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Nicole Sawyer

Publications and source records attributed to Nicole Sawyer.

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Evolutionary Games for Correlation-Aware Clustering in Massive Machine-to-Machine Networks

In this paper, the problem of self-organizing, correlation-aware clustering is studied for a dense network of machine-type devices (MTDs) deployed over a cellular network. In dense machine-to-machine networks, MTDs are typically located within close proximity and will gather correlated data, and, thus, clustering MTDs based on data correlation will lead to a decrease in the number of redundant bits transmitted to the base station. To analyze this clustering problem, a novel utility function that captures the average MTD transmission power per cluster is derived, as a function of the MTD location, cluster size, and inter-cluster interference. Then, the clustering problem is formulated as an evolutionary game, which models the interactions among the massive number of MTDs, in order to decrease MTD transmission power. To solve this game, a distributed algorithm is proposed to allow the infinite number of MTDs to autonomously form clusters. It is shown that the proposed distributed algorithm converges to an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), that is robust to a small portion of MTDs deviating from the stable cluster formation at convergence. The maximum fraction of MTDs that can deviate from the ESS, while still maintaining a stable cluster formation is derived. Simulation results show that the proposed approach can effectively cluster MTDs with highly correlated data, which, in turn, enables those MTDs to eliminate a large number of redundant bits. The results show that, on average, using the proposed approach yields reductions of up to 23.4% and 9.6% in terms of the transmit power per cluster, compared to forming clusters with the maximum possible size and uniformly selecting a cluster size, respectively.

cs.GT

U-BeAS: A Stackelberg Game for Device-to-Device Communications

User-behavior-aware communications will be a key feature of future generation cellular networks, so user experience is enhanced with greater benefit to users. In this paper, a user-behavior-aware Stackelberg (U-BeAS) game for device-to-device (D2D) communications overlaying cellular communications is proposed. Our proposed game provides an optimal trade-off between minimizing transmit power and maximizing packet delivery ratio (PDR), with respect to D2D user-behavior for all D2D pairs. The Stackelberg leader, base station (BS), selects its satisfaction with the social welfare of the D2D followers by considering the reaction of the followers to the price it charges. All followers (D2D pairs) select transmit power so as to guarantee a desired quality-of-experience (QoE), where each follower enacts one of three possible behaviors: (i) casual; (ii) intermediate; or (iii) serious. Analysis shows that there exists a sub-game perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium across all players. Analysis and simulation demonstrates that the BS leader rapidly converges to an optimal satisfaction while guaranteeing social welfare across D2D users, and all D2D followers then rapidly converge to a Pareto-efficient outcome with respect to transmit power and PDR.

cs.NI

The Application of Non-Cooperative Stackelberg Game Theory in Behavioral Science: Social Optimality with any Number of Players

Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or (stationary/non-stationary) or (sequential/one-shot) non-cooperative games, and importantly, whether or not they are intended to represent a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, they can be mapped to a Stackelberg game. I.e., the game designer is the leader who is totally rational and honest, and the followers are mapped to the players of the designed game. If now the game designer, or "the leader" in the Stackelberg context, adopts a pure strategy, we postulate the following second part following from axiomatic observation of ultimate game leadership, where empirical insight leads to the second part of this postulate. Importantly, implementing a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, with a very honest and rational leader results in social optimality for all players (followers), assuming pure strategy across all followers and leader, and that the leader is totally rational, honest, and is able to achieve a minimum amount of competency in leading this game, with any finite number of iterations of leading this finite game.

cs.GT