arXiv subjects

Nicholas Mattei

Publications and source records attributed to Nicholas Mattei.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

Value-based Fast and Slow AI Nudging

Nudging is a behavioral strategy aimed at influencing people's thoughts and actions. Nudging techniques can be found in many situations in our daily lives, and these nudging techniques can targeted at human fast and unconscious thinking, e.g., by using images to generate fear or the more careful and effortful slow thinking, e.g., by releasing information that makes us reflect on our choices. In this paper, we propose and discuss a value-based AI-human collaborative framework where AI systems nudge humans by proposing decision recommendations. Three different nudging modalities, based on when recommendations are presented to the human, are intended to stimulate human fast thinking, slow thinking, or meta-cognition. Values that are relevant to a specific decision scenario are used to decide when and how to use each of these nudging modalities. Examples of values are decision quality, speed, human upskilling and learning, human agency, and privacy. Several values can be present at the same time, and their priorities can vary over time. The framework treats values as parameters to be instantiated in a specific decision environment.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Pandering in a Flexible Representative Democracy

In representative democracies, the election of new representatives in regular election cycles is meant to prevent corruption and other misbehavior by elected officials and to keep them accountable in service of the ``will of the people." This democratic ideal can be undermined when candidates are dishonest when campaigning for election over these multiple cycles or rounds of voting. Much of the work on COMSOC to date has investigated strategic actions in only a single round. We introduce a novel formal model of \emph{pandering}, or strategic preference reporting by candidates seeking to be elected, and examine the resilience of two democratic voting systems to pandering within a single round and across multiple rounds. The two voting systems we compare are Representative Democracy (RD) and Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD). For each voting system, our analysis centers on the types of strategies candidates employ and how voters update their views of candidates based on how the candidates have pandered in the past. We provide theoretical results on the complexity of pandering in our setting for a single cycle, formulate our problem for multiple cycles as a Markov Decision Process, and use reinforcement learning to study the effects of pandering by both single candidates and groups of candidates across a number of rounds.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Flexible Representative Democracy: An Introduction with Binary Issues

We introduce Flexible Representative Democracy (FRD), a novel hybrid of Representative Democracy (RD) and Direct Democracy (DD) in which voters can alter the issue-dependent weights of a set of elected representatives. In line with the literature on Interactive Democracy, our model allows the voters to actively determine the degree to which the system is direct versus representative. However, unlike Liquid Democracy, Flexible Representative Democracy uses strictly non-transitive delegations, making delegation cycles impossible, and maintains a fixed set of accountable, elected representatives. We present FRD and analyze it using a computational approach with issues that are binary and symmetric. We compare the outcomes of various voting systems using Direct Democracy with majority voting as an ideal baseline. First, we demonstrate the shortcomings of Representative Democracy in our model. We provide NP-Hardness results for electing an ideal set of representatives, discuss pathologies, and demonstrate empirically that common multi-winner election rules for selecting representatives do not perform well in expectation. To analyze the effects of adding flexibility, we begin by providing theoretical results on how issue-specific delegations determine outcomes. Finally, we provide empirical results comparing the outcomes of Representative Democracy, proxy voting with fixed sets of proxies across issues, and Flexible Representative Democracy with issue-specific delegations. Our results show that variants of Proxy Voting yield no discernible benefit over unweighted representatives and reveal the potential for Flexible Representative Democracy to improve outcomes as voter participation increases.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Computing Welfare-Maximizing Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods

We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents' utilities. We focus on two tractable fairness concepts: envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and proportionality up to one item (PROP1). We consider two computational problems: (1) Among the utilitarian-maximal allocations, decide whether there exists one that is also fair; (2) among the fair allocations, compute one that maximizes the utilitarian welfare. We show that both problems are strongly NP-hard when the number of agents is variable, and remain NP-hard for a fixed number of agents greater than two. For the special case of two agents, we find that problem (1) is polynomial-time solvable, while problem (2) remains NP-hard. Finally, with a fixed number of agents, we design pseudopolynomial-time algorithms for both problems. We extend our results to the stronger fairness notions envy-freeness up to any item (EFx) and proportionality up to any item (PROPx).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Who Pays? Personalization, Bossiness and the Cost of Fairness

Fairness-aware recommender systems that have a provider-side fairness concern seek to ensure that protected group(s) of providers have a fair opportunity to promote their items or products. There is a ``cost of fairness'' borne by the consumer side of the interaction when such a solution is implemented. This consumer-side cost raises its own questions of fairness, particularly when personalization is used to control the impact of the fairness constraint. In adopting a personalized approach to the fairness objective, researchers may be opening their systems up to strategic behavior on the part of users. This type of incentive has been studied in the computational social choice literature under the terminology of ``bossiness''. The concern is that a bossy user may be able to shift the cost of fairness to others, improving their own outcomes and worsening those for others. This position paper introduces the concept of bossiness, shows its application in fairness-aware recommendation and discusses strategies for reducing this strategic incentive.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2022

Towards Group Learning: Distributed Weighting of Experts

Aggregating signals from a collection of noisy sources is a fundamental problem in many domains including crowd-sourcing, multi-agent planning, sensor networks, signal processing, voting, ensemble learning, and federated learning. The core question is how to aggregate signals from multiple sources (e.g. experts) in order to reveal an underlying ground truth. While a full answer depends on the type of signal, correlation of signals, and desired output, a problem common to all of these applications is that of differentiating sources based on their quality and weighting them accordingly. It is often assumed that this differentiation and aggregation is done by a single, accurate central mechanism or agent (e.g. judge). We complicate this model in two ways. First, we investigate the setting with both a single judge, and one with multiple judges. Second, given this multi-agent interaction of judges, we investigate various constraints on the judges' reporting space. We build on known results for the optimal weighting of experts and prove that an ensemble of sub-optimal mechanisms can perform optimally under certain conditions. We then show empirically that the ensemble approximates the performance of the optimal mechanism under a broader range of conditions.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Learning Behavioral Soft Constraints from Demonstrations

Many real-life scenarios require humans to make difficult trade-offs: do we always follow all the traffic rules or do we violate the speed limit in an emergency? These scenarios force us to evaluate the trade-off between collective rules and norms with our own personal objectives and desires. To create effective AI-human teams, we must equip AI agents with a model of how humans make these trade-offs in complex environments when there are implicit and explicit rules and constraints. Agent equipped with these models will be able to mirror human behavior and/or to draw human attention to situations where decision making could be improved. To this end, we propose a novel inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) method: Max Entropy Inverse Soft Constraint IRL (MESC-IRL), for learning implicit hard and soft constraints over states, actions, and state features from demonstrations in deterministic and non-deterministic environments modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). Our method enables agents implicitly learn human constraints and desires without the need for explicit modeling by the agent designer and to transfer these constraints between environments. Our novel method generalizes prior work which only considered deterministic hard constraints and achieves state of the art performance.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Group Fairness in Bandit Arm Selection

We propose a novel formulation of group fairness with biased feedback in the contextual multi-armed bandit (CMAB) setting. In the CMAB setting, a sequential decision maker must, at each time step, choose an arm to pull from a finite set of arms after observing some context for each of the potential arm pulls. In our model, arms are partitioned into two or more sensitive groups based on some protected feature(s) (e.g., age, race, or socio-economic status). Initial rewards received from pulling an arm may be distorted due to some unknown societal or measurement bias. We assume that in reality these groups are equal despite the biased feedback received by the agent. To alleviate this, we learn a societal bias term which can be used to both find the source of bias and to potentially fix the problem outside of the algorithm. We provide a novel algorithm that can accommodate this notion of fairness for an arbitrary number of groups, and provide a theoretical bound on the regret for our algorithm. We validate our algorithm using synthetic data and two real-world datasets for intervention settings wherein we want to allocate resources fairly across groups.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Combining Fast and Slow Thinking for Human-like and Efficient Navigation in Constrained Environments

Current AI systems lack several important human capabilities, such as adaptability, generalizability, self-control, consistency, common sense, and causal reasoning. We believe that existing cognitive theories of human decision making, such as the thinking fast and slow theory, can provide insights on how to advance AI systems towards some of these capabilities. In this paper, we propose a general architecture that is based on fast/slow solvers and a metacognitive component. We then present experimental results on the behavior of an instance of this architecture, for AI systems that make decisions about navigating in a constrained environment. We show how combining the fast and slow decision modalities allows the system to evolve over time and gradually pass from slow to fast thinking with enough experience, and that this greatly helps in decision quality, resource consumption, and efficiency.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

When Is It Acceptable to Break the Rules? Knowledge Representation of Moral Judgement Based on Empirical Data

One of the most remarkable things about the human moral mind is its flexibility. We can make moral judgments about cases we have never seen before. We can decide that pre-established rules should be broken. We can invent novel rules on the fly. Capturing this flexibility is one of the central challenges in developing AI systems that can interpret and produce human-like moral judgment. This paper details the results of a study of real-world decision makers who judge whether it is acceptable to break a well-established norm: ``no cutting in line.'' We gather data on how human participants judge the acceptability of line-cutting in a range of scenarios. Then, in order to effectively embed these reasoning capabilities into a machine, we propose a method for modeling them using a preference-based structure, which captures a novel modification to standard ``dual process'' theories of moral judgment.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

Thinking Fast and Slow in AI: the Role of Metacognition

AI systems have seen dramatic advancement in recent years, bringing many applications that pervade our everyday life. However, we are still mostly seeing instances of narrow AI: many of these recent developments are typically focused on a very limited set of competencies and goals, e.g., image interpretation, natural language processing, classification, prediction, and many others. Moreover, while these successes can be accredited to improved algorithms and techniques, they are also tightly linked to the availability of huge datasets and computational power. State-of-the-art AI still lacks many capabilities that would naturally be included in a notion of (human) intelligence. We argue that a better study of the mechanisms that allow humans to have these capabilities can help us understand how to imbue AI systems with these competencies. We focus especially on D. Kahneman's theory of thinking fast and slow, and we propose a multi-agent AI architecture where incoming problems are solved by either system 1 (or "fast") agents, that react by exploiting only past experience, or by system 2 (or "slow") agents, that are deliberately activated when there is the need to reason and search for optimal solutions beyond what is expected from the system 1 agent. Both kinds of agents are supported by a model of the world, containing domain knowledge about the environment, and a model of "self", containing information about past actions of the system and solvers' skills.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

Making Human-Like Trade-offs in Constrained Environments by Learning from Demonstrations

Many real-life scenarios require humans to make difficult trade-offs: do we always follow all the traffic rules or do we violate the speed limit in an emergency? These scenarios force us to evaluate the trade-off between collective norms and our own personal objectives. To create effective AI-human teams, we must equip AI agents with a model of how humans make trade-offs in complex, constrained environments. These agents will be able to mirror human behavior or to draw human attention to situations where decision making could be improved. To this end, we propose a novel inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) method for learning implicit hard and soft constraints from demonstrations, enabling agents to quickly adapt to new settings. In addition, learning soft constraints over states, actions, and state features allows agents to transfer this knowledge to new domains that share similar aspects. We then use the constraint learning method to implement a novel system architecture that leverages a cognitive model of human decision making, multi-alternative decision field theory (MDFT), to orchestrate competing objectives. We evaluate the resulting agent on trajectory length, number of violated constraints, and total reward, demonstrating that our agent architecture is both general and achieves strong performance. Thus we are able to capture and replicate human-like trade-offs from demonstrations in environments when constraints are not explicit.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

Peer Selection with Noisy Assessments

In the peer selection problem a group of agents must select a subset of themselves as winners for, e.g., peer-reviewed grants or prizes. Here, we take a Condorcet view of this aggregation problem, i.e., that there is a ground-truth ordering over the agents and we wish to select the best set of agents, subject to the noisy assessments of the peers. Given this model, some agents may be unreliable, while others might be self-interested, attempting to influence the outcome in their favour. In this paper we extend PeerNomination, the most accurate peer reviewing algorithm to date, into WeightedPeerNomination, which is able to handle noisy and inaccurate agents. To do this, we explicitly formulate assessors' reliability weights in a way that does not violate strategyproofness, and use this information to reweight their scores. We show analytically that a weighting scheme can improve the overall accuracy of the selection significantly. Finally, we implement several instances of reweighting methods and show empirically that our methods are robust in the face of noisy assessments.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Thinking Fast and Slow in AI

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

Modeling Voters in Multi-Winner Approval Voting

In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting and, in scenarios such as committee or board elections, employing voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent submits a ballot consisting of approvals for as many candidates as they wish, and winners are chosen by tallying up the votes and choosing the top-$k$ candidates receiving the most approvals. In many scenarios, an agent may manipulate the ballot they submit in order to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their true preferences. In complex and uncertain situations, agents may use heuristics instead of incurring the additional effort required to compute the manipulation which most favors them. In this paper, we examine voting behavior in single-winner and multi-winner approval voting scenarios with varying degrees of uncertainty using behavioral data obtained from Mechanical Turk. We find that people generally manipulate their vote to obtain a better outcome, but often do not identify the optimal manipulation. There are a number of predictive models of agent behavior in the COMSOC and psychology literature that are based on cognitively plausible heuristic strategies. We show that the existing approaches do not adequately model real-world data. We propose a novel model that takes into account the size of the winning set and human cognitive constraints, and demonstrate that this model is more effective at capturing real-world behaviors in multi-winner approval voting scenarios.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

"And the Winner Is...": Dynamic Lotteries for Multi-group Fairness-Aware Recommendation

As recommender systems are being designed and deployed for an increasing number of socially-consequential applications, it has become important to consider what properties of fairness these systems exhibit. There has been considerable research on recommendation fairness. However, we argue that the previous literature has been based on simple, uniform and often uni-dimensional notions of fairness assumptions that do not recognize the real-world complexities of fairness-aware applications. In this paper, we explicitly represent the design decisions that enter into the trade-off between accuracy and fairness across multiply-defined and intersecting protected groups, supporting multiple fairness metrics. The framework also allows the recommender to adjust its performance based on the historical view of recommendations that have been delivered over a time horizon, dynamically rebalancing between fairness concerns. Within this framework, we formulate lottery-based mechanisms for choosing between fairness concerns, and demonstrate their performance in two recommendation domains.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2020

PeerNomination: Relaxing Exactness for Increased Accuracy in Peer Selection

In peer selection agents must choose a subset of themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are self-interested, we want to design algorithms that are impartial, so that an individual agent cannot affect their own chance of being selected. This problem has broad application in resource allocation and mechanism design and has received substantial attention in the artificial intelligence literature. Here, we present a novel algorithm for impartial peer selection, PeerNomination, and provide a theoretical analysis of its accuracy. Our algorithm possesses various desirable features. In particular, it does not require an explicit partitioning of the agents, as previous algorithms in the literature. We show empirically that it achieves higher accuracy than the exiting algorithms over several metrics.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

A Multi-Channel Neural Graphical Event Model with Negative Evidence

Event datasets are sequences of events of various types occurring irregularly over the time-line, and they are increasingly prevalent in numerous domains. Existing work for modeling events using conditional intensities rely on either using some underlying parametric form to capture historical dependencies, or on non-parametric models that focus primarily on tasks such as prediction. We propose a non-parametric deep neural network approach in order to estimate the underlying intensity functions. We use a novel multi-channel RNN that optimally reinforces the negative evidence of no observable events with the introduction of fake event epochs within each consecutive inter-event interval. We evaluate our method against state-of-the-art baselines on model fitting tasks as gauged by log-likelihood. Through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, we find that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines on most of the datasets studied.

cs.LG↗