arXiv subjects

Renato Paes Leme

Publications and source records attributed to Renato Paes Leme.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2025

Position Auctions in AI-Generated Content

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Procurement Auctions with Best and Final Offers

We study sequential procurement auctions where the sellers are provided with a ``best and final offer'' (BAFO) strategy. This strategy allows each seller $i$ to effectively ``freeze'' their price while remaining active in the auction, and it signals to the buyer, as well as all other sellers, that seller $i$ would reject any price lower than that. This is in contrast to prior work, e.g., on descending auctions, where the options provided to each seller are to either accept a price reduction or reject it and drop out. As a result, the auctions that we consider induce different extensive form games and our goal is to study the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. We focus on settings involving multiple sellers who have full information regarding each other's cost (i.e., the minimum price that they can accept) and a single buyer (the auctioneer) who has no information regarding these costs. Our main result shows that the auctions enhanced with the BAFO strategy can guarantee efficiency in every subgame perfect equilibrium, even if the buyer's valuation function is an arbitrary monotone function. This is in contrast to prior work which required that the buyer's valuation satisfies restrictive properties, like gross substitutes, to achieve efficiency. We then also briefly analyze the seller's cost in the subgame perfect equilibria of these auctions and we show that even if the auctions all return the same outcome, the cost that they induce for the buyer can vary significantly.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Full Swap Regret and Discretized Calibration

We study the problem of minimizing swap regret in structured normal-form games. Players have a very large (potentially infinite) number of pure actions, but each action has an embedding into $d$-dimensional space and payoffs are given by bilinear functions of these embeddings. We provide an efficient learning algorithm for this setting that incurs at most $\tilde{O}(T^{(d+1)/(d+3)})$ swap regret after $T$ rounds. To achieve this, we introduce a new online learning problem we call \emph{full swap regret minimization}. In this problem, a learner repeatedly takes a (randomized) action in a bounded convex $d$-dimensional action set $\mathcal{K}$ and then receives a loss from the adversary, with the goal of minimizing their regret with respect to the \emph{worst-case} swap function mapping $\mathcal{K}$ to $\mathcal{K}$. For varied assumptions about the convexity and smoothness of the loss functions, we design algorithms with full swap regret bounds ranging from $O(T^{d/(d+2)})$ to $O(T^{(d+1)/(d+2)})$. Finally, we apply these tools to the problem of online forecasting to minimize calibration error, showing that several notions of calibration can be viewed as specific instances of full swap regret. In particular, we design efficient algorithms for online forecasting that guarantee at most $O(T^{1/3})$ $\ell_2$-calibration error and $O(\max(\sqrt{εT}, T^{1/3}))$ \emph{discretized-calibration} error (when the forecaster is restricted to predicting multiples of $ε$).

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Preferences Evolve And So Should Your Bandits: Bandits with Evolving States for Online Platforms

We propose a model for learning with bandit feedback while accounting for deterministically evolving and unobservable states that we call Bandits with Deterministically Evolving States ($B$-$DES$). The workhorse applications of our model are learning for recommendation systems and learning for online ads. In both cases, the reward that the algorithm obtains at each round is a function of the short-term reward of the action chosen and how "healthy" the system is (i.e., as measured by its state). For example, in recommendation systems, the reward that the platform obtains from a user's engagement with a particular type of content depends not only on the inherent features of the specific content, but also on how the user's preferences have evolved as a result of interacting with other types of content on the platform. Our general model accounts for the different rate $λ\in [0,1]$ at which the state evolves (e.g., how fast a user's preferences shift as a result of previous content consumption) and encompasses standard multi-armed bandits as a special case. The goal of the algorithm is to minimize a notion of regret against the best-fixed sequence of arms pulled, which is significantly harder to attain compared to standard benchmark of the best-fixed action in hindsight. We present online learning algorithms for any possible value of the evolution rate $λ$ and we show the robustness of our results to various model misspecifications.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Ex-post Individually Rational Bayesian Persuasion

In the Bayesian persuasion model, a sender can convince a receiver to choose an alternative action to the one originally preferred by the receiver. A crucial assumption in this model is the sender's commitment to a predetermined information disclosure policy (signaling scheme) and the receiver's trust in this commitment. However, in practice, it is difficult to monitor whether the sender adheres to the disclosure policy, and the receiver may refuse to follow the persuasion due to a lack of trust. Trust becomes particularly strained when the receiver knows that the sender will incur obvious losses when truthfully following the protocol. In this work, we propose the notion of ex-post individually rational (ex-post IR) Bayesian persuasion: after observing the state, the sender is never asked to send a signal that is less preferred than no information disclosure. An ex-post IR Bayesian persuasion policy is more likely to be truthfully followed by the sender, thereby providing stronger incentives for the receiver to trust the sender. Our contributions are threefold. First, we demonstrate that the optimal ex-post IR persuasion policy can be efficiently computed through a linear program, while also offering its geometric characterization. Second, we show that surprisingly, for non-trivial classes of games, the requirement of ex-post IR constraints does not incur any cost to the sender's utility. Finally, we compare ex-post IR Bayesian persuasion to other information disclosure models that ensure different notions of credibility.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization

We study procurement auctions, where an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of services is measured by a submodular function known to the auctioneer. Our goal is to design computationally efficient procurement auctions that (approximately) maximize the difference between the quality of the acquired services and the total cost of the sellers, while ensuring incentive compatibility (IC), individual rationality (IR) for sellers, and non-negative surplus (NAS) for the auctioneer. Our contributions are twofold: (i) we provide an improved analysis of existing algorithms for non-positive submodular function maximization, and (ii) we design efficient frameworks that transform submodular optimization algorithms into mechanisms that are IC, IR, NAS, and approximation-preserving. These frameworks apply to both the offline setting, where all sellers' bids and services are available simultaneously, and the online setting, where sellers arrive in an adversarial order, requiring the auctioneer to make irrevocable decisions. We also explore whether state-of-the-art submodular optimization algorithms can be converted into descending auctions in adversarial settings, where the schedule of descending prices is determined by an adversary. We show that a submodular optimization algorithm satisfying bi-criteria $(1/2, 1)$-approximation in welfare can be effectively adapted to a descending auction. Additionally, we establish a connection between descending auctions and online submodular optimization. Finally, we demonstrate the practical applications of our frameworks by instantiating them with state-of-the-art submodular optimization algorithms and empirically comparing their welfare performance on publicly available datasets with thousands of sellers.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey

In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opportunities that have arisen as markets embrace this autobidding and cover a range of topics in this area, including bidding algorithms, equilibrium analysis and efficiency of common auction formats, and optimal auction design.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Mechanism Design for Large Language Models

We investigate auction mechanisms for AI-generated content, focusing on applications like ad creative generation. In our model, agents' preferences over stochastically generated content are encoded as large language models (LLMs). We propose an auction format that operates on a token-by-token basis, and allows LLM agents to influence content creation through single dimensional bids. We formulate two desirable incentive properties and prove their equivalence to a monotonicity condition on output aggregation. This equivalence enables a second-price rule design, even absent explicit agent valuation functions. Our design is supported by demonstrations on a publicly available LLM.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Complex Dynamics in Autobidding Systems

It has become the default in markets such as ad auctions for participants to bid in an auction through automated bidding agents (autobidders) which adjust bids over time to satisfy return-over-spend constraints. Despite the prominence of such systems for the internet economy, their resulting dynamical behavior is still not well understood. Although one might hope that such relatively simple systems would typically converge to the equilibria of their underlying auctions, we provide a plethora of results that show the emergence of complex behavior, such as bi-stability, periodic orbits and quasi periodicity. We empirically observe how the market structure (expressed as motifs) qualitatively affects the behavior of the dynamics. We complement it with theoretical results showing that autobidding systems can simulate both linear dynamical systems as well logical boolean gates.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Combinatorial Bernoulli Factories

A Bernoulli factory is an algorithmic procedure for exact sampling of certain random variables having only Bernoulli access to their parameters. Bernoulli access to a parameter $p \in [0,1]$ means the algorithm does not know $p$, but has sample access to independent draws of a Bernoulli random variable with mean equal to $p$. In this paper, we study the problem of Bernoulli factories for polytopes: given Bernoulli access to a vector $x\in P$ for a given polytope $P\subset [0,1]^n$, output a randomized vertex such that the expected value of the $i$-th coordinate is \emph{exactly} equal to $x_i$. For example, for the special case of the perfect matching polytope, one is given Bernoulli access to the entries of a doubly stochastic matrix $[x_{ij}]$ and asked to sample a matching such that the probability of each edge $(i,j)$ be present in the matching is exactly equal to $x_{ij}$. We show that a polytope $P$ admits a Bernoulli factory if and and only if $P$ is the intersection of $[0,1]^n$ with an affine subspace. Our construction is based on an algebraic formulation of the problem, involving identifying a family of Bernstein polynomials (one per vertex) that satisfy a certain algebraic identity on $P$. The main technical tool behind our construction is a connection between these polynomials and the geometry of zonotope tilings. We apply these results to construct an explicit factory for the perfect matching polytope. The resulting factory is deeply connected to the combinatorial enumeration of arborescences and may be of independent interest. For the $k$-uniform matroid polytope, we recover a sampling procedure known in statistics as Sampford sampling.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2023

U-Calibration: Forecasting for an Unknown Agent

We consider the problem of evaluating forecasts of binary events whose predictions are consumed by rational agents who take an action in response to a prediction, but whose utility is unknown to the forecaster. We show that optimizing forecasts for a single scoring rule (e.g., the Brier score) cannot guarantee low regret for all possible agents. In contrast, forecasts that are well-calibrated guarantee that all agents incur sublinear regret. However, calibration is not a necessary criterion here (it is possible for miscalibrated forecasts to provide good regret guarantees for all possible agents), and calibrated forecasting procedures have provably worse convergence rates than forecasting procedures targeting a single scoring rule. Motivated by this, we present a new metric for evaluating forecasts that we call U-calibration, equal to the maximal regret of the sequence of forecasts when evaluated under any bounded scoring rule. We show that sublinear U-calibration error is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to achieve sublinear regret guarantees. We additionally demonstrate how to compute the U-calibration error efficiently and provide an online algorithm that achieves $O(\sqrt{T})$ U-calibration error (on par with optimal rates for optimizing for a single scoring rule, and bypassing lower bounds for the traditionally calibrated learning procedures). Finally, we discuss generalizations to the multiclass prediction setting.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Description Complexity of Regular Distributions

Myerson's regularity condition of a distribution is a standard assumption in economics. In this paper, we study the complexity of describing a regular distribution within a small statistical distance. Our main result is that $\tildeΘ{(ε^{-0.5})}$ bits are necessary and sufficient to describe a regular distribution with support $[0,1]$ within $ε$ Levy distance. We prove this by showing that we can learn the regular distribution approximately with $\tilde{O}(ε^{-0.5})$ queries to the cumulative density function. As a corollary, we show that the pricing query complexity to learn the class of regular distribution with support $[0,1]$ within $ε$ Levy distance is $\tildeΘ{(ε^{-2.5})}$. To learn the mixture of two regular distributions, $\tildeΘ(ε^{-3})$ pricing queries are required.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Bernoulli Factories for Flow-Based Polytopes

We construct explicit combinatorial Bernoulli factories for the class of \emph{flow-based polytopes}; integral 0/1-polytopes defined by a set of network flow constraints. This generalizes the results of Niazadeh et al. (who constructed an explicit factory for the specific case of bipartite perfect matchings) and provides novel exact sampling procedures for sampling paths, circulations, and $k$-flows. In the process, we uncover new connections to algebraic combinatorics.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2022

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?

The class of gross substitutes (GS) set functions plays a central role in Economics and Computer Science. GS belongs to the hierarchy of {\em complement free} valuations introduced by Lehmann, Lehmann and Nisan, along with other prominent classes: $GS \subsetneq Submodular \subsetneq XOS \subsetneq Subadditive$. The GS class has always been more enigmatic than its counterpart classes, both in its definition and in its relation to the other classes. For example, while it is well understood how closely the Submodular, XOS and Subadditive classes (point-wise) approximate one another, approximability of these classes by GS remained wide open. Our main result is the existence of a submodular valuation (one that is also budget additive) that cannot be approximated by GS within a ratio better than $Ω(\frac{\log m}{\log\log m})$, where $m$ is the number of items. En route, we uncover a new symmetrization operation that preserves GS, which may be of independent interest. We show that our main result is tight with respect to budget additive valuations. Additionally, for a class of submodular functions that we refer to as {\em concave of Rado} valuations (this class greatly extends budget additive valuations), we show approximability by GS within an $O(\log^2m)$ factor.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Multiparameter Bernoulli Factories

We consider the problem of computing with many coins of unknown bias. We are given samples access to $n$ coins with \emph{unknown} biases $p_1,\dots, p_n$ and are asked to sample from a coin with bias $f(p_1, \dots, p_n)$ for a given function $f:[0,1]^n \rightarrow [0,1]$. We give a complete characterization of the functions $f$ for which this is possible. As a consequence, we show how to extend various combinatorial sampling procedures (most notably, the classic Sampford Sampling for $k$-subsets) to the boundary of the hypercube.

math.PR↗

arXiv2021

Pricing Query Complexity of Revenue Maximization

The common way to optimize auction and pricing systems is to set aside a small fraction of the traffic to run experiments. This leads to the question: how can we learn the most with the smallest amount of data? For truthful auctions, this is the \emph{sample complexity} problem. For posted price auctions, we no longer have access to samples. Instead, the algorithm is allowed to choose a price $p_t$; then for a fresh sample $v_t \sim \mathcal{D}$ we learn the sign $s_t = sign(p_t - v_t) \in \{-1,+1\}$. How many pricing queries are needed to estimate a given parameter of the underlying distribution? We give tight upper and lower bounds on the number of pricing queries required to find an approximately optimal reserve price for general, regular and MHR distributions. Interestingly, for regular distributions, the pricing query and sample complexities match. But for general and MHR distributions, we show a strict separation between them. All known results on sample complexity for revenue optimization follow from a variant of using the optimal reserve price of the empirical distribution. In the pricing query complexity setting, we show that learning the entire distribution within an error of $ε$ in Levy distance requires strictly more pricing queries than to estimate the reserve. Instead, our algorithm uses a new property we identify called \emph{relative flatness} to quickly zoom into the right region of the distribution to get the optimal pricing query complexity.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Contextual Recommendations and Low-Regret Cutting-Plane Algorithms

We consider the following variant of contextual linear bandits motivated by routing applications in navigational engines and recommendation systems. We wish to learn a hidden $d$-dimensional value $w^*$. Every round, we are presented with a subset $\mathcal{X}_t \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ of possible actions. If we choose (i.e. recommend to the user) action $x_t$, we obtain utility $\langle x_t, w^* \rangle$ but only learn the identity of the best action $\arg\max_{x \in \mathcal{X}_t} \langle x, w^* \rangle$. We design algorithms for this problem which achieve regret $O(d\log T)$ and $\exp(O(d \log d))$. To accomplish this, we design novel cutting-plane algorithms with low "regret" -- the total distance between the true point $w^*$ and the hyperplanes the separation oracle returns. We also consider the variant where we are allowed to provide a list of several recommendations. In this variant, we give an algorithm with $O(d^2 \log d)$ regret and list size $\mathrm{poly}(d)$. Finally, we construct nearly tight algorithms for a weaker variant of this problem where the learner only learns the identity of an action that is better than the recommendation. Our results rely on new algorithmic techniques in convex geometry (including a variant of Steiner's formula for the centroid of a convex set) which may be of independent interest.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Learning to Price Against a Moving Target

In the Learning to Price setting, a seller posts prices over time with the goal of maximizing revenue while learning the buyer's valuation. This problem is very well understood when values are stationary (fixed or iid). Here we study the problem where the buyer's value is a moving target, i.e., they change over time either by a stochastic process or adversarially with bounded variation. In either case, we provide matching upper and lower bounds on the optimal revenue loss. Since the target is moving, any information learned soon becomes out-dated, which forces the algorithms to keep switching between exploring and exploiting phases.

cs.GT↗