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Robert F. Trager

Publications and source records attributed to Robert F. Trager.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Who Can Evaluate AI Independently? A Framework for Analysing Evaluation Infrastructure

AI evaluation is increasingly central to AI safety and governance, yet taking part in an evaluation does not by itself confer authority over its design, its execution or the resources it depends on. This paper examines how infrastructure arrangements distribute that authority, and so shape who can evaluate AI systems independently. Drawing on Science and Technology Studies, political economy and applied evaluation standards, we introduce PAAI (Power, Access, Adequacy, Independence), a framework for examining who controls evaluation infrastructure, the terms on which it is available, whether it is adequate to the evaluation's purpose and what autonomy it supports. We apply PAAI to twelve African AI evaluation projects (2022-2025) and to the documented roles of all ten member institutes in the three published joint testing exercises of the international network of AI Safety Institutes. We identify three recurring configurations: extractive collaboration, dependent innovation and constrained independence. African actors often contribute data, language expertise and task design while external institutions retain authority over infrastructure and evaluation frameworks; design authority without infrastructure authority never yielded more than partial independence. The joint testing exercises show a similar division among mostly high-income members: the institutes that led each exercise also ran the models, while Kenya, the network's only African member, moved from annotation to task design with no documented model execution. Participation in evaluation does not by itself produce evaluative authority. For evaluation to serve as a credible governance mechanism, access must come with control over priorities, methods, publication and continuity.

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Position: Ensuring mutual privacy is necessary for effective external evaluation of proprietary AI systems

The external evaluation of AI systems is increasingly recognised as a crucial approach for understanding their potential risks. However, facilitating external evaluation in practice faces significant challenges in balancing evaluators' need for system access with AI developers' privacy and security concerns. Additionally, evaluators have reason to protect their own privacy - for example, in order to maintain the integrity of held-out test sets. We refer to the challenge of ensuring both developers' and evaluators' privacy as one of providing mutual privacy. In this position paper, we argue that (i) addressing this mutual privacy challenge is essential for effective external evaluation of AI systems, and (ii) current methods for facilitating external evaluation inadequately address this challenge, particularly when it comes to preserving evaluators' privacy. In making these arguments, we formalise the mutual privacy problem; examine the privacy and access requirements of both model owners and evaluators; and explore potential solutions to this challenge, including through the application of cryptographic and hardware-based approaches.

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Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence

Computing power, or "compute," is crucial for the development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. As a result, governments and companies have started to leverage compute as a means to govern AI. For example, governments are investing in domestic compute capacity, controlling the flow of compute to competing countries, and subsidizing compute access to certain sectors. However, these efforts only scratch the surface of how compute can be used to govern AI development and deployment. Relative to other key inputs to AI (data and algorithms), AI-relevant compute is a particularly effective point of intervention: it is detectable, excludable, and quantifiable, and is produced via an extremely concentrated supply chain. These characteristics, alongside the singular importance of compute for cutting-edge AI models, suggest that governing compute can contribute to achieving common policy objectives, such as ensuring the safety and beneficial use of AI. More precisely, policymakers could use compute to facilitate regulatory visibility of AI, allocate resources to promote beneficial outcomes, and enforce restrictions against irresponsible or malicious AI development and usage. However, while compute-based policies and technologies have the potential to assist in these areas, there is significant variation in their readiness for implementation. Some ideas are currently being piloted, while others are hindered by the need for fundamental research. Furthermore, naive or poorly scoped approaches to compute governance carry significant risks in areas like privacy, economic impacts, and centralization of power. We end by suggesting guardrails to minimize these risks from compute governance.

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