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Nicola Gatti

Publications and source records attributed to Nicola Gatti.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Learning Constrained Markov Decision Processes With Non-stationary Rewards and Constraints

In constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) with adversarial rewards and constraints, a well-known impossibility result prevents any algorithm from attaining both sublinear regret and sublinear constraint violation, when competing against a best-in-hindsight policy that satisfies constraints on average. In this paper, we show that this negative result can be eased in CMDPs with non-stationary rewards and constraints, by providing algorithms whose performances smoothly degrade as non-stationarity increases. Specifically, we propose algorithms attaining $\tilde{\mathcal{O}} (\sqrt{T} + C)$ regret and positive constraint violation under bandit feedback, where $C$ is a corruption value measuring the environment non-stationarity. This can be $Θ(T)$ in the worst case, coherently with the impossibility result for adversarial CMDPs. First, we design an algorithm with the desired guarantees when $C$ is known. Then, in the case $C$ is unknown, we show how to obtain the same results by embedding such an algorithm in a general meta-procedure. This is of independent interest, as it can be applied to any non-stationary constrained online learning setting.

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A Best-of-Both-Worlds Algorithm for Constrained MDPs with Long-Term Constraints

We study online learning in episodic constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs), where the learner aims at collecting as much reward as possible over the episodes, while satisfying some long-term constraints during the learning process. Rewards and constraints can be selected either stochastically or adversarially, and the transition function is not known to the learner. While online learning in classical (unconstrained) MDPs has received considerable attention over the last years, the setting of CMDPs is still largely unexplored. This is surprising, since in real-world applications, such as, e.g., autonomous driving, automated bidding, and recommender systems, there are usually additional constraints and specifications that an agent has to obey during the learning process. In this paper, we provide the first best-of-both-worlds algorithm for CMDPs with long-term constraints, in the flavor of Balseiro et al. (2023). Our algorithm is capable of handling settings in which rewards and constraints are selected either stochastically or adversarially, without requiring any knowledge of the underling process. Moreover, our algorithm matches state-of-the-art regret and constraint violation bounds for settings in which constraints are selected stochastically, while it is the first to provide guarantees in the case in which they are chosen adversarially.

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Constrained Phi-Equilibria

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

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A Primal-Dual Online Learning Approach for Dynamic Pricing of Sequentially Displayed Complementary Items under Sale Constraints

We address the challenging problem of dynamically pricing complementary items that are sequentially displayed to customers. An illustrative example is the online sale of flight tickets, where customers navigate through multiple web pages. Initially, they view the ticket cost, followed by ancillary expenses such as insurance and additional luggage fees. Coherent pricing policies for complementary items are essential because optimizing the pricing of each item individually is ineffective. Our scenario also involves a sales constraint, which specifies a minimum number of items to sell, and uncertainty regarding customer demand curves. To tackle this problem, we originally formulate it as a Markov Decision Process with constraints. Leveraging online learning tools, we design a primal-dual online optimization algorithm. We empirically evaluate our approach using synthetic settings randomly generated from real-world data, covering various configurations from stationary to non-stationary, and compare its performance in terms of constraints violation and regret against well-known baselines optimizing each state singularly.

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Learning Optimal Contracts: How to Exploit Small Action Spaces

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{4/5})$ regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

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Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games

We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated, communication, and certification equilibria. We observe that optimal equilibria are minimax equilibrium strategies of a player in an extensive-form zero-sum game. This reformulation allows to apply techniques for learning in zero-sum games, yielding the first learning dynamics that converge to optimal equilibria, not only in empirical averages, but also in iterates. We demonstrate the practical scalability and flexibility of our approach by attaining state-of-the-art performance in benchmark tabular games, and by computing an optimal mechanism for a sequential auction design problem using deep reinforcement learning.

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The Sample Complexity of Stackelberg Games

Stackelberg games (SGs) constitute the most fundamental and acclaimed models of strategic interactions involving some form of commitment. Moreover, they form the basis of more elaborate models of this kind, such as, e.g., Bayesian persuasion and principal-agent problems. Addressing learning tasks in SGs and related models is crucial to operationalize them in practice, where model parameters are usually unknown. In this paper, we revise the sample complexity of learning an optimal strategy to commit to in SGs. We provide a novel algorithm that (i) does not require any of the limiting assumptions made by state-of-the-art approaches and (ii) deals with a trade-off between sample complexity and termination probability arising when leader's strategies representation has finite precision. Such a trade-off has been completely neglected by existing algorithms and, if not properly managed, it may result in them using exponentially-many samples. Our algorithm requires novel techniques, which also pave the way to addressing learning problems in other models with commitment ubiquitous in the real world.

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Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratch

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings in which sender and receivers interact sequentially. Recently, Markov persuasion processes (MPPs) have been introduced to capture sequential scenarios where a sender faces a stream of myopic receivers in a Markovian environment. The MPPs studied so far in the literature suffer from issues that prevent them from being fully operational in practice, e.g., they assume that the sender knows receivers' rewards. We fix such issues by addressing MPPs where the sender has no knowledge about the environment. We design a learning algorithm for the sender, working with partial feedback. We prove that its regret with respect to an optimal information-disclosure policy grows sublinearly in the number of episodes, as it is the case for the loss in persuasiveness cumulated while learning. Moreover, we provide a lower bound for our setting matching the guarantees of our algorithm.

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Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, and the joint action induces outcomes according to an arbitrary distribution. We study two classes of mechanisms: a class of deterministic mechanisms that is the natural extension of single-agent contracts, in which the agents play a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the contract, and a class of randomized mechanisms that is inspired by single-agent randomized contracts and correlated equilibria.

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Autoregressive Bandits

Autoregressive processes naturally arise in a large variety of real-world scenarios, including stock markets, sales forecasting, weather prediction, advertising, and pricing. When facing a sequential decision-making problem in such a context, the temporal dependence between consecutive observations should be properly accounted for guaranteeing convergence to the optimal policy. In this work, we propose a novel online learning setting, namely, Autoregressive Bandits (ARBs), in which the observed reward is governed by an autoregressive process of order $k$, whose parameters depend on the chosen action. We show that, under mild assumptions on the reward process, the optimal policy can be conveniently computed. Then, we devise a new optimistic regret minimization algorithm, namely, AutoRegressive Upper Confidence Bound (AR-UCB), that suffers sublinear regret of order $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}} \left( \frac{(k+1)^{3/2}\sqrt{nT}}{(1-Γ)^2}\right)$, where $T$ is the optimization horizon, $n$ is the number of actions, and $Γ< 1$ is a stability index of the process. Finally, we empirically validate our algorithm, illustrating its advantages w.r.t. bandit baselines and its robustness to misspecification of key parameters.

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$(ε, u)$-Adaptive Regret Minimization in Heavy-Tailed Bandits

Heavy-tailed distributions naturally arise in several settings, from finance to telecommunications. While regret minimization under subgaussian or bounded rewards has been widely studied, learning with heavy-tailed distributions only gained popularity over the last decade. In this paper, we consider the setting in which the reward distributions have finite absolute raw moments of maximum order $1+ε$, uniformly bounded by a constant $u<+\infty$, for some $ε\in (0,1]$. In this setting, we study the regret minimization problem when $ε$ and $u$ are unknown to the learner and it has to adapt. First, we show that adaptation comes at a cost and derive two negative results proving that the same regret guarantees of the non-adaptive case cannot be achieved with no further assumptions. Then, we devise and analyze a fully data-driven trimmed mean estimator and propose a novel adaptive regret minimization algorithm, AdaR-UCB, that leverages such an estimator. Finally, we show that AdaR-UCB is the first algorithm that, under a known distributional assumption, enjoys regret guarantees nearly matching those of the non-adaptive heavy-tailed case.

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Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$ regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

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Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for \emph{information acquisition} scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed \emph{receiver} and a set of informed \emph{senders}. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal \emph{incentive compatible} (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the \emph{online} problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the \emph{cumulative regret} w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the \emph{cumulative violation} of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, \emph{i.e.,} the \emph{full} and \emph{bandit feedback} settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees $\tilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt T)$ regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains $\tilde{\mathcal O}(T^α)$ regret and $\tilde{\mathcal O}(T^{1-α/2})$ violation for any $α\in[1/2, 1]$. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

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Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender repeatedly faces one or more receivers with unknown and adversarially selected types. First, we show how to obtain a tight $\tilde O(T^{1/2})$ regret bound in the case in which the sender faces a single receiver and has partial feedback, improving over the best previously known bound of $\tilde O(T^{4/5})$. Then, we provide the first no-regret guarantees for the multi-receiver setting under partial feedback. Finally, we show how to design no-regret algorithms with polynomial per-iteration running time by exploiting type reporting, thereby circumventing known intractability results on online Bayesian persuasion. We provide efficient algorithms guaranteeing a $O(T^{1/2})$ regret upper bound both in the single- and multi-receiver scenario when type reporting is allowed.

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Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcome

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. These are problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme in order to incentivize some agents to take costly, unobservable actions that lead to favorable outcomes. Previous works on multi-agent problems study models where the principal observes a single outcome determined by the actions of all the agents. Such models considerably limit the contracting power of the principal, since payments can only depend on the joint result of all the agents' actions, and there is no way of paying each agent for their individual result. In this paper, we consider a model in which each agent determines their own individual outcome as an effect of their action only, the principal observes all the individual outcomes separately, and they perceive a reward that jointly depends on all these outcomes. This considerably enhances the principal's contracting capabilities, by allowing them to pay each agent on the basis of their individual result. We analyze the computational complexity of finding principal-optimal contracts, revolving around two newly-introduced properties of principal's rewards, which we call IR-supermodularity and DR-submodularity. Intuitively, the former captures settings with increasing returns, where the rewards grow faster as the agents' effort increases, while the latter models the case of diminishing returns, in which rewards grow slower instead. These two properties naturally model two common real-world phenomena, namely diseconomies and economies of scale. In this paper, we first address basic instances in which the principal knows everything about the agents, and, then, more general Bayesian instances where each agent has their own private type determining their features, such as action costs and how actions stochastically determine individual outcomes.

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Selling Information while Being an Interested Party

We study the algorithmic problem faced by an information holder (seller) who wants to optimally sell such information to a budged-constrained decision maker (buyer) that has to undertake some action. Differently from previous, we consider the case in which the seller is an interested party, as the action chosen by the buyer does not only influence their utility, but also seller's one. This happens in many real-world settings, where the way in which businesses use acquired information may positively or negatively affect the seller, due to the presence of externalities on the information market. The utilities of both the seller and the buyer depend on a random state of nature, which is revealed to the seller, but it is unknown to the buyer. Thus, the seller's goal is to (partially) sell their information about the state of nature to the buyer, so as to concurrently maximize revenue and induce the buyer to take a desirable action. We study settings in which buyer's budget and utilities are determined by a random buyer's type that is unknown to the seller. In such settings, an optimal protocol for the seller must propose to the buyer a menu of information-revelation policies to choose from, with the latter acquiring one of them by paying its corresponding price. Moreover, since in our model the seller is an interested party, an optimal protocol must also prescribe the seller to pay back the buyer contingently on their action. First, we show that the problem of computing a seller-optimal protocol can be solved in polynomial time. Next, we switch the attention to the case in which a seller's protocol employs a single information-revelation policy, rather than proposing a menu, deriving both positive and negative results.

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Dynamic Pricing with Volume Discounts in Online Settings

According to the main international reports, more pervasive industrial and business-process automation, thanks to machine learning and advanced analytic tools, will unlock more than 14 trillion USD worldwide annually by 2030. In the specific case of pricing problems-which constitute the class of problems we investigate in this paper-, the estimated unlocked value will be about 0.5 trillion USD per year. In particular, this paper focuses on pricing in e-commerce when the objective function is profit maximization and only transaction data are available. This setting is one of the most common in real-world applications. Our work aims to find a pricing strategy that allows defining optimal prices at different volume thresholds to serve different classes of users. Furthermore, we face the major challenge, common in real-world settings, of dealing with limited data available. We design a two-phase online learning algorithm, namely PVD-B, capable of exploiting the data incrementally in an online fashion. The algorithm first estimates the demand curve and retrieves the optimal average price, and subsequently it offers discounts to differentiate the prices for each volume threshold. We ran a real-world 4-month-long A/B testing experiment in collaboration with an Italian e-commerce company, in which our algorithm PVD-B-corresponding to A configuration-has been compared with human pricing specialists-corresponding to B configuration. At the end of the experiment, our algorithm produced a total turnover of about 300 KEuros, outperforming the B configuration performance by about 55%. The Italian company we collaborated with decided to adopt our algorithm for more than 1,200 products since January 2022.

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A Unifying Framework for Online Optimization with Long-Term Constraints

We study online learning problems in which a decision maker has to take a sequence of decisions subject to $m$ long-term constraints. The goal of the decision maker is to maximize their total reward, while at the same time achieving small cumulative constraints violation across the $T$ rounds. We present the first best-of-both-world type algorithm for this general class of problems, with no-regret guarantees both in the case in which rewards and constraints are selected according to an unknown stochastic model, and in the case in which they are selected at each round by an adversary. Our algorithm is the first to provide guarantees in the adversarial setting with respect to the optimal fixed strategy that satisfies the long-term constraints. In particular, it guarantees a $ρ/(1+ρ)$ fraction of the optimal reward and sublinear regret, where $ρ$ is a feasibility parameter related to the existence of strictly feasible solutions. Our framework employs traditional regret minimizers as black-box components. Therefore, by instantiating it with an appropriate choice of regret minimizers it can handle the full-feedback as well as the bandit-feedback setting. Moreover, it allows the decision maker to seamlessly handle scenarios with non-convex rewards and constraints. We show how our framework can be applied in the context of budget-management mechanisms for repeated auctions in order to guarantee long-term constraints that are not packing (e.g., ROI constraints).

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