arXiv subjects

Sören Mindermann

Publications and source records attributed to Sören Mindermann.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Open Technical Problems in Open-Weight AI Model Risk Management

Frontier AI models with openly available weights are steadily becoming more powerful and widely adopted. However, compared to proprietary models, open-weight models pose different opportunities and challenges for effective risk management. For example, they allow for more open research and testing. However, managing their risks is also challenging because they can be modified arbitrarily, used without oversight, and spread irreversibly. Currently, there is limited research on safety tooling specific to open-weight models. Addressing these gaps will be key to both realizing their benefits and mitigating their harms. In this paper, we present 16 open technical challenges for open-weight model safety involving training data, training algorithms, evaluations, deployment, and ecosystem monitoring. We conclude by discussing the nascent state of the field, emphasizing that openness about research, methods, and evaluations -- not just weights -- will be key to building a rigorous science of open-weight model risk management.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Introspection Adapters: Training LLMs to Report Their Learned Behaviors

When model developers or users fine-tune an LLM, this can induce behaviors that are unexpected, deliberately harmful, or hard to detect. It would be far easier to audit LLMs if they could simply describe their behaviors in natural language. Here, we study a scalable approach to rapidly identify learned behaviors of many LLMs derived from a shared base LLM. Given a model $M$, our method works by finetuning models $M_i$ from $M$ with implanted behaviors $b_i$; the $(M_i, b_i)$ pairs serve as labeled training data. We then train an introspection adapter (IA): a single LoRA adapter jointly trained across the finetunes $M_i$ to cause them to verbalize their implanted behaviors. We find that this IA induces self-description of learned behaviors even in finetunes of $M$ that were trained in very different ways from the $M_i$. For example, IAs generalize to AuditBench, achieving state-of-the-art at identifying explicitly hidden concerning behaviors. IAs can also be used to detect encrypted finetuning API attacks. They scale favorably with model size and training data diversity. Overall, our results suggest that IAs are a scalable, effective, and practically useful approach to auditing fine-tuned LLMs.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

International AI Safety Report 2026

The International AI Safety Report 2026 synthesises the current scientific evidence on the capabilities, emerging risks, and safety of general-purpose AI systems. The report series was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. 29 nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. Over 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the Report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report 2025: Second Key Update: Technical Safeguards and Risk Management

This second update to the 2025 International AI Safety Report assesses new developments in general-purpose AI risk management over the past year. It examines how researchers, public institutions, and AI developers are approaching risk management for general-purpose AI. In recent months, for example, three leading AI developers applied enhanced safeguards to their new models, as their internal pre-deployment testing could not rule out the possibility that these models could be misused to help create biological weapons. Beyond specific precautionary measures, there have been a range of other advances in techniques for making AI models and systems more reliable and resistant to misuse. These include new approaches in adversarial training, data curation, and monitoring systems. In parallel, institutional frameworks that operationalise and formalise these technical capabilities are starting to emerge: the number of companies publishing Frontier AI Safety Frameworks more than doubled in 2025, and governments and international organisations have established a small number of governance frameworks for general-purpose AI, focusing largely on transparency and risk assessment.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report 2025: First Key Update: Capabilities and Risk Implications

Since the publication of the first International AI Safety Report, AI capabilities have continued to improve across key domains. New training techniques that teach AI systems to reason step-by-step and inference-time enhancements have primarily driven these advances, rather than simply training larger models. As a result, general-purpose AI systems can solve more complex problems in a range of domains, from scientific research to software development. Their performance on benchmarks that measure performance in coding, mathematics, and answering expert-level science questions has continued to improve, though reliability challenges persist, with systems excelling on some tasks while failing completely on others. These capability improvements also have implications for multiple risks, including risks from biological weapons and cyber attacks. Finally, they pose new challenges for monitoring and controllability. This update examines how AI capabilities have improved since the first Report, then focuses on key risk areas where substantial new evidence warrants updated assessments.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

The Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities

Rapidly improving AI capabilities and autonomy hold significant promise of transformation, but are also driving vigorous debate on how to ensure that AI is safe, i.e., trustworthy, reliable, and secure. Building a trusted ecosystem is therefore essential -- it helps people embrace AI with confidence and gives maximal space for innovation while avoiding backlash. The "2025 Singapore Conference on AI (SCAI): International Scientific Exchange on AI Safety" aimed to support research in this space by bringing together AI scientists across geographies to identify and synthesise research priorities in AI safety. This resulting report builds on the International AI Safety Report chaired by Yoshua Bengio and backed by 33 governments. By adopting a defence-in-depth model, this report organises AI safety research domains into three types: challenges with creating trustworthy AI systems (Development), challenges with evaluating their risks (Assessment), and challenges with monitoring and intervening after deployment (Control).

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspective

In coming years or decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities across many critical domains. We argue that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals that are in conflict (i.e. misaligned) with human interests. If trained like today's most capable models, AGIs could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn misaligned internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their fine-tuning distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We review emerging evidence for these properties. In this revised paper, we include more direct empirical evidence published as of early 2025. AGIs with these properties would be difficult to align and may appear aligned even when they are not. Finally, we briefly outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and we review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Bare Minimum Mitigations for Autonomous AI Development

Artificial intelligence (AI) is advancing rapidly, with the potential for significantly automating AI research and development itself in the near future. In 2024, international scientists, including Turing Award recipients, warned of risks from autonomous AI research and development (R&D), suggesting a red line such that no AI system should be able to improve itself or other AI systems without explicit human approval and assistance. However, the criteria for meaningful human approval remain unclear, and there is limited analysis on the specific risks of autonomous AI R&D, how they arise, and how to mitigate them. In this brief paper, we outline how these risks may emerge and propose four minimum safeguard recommendations applicable when AI agents significantly automate or accelerate AI development.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

In Which Areas of Technical AI Safety Could Geopolitical Rivals Cooperate?

International cooperation is common in AI research, including between geopolitical rivals. While many experts advocate for greater international cooperation on AI safety to address shared global risks, some view cooperation on AI with suspicion, arguing that it can pose unacceptable risks to national security. However, the extent to which cooperation on AI safety poses such risks, as well as provides benefits, depends on the specific area of cooperation. In this paper, we consider technical factors that impact the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, focusing on the degree to which such cooperation can advance dangerous capabilities, result in the sharing of sensitive information, or provide opportunities for harm. We begin by why nations historically cooperate on strategic technologies and analyse current US-China cooperation in AI as a case study. We further argue that existing frameworks for managing associated risks can be supplemented with consideration of key risks specific to cooperation on technical AI safety research. Through our analysis, we find that research into AI verification mechanisms and shared protocols may be suitable areas for such cooperation. Through this analysis we aim to help researchers and governments identify and mitigate the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, so that the benefits of cooperation can be fully realised.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI (Interim Report)

This is the interim publication of the first International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI. The report synthesises the scientific understanding of general-purpose AI -- AI that can perform a wide variety of tasks -- with a focus on understanding and managing its risks. A diverse group of 75 AI experts contributed to this report, including an international Expert Advisory Panel nominated by 30 countries, the EU, and the UN. Led by the Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content. The final report is available at arXiv:2501.17805

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Superintelligent Agents Pose Catastrophic Risks: Can Scientist AI Offer a Safer Path?

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report

The first International AI Safety Report comprehensively synthesizes the current evidence on the capabilities, risks, and safety of advanced AI systems. The report was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. Thirty nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. A total of 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Open Problems in Machine Unlearning for AI Safety

As AI systems become more capable, widely deployed, and increasingly autonomous in critical areas such as cybersecurity, biological research, and healthcare, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values is paramount. Machine unlearning -- the ability to selectively forget or suppress specific types of knowledge -- has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, which has been the primary focus of existing research. More recently, its potential application to AI safety has gained attention. In this paper, we identify key limitations that prevent unlearning from serving as a comprehensive solution for AI safety, particularly in managing dual-use knowledge in sensitive domains like cybersecurity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) safety. In these contexts, information can be both beneficial and harmful, and models may combine seemingly harmless information for harmful purposes -- unlearning this information could strongly affect beneficial uses. We provide an overview of inherent constraints and open problems, including the broader side effects of unlearning dangerous knowledge, as well as previously unexplored tensions between unlearning and existing safety mechanisms. Finally, we investigate challenges related to evaluation, robustness, and the preservation of safety features during unlearning. By mapping these limitations and open challenges, we aim to guide future research toward realistic applications of unlearning within a broader AI safety framework, acknowledging its limitations and highlighting areas where alternative approaches may be required.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Alignment faking in large language models

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Managing extreme AI risks amid rapid progress

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is progressing rapidly, and companies are shifting their focus to developing generalist AI systems that can autonomously act and pursue goals. Increases in capabilities and autonomy may soon massively amplify AI's impact, with risks that include large-scale social harms, malicious uses, and an irreversible loss of human control over autonomous AI systems. Although researchers have warned of extreme risks from AI, there is a lack of consensus about how exactly such risks arise, and how to manage them. Society's response, despite promising first steps, is incommensurate with the possibility of rapid, transformative progress that is expected by many experts. AI safety research is lagging. Present governance initiatives lack the mechanisms and institutions to prevent misuse and recklessness, and barely address autonomous systems. In this short consensus paper, we describe extreme risks from upcoming, advanced AI systems. Drawing on lessons learned from other safety-critical technologies, we then outline a comprehensive plan combining technical research and development with proactive, adaptive governance mechanisms for a more commensurate preparation.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoor behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoor behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Specific versus General Principles for Constitutional AI

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2023

Prioritized training on points that are learnable, worth learning, and not yet learned (workshop version)

We introduce Goldilocks Selection, a technique for faster model training which selects a sequence of training points that are "just right". We propose an information-theoretic acquisition function -- the reducible validation loss -- and compute it with a small proxy model -- GoldiProx -- to efficiently choose training points that maximize information about a validation set. We show that the "hard" (e.g. high loss) points usually selected in the optimization literature are typically noisy, while the "easy" (e.g. low noise) samples often prioritized for curriculum learning confer less information. Further, points with uncertain labels, typically targeted by active learning, tend to be less relevant to the task. In contrast, Goldilocks Selection chooses points that are "just right" and empirically outperforms the above approaches. Moreover, the selected sequence can transfer to other architectures; practitioners can share and reuse it without the need to recreate it.

cs.LG↗