arXiv subjects

Nicola Gatti

Publications and source records attributed to Nicola Gatti.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Regret Minimization for Piecewise Linear Rewards: Contracts, Auctions, and Beyond

Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function. These include contract design in hidden-action principal-agent problems, selling an item in posted-price auctions, and bidding in first-price auctions. When the relevant model parameters are unknown and determined by some (unknown) probability distributions, the problem becomes learning how to optimize an unknown and stochastic piecewise linear reward function. Such a problem is usually framed within an online learning framework, where the decision-maker (learner) seeks to minimize the regret of not knowing an optimal decision in hindsight. This paper introduces a general online learning framework that offers a unified approach to tackle regret minimization for piecewise linear rewards, under a suitable monotonicity assumption commonly satisfied by microeconomic models. We design a learning algorithm that attains a regret of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{nT})$, where $n$ is the number of ``pieces'' of the reward function and $T$ is the number of rounds. This result is tight when $n$ is \emph{small} relative to $T$, specifically when $n \leq T^{1/3}$. Our algorithm solves two open problems in the literature on learning in microeconomic settings. First, it shows that the $\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret bound obtained by Zhu et al. [Zhu+23] for learning optimal linear contracts in hidden-action principal-agent problems is not tight when the number of agent's actions is small relative to $T$. Second, our algorithm demonstrates that, in the problem of learning to set prices in posted-price auctions, it is possible to attain suitable (and desirable) instance-independent regret bounds, addressing an open problem posed by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [CBCP19].

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Beyond Slater's Condition in Online CMDPs with Stochastic and Adversarial Constraints

We study \emph{online episodic Constrained Markov Decision Processes} (CMDPs) under both stochastic and adversarial constraints. We provide a novel algorithm whose guarantees greatly improve those of the state-of-the-art best-of-both-worlds algorithm introduced by Stradi et al. (2025). In the stochastic regime, \emph{i.e.}, when the constraints are sampled from fixed but unknown distributions, our method achieves $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret and constraint violation without relying on Slater's condition, thereby handling settings where no strictly feasible solution exists. Moreover, we provide guarantees on the stronger notion of \emph{positive} constraint violation, which does not allow to recover from large violation in the early episodes by playing strictly safe policies. In the adversarial regime, \emph{i.e.}, when the constraints may change arbitrarily between episodes, our algorithm ensures sublinear constraint violation without Slater's condition, and achieves sublinear $α$-regret with respect to the \emph{unconstrained} optimum, where $α$ is a suitably defined multiplicative approximation factor. We further validate our results through synthetic experiments, showing the practical effectiveness of our algorithm.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Bridging Rested and Restless Bandits with Graph-Triggering: Rising and Rotting

Rested and Restless Bandits are two well-known bandit settings that are useful to model real-world sequential decision-making problems in which the expected reward of an arm evolves over time due to the actions we perform or due to the nature. In this work, we propose Graph-Triggered Bandits (GTBs), a unifying framework to generalize and extend rested and restless bandits. In this setting, the evolution of the arms' expected rewards is governed by a graph defined over the arms. An edge connecting a pair of arms $(i,j)$ represents the fact that a pull of arm $i$ triggers the evolution of arm $j$, and vice versa. Interestingly, rested and restless bandits are both special cases of our model for some suitable (degenerated) graph. As relevant case studies for this setting, we focus on two specific types of monotonic bandits: rising, where the expected reward of an arm grows as the number of triggers increases, and rotting, where the opposite behavior occurs. For these cases, we study the optimal policies. We provide suitable algorithms for all scenarios and discuss their theoretical guarantees, highlighting the complexity of the learning problem concerning instance-dependent terms that encode specific properties of the underlying graph structure.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2026

Efficient representations for team and imperfect-recall equilibrium computation

Equilibrium finding in two-player zero-sum games with perfect recall is a well-studied topic that has led to many breakthroughs in computational game theory. This paper aims to generalize such techniques to (timeable) two-player zero-sum games with imperfect recall, or equivalently to two-team zero-sum games. In this setting, the problem of computing a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (or, equivalently, a team maxmin equilibrium with correlation) is known to be NP-hard. We connect the imperfect-recall setting with its perfect-recall counterpart through a novel construction we call the belief game. This is a perfect-recall game equivalent to a given (timeable) two-player zero-sum game with imperfect recall. The belief game may be exponentially larger than the original game but can be solved using any standard method. We then show that the strategy spaces of the two players in the belief game can be directly represented as a DAG, leading to a possibly exponential speedup. We call this the team belief DAG (TB-DAG). The TB-DAG simultaneously enjoys essentially optimal parameterized complexity bounds and the advantages of efficient regret minimization techniques. Along the way, we show $Δ_2^P$-completeness and $Σ_2^P$-completeness of finding Nash equilibria in both mixed and behavioral strategies for the class of games we consider. Experimentally, we show that the TB-DAG, when paired with existing learning techniques, yields state-of-the-art performance on a wide variety of benchmark team games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium

A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across $T$ rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equilibrium by giving (nonnegative) payments to players. We call this the steering problem. The steering problem captures problems several problems of interest, among them equilibrium selection and information design (persuasion). If the mediator's budget is unbounded, steering is trivial because the mediator can simply pay the players to play desirable actions. We study two bounds on the mediator's payments: a total budget and a per-round budget. If the mediator's total budget does not grow with $T$, we show that steering is impossible. However, we show that it is enough for the total budget to grow sublinearly with $T$, that is, for the average payment to vanish. When players' full strategies are observed at each round, we show that constant per-round budgets permit steering. In the more challenging setting where only trajectories through the game tree are observable, we show that steering is impossible with constant per-round budgets in general extensive-form games, but possible in normal-form games or if the per-round budget may itself depend on $T$. We also show how our results can be generalized to the case when the equilibrium is being computed online while steering is happening. We supplement our theoretical positive results with experiments highlighting the efficacy of steering in large games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation

In this paper, we study the class of games known as hidden-role games in which players are assigned privately to teams and are faced with the challenge of recognizing and cooperating with teammates. This model includes both popular recreational games such as the Mafia/Werewolf family and The Resistance (Avalon) and many real-world settings, such as distributed systems where nodes need to work together to accomplish a goal in the face of possible corruptions. There has been little to no formal mathematical grounding of such settings in the literature, and it was previously not even clear what the right solution concepts (notions of equilibria) should be. A suitable notion of equilibrium should take into account the communication channels available to the players (e.g., can they communicate? Can they communicate in private?). Defining such suitable notions turns out to be a nontrivial task with several surprising consequences. In this paper, we provide the first rigorous definition of equilibrium for hidden-role games, which overcomes serious limitations of other solution concepts not designed for hidden-role games. We then show that in certain cases, including the above recreational games, optimal equilibria can be computed efficiently. In most other cases, we show that computing an optimal equilibrium is at least NP-hard or coNP-hard. Lastly, we experimentally validate our approach by computing exact equilibria for complete 5- and 6-player Avalon instances whose size in terms of number of information sets is larger than $10^{56}$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Truly Adapting to Adversarial Constraints in Constrained MABs

We study the constrained variant of the \emph{multi-armed bandit} (MAB) problem, in which the learner aims not only at minimizing the total loss incurred during the learning dynamic, but also at controlling the violation of multiple \emph{unknown} constraints, under both \emph{full} and \emph{bandit feedback}. We consider a non-stationary environment that subsumes both stochastic and adversarial models and where, at each round, both losses and constraints are drawn from distributions that may change arbitrarily over time. In such a setting, it is provably not possible to guarantee both sublinear regret and sublinear violation. Accordingly, prior work has mainly focused either on settings with stochastic constraints or on relaxing the benchmark with fully adversarial constraints (\emph{e.g.}, via competitive ratios with respect to the optimum). We provide the first algorithms that achieve optimal rates of regret and \emph{positive} constraint violation when the constraints are stochastic while the losses may vary arbitrarily, and that simultaneously yield guarantees that degrade smoothly with the degree of adversariality of the constraints. Specifically, under \emph{full feedback} we propose an algorithm attaining $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ regret and $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ {positive} violation, where $C$ quantifies the amount of non-stationarity in the constraints. We then show how to extend these guarantees when only bandit feedback is available for the losses. Finally, when \emph{bandit feedback} is available for the constraints, we design an algorithm achieving $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C)$ {positive} violation and $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}+C\sqrt{T})$ regret.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Safe Online Bid Optimization with Return on Investment and Budget Constraints

In online marketing, the advertisers aim to balance achieving high volumes and high profitability. The companies' business units address this tradeoff by maximizing the volumes while guaranteeing a minimum Return On Investment (ROI) level. Such a task can be naturally modeled as a combinatorial optimization problem subject to ROI and budget constraints that can be solved online. In this picture, the learner's uncertainty over the constraints' parameters plays a crucial role since the algorithms' exploration choices might lead to their violation during the entire learning process. Such violations represent a major obstacle to adopting online techniques in real-world applications. Thus, controlling the algorithms' exploration during learning is paramount to making humans trust online learning tools. This paper studies the nature of both optimization and learning problems. In particular, we show that the learning problem is inapproximable within any factor (unless P = NP) and provide a pseudo-polynomial-time algorithm to solve its discretized version. Subsequently, we prove that no online learning algorithm can violate the (ROI or budget) constraints a sublinear number of times during the learning process while guaranteeing a sublinear regret. We provide the $GCB$ algorithm that guarantees sublinear regret at the cost of a linear number of constraint violations and $GCB_{safe}$ that guarantees w.h.p. a constant upper bound on the number of constraint violations at the cost of a linear regret. Moreover, we designed $GCB_{safe}(ψ,ϕ)$, which guarantees both sublinear regret and safety w.h.p. at the cost of accepting tolerances $ψ$ and $ϕ$ in the satisfaction of the ROI and budget constraints, respectively. Finally, we provide experimental results to compare the regret and constraint violations of $GCB$, $GCB_{safe}$, and $GCB_{safe}(ψ,ϕ)$.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Data-Dependent Regret Bounds for Constrained MABs

This paper initiates the study of data-dependent regret bounds in constrained MAB settings. These bounds depend on the sequence of losses that characterize the problem instance. Thus, they can be much smaller than classical $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret bounds, while being equivalent to them in the worst case. Despite this, data-dependent regret bounds have been completely overlooked in constrained MAB settings. The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: Can data-dependent regret bounds be derived in the presence of constraints? We answer this question affirmatively in constrained MABs with adversarial losses and stochastic constraints. Specifically, our main focus is on the most challenging and natural settings with hard constraints, where the learner must ensure that the constraints are always satisfied with high probability. We design an algorithm with a regret bound consisting of two data-dependent terms. The first term captures the difficulty of satisfying the constraints, while the second one encodes the complexity of learning independently of the presence of constraints. We also prove a lower bound showing that these two terms are not artifacts of our specific approach and analysis, but rather the fundamental components that inherently characterize the complexities of the problem. Finally, in designing our algorithm, we also derive some novel results in the related (and easier) soft constraints settings, which may be of independent interest.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

No-Regret Learning Under Adversarial Resource Constraints: A Spending Plan Is All You Need!

We study online decision making problems under resource constraints, where both reward and cost functions are drawn from distributions that may change adversarially over time. We focus on two canonical settings: $(i)$ online resource allocation where rewards and costs are observed before action selection, and $(ii)$ online learning with resource constraints where they are observed after action selection, under full feedback or bandit feedback. It is well known that achieving sublinear regret in these settings is impossible when reward and cost distributions may change arbitrarily over time. To address this challenge, we analyze a framework in which the learner is guided by a spending plan--a sequence prescribing expected resource usage across rounds. We design general (primal-)dual methods that achieve sublinear regret with respect to baselines that follow the spending plan. Crucially, the performance of our algorithms improves when the spending plan ensures a well-balanced distribution of the budget across rounds. We additionally provide a robust variant of our methods to handle worst-case scenarios where the spending plan is highly imbalanced. To conclude, we study the regret of our algorithms when competing against benchmarks that deviate from the prescribed spending plan.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Catoni-Style Change Point Detection for Regret Minimization in Non-Stationary Heavy-Tailed Bandits

Regret minimization in stochastic non-stationary bandits gained popularity over the last decade, as it can model a broad class of real-world problems, from advertising to recommendation systems. Existing literature relies on various assumptions about the reward-generating process, such as Bernoulli or subgaussian rewards. However, in settings such as finance and telecommunications, heavy-tailed distributions naturally arise. In this work, we tackle the heavy-tailed piecewise-stationary bandit problem. Heavy-tailed bandits, introduced by Bubeck et al., 2013, operate on the minimal assumption that the finite absolute centered moments of maximum order $1+ε$ are uniformly bounded by a constant $v<+\infty$, for some $ε\in (0,1]$. We focus on the most popular non-stationary bandit setting, i.e., the piecewise-stationary setting, in which the mean of reward-generating distributions may change at unknown time steps. We provide a novel Catoni-style change-point detection strategy tailored for heavy-tailed distributions that relies on recent advancements in the theory of sequential estimation, which is of independent interest. We introduce Robust-CPD-UCB, which combines this change-point detection strategy with optimistic algorithms for bandits, providing its regret upper bound and an impossibility result on the minimum attainable regret for any policy. Finally, we validate our approach through numerical experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Automating the loop in traffic incident management on highway

Effective traffic incident management is essential for ensuring safety, minimizing congestion, and reducing response times in emergency situations. Traditional highway incident management relies heavily on radio room operators, who must make rapid, informed decisions in high-stakes environments. This paper proposes an innovative solution to support and enhance these decisions by integrating Large Language Models (LLMs) into a decision-support system for traffic incident management. We introduce two approaches: (1) an LLM + Optimization hybrid that leverages both the flexibility of natural language interaction and the robustness of optimization techniques, and (2) a Full LLM approach that autonomously generates decisions using only LLM capabilities. We tested our solutions using historical event data from Autostrade per l'Italia. Experimental results indicate that while both approaches show promise, the LLM + Optimization solution demonstrates superior reliability, making it particularly suited to critical applications where consistency and accuracy are paramount. This research highlights the potential for LLMs to transform highway incident management by enabling accessible, data-driven decision-making support.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Contract Design Under Approximate Best Responses

Principal-agent problems model scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to take costly, unobservable actions through the provision of payments. Such problems are ubiquitous in several real-world applications, ranging from blockchain to the delegation of machine learning tasks. In this paper, we initiate the study of hidden-action principal-agent problems under approximate best responses, in which the agent may select any action that is not too much suboptimal given the principal's payment scheme (a.k.a. contract). Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal contract under approximate best responses. This positive result is perhaps surprising, since, in Stackelberg games, computing an optimal commitment under approximate best responses is computationally intractable. We also investigate the learnability of contracts under approximate best responses, by providing a no-regret learning algorithm for a natural application scenario where the principal has no prior knowledge about the environment.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Learning Adversarial MDPs with Stochastic Hard Constraints

We study online learning in constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) with adversarial losses and stochastic hard constraints, under bandit feedback. We consider three scenarios. In the first one, we address general CMDPs, where we design an algorithm attaining sublinear regret and cumulative positive constraints violation. In the second scenario, under the mild assumption that a policy strictly satisfying the constraints exists and is known to the learner, we design an algorithm that achieves sublinear regret while ensuring that constraints are satisfied at every episode with high probability. In the last scenario, we only assume the existence of a strictly feasible policy, which is not known to the learner, and we design an algorithm attaining sublinear regret and constant cumulative positive constraints violation. Finally, we show that in the last two scenarios, a dependence on the Slater's parameter is unavoidable. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study CMDPs involving both adversarial losses and hard constraints. Thus, our algorithms can deal with general non-stationary environments subject to requirements much stricter than those manageable with existing ones, enabling their adoption in a much wider range of applications.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Best-of-Both-Worlds Policy Optimization for CMDPs with Bandit Feedback

We study online learning in constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) in which rewards and constraints may be either stochastic or adversarial. In such settings, Stradi et al.(2024) proposed the first best-of-both-worlds algorithm able to seamlessly handle stochastic and adversarial constraints, achieving optimal regret and constraint violation bounds in both cases. This algorithm suffers from two major drawbacks. First, it only works under full feedback, which severely limits its applicability in practice. Moreover, it relies on optimizing over the space of occupancy measures, which requires solving convex optimization problems, an highly inefficient task. In this paper, we provide the first best-of-both-worlds algorithm for CMDPs with bandit feedback. Specifically, when the constraints are stochastic, the algorithm achieves $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ regret and constraint violation, while, when they are adversarial, it attains $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ constraint violation and a tight fraction of the optimal reward. Moreover, our algorithm is based on a policy optimization approach, which is much more efficient than occupancy-measure-based methods.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Online Bayesian Persuasion Without a Clue

We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has knowledge about either the prior distribution over states of nature or receiver's utilities, or both. We relax such unrealistic assumptions by considering settings in which the sender does not know anything about the prior and the receiver. We design an algorithm that achieves sublinear regret with respect to an optimal signaling scheme, and we also provide a collection of lower bounds showing that the guarantees of such an algorithm are tight. Our algorithm works by searching a suitable space of signaling schemes in order to learn receiver's best responses. To do this, we leverage a non-standard representation of signaling schemes that allows to cleverly overcome the challenge of not knowing anything about the prior over states of nature and receiver's utilities. Finally, our results also allow to derive lower/upper bounds on the sample complexity of learning signaling schemes in a related Bayesian persuasion PAC-learning problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Contracting With a Reinforcement Learning Agent by Playing Trick or Treat

We study principal-agent problems where a farsighted agent takes costly actions in an MDP. The core challenge in these settings is that agent's actions are hidden to the principal, who can only observe their outcomes, namely state transitions and their associated rewards. Thus, the principal's goal is to devise a policy that incentives the agent to take actions leading to desirable outcomes. This is accomplished by committing to a payment scheme (a.k.a. contract) at each step, specifying a monetary transfer from the principal to the agent for every possible outcome. Interestingly, we show that Markovian policies are unfit in these settings, as they do not allow to achieve the optimal principal's utility and are constitutionally intractable. Thus, accounting for history in unavoidable, and this begets considerable additional challenges compared to standard MDPs. Nevertheless, we design an efficient algorithm to compute an optimal policy, leveraging a compact way of representing histories for this purpose. Unfortunately, the policy produced by such an algorithm cannot be readily implemented, as it is only approximately incentive compatible, meaning that the agent is incentivized to take the desired actions only approximately. To fix this, we design an efficient method to make such a policy incentive compatible, by only introducing a negligible loss in principal's utility. This method can be generally applied to any approximately-incentive-compatible policy, and it generalized a related approach that has already been discovered for classical principal-agent problems to more general settings in MDPs.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Optimal Strong Regret and Violation in Constrained MDPs via Policy Optimization

We study online learning in \emph{constrained MDPs} (CMDPs), focusing on the goal of attaining sublinear strong regret and strong cumulative constraint violation. Differently from their standard (weak) counterparts, these metrics do not allow negative terms to compensate positive ones, raising considerable additional challenges. Efroni et al. (2020) were the first to propose an algorithm with sublinear strong regret and strong violation, by exploiting linear programming. Thus, their algorithm is highly inefficient, leaving as an open problem achieving sublinear bounds by means of policy optimization methods, which are much more efficient in practice. Very recently, Muller et al. (2024) have partially addressed this problem by proposing a policy optimization method that allows to attain $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{0.93})$ strong regret/violation. This still leaves open the question of whether optimal bounds are achievable by using an approach of this kind. We answer such a question affirmatively, by providing an efficient policy optimization algorithm with $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$ strong regret/violation. Our algorithm implements a primal-dual scheme that employs a state-of-the-art policy optimization approach for adversarial (unconstrained) MDPs as primal algorithm, and a UCB-like update for dual variables.

cs.LG↗