arXiv · cond-mat/0005043
Mixed population Minority Game with generalized strategies
Abstract
We present a quantitative theory, based on crowd effects, for the market volatility in a Minority Game played by a mixed population. Below a critical concentration of generalized strategy players, we find that the volatility in the crowded regime remains above the random coin-toss value regardless of the "temperature" controlling strategy use. Our theory yields good agreement with numerical simulations.
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P. Jefferies, M. Hart, N. F. Johnson, P. M. Hui. 2000-05-02. Mixed population Minority Game with generalized strategies. https://doi.org/10.1088/0305-4470%2F33%2F43%2F101
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