Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Sarit Kraus

Publications and source records attributed to Sarit Kraus.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Perturbed Public Voices (P$^{2}$V): A Dataset for Robust Audio Deepfake Detection

Current audio deepfake detectors cannot be trusted. While they excel on controlled benchmarks, they fail when tested in the real world. We introduce Perturbed Public Voices (P$^{2}$V), an IRB-approved dataset capturing three critical aspects of malicious deepfakes: (1) identity-consistent transcripts via LLMs, (2) environmental and adversarial noise, and (3) state-of-the-art voice cloning (2020-2025). Experiments reveal alarming vulnerabilities of 22 recent audio deepfake detectors: models trained on current datasets lose 43% performance when tested on P$^{2}$V, with performance measured as the mean of F1 score on deepfake audio, AUC, and 1-EER. Simple adversarial perturbations induce up to 16% performance degradation, while advanced cloning techniques reduce detectability by 20-30%. In contrast, P$^{2}$V-trained models maintain robustness against these attacks while generalizing to existing datasets, establishing a new benchmark for robust audio deepfake detection. P$^{2}$V will be publicly released upon acceptance by a conference/journal.

cs.SD↗

Contrastive Explainable Clustering with Differential Privacy

This paper presents a novel approach to Explainable AI (XAI) that combines contrastive explanations with differential privacy for clustering algorithms. Focusing on k-median and k-means problems, we calculate contrastive explanations as the utility difference between original clustering and clustering with a centroid fixed to a specific data point. This method provides personalized insights into centroid placement. Our key contribution is demonstrating that these differentially private explanations achieve essentially the same utility bounds as non-private explanations. Experiments across various datasets show that our approach offers meaningful, privacy-preserving, and individually relevant explanations without significantly compromising clustering utility. This work advances privacy-aware machine learning by balancing data protection, explanation quality, and personalization in clustering tasks.

cs.LG↗

Bribery for Coalitions in Parliamentary Elections

We study the computational complexity of bribery in parliamentary voting, in settings where the briber is (also) interested in the success of an entire set of political parties - a ``coalition'' - rather than an individual party. We introduce two variants of the problem: the Coalition-Bribery Problem (CB) and the Coalition-Bribery-with-Preferred-party Problem (CBP). In CB, the goal is to maximize the total number of seats held by a coalition, while in CBP, there are two objectives: to maximize the votes for the preferred party, while also ensuring that the total number of seats held by the coalition is above the target support (e.g. majority). We study the complexity of these bribery problems under two positional scoring functions - Plurality and Borda - and for multiple bribery types - $1$-bribery, $\$$-bribery, swap-bribery, and coalition-shift-bribery. We also consider both the case where seats are only allotted to parties whose number of votes passes some minimum support level and the case with no such minimum. We provide polynomial-time algorithms to solve some of these problems and prove that the others are NP-hard.

cs.GT↗

Control for Coalitions in Parliamentary Elections

The traditional election control problem focuses on the use of control to promote a single candidate. In parliamentary elections, however, the focus shifts: voters care no less about the overall governing coalition than the individual parties' seat count. This paper introduces a new problem: controlling parliamentary elections, where the goal extends beyond promoting a single party to influencing the collective seat count of coalitions of parties. We focus on plurality rule and control through the addition or deletion of parties. Our analysis reveals that, without restrictions on voters' preferences, these control problems are W[1]-hard. In some cases, the problems are immune to control, making such efforts ineffective. We then study the special case where preferences are symmetric single-peaked. We show that in the single-peaked setting, aggregation of voters into types allows for a compact representation of the problem. Our findings show that for the single-peaked setting, some cases are solvable in polynomial time, while others are NP-hard for the compact representation - but admit a polynomial algorithm for the extensive representation.

cs.GT↗

Advising Agent for Supporting Human-Multi-Drone Team Collaboration

Multi-drone systems have become transformative technologies across various industries, offering innovative applications. However, despite significant advancements, their autonomous capabilities remain inherently limited. As a result, human operators are often essential for supervising and controlling these systems, creating what is referred to as a human-multi-drone team. In realistic settings, human operators must make real-time decisions while addressing a variety of signals, such as drone statuses and sensor readings, and adapting to dynamic conditions and uncertainty. This complexity may lead to suboptimal operations, potentially compromising the overall effectiveness of the team. In critical contexts like Search And Rescue (SAR) missions, such inefficiencies can have costly consequences. This work introduces an advising agent designed to enhance collaboration in human-multi-drone teams, with a specific focus on SAR scenarios. The advising agent is designed to assist the human operator by suggesting contextual actions worth taking. To that end, the agent employs a novel computation technique that relies on a small set of human demonstrations to generate varying realistic human-like trajectories. These trajectories are then generalized using machine learning for fast and accurate predictions of the long-term effects of different advice. Through human evaluations, we demonstrate that our approach delivers high-quality assistance, resulting in significantly improved performance compared to baseline conditions.

cs.HC↗

Explaining Decisions of Agents in Mixed-Motive Games

In recent years, agents have become capable of communicating seamlessly via natural language and navigating in environments that involve cooperation and competition, a fact that can introduce social dilemmas. Due to the interleaving of cooperation and competition, understanding agents' decision-making in such environments is challenging, and humans can benefit from obtaining explanations. However, such environments and scenarios have rarely been explored in the context of explainable AI. While some explanation methods for cooperative environments can be applied in mixed-motive setups, they do not address inter-agent competition, cheap-talk, or implicit communication by actions. In this work, we design explanation methods to address these issues. Then, we proceed to establish generality and demonstrate the applicability of the methods to three games with vastly different properties. Lastly, we demonstrate the effectiveness and usefulness of the methods for humans in two mixed-motive games. The first is a challenging 7-player game called no-press Diplomacy. The second is a 3-player game inspired by the prisoner's dilemma, featuring communication in natural language.

cs.AI↗

Voter Priming Campaigns: Strategies, Equilibria, and Algorithms

Issue salience is a major determinant in voters' decisions. Candidates and political parties campaign to shift salience to their advantage - a process termed priming. We study the dynamics, strategies and equilibria of campaign spending for voter priming in multi-issue multi-party settings. We consider both parliamentary elections, where parties aim to maximize their share of votes, and various settings for presidential elections, where the winner takes all. For parliamentary elections, we show that pure equilibrium spending always exists and can be computed in time linear in the number of voters. For two parties and all settings, a spending equilibrium exists such that each party invests only in a single issue, and an equilibrium can be computed in time that is polynomial in the number of issues and linear in the number of voters. We also show that in most presidential settings no equilibrium exists. Additional properties of optimal campaign strategies are also studied.

cs.GT↗

Heterogeneous Multi-Robot Graph Coverage with Proximity and Movement Constraints

Multi-Robot Coverage problems have been extensively studied in robotics, planning and multi-agent systems. In this work, we consider the coverage problem when there are constraints on the proximity (e.g., maximum distance between the agents, or a blue agent must be adjacent to a red agent) and the movement (e.g., terrain traversability and material load capacity) of the robots. Such constraints naturally arise in many real-world applications, e.g. in search-and-rescue and maintenance operations. Given such a setting, the goal is to compute a covering tour of the graph with a minimum number of steps, and that adheres to the proximity and movement constraints. For this problem, our contributions are four: (i) a formal formulation of the problem, (ii) an exact algorithm that is FPT in F, d and tw, the set of robot formations that encode the proximity constraints, the maximum nodes degree, and the tree-width of the graph, respectively, (iii) for the case that the graph is a tree: a PTAS approximation scheme, that given an approximation parameter epsilon, produces a tour that is within a epsilon times error(||F||, d) of the optimal one, and the computation runs in time poly(n) times h(1/epsilon,||F||). (iv) for the case that the graph is a tree, with $k=3$ robots, and the constraint is that all agents are connected: a PTAS scheme with multiplicative approximation error of 1+O(epsilon), independent of the maximal degree d.

cs.MA↗

Bayesian Persuasion with Externalities: Exploiting Agent Types

We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to the existence of externalities in the agents' utilities, the principal also acts as a correlation device to correlate the agents' actions. We consider the setting where the agents are categorized into a small number of types. Agents of the same type share identical utility functions and are treated equitably in the utility functions of both other agents and the principal. We study the problem of computing optimal signaling strategies for the principal, under three different types of signaling channels: public, private, and semi-private. Our results include revelation-principle-style characterizations of optimal signaling strategies, linear programming formulations, and analysis of in/tractability of the optimization problems. It is demonstrated that when the maximum number of deviating agents is bounded by a constant, our LP-based formulations compute optimal signaling strategies in polynomial time. Otherwise, the problems are NP-hard.

cs.AI↗

ADESSE: Advice Explanations in Complex Repeated Decision-Making Environments

In the evolving landscape of human-centered AI, fostering a synergistic relationship between humans and AI agents in decision-making processes stands as a paramount challenge. This work considers a problem setup where an intelligent agent comprising a neural network-based prediction component and a deep reinforcement learning component provides advice to a human decision-maker in complex repeated decision-making environments. Whether the human decision-maker would follow the agent's advice depends on their beliefs and trust in the agent and on their understanding of the advice itself. To this end, we developed an approach named ADESSE to generate explanations about the adviser agent to improve human trust and decision-making. Computational experiments on a range of environments with varying model sizes demonstrate the applicability and scalability of ADESSE. Furthermore, an interactive game-based user study shows that participants were significantly more satisfied, achieved a higher reward in the game, and took less time to select an action when presented with explanations generated by ADESSE. These findings illuminate the critical role of tailored, human-centered explanations in AI-assisted decision-making.

cs.AI↗

The Complexity of Manipulation of k-Coalitional Games on Graphs

In many settings, there is an organizer who would like to divide a set of agents into $k$ coalitions, and cares about the friendships within each coalition. Specifically, the organizer might want to maximize utilitarian social welfare, maximize egalitarian social welfare, or simply guarantee that every agent will have at least one friend within his coalition. However, in many situations, the organizer is not familiar with the friendship connections, and he needs to obtain them from the agents. In this setting, a manipulative agent may falsely report friendship connections in order to increase his utility. In this paper, we analyze the complexity of finding manipulation in such $k$-coalitional games on graphs. We also introduce a new type of manipulation, socially-aware manipulation, in which the manipulator would like to increase his utility without decreasing the social welfare. We then study the complexity of finding socially-aware manipulation in our setting. Finally, we examine the frequency of socially-aware manipulation and the running time of our algorithms via simulation results.

cs.GT↗

Design a Win-Win Strategy That Is Fair to Both Service Providers and Tasks When Rejection Is Not an Option

Assigning tasks to service providers is a frequent procedure across various applications. Often the tasks arrive dynamically while the service providers remain static. Preventing task rejection caused by service provider overload is of utmost significance. To ensure a positive experience in relevant applications for both service providers and tasks, fairness must be considered. To address the issue, we model the problem as an online matching within a bipartite graph and tackle two minimax problems: one focuses on minimizing the highest waiting time of a task, while the other aims to minimize the highest workload of a service provider. We show that the second problem can be expressed as a linear program and thus solved efficiently while maintaining a reasonable approximation to the objective of the first problem. We developed novel methods that utilize the two minimax problems. We conducted extensive simulation experiments using real data and demonstrated that our novel heuristics, based on the linear program, performed remarkably well.

cs.DC↗

Intelligent Agents for Auction-based Federated Learning: A Survey

Auction-based federated learning (AFL) is an important emerging category of FL incentive mechanism design, due to its ability to fairly and efficiently motivate high-quality data owners to join data consumers' (i.e., servers') FL training tasks. To enhance the efficiency in AFL decision support for stakeholders (i.e., data consumers, data owners, and the auctioneer), intelligent agent-based techniques have emerged. However, due to the highly interdisciplinary nature of this field and the lack of a comprehensive survey providing an accessible perspective, it is a challenge for researchers to enter and contribute to this field. This paper bridges this important gap by providing a first-of-its-kind survey on the Intelligent Agents for AFL (IA-AFL) literature. We propose a unique multi-tiered taxonomy that organises existing IA-AFL works according to 1) the stakeholders served, 2) the auction mechanism adopted, and 3) the goals of the agents, to provide readers with a multi-perspective view into this field. In addition, we analyse the limitations of existing approaches, summarise the commonly adopted performance evaluation metrics, and discuss promising future directions leading towards effective and efficient stakeholder-oriented decision support in IA-AFL ecosystems.

cs.LG↗

Contrastive Explanations of Centralized Multi-agent Optimization Solutions

In many real-world scenarios, agents are involved in optimization problems. Since most of these scenarios are over-constrained, optimal solutions do not always satisfy all agents. Some agents might be unhappy and ask questions of the form ``Why does solution $S$ not satisfy property $P$?''. We propose CMAoE, a domain-independent approach to obtain contrastive explanations by: (i) generating a new solution $S^\prime$ where property $P$ is enforced, while also minimizing the differences between $S$ and $S^\prime$; and (ii) highlighting the differences between the two solutions, with respect to the features of the objective function of the multi-agent system. Such explanations aim to help agents understanding why the initial solution is better in the context of the multi-agent system than what they expected. We have carried out a computational evaluation that shows that CMAoE can generate contrastive explanations for large multi-agent optimization problems. We have also performed an extensive user study in four different domains that shows that: (i) after being presented with these explanations, humans' satisfaction with the original solution increases; and (ii) the constrastive explanations generated by CMAoE are preferred or equally preferred by humans over the ones generated by state of the art approaches.

cs.AI↗

Value-based Resource Matching with Fairness Criteria: Application to Agricultural Water Trading

Optimal allocation of agricultural water in the event of droughts is an important global problem. In addressing this problem, many aspects, including the welfare of farmers, the economy, and the environment, must be considered. Under this backdrop, our work focuses on several resource-matching problems accounting for agents with multi-crop portfolios, geographic constraints, and fairness. First, we address a matching problem where the goal is to maximize a welfare function in two-sided markets where buyers' requirements and sellers' supplies are represented by value functions that assign prices (or costs) to specified volumes of water. For the setting where the value functions satisfy certain monotonicity properties, we present an efficient algorithm that maximizes a social welfare function. When there are minimum water requirement constraints, we present a randomized algorithm which ensures that the constraints are satisfied in expectation. For a single seller--multiple buyers setting with fairness constraints, we design an efficient algorithm that maximizes the minimum level of satisfaction of any buyer. We also present computational complexity results that highlight the limits on the generalizability of our results. We evaluate the algorithms developed in our work with experiments on both real-world and synthetic data sets with respect to drought severity, value functions, and seniority of agents.

cs.DS↗

The Impact of Snippet Reliability on Misinformation in Online Health Search

Search result snippets are crucial in modern search engines, providing users with a quick overview of a website's content. Snippets help users determine the relevance of a document to their information needs, and in certain scenarios even enable them to satisfy those needs without visiting web documents. Hence, it is crucial for snippets to reliably represent the content of their corresponding documents. While this may be a straightforward requirement for some queries, it can become challenging in the complex domain of healthcare, and can lead to misinformation. This paper aims to examine snippets' reliability in representing their corresponding documents, specifically in the health domain. To achieve this, we conduct a series of user studies using Google's search results, where participants are asked to infer viewpoints of search results pertaining to queries about the effectiveness of a medical intervention for a medical condition, based solely on their titles and snippets. Our findings reveal that a considerable portion of Google's snippets (28%) failed to present any viewpoint on the intervention's effectiveness, and that 35% were interpreted by participants as having a different viewpoint compared to their corresponding documents. To address this issue, we propose a snippet extraction solution tailored directly to users' information needs, i.e., extracting snippets that summarize documents' viewpoints regarding the intervention and condition that appear in the query. User study demonstrates that our information need-focused solution outperforms the mainstream query-based approach. With only 19.67% of snippets generated by our solution reported as not presenting a viewpoint and a mere 20.33% misinterpreted by participants. These results strongly suggest that an information need-focused approach can significantly improve the reliability of extracted snippets in online health search.

cs.IR↗

Cognitive Effects in Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have received enormous attention over the past year and are now used by hundreds of millions of people every day. The rapid adoption of this technology naturally raises questions about the possible biases such models might exhibit. In this work, we tested one of these models (GPT-3) on a range of cognitive effects, which are systematic patterns that are usually found in human cognitive tasks. We found that LLMs are indeed prone to several human cognitive effects. Specifically, we show that the priming, distance, SNARC, and size congruity effects were presented with GPT-3, while the anchoring effect is absent. We describe our methodology, and specifically the way we converted real-world experiments to text-based experiments. Finally, we speculate on the possible reasons why GPT-3 exhibits these effects and discuss whether they are imitated or reinvented.

cs.AI↗

Strategic Voting in the Context of Stable-Matching of Teams

In the celebrated stable-matching problem, there are two sets of agents M and W, and the members of M only have preferences over the members of W and vice versa. It is usually assumed that each member of M and W is a single entity. However, there are many cases in which each member of M or W represents a team that consists of several individuals with common interests. For example, students may need to be matched to professors for their final projects, but each project is carried out by a team of students. Thus, the students first form teams, and the matching is between teams of students and professors. When a team is considered as an agent from M or W, it needs to have a preference order that represents it. A voting rule is a natural mechanism for aggregating the preferences of the team members into a single preference order. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams. Specifically, we assume that members of each team use the Borda rule for generating the preference order of the team. Then, the Gale-Shapley algorithm is used for finding a stable-matching, where the set M is the proposing side. We show that the single-voter manipulation problem can be solved in polynomial time, both when the team is from M and when it is from W. We show that the coalitional manipulation problem is computationally hard, but it can be solved approximately both when the team is from M and when it is from W.

cs.GT↗