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Nikolaos Kekatos

Publications and source records attributed to Nikolaos Kekatos.

17 recordsLinked to original sources

The Amplifier Effect: Human-Factor Risks of AI-Suggested Correlation and Auto-Propagation in Multi-Framework GRC Self-Assessment

Multi-framework Governance, Risk and Compliance (GRC) platforms increasingly automate the link between an organisation's self-assessment answer and the compliance obligations that answer is said to satisfy. Cross-framework control mapping, AI-suggested question correlation, and automatic propagation of answers and evidence across correlated questions all serve the legitimate efficiency goal of reducing duplicate work for small and medium-sized enterprises under the EU Cyber Resilience Act, NIS2 and GDPR. The same mechanisms, however, amplify the consequences of any human-factor bias in a single answer: one optimistically-graded control, one rubber-stamped attestation, or one AI-drafted answer can be silently replicated as evidence of compliance with many obligations across multiple frameworks. We call this the amplifier effect: a platform-design property (coarse-grained attestation and un-gated propagation) rather than a failing of individual users. Using two EU-funded SME-facing GRC platforms, CYBERFORT and CYBER-BRIDGE, as examples, we (i) describe the amplification mechanism in concrete data-model terms, (ii) propose a six-dimension scoring framework for evaluating any GRC tool's exposure to the effect, (iii) instantiate the framework on a thirteen-tool comparison covering enterprise IRM, mid-market platforms, compliance-automation tools, and the two EU SME projects, and (iv) outline a measurement protocol that a consortium with access to production self-assessment data can run. The thirteen-tool comparison is a structured design assessment, not an empirical measurement of user behaviour. The EU SME platforms score lowest on the amplifier dimensions because their burden-reduction design deliberately trades sign-off granularity for throughput; we report this as a design trade-off, not a verdict on the platforms. Our contribution is the framing and the measurement protocol.

cs.CR↗

Preparing an AI-Augmented SIEM for the EU Cyber Resilience Act: A Practitioner Case Study

The EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, makes product cybersecurity a lifecycle obligation for products with digital elements on the EU market: risk assessment, vulnerability handling, conformity documentation, and Article 14 incident- and vulnerability-reporting readiness must be operational before market placement. Small and medium-sized enterprises that build security products are doubly exposed, since their products are in scope while their customers expect them to be exemplary. This case study documents a CRA preparedness pilot for one such product, SEUXDR, an AI-augmented security monitoring product with a large-language-model active-response component, on the open-source CYBERFORT platform. We contribute a reproducible six-step recipe (Scope and Classify, Asset Registration, Produce Evidence, Map to CRA, Gap and Actions, Audit Pack), two end-to-end traceability threads, and a pilot snapshot tracing product risks through baseline and AI-specific controls and policies to CRA objectives. It offers practitioners a replicable starting point for translating CRA legal text into operational preparedness for incident response, vulnerability reporting, and conformity assessment.

cs.CR↗

Quantifying the Privacy Posture of Operator-Side 5G/O-RAN Profiles

Operator-side network profiles derived from 5G/ORAN traffic carry personal data such as ephemeral subscriber identifiers, slice-level KPIs, and control-plane signalling, and must be anonymised before release to a federated-learning aggregator, threat-intelligence exchange, or ML training pipeline. We study how much re-identification risk remains after standard operator-side anonymisation. We quantify privacy posture with k-anonymity, l-diversity and t-closeness, aggregate them into a composite Privacy-Posture Index (PPI), and measure residual re-identification across eight transformation configurations on internal PCAP captures and the public Idaho Labs 5GAD corpus, under a full-QI syntactic bound and two simulated adversaries. The evaluation is modest in scale, and we read its trends as indicative rather than definitive. Three findings emerge. Pseudonymisation alone leaves re-identification unchanged; material privacy gains arise when quasi-identifiers are coarsened through generalisation, optionally combined with suppression. A downstream classification task then shows that suppression-heavy releases retain majority-class utility but sacrifice much of their minority-class recall, a cost the aggregate metrics hide. Finally, the standard kmin-based PPI correlates only modestly with the disclosure bound and not at all with the partial-knowledge attack, whereas a mean-class-size variant PPI correlates strongly with all three disclosure/attack measures; we therefore read PPI as a regulator-facing summary, not a security bound. The profiles are produced by passive operator-side monitoring with rule-based DPI; our contribution is the privacy-quantification layer that computes these metrics, applies the transformation policy, and exposes both through an inspectable dashboard.

cs.CR↗

Explainable Rule Mining of IPv6 Extension-Header Presence Patterns from Paired-Vantage Captures

IPv6 extension headers (EHs), such as fragmentation, segment routing, and in-situ telemetry, are operationally important yetwidely dropped in transit, and characterising their behaviour from packet captures is a recurring measurement problem. We ask whetheran explainable miner can recover human-readable rules of EH behaviour, and we contribute two reusable tools: a negative-control protocol that diagnoses whether a mined "temporal" network rule reflects genuine cross-packet dynamics or mere within-packetco-occurrence, and a sender-conditioned, per-family EH-retention measurement. Applying an interpretable temporal-logic rule miner to the JAMES paired-vantage dataset, we recover a portable Fragment-EH rule that the protocol reveals to be a within-packet,near-definitional co-occurrence rather than a temporal pattern, so the temporal-logic machinery does no work for this dominant rule;the retention measurement independently recovers the expected within-window ordering of EH observability. Our main result istherefore an honest, controlled negative finding, corroborated by executed decision-tree and large-language-model baselines: on theevaluated JAMES traces network-temporal structure does not carry the dominant Fragment-EH signal, and we supply the controls thatestablish when it would, validated on a synthetic positive control containing a genuine cross-packet dependency.

cs.CR↗

Mission-Aware Attestation Envelopes for Time-Critical Autonomous Action: A Hardware-in-the-Loop V2I Study

An autonomous system that asks for a privileged physical action is usually gated on integrity evidence: a platform proves what it is running, and the request is granted or refused on that basis. Such a gate is normally treated as a predicate, yet the evidence behind it has an age, the decision that consumes it has a latency, and the physical system that waits for it has a deadline. We formulate mission-aware attestation as a runtime assurance contract that holds only when integrity is valid, the evidence is fresh enough, and the decision completes inside a budget derived from the current physical state. The contract yields four operational outcomes where a binary gate yields two, separating a refusal caused by tampering from one caused by stale evidence and from one caused by a late decision. We evaluate it on a hardware-in-the-loop vehicle-to-infrastructure platform: a driving simulator supplies the physical state and the authorisation deadline, while a microcontroller on-board unit and a TPM-backed roadside unit running Linux integrity measurement supply the assurance evidence. A security-blind model admits the whole operating space and a hardware-informed one three quarters of it, and every point it refuses fails the freshness margin rather than the response margin. Moving the attestation interval across the range the verifier permits costs about as much as a fivefold scaling of the latency distribution, and the interval is directly configurable, which makes it the immediately actionable deployment parameter. If the freshness bound does not exceed the authorisation budget, every late decision is also stale and lateness becomes unobservable, so the attestation interval and the freshness bound cannot be chosen from security requirements alone.

cs.CR↗

A Resilient Runtime-Verification Fabric for Security Monitoring of Critical Edge-IoT Infrastructure

Protecting critical infrastructure increasingly depends on continuously verifying large IoT fleets against formal security specifications at runtime. Yet the runtime-verification (RV) pipelines proposed for this task are typically single-host prototypes whose monitors read a shared log file, with no resilience to the failures such deployments incur: a crash or overload silently drops events, clock skew corrupts the ordering metric monitors require, a time-triggered "node has gone silent" property cannot fire when the network itself falls silent, and one slow consumer stalls the pipeline. Each failure is silent: the monitor keeps emitting verdicts over a corrupted view. We present RV-Fabric, a resilient delivery layer that carries the hierarchy over two brokers (MQTT for device ingest, a durable stream broker for backend delivery) and re-establishes five continuity guarantees: durable delivery under crashes, a trusted event order, progress under total silence, consumer isolation and flow control under bounded overload, each an invariant conditioned on broker durability. Above the transport, RV-Fabric makes evidence completeness part of runtime-verification semantics: every verdict carries a status (sound, degraded, incomplete or unavailable) derived from delivery gaps, retention pressure and liveness, so an incomplete stream cannot yield an unqualified all-clear. Under controlled fault injection on a containerised testbed, measured against a fault-free oracle using the real MonPoly engine, the shared-log baseline misses six of seven injected incidents, reporting each as an unqualified all-clear, whereas RV-Fabric preserves all seven; removing a delivery mechanism reintroduces silent loss, removing isolation costs only timeliness. Two published critical-infrastructure datasets, water-SCADA and IoT/IIoT, replay end-to-end.

cs.CR↗

From Sandbox to Enforcement: Confidence-Qualified Threat Intelligence for Critical Infrastructure

Security operations centres and national incident-response teams defending critical infrastructure collect abundant threat data yet struggle to turn it into actionable intelligence. A malware sandbox produces detailed behavioural evidence, but as a large, unranked report whose confidence is unstated. We present CG-CTI, an operational pipeline that converts live sandbox output (CAPEv2) into STIX 2.1, correlates it in a knowledge graph with other critical-infrastructure sensors, and attaches to every intelligence object an explicit confidence status derived from provenance, cross-source corroboration, and observation durability. This status gates automated action: only corroborated intelligence is eligible for automated enforcement, while lower-confidence objects are routed to analyst review or kept as context. A grounded language-model stage then narrates the confidence-qualified evidence, where each statement either cites a supporting object or is marked unsupported, so fabricated references are removed before analyst review. We implement CG-CTI within the CYBERGUARD project, whose consortium includes Romania's national cyber-security directorate, and evaluate it against the live sandbox on a labelled malware corpus, measuring conversion validity, indicator yield, technique coverage, corroboration, enforcement eligibility, latency, and summary grounding. CG-CTI turns fragmented sandbox output into corroborated, confidence-ranked, and auditable intelligence for critical-infrastructure defence.

cs.CR↗

SoK: Formal Methods for Fact-Checking and Information Integrity

An automated fact-checking system returns a label: the claim is true, or it is false. In many such systems the verdict remains the primary output. What is generally missing is a record of which document settled the question, of what would have had to be different for the verdict to change, or of whether the same claim, reworded, would have been judged the same way. We call the missing piece a warrant: a separate statement of what was guaranteed and on what grounds. Formal methods produce evidence of this kind, and regulation is beginning to ask for it, since the Digital Services Act and the AI Act both call for auditable evidence about how systems behave. Surveys of automated fact-checking are usually organised by pipeline stage, and treat logic as one technique among many. We organise the field by what is being formalised instead, which gives five levels: the claim, the reasoning, the system doing the checking, the ecosystem the claim spreads through, and the regulatory obligation. Sorting 121 works into those levels, two patterns stand out. Most of the relevant formal machinery already exists, but it was built for other domains and has rarely been applied here, and the gap is widest for verifying the checking system itself. Several stages of the routine professional fact-checkers follow also have no stated correctness criterion, and two of them, writing a claim in checkable form and correcting a verdict already published, are not formally specified in any work we coded. We close with open problems, each with a suggested first step.

cs.CL↗

Architecting the Secure AI-SOC: A Neurosymbolic Framework for Pipeline Integrity and Threat Mitigation

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Security Operations Centers (SOCs) streamlines threat intelligence but introduces critical vulnerabilities, notably indirect prompt injection via log poisoning. Adversaries exploit this vector to execute multistep ``promptware'' kill chains by embedding malicious payloads within system logs to hijack the LLM's operational logic. Securing this pipeline presents a dichotomy: deterministic defenses are computationally efficient yet semantically blind, while purely neural evaluations introduce prohibitive latency and probabilistic flaws. To address this, we propose a novel neurosymbolic defense-in-depth architecture that ensures end-to-end pipeline integrity. The primary layer employs customized SIEM decoders as a deterministic pre-filter, performing immediate structural sanitization to neutralize volumetric padding and signature-based injections at the ingestion edge. The secondary layer leverages NeMo Guardrails to enforce strict semantic boundaries through self-checking validation on the structured SIEM alerts prior to LLM processing. Furthermore, the framework integrates a closed-loop telemetry system, providing critical Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) visibility into thwarted attacks directly within the SOC dashboard. We present a comprehensive experimental evaluation mapped to the MITRE ATLAS taxonomy, assessing the framework against diverse prompt injections. Our results demonstrate that this synergistic approach effectively dismantles the promptware kill chain - bounding LLM stochasticity with verifiable constraints, and delivering a resilient, highly observable defense mechanism for next-generation AI-SOCs.

cs.CR↗

Mission-Level Runtime Assurance for LLM-Assisted ISR Swarms over a Verification-Aware Fabric

Swarms of LLM-assisted autonomous robots are increasingly proposed for cooperative intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments. A growing class of their assurance failures arises not within any single platform but across the swarm: individually-compliant actions compose into a mission-level violation: a prohibited objective split across platforms to evade per-platform lim- its, or a collective budget quietly exceeded. Per-platform guardrails miss these by construction, and contested communications let the violation hide behind lost or delayed evidence. We present a three-tier (platfor- m/squad/mission) compositional runtime-verification framework that de- composes a mission policy into per-agent and cross-agent aspects, aggre- gates per-platform verdicts over a verification-aware messaging fabric, and fuses them with an evidence-aware, two-axis (security x complete- ness) algebra whose provenance names the platforms that jointly trig- gered a violation. Because the fabric makes evidence loss and silence observable, unsupported negative verdicts are downgraded to an explicit unknown rather than reported as mission-wide all-clears. On a simulated ISR mission, an indirect prompt injection that causes real LLM planners to split a prohibited collection task across four platforms is invisible to every per-platform monitor yet detected compositionally with full prove- nance; under an injected fault campaign a best-effort central monitor emits silent false all-clears while the verification-aware fabric emits none

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Counter-example guided Imitation Learning of Feedback Controllers from Temporal Logic Specifications

We present a novel method for imitation learning for control requirements expressed using Signal Temporal Logic (STL). More concretely we focus on the problem of training a neural network to imitate a complex controller. The learning process is guided by efficient data aggregation based on counter-examples and a coverage measure. Moreover, we introduce a method to evaluate the performance of the learned controller via parameterization and parameter estimation of the STL requirements. We demonstrate our approach with a flying robot case study.

cs.RO↗

A Digital Twin prototype for traffic sign recognition of a learning-enabled autonomous vehicle

In this paper, we present a novel digital twin prototype for a learning-enabled self-driving vehicle. The primary objective of this digital twin is to perform traffic sign recognition and lane keeping. The digital twin architecture relies on co-simulation and uses the Functional Mock-up Interface and SystemC Transaction Level Modeling standards. The digital twin consists of four clients, i) a vehicle model that is designed in Amesim tool, ii) an environment model developed in Prescan, iii) a lane-keeping controller designed in Robot Operating System, and iv) a perception and speed control module developed in the formal modeling language of BIP (Behavior, Interaction, Priority). These clients interface with the digital twin platform, PAVE360-Veloce System Interconnect (PAVE360-VSI). PAVE360-VSI acts as the co-simulation orchestrator and is responsible for synchronization, interconnection, and data exchange through a server. The server establishes connections among the different clients and also ensures adherence to the Ethernet protocol. We conclude with illustrative digital twin simulations and recommendations for future work.

cs.RO↗

On Neural Network Equivalence Checking using SMT Solvers

Two pretrained neural networks are deemed equivalent if they yield similar outputs for the same inputs. Equivalence checking of neural networks is of great importance, due to its utility in replacing learning-enabled components with equivalent ones, when there is need to fulfill additional requirements or to address security threats, as is the case for example when using knowledge distillation, adversarial training etc. SMT solvers can potentially provide solutions to the problem of neural network equivalence checking that will be sound and complete, but as it is expected any such solution is associated with significant limitations with respect to the size of neural networks to be checked. This work presents a first SMT-based encoding of the equivalence checking problem, explores its utility and limitations and proposes avenues for future research and improvements towards more scalable and practically applicable solutions. We present experimental results that shed light to the aforementioned issues, for diverse types of neural network models (classifiers and regression networks) and equivalence criteria, towards a general and application-independent equivalence checking approach.

cs.AI↗

Explaining Outcomes of Multi-Party Dialogues using Causal Learning

Multi-party dialogues are common in enterprise social media on technical as well as non-technical topics. The outcome of a conversation may be positive or negative. It is important to analyze why a dialogue ends with a particular sentiment from the point of view of conflict analysis as well as future collaboration design. We propose an explainable time series mining algorithm for such analysis. A dialogue is represented as an attributed time series of occurrences of keywords, EMPATH categories, and inferred sentiments at various points in its progress. A special decision tree, with decision metrics that take into account temporal relationships between dialogue events, is used for predicting the cause of the outcome sentiment. Interpretable rules mined from the classifier are used to explain the prediction. Experimental results are presented for the enterprise social media posts in a large company.

cs.AI↗

Encoding sinusoidal functions in hybrid automata formalism

Hybrid systems can express a plethora of physical phenomena and systems as they can combine continuous and discrete dynamics. There exist several tools that enable the reachability analysis of hybrid systems modeled as hybrid automata. However, these tools exhibit certain limitations in the type of mathematical operations that they natively support. For example, SpaceEx, a well-established tool in the hybrid verification community, supports the use of linear ODEs in the flow of each discrete location. Mathematical functions like algebraic equations or trigonometric functions have to be encoded as the solutions of a set of ODEs. In this article, we provide a mechanism to define sinusoidal functions that are supported by SpaceEx. We also show how certain Simulink blocks can be translated into hybrid automata.

cs.FL↗

Verifying a Cruise Control System using Simulink and SpaceEx

This article aims to provide a simple step-by-step guide highlighting the steps needed to verify a control system with formal verification tools. Starting from a description of the physical system and a control objective in natural language, we design the plant and the controller, we use Simulink for simulation and we employ a reachability analysis tool, SpaceEx, for formal verification.

cs.LO↗

Quantitative Corner Case Feature Analysis of Hybrid Automata with ForFET$^{SMT}$

The analysis and verification of hybrid automata (HA) models against rich formal properties can be a challenging task. Existing methods and tools can mainly reason whether a given property is satisfied or violated. However, such qualitative answers might not provide sufficient information about the model behaviors. This paper presents the ForFET$^{SMT}$ tool which can be used to reason quantitatively about such properties. It employs feature automata and can evaluate quantitative property corners of HA. ForFET$^{SMT}$ uses two third-party formal verification tools as its backbone: the SpaceEx reachability tool and the SMT solver dReach/dReal. Herein, we describe the design and implementation of ForFET$^{SMT}$ and present its functionalities and modules. To improve the usability of the tool for non-expert users, we also provide a list of quantitative property templates.

cs.FL↗