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Sebastian De Haro

Publications and source records attributed to Sebastian De Haro.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Holography as an Information Principle in Quantum Gravity

We draw on 't Hooft's seminal formulation of the holographic principle to analyse the methodological and conceptual role of information in quantum gravity. We argue that, in 't Hooft's work and in later developments, information functions as a substantive guiding principle. We distinguish three aspects of this role: First, holographic bounds on the amount of information that can be stored in a region function as theory selection criteria that constrain viable quantum gravity theories. Second, holography functions as a principle of theoretical equivalence: the bulk and boundary theories must describe the same physical content, even though 't Hooft privileges a more fundamental, lower-dimensional, and potentially deterministic boundary description. Third, the distribution and encoding of information connect 't Hooft's proposals to contemporary work on bulk reconstruction, holographic quantum error correction, and ER=EPR, where emergent spacetime structure is tied to patterns of entanglement and redundancy. On the basis of these three roles, we argue that purely epistemic or Shannon-style conceptions of information are inadequate in this context: we instead outline a distinction between what we call maximal and intermediate conceptions that aim to capture the methodological and interpretative roles of information in holographic quantum gravity. We therefore suggest that, in the context of holography and quantum gravity, a more systematic philosophical treatment of the role of information as an interpretation-guiding principle would be desirable.

physics.hist-ph

Scientific understanding across disciplines: in varietate concordia?

Understanding is a generally acknowledged aim of science, but the way in which understanding is pursued and criteria for when it is achieved differ widely across scientific disciplines. This paper offers a comparative analysis of this disciplinary variation, aimed at revealing differences as well as commonalities in methods and criteria for achieving understanding. Starting point is the contextual theory of scientific understanding (De Regt 2017), which was developed to accommodate contextual variation in criteria for understanding. While this work focused on historical variation and used mainly case studies from the history of physics, the current paper applies the contextual theory to disciplinary variation. We present brief descriptive accounts of how understanding figures in nine scientific disciplines: mathematics, theoretical physics, astrophysics, chemistry, geoscience, biology, neuroscience, psychology, and the engineering sciences. Subsequently, we compare and evaluate these accounts in light of the contextual theory of scientific understanding.

physics.hist-ph

Global Gauge Symmetry Breaking in the Abelian Higgs Mechanism

This paper aims to resolve the incompatibility between two extant gauge-invariant accounts of the Abelian Higgs mechanism: the first account uses global gauge symmetry breaking, and the second eliminates spontaneous symmetry breaking entirely. We resolve this incompatibility by using the constrained Hamiltonian formalism in symplectic geometry. First we argue that, unlike their local counterparts, global gauge symmetries are physical in the presence of boundary conditions. The symmetry that is spontaneously broken by the Higgs mechanism is this global one. Second, we explain how the Coulomb gauge is the preferred gauge for a gauge-invariant account of the Abelian Higgs mechanism. Based on the existence of the physical global gauge symmetry, we resolve the incompatibility between the two accounts by arguing that the correct way to carry out the second method is to eliminate only the redundant gauge symmetries, i.e. those local gauge symmetries which are not global. We extend our analysis to quantum field theory, where we show that the Abelian Higgs mechanism can be understood as spontaneous global $U(1)$ symmetry breaking in the $C^*$-algebraic sense.

physics.hist-ph

Holographic Strange Metals for Philosophers and Physicists

This paper introduces the physics and philosophy of strange metals, which are characterized by unusual electrical and thermal properties that deviate from conventional metallic behaviour. The anomalous strange-metal behaviour discussed here appears in the normal state of a copper-oxide high-temperature superconductor, and it cannot be described using standard condensed-matter physics. Currently, it can only be described through a holographic dual, viz.~a four-dimensional black hole in anti-de Sitter spacetime. This paper first introduces the theory of, and specific experiments carried out on, strange metals. Then it discusses a number of philosophical questions that strange metals open up regarding the experimental evidence for holography and its realist interpretation. Strange metals invert the explanatory arrows, in that usual holographic arguments are seen as giving explanations of the bulk quantum-gravity theory from the boundary. By contrast, the aim here is, by using holography, to explain the experimentally discovered and anomalous properties of strange metals.

physics.hist-ph

The Geometric View of Theories

Recent critiques of the semantic conception of scientific theories suggest that a theory is not best formulated as a collection of models satisfying some set of kinematical or dynamical conditions. Thus it has been argued that additional structure on the set of models is required. Furthermore, there are calls for developing a `theory of theories', where what was formerly a `theory' is seen as a `model' within a larger theoretical structure. This paper makes a two-pronged proposal for the ``shape'' that physical theories should take, based on recent insights on dualities and quasi-dualities in physics. First, I develop a geometric view of theories, according to which a physical theory is a set of models equipped with topological and geometric structure. This general view is briefly illustrated in an example from quantum cosmology. Second, I make a more specific proposal for a natural structure that can encompass various `theories' as its models, with topological and algebraic-geometric structure on them. I call the latter more specific structure a `model bundle', where the models are in the fibres and there is a moduli space in the base. I illustrate my second proposal in an example from quantum field theory. This view highlights the important role of quasi-dualities as local transition functions between fibres; dualities are recovered as global transition functions when the bundle is trivial. I discuss some philosophical issues that this geometric view of physical theories opens up, such as its realist interpretation.

physics.hist-ph

Dualities in Physics

For more than half a century, dualities have been at the heart of modern physics. From quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics, condensed matter physics, quantum field theory and quantum gravity, dualities have proven useful in solving problems that are otherwise quite intractable. Being surprising and unexpected, dualities have been taken to raise philosophical questions about the nature and formulation of scientific theories, scientific realism, emergence, symmetries, explanation, understanding, and theory construction. This book discusses what dualities are, gives a selection of examples, explores the themes and roles that make dualities interesting, and highlights their most salient types. It aims to be an entry point into discussions of dualities in both physics and philosophy. The philosophical discussion emphasises three main topics: whether duals are theoretically equivalent, the view of scientific theories that is suggested by dualities (namely, a geometric view of theories), and the compatibility between duality and emergence.

physics.hist-ph

A Contextual Approach to Technological Understanding and Its Assessment

Technological understanding is not a singular concept but varies depending on context. Building on De Jong and De Haro's (2025) notion of technological understanding as the ability to realise an aim through the use of a technological artefact, this paper refines the concept as an ability that differs by context and degree. We extend the original specification developed for a design context by introducing two additional contexts: operation and innovation. Each context represents a distinct way of realising an aim through technology, yielding three types of technological understanding. To clarify the nature of technological understanding further, we propose an assessment framework based on counterfactual reasoning. Each type of understanding is associated with the ability to answer a specific set of what-if questions concerning changes in an artefact's structure, performance, or appropriateness. Distinguishing these different types helps focus efforts to improve technological understanding, clarifies the epistemic requirements of different forms of engagement with technology, and supports a pluralistic perspective on expertise.

physics.hist-ph

Technological Understanding: On the cognitive skill involved in the design and use of technological artefacts

Although several accounts of scientific understanding exist, the concept of understanding in relation to technology remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by proposing a philosophical account of technological understanding: the type of understanding that is required for and reflected by successfully designing and using technological artefacts. We develop this notion by building on the concept of scientific understanding. Drawing on parallels between science and technology, and specifically between scientific theories and technological artefacts, we extend the idea of scientific understanding into the realm of technology. We argue that, just as scientific understanding involves the ability to explain a phenomenon using a theory, technological understanding involves the ability to use a technological artefact to realise a practical aim. Both theories and artefacts are tools, and using them successfully requires the cognitive skill of understanding. Technological understanding is thus conceived as the ability to recognise how a practical aim can be achieved by using a technological artefact. In a context of design, this general notion of technological understanding is specified as the ability to design an artefact that, by producing a phenomenon through its physical structure, achieves the intended aim. By analogy with De Regt's criterion of the intelligibility of theories, we give, as a precondition for technological understanding, a criterion for the intelligibility of a technological artefact. We illustrate our concept of technological understanding through two running examples: magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and superconducting quantum computers. Our account highlights the epistemic dimension of engaging with technology and, by allowing for context-dependent specifications, provides guidance for testing and improving technological understanding in specific contexts.

physics.hist-ph

Irrelevant carrots and non-existent sticks: trust, governance, and security in the transition to quantum-safe systems

Quantum computing poses an urgent and widely recognised threat to global cybersecurity, enabling encrypted government, financial, and healthcare data harvested today to be decrypted in the near future. Transitioning to quantum-safe cryptography is therefore essential, demanding coordinated action across a complex, multi-actor innovation system. Drawing on insights from an expert workshop in Amsterdam, this study develops a socially informed vision for a quantum-safe future and analyses the current innovation landscape to identify critical gaps and the actions needed to address them. We map twelve key actor groups involved in the migration process, finding that regulators exert the strongest direct influence, while standardisation bodies play a crucial indirect role. This research provides one of the first system-level mappings of actors, influence pathways and governance responsibilities shaping the quantum-safe transition, revealing several responsibilities with unclear ownership. Although centred on the Netherlands, our findings are applicable to other national contexts navigating quantum-safe transitions.

physics.soc-ph

The Philosophy and Physics of Duality

This monograph discusses dualities in physics: what dualities are, their main examples--from quantum mechanics and electrodynamics to statistical mechanics, quantum field theory and string theory--and the philosophical questions they raise. Part I first conceptualises dualities and discusses their main roles and themes, including how they are related to familiar notions like symmetry and interpretation. It also discusses the main simple examples of dualities: position-momentum, wave-particle, electric-magnetic, and Kramers-Wannier dualities. Part II discusses advanced examples and their inter-relations: particle-soliton dualities, electric-magnetic dualities in quantum field theories, dualities in string theory, and gauge-gravity duality. This Part ends with discussions of the hole argument, and how string theory counts the microstates of a black hole. Part III is an in-depth discussion of general philosophical issues on which dualities bear: theoretical equivalence (two theories 'saying the same thing, in different words'), scientific realism and the under-determination of theories by data, theory succession and the M-theory programme, explanation, and scientific understanding. It proposes a view of scientific theories that it dubs 'the geometric view of theories'. The book's treatment of the examples is at the advanced undergraduate and graduate level, starting from elementary and progressing to more advanced examples. The discussions of philosophical topics, such as referential semantics, theoretical equivalence, scientific realism and scientific understanding, are both self-contained and in-depth. Thus the book is aimed at students and researchers with an interest in the physical examples and philosophical questions about dualities, and also in how physics and philosophy can fruitfully interact with each other.

physics.hist-ph

Book Review: 'Background Independence in Classical and Quantum Gravity', by James Read

This is a review of James Read's insightful book, Background Independence in Classical and Quantum Gravity. The book introduces various notions of background-independence which it then makes precise, and uses to make verdicts about background-independence on a wide range of examples of spacetime theories in both classical and quantum gravity. This short book is, in several ways, a worthy example of how technical philosophy of physics ought to be done. I first discuss the content, then raise a number points where I disagree with the book.

physics.hist-ph

Supersymmetry in the Seiberg-Witten Theory: A Window into Quantum Field Theory

We take supersymmetry in the Seiberg-Witten theory as a case study of the uses of (super)symmetry arguments in studying the ontology of four-dimensional interacting quantum field theories. Together with a double expansion, supersymmetry is a via media that helps to bridge the gap between the ontologies of an exact quantum field theory and its semi-classical limit. We discuss a class of states that exist at any value of the coupling, and whose properties such as mass, electric and magnetic charges, and spin quantum numbers can be precisely characterised at low energies. The low-energy theory is best presented as a one-dimensional complex manifold, equipped with metric and other structures: namely, the space of low-energy vacua, covered by three open regions that are interpreted as macroscopic phases. We discuss two cases of emergence: the emergence of the low-energy regime and the emergence between models at low energies, thereby highlighting the significance of the topology of the space of vacua for such cases of emergence.

physics.hist-ph

Four Attitudes Towards Singularities in the Search for a Theory of Quantum Gravity

Singularities in general relativity and quantum field theory are often taken not only to motivate the search for a more-fundamental theory (quantum gravity, QG), but also to characterise this new theory and shape expectations of what it is to achieve. Here, we first evaluate how particular types of singularities may suggest an incompleteness of current theories. We then classify four different `attitudes' towards singularities in the search for QG, and show, through examples in the physics literature, that these lead to different scenarios for the new theory. Two of the attitudes prompt singularity resolution, but only one suggests the need for a theory of QG. Rather than evaluate the different attitudes, we close with some suggestions of factors that influence the choice between them.

gr-qc

Noether's Theorems and Energy in General Relativity

This paper has three main aims: first, to give a pedagogical introduction to Noether's two theorems and their implications for energy conservation in general relativity, which was a central point of discussion between Hilbert, Klein, Noether and Einstein. Second, it introduces and compares two proposals for gravitational energy and momentum, one of which is very influential in physics: and, so far as I know, neither of the two has been discussed in the philosophical literature. Third, it assesses these proposals in connection with recent philosophical discussions of energy and momentum in general relativity. After briefly reviewing the debates about energy conservation between Hilbert, Klein, Noether and Einstein, I give Noether's two theorems. I show that Einstein's gravitational energy-momentum pseudo-tensor, including its superpotential, is fixed, through Noether's theorem, by the boundary terms in the action. That is, the freedom to add an arbitrary superpotential to the gravitational pseudo-tensor corresponds to the freedom to add boundary terms to the action without changing the equations of motion. This freedom is fixed in the same way for both problems. I also review two proposals for energy and momentum in GR, of which one is a quasi-local alternative to the local expressions, and the other builds on Einstein's local pseudo-tensor approach. I discuss the recent philosophical literature on the conservation of energy and momentum in general relativity, and I assess and compare the two proposals in the light of this literature: especially, in light of questions about diffeomorphism invariance and background-independence.

physics.hist-ph

The Empirical Under-determination Argument Against Scientific Realism for Dual Theories

This paper explores the options available to the anti-realist to defend a Quinean empirical under-determination thesis using examples of dualities. I first explicate a version of the empirical under-determination thesis that can be brought to bear on theories of contemporary physics. Then I identify a class of examples of dualities that lead to empirical under-determination. But I argue that the resulting under-determination is benign, and is not a threat to a cautious scientific realism. Thus dualities are not new ammunition for the anti-realist. The paper also shows how the number of possible interpretative options about dualities that have been considered in the literature can be reduced, and suggests a general approach to scientific realism that one may take dualities to favour.

physics.hist-ph

Spacetime and Physical Equivalence

In this essay I begin to lay out a conceptual scheme for: (i) analysing dualities as cases of theoretical equivalence; (ii) assessing when cases of theoretical equivalence are also cases of physical equivalence. The scheme is applied to gauge/gravity dualities. I expound what I argue to be their contribution to questions about: (iii) the nature of spacetime in quantum gravity; (iv) broader philosophical and physical discussions of spacetime. (i)-(ii) proceed by analysing duality through four contrasts. A duality will be a suitable isomorphism between models: and the four relevant contrasts are as follows: (a) Bare theory: a triple of states, quantities, and dynamics endowed with appropriate structures and symmetries; vs. interpreted theory: which is endowed with, in addition, a suitable pair of interpretative maps. (b) Extendable vs. unextendable theories: which can, respectively cannot, be extended as regards their domains of application. (c) External vs. internal intepretations: which are constructed, respectively, by coupling the theory to another interpreted theory vs. from within the theory itself. (d) Theoretical vs. physical equivalence: which contrasts formal equivalence with the equivalence of fully interpreted theories. I apply this scheme to answering questions (iii)-(iv) for gauge/gravity dualities. I argue that the things that are physically relevant are those that stand in a bijective correspondence under duality: the common core of the two models. I therefore conclude that most of the mathematical and physical structures that we are familiar with, in these models, are largely, though crucially never entirely, not part of that common core. Thus, the interpretation of dualities for theories of quantum gravity compels us to rethink the roles that spacetime, and many other tools in theoretical physics, play in theories of spacetime.

hep-th

Science and Philosophy: A Love-Hate Relationship

In this paper I review the problematic relationship between science and philosophy; in particular, I will address the question of whether science needs philosophy, and I will offer some positive perspectives that should be helpful in developing a synergetic relationship between the two. I will review three lines of reasoning often employed in arguing that philosophy is useless for science: a) philosophy's death diagnosis ('philosophy is dead'); b) the historic-agnostic argument/challenge "show me examples where philosophy has been useful for science, for I don't know of any"; c) the division of property argument (or: philosophy and science have different subject matters, therefore philosophy is useless for science). These arguments will be countered with three contentions to the effect that the natural sciences need philosophy. I will: a) point to the fallacy of anti-philosophicalism (or: 'in order to deny the need for philosophy, one must do philosophy') and examine the role of paradigms and presuppositions (or: why science can't live without philosophy); b) point out why the historical argument fails (in an example from quantum mechanics, alive and kicking); c) briefly sketch some domains of intersection of science and philosophy and how the two can have mutual synergy. I will conclude with some implications of this synergetic relationship between science and philosophy for the liberal arts and sciences.

physics.hist-ph

On Empirical Equivalence and Duality

I argue that, on a judicious reading of two existing criteria--one syntactic and the other semantic--dual theories can be taken to be empirically equivalent. The judicious reading is straightforward, but leads to the surprising conclusion that very different-looking theories can have equivalent empirical content. And thus it shows how a widespread scientific practice, of interpreting duals as empirically equivalent, can be understood by a thus-far unnoticed feature of existing accounts of empirical equivalence.

physics.hist-ph