arXiv subjects

Neeldhara Misra

Publications and source records attributed to Neeldhara Misra.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Structural Parameterizations for Eternal Vertex Cover

Eternal Vertex Cover (EVC) is a turn-based attacker-defender game on an undirected graph $G$. To begin with, the defender places $k$ guards on vertices of $G$. The attacker, on their turn, can choose an edge $e$ not already occupied at both endpoints to "attack". The edge $e$ is defended if a guard moves along the edge $e$. The defender, on their turn, can move any subset of guards. A guard can only move to a neighboring vertex. The minimum number of guards needed to indefinitely defend against any sequence of attacks is called the eternal vertex cover number, generalizing the classic vertex cover number. Determining this number is NP-hard in general, motivating the study of parameterized and approximation algorithms. The problem is known to be FPT when parameterized by the cover number, but structural parameters remain relatively unexplored in the literature. In this work, we explore structural parameterizations for EVC. We show that EVC is FPT parameterized by the cluster vertex deletion number, which generalizes the previously studied parameterization by vertex cover number. We next study the problem parameterized by vertex integrity, which is the smallest number of vertices we need to delete from $G$ so that the resulting graph is a disjoint union of constant-sized components. We first show that Eternal Vertex Cover is XP parameterized by vertex integrity. Then, we develop a polynomial-time approximation algorithm, which computes an additive $6k+1$ ($g(k)$) approximation, where $k$ is equal to the cluster vertex deletion number (vertex integrity). Finally, we show a FPT algorithm for when the deletion set produces "nice" connected components, which are components that are bounded in size and satisfy a technical condition.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2026

Permutation Match Puzzles: How Young Tanvi Learned About Computational Complexity

We study a family of sorting match puzzles on grids, which we call permutation match puzzles. In this puzzle, each row and column of a $n \times n$ grid is labeled with an ordering constraint -- ascending (A) or descending (D) -- and the goal is to fill the grid with the numbers 1 through $n^2$ such that each row and column respects its constraint. We provide a complete characterization of solvable puzzles: a puzzle admits a solution if and only if its associated constraint graph is acyclic, which translates to a simple "at most one switch" condition on the A/D labels. When solutions exist, we show that their count is given by a hook length formula. For unsolvable puzzles, we present an $O(n)$ algorithm to compute the minimum number of label flips required to reach a solvable configuration. Finally, we consider a generalization where rows and columns may specify arbitrary permutations rather than simple orderings, and establish that finding minimal repairs in this setting is NP-complete by a reduction from feedback arc set.

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arXiv2025

m-Eternal Domination and Variants on Some Classes of Finite and Infinite Graphs

We study the m-Eternal Domination problem, which is the following two-player game between a defender and an attacker on a graph: initially, the defender positions k guards on vertices of the graph; the game then proceeds in turns between the defender and the attacker, with the attacker selecting a vertex and the defender responding to the attack by moving a guard to the attacked vertex. The defender may move more than one guard on their turn, but guards can only move to neighboring vertices. The defender wins a game on a graph G with k guards if the defender has a strategy such that at every point of the game the vertices occupied by guards form a dominating set of G and the attacker wins otherwise. The m-eternal domination number of a graph G is the smallest value of k for which (G,k) is a defender win. We show that m-Eternal Domination is NP-hard, as well as some of its variants, even on special classes of graphs. We also show structural results for the Domination and m-Eternal Domination problems in the context of four types of infinite regular grids: square, octagonal, hexagonal, and triangular, establishing tight bounds.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2025

On a Characterization of Spartan Graphs

The eternal vertex cover game is played between an attacker and a defender on an undirected graph $G$. The defender identifies $k$ vertices to position guards on to begin with. The attacker, on their turn, attacks an edge $e$, and the defender must move a guard along $e$ to defend the attack. The defender may move other guards as well, under the constraint that every guard moves at most once and to a neighboring vertex. The smallest number of guards required to defend attacks forever is called the eternal vertex cover number of $G$, denoted $evc(G)$. For any graph $G$, $evc(G)$ is at least the vertex cover number of $G$, denoted $mvc(G)$. A graph is Spartan if $evc(G) = mvc(G)$. It is known that a bipartite graph is Spartan if and only if every edge belongs to a perfect matching. We show that the only König graphs that are Spartan are the bipartite Spartan graphs. We also give new lower bounds for $evc(G)$, generalizing a known lower bound based on cut vertices. We finally show a new matching-based characterization of all Spartan graphs.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2025

The Cost and Complexity of Minimizing Envy in House Allocation

We study almost-envy-freeness in house allocation, where $m$ houses are to be allocated among $n$ agents so that every agent receives exactly one house. An envy-free allocation need not exist, and therefore we may have to settle for relaxations of envy-freeness. But typical relaxations such as envy-free up to one good do not make sense for house allocation, as every agent is required to receive exactly one house. Hence we turn to different aggregate measures of envy as markers of fairness. In particular, we define the amount of envy experienced by an agent $a$ w.r.t. an allocation to be the number of agents that agent $a$ envies under that allocation. We quantify the envy generated by an allocation using three different metrics: 1) the number of agents who are envious; 2) the maximum amount of envy experienced by any agent; and 3) the total amount of envy experienced by all agents, and look for allocations that minimize one of the three metrics. We thus study three computational problems corresponding to each of the three metrics and prove a host of algorithmic and hardness results. We also suggest practical approaches for these problems via integer linear program (ILP) formulations and report the findings of our experimental evaluation of ILPs. Finally, we study the price of fairness (PoF), which quantifies the loss of welfare we must suffer due to the fairness requirements, and we prove a number of results on PoF, including tight bounds as well as algorithms that simultaneously optimize both welfare and fairness.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

On the Parameterized Complexity of Diverse SAT

We study the Boolean Satisfiability problem (SAT) in the framework of diversity, where one asks for multiple solutions that are mutually far apart (i.e., sufficiently dissimilar from each other) for a suitable notion of distance/dissimilarity between solutions. Interpreting assignments as bit vectors, we take their Hamming distance to quantify dissimilarity, and we focus on problem of finding two solutions. Specifically, we define the problem MAX DIFFER SAT (resp. EXACT DIFFER SAT) as follows: Given a Boolean formula $ϕ$ on $n$ variables, decide whether $ϕ$ has two satisfying assignments that differ on at least (resp. exactly) $d$ variables. We study classical and parameterized (in parameters $d$ and $n-d$) complexities of MAX DIFFER SAT and EXACT DIFFER SAT, when restricted to some formula-classes on which SAT is known to be polynomial-time solvable. In particular, we consider affine formulas, $2$-CNF formulas and hitting formulas. For affine formulas, we show the following: Both problems are polynomial-time solvable when each equation has at most two variables. EXACT DIFFER SAT is NP-hard, even when each equation has at most three variables and each variable appears in at most four equations. Also, MAX DIFFER SAT is NP-hard, even when each equation has at most four variables. Both problems are W[1]-hard in the parameter $n-d$. In contrast, when parameterized by $d$, EXACT DIFFER SAT is W[1]-hard, but MAX DIFFER SAT admits a single-exponential FPT algorithm and a polynomial-kernel. For 2-CNF formulas, we show the following: Both problems are polynomial-time solvable when each variable appears in at most two clauses. Also, both problems are W[1]-hard in the parameter $d$ (and therefore, it turns out, also NP-hard), even on monotone inputs (i.e., formulas with no negative literals). Finally, for hitting formulas, we show that both problems are polynomial-time solvable.

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arXiv2024

Envy-Free and Efficient Allocations for Graphical Valuations

We consider the complexity of finding envy-free allocations for the class of graphical valuations. Graphical valuations were introduced by Christodoulou et. al.(2023) as a structured class of valuations that admit allocations that are envy-free up to any item (EFX). These are valuations where every item is valued by two agents, lending a (simple) graph structure to the utilities, where the agents are vertices and are adjacent if and only if they value a (unique) common item. Finding envy-free allocations for general valuations is known to be computationally intractable even for very special cases: in particular, even for binary valuations, and even for identical valuations with two agents. We show that, for binary graphical valuations, the existence of envy-free allocations can be determined in polynomial time. In contrast, we also show that allowing for even slightly more general utilities {0, 1, d} leads to intractability even for graphical valuations. This motivates other approaches to tractability, and to that end, we exhibit the fixed-parameter tractability of the problem parameterized by the vertex cover number of the graph when the number of distinct utilities is bounded. We also show that, all graphical instances that admit EF allocations also admit one that is non-wasteful. Since EFX allocations are possibly wasteful, we also address the question of determining the price of fairness of EFX allocations. We show that the price of EFX with respect to utilitarian welfare is one for binary utilities, but can be arbitrarily large {0, 1, d} valuations. We also show the hardness of deciding the existence of an EFX allocation which is also welfare-maximizing and of finding a welfare-maximizing allocation within the set of EFX allocations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

A Little Aggression Goes a Long Way

Aggression is a two-player game of troop placement and attack played on a map (modeled as a graph). Players take turns deploying troops on a territory (a vertex on the graph) until they run out. Once all troops are placed, players take turns attacking enemy territories. A territory can be attacked if it has $k$ troops and there are more than $k$ enemy troops on adjacent territories. At the end of the game, the player who controls the most territories wins. In the case of a tie, the player with more surviving troops wins. The first player to exhaust their troops in the placement phase leads the attack phase. We study the complexity of the game when the graph along with an assignment of troops and the sequence of attacks planned by the second player. Even in this restrained setting, we show that the problem of determining an optimal sequence of first player moves is NP-complete. We then analyze the game for when the input graph is a matching or a cycle.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Eternal Vertex Cover on Bipartite and Co-Bipartite Graphs

Eternal Vertex Cover problem is a dynamic variant of the vertex cover problem. We have a two player game in which guards are placed on some vertices of a graph. In every move, one player (the attacker) attacks an edge. In response to the attack, the second player (defender) moves the guards along the edges of the graph in such a manner that at least one guard moves along the attacked edge. If such a movement is not possible, then the attacker wins. If the defender can defend the graph against an infinite sequence of attacks, then the defender wins. The minimum number of guards with which the defender has a winning strategy is called the Eternal Vertex Cover Number of the graph G. On general graphs, the computational problem of determining the minimum eternal vertex cover number is NP-hard and admits a 2-approximation algorithm and an exponential kernel. The complexity of the problem on bipartite graphs is open, as is the question of whether the problem admits a polynomial kernel. We settle both these questions by showing that Eternal Vertex Cover is NP-hard and does not admit a polynomial compression even on bipartite graphs of diameter six. We also show that the problem admits a polynomial time algorithm on the class of cobipartite graphs.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

On the Complexity of the Eigenvalue Deletion Problem

For any fixed positive integer $r$ and a given budget $k$, the $r$-\textsc{Eigenvalue Vertex Deletion} ($r$-EVD) problem asks if a graph $G$ admits a subset $S$ of at most $k$ vertices such that the adjacency matrix of $G\setminus S$ has at most $r$ distinct eigenvalues. The edge deletion, edge addition, and edge editing variants are defined analogously. For $r = 1$, $r$-EVD is equivalent to the Vertex Cover problem. For $r = 2$, it turns out that $r$-EVD amounts to removing a subset $S$ of at most $k$ vertices so that $G\setminus S$ is a cluster graph where all connected components have the same size. We show that $r$-EVD is NP-complete even on bipartite graphs with maximum degree four for every fixed $r > 2$, and FPT when parameterized by the solution size and the maximum degree of the graph. We also establish several results for the special case when $r = 2$. For the vertex deletion variant, we show that $2$-EVD is NP-complete even on triangle-free and $3d$-regular graphs for any $d\geq 2$, and also NP-complete on $d$-regular graphs for any $d\geq 8$. The edge deletion, addition, and editing variants are all NP-complete for $r = 2$. The edge deletion problem admits a polynomial time algorithm if the input is a cluster graph, while the edge addition variant is hard even when the input is a cluster graph. We show that the edge addition variant has a quadratic kernel. The edge deletion and vertex deletion variants are FPT when parameterized by the solution size alone. Our main contribution is to develop the complexity landscape for the problem of modifying a graph with the aim of reducing the number of distinct eigenvalues in the spectrum of its adjacency matrix. It turns out that this captures, apart from Vertex Cover, also a natural variation of the problem of modifying to a cluster graph as a special case, which we believe may be of independent interest.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

Parameterized Aspects of Distinct Kemeny Rank Aggregation

The Kemeny method is one of the popular tools for rank aggregation. However, computing an optimal Kemeny ranking is NP-hard. Consequently, the computational task of finding a Kemeny ranking has been studied under the lens of parameterized complexity with respect to many parameters. We first present a comprehensive relationship, both theoretical and empirical, among these parameters. Further, we study the problem of computing all distinct Kemeny rankings under the lens of parameterized complexity. We consider the target Kemeny score, number of candidates, average distance of input rankings, maximum range of any candidate, and unanimity width as our parameters. For all these parameters, we already have FPT algorithms. We find that any desirable number of Kemeny rankings can also be found without substantial increase in running time. We also present FPT approximation algorithms for Kemeny rank aggregation with respect to these parameters.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

Spartan Bipartite Graphs are Essentially Elementary

We study a two-player game on a graph between an attacker and a defender. To begin with, the defender places guards on a subset of vertices. In each move, the attacker attacks an edge. The defender must move at least one guard across the attacked edge to defend the attack. The defender wins if and only if the defender can defend an infinite sequence of attacks. The smallest number of guards with which the defender has a winning strategy is called the eternal vertex cover number of a graph $G$ and is denoted by $evc(G)$. It is clear that $evc(G)$ is at least $mvc(G)$, the size of a minimum vertex cover of $G$. We say that $G$ is Spartan if $evc(G) = mvc(G)$. The characterization of Spartan graphs has been largely open. In the setting of bipartite graphs on $2n$ vertices where every edge belongs to a perfect matching, an easy strategy is to have $n$ guards that always move along perfect matchings in response to attacks. We show that these are essentially the only Spartan bipartite graphs.

cs.DM↗

arXiv2023

The Price of Equity with Binary Valuations and Few Agent Types

In fair division problems, the notion of price of fairness measures the loss in welfare due to a fairness constraint. Prior work on the price of fairness has focused primarily on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) as the fairness constraint, and on the utilitarian and egalitarian welfare measures. Our work instead focuses on the price of equitability up to one good (EQ1) (which we term price of equity) and considers the broad class of generalized $p$-mean welfare measures (which includes utilitarian, egalitarian, and Nash welfare as special cases). We derive fine-grained bounds on the price of equity in terms of the number of agent types (i.e., the maximum number of agents with distinct valuations), which allows us to identify scenarios where the existing bounds in terms of the number of agents are overly pessimistic. Our work focuses on the setting with binary additive valuations, and obtains upper and lower bounds on the price of equity for $p$-mean welfare for all $p \leqslant 1$. For any fixed $p$, our bounds are tight up to constant factors. A useful insight of our work is to identify the structure of allocations that underlie the upper (respectively, the lower) bounds simultaneously for all $p$-mean welfare measures, thus providing a unified structural understanding of price of fairness in this setting. This structural understanding, in fact, extends to the more general class of binary submodular (or matroid rank) valuations. We also show that, unlike binary additive valuations, for binary submodular valuations the number of agent types does not provide bounds on the price of equity.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Romeo and Juliet Meeting in Forest Like Regions

The game of rendezvous with adversaries is a game on a graph played by two players: Facilitator and Divider. Facilitator has two agents and Divider has a team of $k \ge 1$ agents. While the initial positions of Facilitator's agents are fixed, Divider gets to select the initial positions of his agents. Then, they take turns to move their agents to adjacent vertices (or stay put) with Facilitator's goal to bring both her agents at same vertex and Divider's goal to prevent it. The computational question of interest is to determine if Facilitator has a winning strategy against Divider with $k$ agents. Fomin, Golovach, and Thilikos [WG, 2021] introduced this game and proved that it is PSPACE-hard and co-W[2]-hard parameterized by the number of agents. This hardness naturally motivates the structural parameterization of the problem. The authors proved that it admits an FPT algorithm when parameterized by the modular width and the number of allowed rounds. However, they left open the complexity of the problem from the perspective of other structural parameters. In particular, they explicitly asked whether the problem admits an FPT or XP-algorithm with respect to the treewidth of the input graph. We answer this question in the negative and show that Rendezvous is co-NP-hard even for graphs of constant treewidth. Further, we show that the problem is co-W[1]-hard when parameterized by the feedback vertex set number and the number of agents, and is unlikely to admit a polynomial kernel when parameterized by the vertex cover number and the number of agents. Complementing these hardness results, we show that the Rendezvous is FPT when parameterized by both the vertex cover number and the solution size. Finally, for graphs of treewidth at most two and girds, we show that the problem can be solved in polynomial time.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2022

Chess is hard even for a single player

We introduce a generalization of "Solo Chess", a single-player variant of the game that can be played on chess.com. The standard version of the game is played on a regular 8 x 8 chessboard by a single player, with only white pieces, using the following rules: every move must capture a piece, no piece may capture more than 2 times, and if there is a King on the board, it must be the final piece. The goal is to clear the board, i.e, make a sequence of captures after which only one piece is left. We generalize this game to unbounded boards with $n$ pieces, each of which have a given number of captures that they are permitted to make. We show that Generalized Solo Chess is NP-complete, even when it is played by only rooks that have at most two captures remaining. It also turns out to be NP-complete even when every piece is a queen with exactly two captures remaining in the initial configuration. In contrast, we show that solvable instances of Generalized Solo Chess can be completely characterized when the game is: a) played by rooks on a one-dimensional board, and b) played by pawns with two captures left on a 2D board. Inspired by Generalized Solo Chess, we also introduce the Graph Capture Game, which involves clearing a graph of tokens via captures along edges. This game subsumes Generalized Solo Chess played by knights. We show that the Graph Capture Game is NP-complete for undirected graphs and DAGs.

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arXiv2021

On Fair Division with Binary Valuations Respecting Social Networks

We study the computational complexity of finding fair allocations of indivisible goods in the setting where a social network on the agents is given. Notions of fairness in this context are "localized", that is, agents are only concerned about the bundles allocated to their neighbors, rather than every other agent in the system. We comprehensively address the computational complexity of finding locally envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in the setting where the agents have binary valuations for the goods and the underlying social network is modeled by an undirected graph. We study the problem in the framework of parameterized complexity. We show that the problem is computationally intractable even in fairly restricted scenarios, for instance, even when the underlying graph is a path. We show NP-hardness for settings where the graph has only two distinct valuations among the agents. We demonstrate W-hardness with respect to the number of goods or the size of the vertex cover of the underlying graph. We also consider notions of proportionality that respect the structure of the underlying graph and show that two natural versions of this notion have different complexities: allocating according to the notion that accounts for locality to the greatest degree turns out to be computationally intractable, while for other notions, the allocation problem can be modeled as a structured ILP which can be solved efficiently.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Equitable Division of a Path

We study fair resource allocation under a connectedness constraint wherein a set of indivisible items are arranged on a path and only connected subsets of items may be allocated to the agents. An allocation is deemed fair if it satisfies equitability up to one good (EQ1), which requires that agents' utilities are approximately equal. We show that achieving EQ1 in conjunction with well-studied measures of economic efficiency (such as Pareto optimality, non-wastefulness, maximum egalitarian or utilitarian welfare) is computationally hard even for binary additive valuations. On the algorithmic side, we show that by relaxing the efficiency requirement, a connected EQ1 allocation can be computed in polynomial time for any given ordering of agents, even for general monotone valuations. Interestingly, the allocation computed by our algorithm has the highest egalitarian welfare among all allocations consistent with the given ordering. On the other hand, if efficiency is required, then tractability can still be achieved for binary additive valuations with interval structure. On our way, we strengthen some of the existing results in the literature for other fairness notions such as envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), and also provide novel results for negatively-valued items or chores.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Planar F-Deletion: Approximation, Kernelization and Optimal FPT Algorithms

Let F be a finite set of graphs. In the F-Deletion problem, we are given an n-vertex graph G and an integer k as input, and asked whether at most k vertices can be deleted from G such that the resulting graph does not contain a graph from F as a minor. F-Deletion is a generic problem and by selecting different sets of forbidden minors F, one can obtain various fundamental problems such as Vertex Cover, Feedback Vertex Set or Treewidth t-Deletion. In this paper we obtain a number of generic algorithmic results about Planar F-Deletion, when F contains at least one planar graph. The highlights of our work are - A constant factor approximation algorithm for the optimization version of Planar F-Deletion. - A randomized linear time and single exponential parameterized algorithm, that is, an algorithm running in time O(2^{O(k)} n), for the parameterized version of Planar F-deletion where all graphs in F are connected. The algorithm can be made deterministic at the cost of making the polynomial factor in the running time n*log^2 n rather than linear. - A polynomial kernel for parameterized Planar F-deletion These algorithms unify, generalize, and improve a multitude of results in the literature. Our main results have several direct applications, but also the methods we develop on the way have applicability beyond the scope of this paper. Our results -- constant factor approximation, polynomial kernelization and FPT algorithms -- are stringed together by a common theme of polynomial time preprocessing.

cs.DS↗