arXiv subjects

P. Jefferies

Publications and source records attributed to P. Jefferies.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2001

Application of multi-agent games to the prediction of financial time-series

We report on a technique based on multi-agent games which has potential use in the prediction of future movements of financial time-series. A third-party game is trained on a black-box time-series, and is then run into the future to extract next-step and multi-step predictions. In addition to the possibility of identifying profit opportunities, the technique may prove useful in the development of improved risk management strategies.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2001

Deterministic Dynamics in the Minority Game

The Minority Game (MG) behaves as a stochastically perturbed deterministic system due to the coin-toss invoked to resolve tied strategies. Averaging over this stochasticity yields a description of the MG's deterministic dynamics via mapping equations for the strategy score and global information. The strategy-score map contains both restoring-force and bias terms, whose magnitudes depend on the game's quenched disorder. Approximate analytical expressions are obtained and the effect of `market impact' discussed. The global-information map represents a trajectory on a De Bruijn graph. For small quenched disorder, an Eulerian trail represents a stable attractor. It is shown analytically how anti-persistence arises. The response to perturbations and different initial conditions are also discussed.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2000

Stochastic strategies in the Minority Game

We show analytically how the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation) in the Minority Game (MG) can decrease below the random coin-toss limit if the agents use more general, stochastic strategies. This suppression of the standard deviation results from a cancellation between the actions of a crowd, in which agents act collectively and make the same decision, and an anticrowd in which agents act collectively by making the opposite decision to the crowd.

cond-mat↗

arXiv2000

From market games to real-world markets

This paper uses the development of multi-agent market models to present a unified approach to the joint questions of how financial market movements may be simulated, predicted, and hedged against. We examine the effect of different market clearing mechanisms and show that an out-of-equilibrium clearing process leads to dynamics that closely resemble real financial movements. We then show that replacing the `synthetic' price history used by these simulations with data taken from real financial time-series leads to the remarkable result that the agents can collectively learn to identify moments in the market where profit is attainable. We then employ the formalism of Bouchaud and Sornette in conjunction with agent based models to show that in general risk cannot be eliminated from trading with these models. We also show that, in the presence of transaction costs, the risk of option writing is greatly increased. This risk, and the costs, can however be reduced through the use of a delta-hedging strategy with modified, time-dependent volatility structure.

cond-mat↗

arXiv2000

Crowd-Anticrowd Theory of Multi-Agent Market Games

We present a dynamical theory of a multi-agent market game, the so-called Minority Game (MG), based on crowds and anticrowds. The time-averaged version of the dynamical equations provides a quantitatively accurate, yet intuitively simple, explanation for the variation of the standard deviation (`volatility') in MG-like games. We demonstrate this for the basic MG, and the MG with stochastic strategies. The time-dependent equations themselves reproduce the essential dynamics of the MG.

cond-mat↗

arXiv2000

Crowd-anticrowd theory of the Minority Game

The Minority Game is a simple yet highly non-trivial agent-based model for a complex adaptive system. Despite its importance, a quantitative explanation of the game's fluctuations which applies over the entire parameter range of interest has so far been lacking. We provide such a quantitative description based on the interplay between crowds of like-minded agents and their anti-correlated partners (anticrowds).

cond-mat↗

arXiv2000

Mixed population Minority Game with generalized strategies

We present a quantitative theory, based on crowd effects, for the market volatility in a Minority Game played by a mixed population. Below a critical concentration of generalized strategy players, we find that the volatility in the crowded regime remains above the random coin-toss value regardless of the "temperature" controlling strategy use. Our theory yields good agreement with numerical simulations.

cond-mat↗

arXiv2000

Generalized strategies in the Minority Game

We show analytically how the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation) in the Minority Game (MG) can be made to decrease below the random coin-toss limit if the agents use more general behavioral strategies. This suppression of the standard deviation results from a cancellation between the actions of a crowd, in which agents act collectively and make the same decision, and an anticrowd in which agents act collectively by making the opposite decision to the crowd.

cond-mat↗

arXiv2000

Crowd-anticrowd model of the Minority Game

We provide a theoretical description of the Minority Game in terms of crowd effects. The size of the fluctuations arising in the game is controlled by the interplay between crowds of like-minded agents and their anti-correlated partners (anticrowds). The theoretical results are in good agreement with the numerical simulations over the entire parameter range of interest.

cond-mat↗