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Qiaomin Xie

Publications and source records attributed to Qiaomin Xie.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Achieving Exponential Asymptotic Optimality in Average-Reward Restless Bandits without Global Attractor Assumption

We consider the infinite-horizon average-reward restless bandit problem. We propose a novel \emph{two-set policy} that maintains two dynamic subsets of arms: one subset of arms has a nearly optimal state distribution and takes actions according to an Optimal Local Control routine; the other subset of arms is driven towards the optimal state distribution and gradually merged into the first subset. We show that our two-set policy is asymptotically optimal with an $O(\exp(-C N))$ optimality gap for an $N$-armed problem, under the mild assumptions of aperiodic-unichain, non-degeneracy, and local stability. Our policy is the first to achieve \emph{exponential asymptotic optimality} under the above set of easy-to-verify assumptions, whereas prior work either requires a strong \emph{global attractor} assumption or only achieves an $O(1/\sqrt{N})$ optimality gap. We further discuss obstacles in weakening the assumptions by demonstrating examples where exponential asymptotic optimality is not achievable when any of the three assumptions is violated. Notably, we prove a lower bound for a large class of locally unstable restless bandits, showing that local stability is particularly fundamental for exponential asymptotic optimality. Finally, we use simulations to demonstrate that the two-set policy outperforms previous policies on certain RB problems and performs competitively overall.

cs.LG↗

Two-Timescale Linear Stochastic Approximation: Constant Stepsizes Go a Long Way

Previous studies on two-timescale stochastic approximation (SA) mainly focused on bounding mean-squared errors under diminishing stepsize schemes. In this work, we investigate {\it constant} stpesize schemes through the lens of Markov processes, proving that the iterates of both timescales converge to a unique joint stationary distribution in Wasserstein metric. We derive explicit geometric and non-asymptotic convergence rates, as well as the variance and bias introduced by constant stepsizes in the presence of Markovian noise. Specifically, with two constant stepsizes $α< β$, we show that the biases scale linearly with both stepsizes as $Θ(α)+Θ(β)$ up to higher-order terms, while the variance of the slower iterate (resp., faster iterate) scales only with its own stepsize as $O(α)$ (resp., $O(β)$). Unlike previous work, our results require no additional assumptions such as $β^2 \ll α$ nor extra dependence on dimensions. These fine-grained characterizations allow tail-averaging and extrapolation techniques to reduce variance and bias, improving mean-squared error bound to $O(β^4 + \frac{1}{t})$ for both iterates.

eess.SY↗

Minimally Modifying a Markov Game to Achieve Any Nash Equilibrium and Value

We study the game modification problem, where a benevolent game designer or a malevolent adversary modifies the reward function of a zero-sum Markov game so that a target deterministic or stochastic policy profile becomes the unique Markov perfect Nash equilibrium and has a value within a target range, in a way that minimizes the modification cost. We characterize the set of policy profiles that can be installed as the unique equilibrium of a game and establish sufficient and necessary conditions for successful installation. We propose an efficient algorithm that solves a convex optimization problem with linear constraints and then performs random perturbation to obtain a modification plan with a near-optimal cost. The code for our algorithm is available at https://github.com/YoungWu559/game-modification .

cs.GT↗

Inception: Efficiently Computable Misinformation Attacks on Markov Games

We study security threats to Markov games due to information asymmetry and misinformation. We consider an attacker player who can spread misinformation about its reward function to influence the robust victim player's behavior. Given a fixed fake reward function, we derive the victim's policy under worst-case rationality and present polynomial-time algorithms to compute the attacker's optimal worst-case policy based on linear programming and backward induction. Then, we provide an efficient inception ("planting an idea in someone's mind") attack algorithm to find the optimal fake reward function within a restricted set of reward functions with dominant strategies. Importantly, our methods exploit the universal assumption of rationality to compute attacks efficiently. Thus, our work exposes a security vulnerability arising from standard game assumptions under misinformation.

cs.LG↗

Data Poisoning to Fake a Nash Equilibrium in Markov Games

We characterize offline data poisoning attacks on Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL), where an attacker may change a data set in an attempt to install a (potentially fictitious) unique Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for a two-player zero-sum Markov game. We propose the unique Nash set, namely the set of games, specified by their Q functions, with a specific joint policy being the unique Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash set is central to poisoning attacks because the attack is successful if and only if data poisoning pushes all plausible games inside the set. The unique Nash set generalizes the reward polytope commonly used in inverse reinforcement learning to MARL. For zero-sum Markov games, both the inverse Nash set and the set of plausible games induced by data are polytopes in the Q function space. We exhibit a linear program to efficiently compute the optimal poisoning attack. Our work sheds light on the structure of data poisoning attacks on offline MARL, a necessary step before one can design more robust MARL algorithms.

cs.MA↗

Optimal Attack and Defense for Reinforcement Learning

To ensure the usefulness of Reinforcement Learning (RL) in real systems, it is crucial to ensure they are robust to noise and adversarial attacks. In adversarial RL, an external attacker has the power to manipulate the victim agent's interaction with the environment. We study the full class of online manipulation attacks, which include (i) state attacks, (ii) observation attacks (which are a generalization of perceived-state attacks), (iii) action attacks, and (iv) reward attacks. We show the attacker's problem of designing a stealthy attack that maximizes its own expected reward, which often corresponds to minimizing the victim's value, is captured by a Markov Decision Process (MDP) that we call a meta-MDP since it is not the true environment but a higher level environment induced by the attacked interaction. We show that the attacker can derive optimal attacks by planning in polynomial time or learning with polynomial sample complexity using standard RL techniques. We argue that the optimal defense policy for the victim can be computed as the solution to a stochastic Stackelberg game, which can be further simplified into a partially-observable turn-based stochastic game (POTBSG). Neither the attacker nor the victim would benefit from deviating from their respective optimal policies, thus such solutions are truly robust. Although the defense problem is NP-hard, we show that optimal Markovian defenses can be computed (learned) in polynomial time (sample complexity) in many scenarios.

cs.LG↗

Roping in Uncertainty: Robustness and Regularization in Markov Games

We study robust Markov games (RMG) with $s$-rectangular uncertainty. We show a general equivalence between computing a robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) of a $s$-rectangular RMG and computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of an appropriately constructed regularized MG. The equivalence result yields a planning algorithm for solving $s$-rectangular RMGs, as well as provable robustness guarantees for policies computed using regularized methods. However, we show that even for just reward-uncertain two-player zero-sum matrix games, computing an RNE is PPAD-hard. Consequently, we derive a special uncertainty structure called efficient player-decomposability and show that RNE for two-player zero-sum RMG in this class can be provably solved in polynomial time. This class includes commonly used uncertainty sets such as $L_1$ and $L_\infty$ ball uncertainty sets.

cs.GT↗

The Collusion of Memory and Nonlinearity in Stochastic Approximation With Constant Stepsize

In this work, we investigate stochastic approximation (SA) with Markovian data and nonlinear updates under constant stepsize $α>0$. Existing work has primarily focused on either i.i.d. data or linear update rules. We take a new perspective and carefully examine the simultaneous presence of Markovian dependency of data and nonlinear update rules, delineating how the interplay between these two structures leads to complications that are not captured by prior techniques. By leveraging the smoothness and recurrence properties of the SA updates, we develop a fine-grained analysis of the correlation between the SA iterates $θ_k$ and Markovian data $x_k$. This enables us to overcome the obstacles in existing analysis and establish for the first time the weak convergence of the joint process $(x_k, θ_k)_{k\geq0}$. Furthermore, we present a precise characterization of the asymptotic bias of the SA iterates, given by $\mathbb{E}[θ_\infty]-θ^\ast=α(b_\text{m}+b_\text{n}+b_\text{c})+O(α^{3/2})$. Here, $b_\text{m}$ is associated with the Markovian noise, $b_\text{n}$ is tied to the nonlinearity, and notably, $b_\text{c}$ represents a multiplicative interaction between the Markovian noise and nonlinearity, which is absent in previous works. As a by-product of our analysis, we derive finite-time bounds on higher moment $\mathbb{E}[\|θ_k-θ^\ast\|^{2p}]$ and present non-asymptotic geometric convergence rates for the iterates, along with a Central Limit Theorem.

stat.ML↗

Learning to Stabilize Online Reinforcement Learning in Unbounded State Spaces

In many reinforcement learning (RL) applications, we want policies that reach desired states and then keep the controlled system within an acceptable region around the desired states over an indefinite period of time. This latter objective is called stability and is especially important when the state space is unbounded, such that the states can be arbitrarily far from each other and the agent can drift far away from the desired states. For example, in stochastic queuing networks, where queues of waiting jobs can grow without bound, the desired state is all-zero queue lengths. Here, a stable policy ensures queue lengths are finite while an optimal policy minimizes queue lengths. Since an optimal policy is also stable, one would expect that RL algorithms would implicitly give us stable policies. However, in this work, we find that deep RL algorithms that directly minimize the distance to the desired state during online training often result in unstable policies, i.e., policies that drift far away from the desired state. We attribute this instability to poor credit-assignment for destabilizing actions. We then introduce an approach based on two ideas: 1) a Lyapunov-based cost-shaping technique and 2) state transformations to the unbounded state space. We conduct an empirical study on various queueing networks and traffic signal control problems and find that our approach performs competitively against strong baselines with knowledge of the transition dynamics. Our code is available here: https://github.com/Badger-RL/STOP.

cs.LG↗

SPEED: Experimental Design for Policy Evaluation in Linear Heteroscedastic Bandits

In this paper, we study the problem of optimal data collection for policy evaluation in linear bandits. In policy evaluation, we are given a target policy and asked to estimate the expected reward it will obtain when executed in a multi-armed bandit environment. Our work is the first work that focuses on such optimal data collection strategy for policy evaluation involving heteroscedastic reward noise in the linear bandit setting. We first formulate an optimal design for weighted least squares estimates in the heteroscedastic linear bandit setting that reduces the MSE of the value of the target policy. We then use this formulation to derive the optimal allocation of samples per action during data collection. We then introduce a novel algorithm SPEED (Structured Policy Evaluation Experimental Design) that tracks the optimal design and derive its regret with respect to the optimal design. Finally, we empirically validate that SPEED leads to policy evaluation with mean squared error comparable to the oracle strategy and significantly lower than simply running the target policy.

stat.ML↗

Constant Stepsize Q-learning: Distributional Convergence, Bias and Extrapolation

Stochastic Approximation (SA) is a widely used algorithmic approach in various fields, including optimization and reinforcement learning (RL). Among RL algorithms, Q-learning is particularly popular due to its empirical success. In this paper, we study asynchronous Q-learning with constant stepsize, which is commonly used in practice for its fast convergence. By connecting the constant stepsize Q-learning to a time-homogeneous Markov chain, we show the distributional convergence of the iterates in Wasserstein distance and establish its exponential convergence rate. We also establish a Central Limit Theory for Q-learning iterates, demonstrating the asymptotic normality of the averaged iterates. Moreover, we provide an explicit expansion of the asymptotic bias of the averaged iterate in stepsize. Specifically, the bias is proportional to the stepsize up to higher-order terms and we provide an explicit expression for the linear coefficient. This precise characterization of the bias allows the application of Richardson-Romberg (RR) extrapolation technique to construct a new estimate that is provably closer to the optimal Q function. Numerical results corroborate our theoretical finding on the improvement of the RR extrapolation method.

stat.ML↗

Restless Bandits with Average Reward: Breaking the Uniform Global Attractor Assumption

We study the infinite-horizon restless bandit problem with the average reward criterion, in both discrete-time and continuous-time settings. A fundamental goal is to efficiently compute policies that achieve a diminishing optimality gap as the number of arms, $N$, grows large. Existing results on asymptotic optimality all rely on the uniform global attractor property (UGAP), a complex and challenging-to-verify assumption. In this paper, we propose a general, simulation-based framework, Follow-the-Virtual-Advice, that converts any single-armed policy into a policy for the original $N$-armed problem. This is done by simulating the single-armed policy on each arm and carefully steering the real state towards the simulated state. Our framework can be instantiated to produce a policy with an $O(1/\sqrt{N})$ optimality gap. In the discrete-time setting, our result holds under a simpler synchronization assumption, which covers some problem instances that violate UGAP. More notably, in the continuous-time setting, we do not require \emph{any} additional assumptions beyond the standard unichain condition. In both settings, our work is the first asymptotic optimality result that does not require UGAP.

cs.LG↗

Effectiveness of Constant Stepsize in Markovian LSA and Statistical Inference

In this paper, we study the effectiveness of using a constant stepsize in statistical inference via linear stochastic approximation (LSA) algorithms with Markovian data. After establishing a Central Limit Theorem (CLT), we outline an inference procedure that uses averaged LSA iterates to construct confidence intervals (CIs). Our procedure leverages the fast mixing property of constant-stepsize LSA for better covariance estimation and employs Richardson-Romberg (RR) extrapolation to reduce the bias induced by constant stepsize and Markovian data. We develop theoretical results for guiding stepsize selection in RR extrapolation, and identify several important settings where the bias provably vanishes even without extrapolation. We conduct extensive numerical experiments and compare against classical inference approaches. Our results show that using a constant stepsize enjoys easy hyperparameter tuning, fast convergence, and consistently better CI coverage, especially when data is limited.

stat.ML↗

Multi-task Representation Learning for Pure Exploration in Bilinear Bandits

We study multi-task representation learning for the problem of pure exploration in bilinear bandits. In bilinear bandits, an action takes the form of a pair of arms from two different entity types and the reward is a bilinear function of the known feature vectors of the arms. In the \textit{multi-task bilinear bandit problem}, we aim to find optimal actions for multiple tasks that share a common low-dimensional linear representation. The objective is to leverage this characteristic to expedite the process of identifying the best pair of arms for all tasks. We propose the algorithm GOBLIN that uses an experimental design approach to optimize sample allocations for learning the global representation as well as minimize the number of samples needed to identify the optimal pair of arms in individual tasks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to give sample complexity analysis for pure exploration in bilinear bandits with shared representation. Our results demonstrate that by learning the shared representation across tasks, we achieve significantly improved sample complexity compared to the traditional approach of solving tasks independently.

cs.LG↗

Near-Optimal Stochastic Bin-Packing in Large Service Systems with Time-Varying Item Sizes

In modern computing systems, jobs' resource requirements often vary over time. Accounting for this temporal variability during job scheduling is essential for meeting performance goals. However, theoretical understanding on how to schedule jobs with time-varying resource requirements is limited. Motivated by this gap, we propose a \emph{new setting} of the stochastic bin-packing problem in service systems that allows for \emph{time-varying} job resource requirements, also referred to as `item sizes' in traditional bin-packing terms. In this setting, a job or `item' must be dispatched to a server or `bin' upon arrival. Its resource requirement may vary over time while in service, following a Markovian assumption. Once the job's service is complete, it departs from the system. Our goal is to minimize the expected number of active servers, or `non-empty bins', in steady state. Under our problem formulation, we develop a job dispatch policy, named Join-Reqesting-Server (JRS). Broadly, JRS lets each server independently evaluate its current job configuration and decide whether to accept additional jobs, balancing the competing objectives of maximizing throughput and minimizing the risk of resource capacity overruns. The JRS dispatcher then utilizes these individual evaluations to decide which server to dispatch each arriving job to. The theoretical performance guarantee of JRS is in the asymptotic regime where the job arrival rate scales large linearly with respect to a scaling factor $r$. We show that JRS achieves an additive optimality gap of $O(\sqrt{r})$ in the objective value, where the optimal objective value is $Θ(r)$. When specialized to constant job resource requirements, our result improves upon the state-of-the-art $o(r)$ optimality gap. Our technical approach highlights a novel policy conversion framework that reduces the policy design problem into a single-server problem.

cs.PF↗

Reinforcement Learning for SBM Graphon Games with Re-Sampling

The Mean-Field approximation is a tractable approach for studying large population dynamics. However, its assumption on homogeneity and universal connections among all agents limits its applicability in many real-world scenarios. Multi-Population Mean-Field Game (MP-MFG) models have been introduced in the literature to address these limitations. When the underlying Stochastic Block Model is known, we show that a Policy Mirror Ascent algorithm finds the MP-MFG Nash Equilibrium. In more realistic scenarios where the block model is unknown, we propose a re-sampling scheme from a graphon integrated with the finite N-player MP-MFG model. We develop a novel learning framework based on a Graphon Game with Re-Sampling (GGR-S) model, which captures the complex network structures of agents' connections. We analyze GGR-S dynamics and establish the convergence to dynamics of MP-MFG. Leveraging this result, we propose an efficient sample-based N-player Reinforcement Learning algorithm for GGR-S without population manipulation, and provide a rigorous convergence analysis with finite sample guarantee.

cs.GT↗

Bias and Extrapolation in Markovian Linear Stochastic Approximation with Constant Stepsizes

We consider Linear Stochastic Approximation (LSA) with a constant stepsize and Markovian data. Viewing the joint process of the data and LSA iterate as a time-homogeneous Markov chain, we prove its convergence to a unique limiting and stationary distribution in Wasserstein distance and establish non-asymptotic, geometric convergence rates. Furthermore, we show that the bias vector of this limit admits an infinite series expansion with respect to the stepsize. Consequently, the bias is proportional to the stepsize up to higher order terms. This result stands in contrast with LSA under i.i.d. data, for which the bias vanishes. In the reversible chain setting, we provide a general characterization of the relationship between the bias and the mixing time of the Markovian data, establishing that they are roughly proportional to each other. While Polyak-Ruppert tail-averaging reduces the variance of the LSA iterates, it does not affect the bias. The above characterization allows us to show that the bias can be reduced using Richardson-Romberg extrapolation with $m\ge 2$ stepsizes, which eliminates the $m-1$ leading terms in the bias expansion. This extrapolation scheme leads to an exponentially smaller bias and an improved mean squared error, both in theory and empirically. Our results immediately apply to the Temporal Difference learning algorithm with linear function approximation, Markovian data, and constant stepsizes.

stat.ML↗

VISER: A Tractable Solution Concept for Games with Information Asymmetry

Many real-world games suffer from information asymmetry: one player is only aware of their own payoffs while the other player has the full game information. Examples include the critical domain of security games and adversarial multi-agent reinforcement learning. Information asymmetry renders traditional solution concepts such as Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) and Robust-Optimization Equilibrium (ROE) inoperative. We propose a novel solution concept called VISER (Victim Is Secure, Exploiter best-Responds). VISER enables an external observer to predict the outcome of such games. In particular, for security applications, VISER allows the victim to better defend itself while characterizing the most damaging attacks available to the attacker. We show that each player's VISER strategy can be computed independently in polynomial time using linear programming (LP). We also extend VISER to its Markov-perfect counterpart for Markov games, which can be solved efficiently using a series of LPs.

cs.GT↗