, and largely determine the effectiveness of rumor propagation control in the simulations, reflecting the substantial influence of these three mechanisms in real-world spreading scenarios. Finally, through multiple evaluation indicators, we provide references for determining the optimal number of supervisors.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Digital Epidemiology with Awareness-Based Event-Triggered Migration in Networked Cyber-Physical Systems

Understanding how human mobility and information propagation influence the course of an epidemic remains a key challenge in digital epidemiology. In this work, we develop a new awareness-based, event-triggered epidemic model embedded within a networked Cyber-Physical System (CPS). In our framework, disease transmission and the dissemination of epidemic-related information evolve together on two interconnected layers. In detail, the physical layer models disease spread through human movement between two types of locations - residences and transfer stations - forming a bipartite metapopulation network. This structure captures the rendezvous effect, which reflects how gatherings in shared locations contribute to infection spread. The cyber layer represents the flow of information through digital communication networks. We introduce an event-triggered migration regulation mechanism, whereby individuals adapt their movement patterns based on local awareness thresholds, leading to a decentralized control process embedded within the network. Using a microscopic Markov chain approach (MMCA), we derive the epidemic threshold analytically and validate our results through extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Our findings show that event-triggered migration effectively suppresses the overall spread of the disease and lowers infection peaks - especially in heterogeneous populations and densely connected gathering points. These results demonstrate the potential of CPS-based epidemic models to enable real-time, awareness-driven interventions and to inform the design of decentralized control strategies that leverage digital communication dynamics.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Epidemic Transmission Modelling on the Birth-death Evolving Network with Indirect Contacts

Epidemic modelling on complex networks has been studied intensively all the time. The majority of relative research assumes that the time scale of the underlying network evolution is much larger compared to the propagation dynamics on it, while the co-evolution of epidemics and networks needs exploring further. In this paper, we investigate how our recently proposed birth-death evolving network impacts the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible (SIRS) epidemic process. Our evolving network considers the increase and the heritable deletion of nodes, which enables to depicting individual behaviors during an epidemic, e.g., population migration and indirect contacts. To model the above processes, we construct a Markovian queueing network and perform analyses for the variation of population size of different epidemic states. In simulations, we reveal how the population migration and indirect contacts caused by our network dynamic properties influence the population sizes of each epidemic state, and find that newly-created indirect contacts facilitate epidemic transmission.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Cooperation in Public Goods Games over Uniform Random Hypergraphs with Game Transitions

The evolution of cooperation is a central enigma in evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, the combination of pairwise networks and repeated Public Goods Games with a single state fails to adequately describe realistic group interaction scenarios. On the one hand, pairwise networks lack clear group definitions. On the other hand, a participant's decision affects not only competitors' fitness but also the state of the surrounding environment. To address this problem, we propose a Public Goods Game with game transition mechanisms based on Uniform Random Hypergraphs. In our model, game groups formed by hyperedges transition between two types of games, one with abundant public resources and the other with scarce public resources. The transition probability is closely related to the strategies of players within the hyperedges. By developing a Monte Carlo simulation framework that incorporates payoff accumulation, strategy imitation, and game state transitions, we aim to reveal the coevolutionary patterns of strategies and game states in group interactions. Our study highlights a nonlinear relationship between defection sensitivity and cooperation frequency under game transitions, as well as the asymmetric effects of the two sensitivities in state-dependent transitions. These observations open new directions for how to approach social dilemmas.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Evolutionary Dynamics of Variable Games in Structured Populations

The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic properties in structured populations, derive theoretical conditions for cooperation, and identify the optimal game distribution for promoting cooperation. To address these issues, we propose the variable game framework in a structured population, where the game interactions between different individuals change over time. By means of the Markov chain and the pair approximation method, we derive theoretical conditions under which cooperation is favored by natural selection and when it is favored over defection under weak selection. Furthermore, we respectively formulate and solve two optimization problems to determine the optimal game distribution that most effectively fosters the evolution of cooperation by maximizing the gradient of cooperation selection and minimizing the fitness difference between defectors and cooperators. The theoretical predictions regarding both the conditions for cooperation and optimal game distribution are further validated by numerical calculations and extensive Monte Carlo simulations. Our findings offer novel insights into the mechanisms driving cooperative behavior in complex systems and provide theoretical guidance for designing optimal game environments that facilitate the evolution of cooperation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Supervised tax compliance and evasion from a spatial evolutionary game perspective

Taxation constitutes a fundamental component of modern national economic systems, exerting profound impacts on both societal functioning and governmental operations. In this paper, we employ an interdependent network approach to model the coevolution between citizens and regulators within a taxation system that fundamentally constitutes a public goods game framework with complex interactive dynamics. In a game layer, citizens engage in public goods games, facing the social dilemma of tax compliance (cooperation) versus evasion (defection). Tax compliance supports the sustainability of public finances while tax evasion presents markedly stronger short-term incentives. In a regulatory layer, fair regulators punish tax evaders, while corrupt regulators keep silent due to bribes. Governmental regulatory interventions introduce critical institutional constraints that alter the traditional equilibrium of the game. Importantly, there exists a strategy update not only among citizens but also among regulators. Our results indicate that strengthening penalties can effectively curb tax evasion, and the influence of bribery on both tax compliance rates and the proportion of fair regulators is nonlinear. Additionally, increasing regulators' salaries and intensifying the crackdown on corrupt regulators can foster the emergence of fair regulators, thereby reducing tax evasion among citizens. The results offer practical policy implications, suggesting that balanced deterrence and institutional fairness are essential to sustaining compliance, and point to the need for future empirical validation and model extensions.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Effects of Stochastic Games on Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations

Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote cooperative behavior significantly. Quantitative analysis, however, is limited to homogeneous populations, while realistic populations in nature are often more complex and highly heterogeneous. We hereby provide an analytical treatment of when the evolution of cooperation can be supported in stochastic games, applying to arbitrary spatial heterogeneity and payoff structure. We highlight that the rule and frequency of game changes can have surprisingly diverse effects on evolutionary outcomes, depending on the governing social dilemmas. While stochastic games favor the evolution of cooperation in donation games, this is not the case for public goods games and snowdrift games. Hence, our framework and model results offer a more subtle insight into the long-standing enigma.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2026

Fixed-Size Dynamic Scale-Free Networks: Modeling, Stationarity, and Resilience

Many real-world scale-free networks, such as neural networks and online communication networks, consist of a fixed number of nodes but exhibit dynamic edge fluctuations. However, traditional models frequently overlook scenarios where the node count remains constant, instead prioritizing node growth. In this work, we depart from the assumptions of node number variation and preferential attachment to present an innovative model that conceptualizes node degree fluctuations as a state-dependent random walk process with stasis and variable diffusion coefficient. We show that this model yields stochastic dynamic networks with stable scale-free properties. Through comprehensive theoretical and numerical analyses, we demonstrate that the degree distribution converges to a power-law distribution, provided that the lowest degree state within the network is not an absorbing state. Furthermore, we investigate the resilience of the fraction of the largest component and the average shortest path length following deliberate attacks on the network. By using three real-world networks, we confirm that the proposed model accurately replicates actual data. The proposed model thus elucidates mechanisms by which networks, devoid of growth and preferential attachment features, can still exhibit power-law distributions and be used to simulate and study the resilience of attacked fixed-size scale-free networks.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2026

Modeling Epidemic Dynamics of Mutant Strains with Evolutionary Game-based Vaccination Behavior

The outbreak of mutant strains and vaccination behaviors have been the focus of recent epidemiological research, but most existing epidemic models failed to simultaneously capture viral mutation and consider the complexity and behavioral dynamics of vaccination. To address this gap, we develop an extended SIRS model that distinguishes infections with the original strain and a mutant strain, and explicitly introduces a vaccinated compartment state. At the behavioral level, we employ evolutionary game theory to model individual vaccination decisions, where strategies are determined by both neighbors' choices and the current epidemiological situation. This process corresponds to the time-varying vaccination rate of susceptible individuals transitioning to vaccinated individuals at the epidemic spreading level. We then couple the epidemic and vaccination behavioral processes through the microscopic Markov chain approach (MMCA) and finally investigate the evolutionary dynamics via numerical simulations. The results show that our framework can effectively mitigate outbreaks across different disease scenarios. Sensitivity analysis further reveals that vaccination uptake is most strongly influenced by vaccine cost, efficacy, and perceived risk of side effects. Overall, this behavior-aware modeling framework captures the co-evolution of viral mutation and vaccination behavior, providing quantitative and theoretical support for designing effective public health vaccination policies.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2025

Evolutionary Cooperation with Game Transitions via Markov Decision Chain in Networked Population

Individual cooperative strategy influences the surrounding dynamic population, which in turn affects cooperative strategy. To better model this phenomenon, we develop a Markov decision chain based game transitions model and examine the dynamic transitions in game states of individuals within a network and their impact on the strategy's evolution. Additionally, we extend single-round strategy imitation to multiple rounds to better capture players' potential non-rational behavior. Using intensive simulations, we explore the effects of transition probabilities and game parameters on game transitions and cooperation. Our study finds that strategy-driven game transitions promote cooperation, and increasing the transition rates of Markov decision chains can significantly accelerate this process. By designing different Markov decision chains, these results provide simulation based guidance for practical applications in swarm intelligence, such as strategic collaboration.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

Evolutionary Dynamics Based on Reputation in Networked Populations with Game Transitions

The environment undergoes perpetual changes that are influenced by a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Consequently, it exerts a substantial influence on an individual's physical and psychological state, directly or indirectly affecting the evolutionary dynamics of a population described by a network, which in turn can also alter the environment. Furthermore, the evolution of strategies, shaped by reputation, can diverge due to variations in multiple factors. To explore the potential consequences of the mentioned situations, this paper studies how game and reputation dynamics alter the evolution of cooperation. Concretely, game transitions are determined by individuals' behaviors and external uncontrollable factors. The cooperation level of its neighbors reflects individuals' reputation, and further, a general fitness function regarding payoff and reputation is provided. Within the context of the donation game, we investigate the relevant outcomes associated with the aforementioned evolutionary process, considering various topologies for distinct interactions. Additionally, a biased mutation is introduced to gain a deeper insight into the strategy evolution. We detect a substantial increase in the cooperation level through intensive simulations, and some important phenomena are observed, e.g., the unilateral increase of the value of prosocial behavior limits promotion in cooperative behavior in square-lattice networks.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

Reputation assimilation mechanism for sustaining cooperation

Keeping a high reputation, by contributing to common efforts, plays a key role in explaining the evolution of collective cooperation among unrelated agents in a complex society. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily an individual feature, but may also reflect the general state of a local community. Consequently, a person with a high reputation becomes attractive not just because we can expect cooperative acts with higher probability, but also because such a person is involved in a more efficient group venture. These observations highlight the cumulative and socially transmissible nature of reputation. Interestingly, these aspects were completely ignored by previous works. To reveal the possible consequences, we introduce a spatial public goods game in which we use an assimilated reputation simultaneously characterizing the individual and its neighbors' reputation. Furthermore, a reputation-dependent synergy factor is used to capture the high (or low) quality of a specific group. Through extensive numerical simulations, we investigate how cooperation and extended reputation co-evolve, thereby revealing the dynamic influence of the assimilated reputation mechanism on the emergence and persistence of cooperation. By fostering social learning from high-reputation individuals and granting payoff advantages to high-reputation groups via an adaptive multiplier, the assimilated reputation mechanism promotes cooperation, ultimately to the systemic level.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

Evolutionary Dynamics with Self-Interaction Learning in Networked Systems

The evolution of cooperation in networked systems helps to understand the dynamics in social networks, multi-agent systems, and biological species. The self-persistence of individual strategies is common in real-world decision making. The self-replacement of strategies in evolutionary dynamics forms a selection amplifier, allows an agent to insist on its autologous strategy, and helps the networked system to avoid full defection. In this paper, we study the self-interaction learning in the networked evolutionary dynamics. We propose a self-interaction landscape to capture the strength of an agent's self-loop to reproduce the strategy based on local topology. We find that proper self-interaction can reduce the condition for cooperation and help cooperators to prevail in the system. For a system that favors the evolution of spite, the self-interaction can save cooperative agents from being harmed. Our results on random networks further suggest that an appropriate self-interaction landscape can significantly reduce the critical condition for advantageous mutants, especially for large-degree networks.

cs.SI↗