arXiv subjects

Seung Ki Baek

Publications and source records attributed to Seung Ki Baek.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Threshold behavior of a social norm in response to error proneness

A social norm defines what is good and what is bad in social contexts, as well as what to do based on such assessments. A stable social norm should be maintained against errors committed by its players. In addition, individuals may have different probabilities of errors in following the norm, and a social norm would be unstable if it benefited those who do not follow the norm carefully. In this work, we show that Simple Standing, which has been known to resist errors and mutants successfully, actually exhibits threshold behavior. That is, in a population of individuals playing the donation game according to Simple Standing, the residents can suppress the invasion of mutants with higher error proneness only if the residents' own error proneness is sufficiently low. Otherwise, the population will be invaded by mutants that commit assessment errors more frequently, and a series of such invasions will eventually undermine the existing social norm. This study suggests that the stability analysis of a social norm may have a different picture if the probability of error itself is regarded as an individual attribute.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2025

Exact cluster dynamics of indirect reciprocity in complete graphs

Heider's balance theory emphasizes cognitive consistency in assessing others, as is expressed by ``The enemy of my enemy is my friend.'' At the same time, the theory of indirect reciprocity provides us with a dynamical framework to study how to assess others based on their actions as well as how to act toward them based on the assessments. Well known are the ``leading eight'' from L1 to L8, the eight norms for assessment and action to foster cooperation in social dilemmas while resisting the invasion of mutant norms prescribing alternative actions. In this work, we begin by showing that balance is equivalent to stationarity of dynamics only for L4 and L6 (stern judging) among the leading eight. Stern judging reflects an intuitive idea that good merits reward whereas evil warrants punishment. By analyzing the dynamics of Stern Judging in complete graphs, we prove that this norm almost always segregates the graph into two mutually hostile groups as the graph size grows. We then compare L4 with stern judging: The only difference of L4 is that a good player's cooperative action toward a bad one is regarded as good. This subtle difference transforms large populations governed by L4 to a ``paradise'' where cooperation prevails and positive assessments abound. Our study thus helps us understand the relationship between individual norms and their emergent consequences at a population level, shedding light on the nuanced interplay between cognitive consistency and segregation dynamics.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

Controlling sternness in judging a good person who helps the bad

Recent studies on indirect reciprocity with private assessment on complete graphs suggest the possibility that one can continuously modulate the degree of segregation by controlling how to judge a good person helping a bad one. A well-known social norm called L6 judges it as bad, which eventually segregates the society into two antagonistic clusters, but if it is judged as good, the system reaches paradise where everyone likes each other. In this work, we numerically study this transition between segregation and paradise in two different settings. Firstly, in a uniform population of size $N$ where everyone regards such a donor as good with probability $p$ and bad with $1-p$, we observe paradise when $Np$ is sufficiently greater than $O(1)$. In contrast, in a heterogeneous setting where only $k$ individuals judge such a donor as good, the size difference of the clusters increases almost linearly as $k$ increases, so paradise can only be reached as $k \to N$ in a large population. Therefore, when an urgent change is needed to overcome the segregation due to L6, a small change in each and every individual's behavior is more efficient than a radical change in a fraction of the population.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

Indirect reciprocity as a dynamics for weak balance

A social network is often divided into many factions. People are friends within each faction, while they are enemies of the other factions, and even my enemy's enemy is not necessarily my friend. This configuration can be described in terms of a weak form of structural balance. Although weak balance explains a number of real social networks, which dynamical rule achieves it has remained relatively unexplored. In this work, we show that the answer can be found in the field of indirect reciprocity, which assumes that people assess each other's behavior and choose how to behave to others based on the assessment according to a social norm. We begin by showing that weak structural balance is equivalent to stationarity when the rule is given by a norm called `judging'. By analyzing its cluster dynamics of merging, fission, and migration induced by assessment error in complete graphs, we obtain the cluster size distribution in a steady state, which shows the coexistence of a giant cluster and smaller ones. This study suggests that indirect reciprocity can provide insight into the interplay between a norm that individuals abide by and the macroscopic group structure in society.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2025

Response of social norms to individual differences in error-proneness

Indirect reciprocity explains the evolution of cooperation by considering how our cooperative behavior toward someone is reciprocated by someone else who has observed us. A cohesive society has a shared norm that prescribes how to assess observed behavior as well as how to behave toward others based on the assessments, and the eight social norms that are evolutionarily stable against the invasion of mutants with different behavioral rules are referred to as the leading eight, whose member norms are called L1 to L8, respectively. Among the leading eight, L8 (also known as `Judging') has been deemed mostly irrelevant due to its poor performance in maintaining cooperation when each person may have a different opinion about someone instead of forming a public consensus. In this work, we propose that L8 can nevertheless be best protected from assessment errors among the leading eight if we take into account the intrinsic heterogeneity of error proneness among individuals because this norm heavily punishes those who are prone to errors in following its assessment rule. This finding suggests that individual differences should be explicitly taken into account as quenched randomness to obtain a thorough understanding of a social norm working in a heterogeneous environment.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2024

Making public reputation out of private assessments

Reputation is not just a simple opinion that an individual has about another but a social construct that emerges through communication. Despite the huge importance in coordinating human behavior, such a communicative aspect has remained relatively unexplored in the field of indirect reciprocity. In this work, we bridge the gap between private assessment and public reputation: We begin by clarifying what we mean by reputation and argue that the formation of reputation can be modeled by a bi-stochastic matrix, provided that both assessment and behavior are regarded as continuous variables. By choosing bi-stochastic matrices that represent averaging processes, we show that only four norms among the leading eight, which judge a good person's cooperation toward a bad one as good, will keep cooperation asymptotically or neutrally stable against assessment error in a homogeneous society where every member has adopted the same norm. However, when one of those four norms is used by the resident population, the opinion averaging process allows neutral invasion of mutant norms with small differences in the assessment rule. Our approach provides a theoretical framework for describing the formation of reputation in mathematical terms.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2023

Finite-size scaling analysis of the two-dimensional random transverse-field Ising ferromagnet

The random transverse-field Ising ferromagnet (RTFIF) is a highly disordered quantum system which contains randomness in the coupling strengths as well as in the transverse-field strengths. In one dimension, the critical properties are governed by an infinite-randomness fixed point (IRFP), and renormalization-group studies argue that the two-dimensional (2D) model is also governed by an IRFP. However, even the location of the critical point remains unsettled among quantum Monte Carlo (QMC) studies. In this work, we perform extensive QMC simulations to locate the quantum critical point and attempt a finite-size scaling analysis to observe the critical behavior. We estimate the critical field strength of the 2D RTFIF as $Γ_c = 7.52(2)$, together with critical exponents such as $β=1.5(3)$, $ν= 1.6(3)$, and $z=3.3(3)$ or $ψ=0.50(3)$. We have also considered the McCoy-Wu model, which has randomness in the ferromagnetic coupling strengths but not in the transverse-field strength. Our QMC calculation shows that the critical behavior of the 2D McCoy-Wu model is closer to that of the 2D transverse-field Ising spin glass than to that of the 2D RTFIF. These numerical findings enhance our understanding of disordered 2D quantum systems.

cond-mat.dis-nn↗

arXiv2023

Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity

Biological and social scientists have long been interested in understanding how to reconcile individual and collective interests in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Many effective strategies have been proposed, and they are often categorized into one of two classes, `partners' and `rivals.' More recently, another class, `friendly rivals,' has been identified in longer-memory strategy spaces. Friendly rivals qualify as both partners and rivals: They fully cooperate with themselves, like partners, but never allow their co-players to earn higher payoffs, like rivals. Although they have appealing theoretical properties, it is unclear whether they would emerge in evolving population because most previous works focus on memory-one strategy space, where no friendly rival strategy exists. To investigate this issue, we have conducted large-scale evolutionary simulations in well-mixed and group-structured populations and compared the evolutionary dynamics between memory-one and memory-three strategy spaces. In a well-mixed population, the memory length does not make a major difference, and the key factors are the population size and the benefit of cooperation. Friendly rivals play a minor role because being a partner or a rival is often good enough in a given environment. It is in a group-structured population that memory length makes a stark difference: When memory-three strategies are available, friendly rivals become dominant, and the cooperation level nearly reaches a maximum, even when the benefit of cooperation is so low that cooperation would not be achieved in a well-mixed population. This result highlights the important interaction between group structure and memory lengths that drive the evolution of cooperation.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2022

Symmetric Nash equilibrium of political polarization in a two-party system

The median-voter hypothesis (MVH) predicts convergence of two party platforms across a one-dimensional political spectrum during majoritarian elections. From the viewpoint of the MVH, an explanation of polarization is that each election has a different median voter so that a party cannot please all the median voters at the same time. We consider two parties competing to win voters along a one-dimensional spectrum and assume that each party nominates one candidate out of two in the primary election, for which the electorates represent only one side of the whole population. We argue that all the four candidates will come to the same distance from the median of the total population through best-response dynamics.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2022

Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations

People tend to have their social interactions with members of their own community. Such group-structured interactions can have a profound impact on the behaviors that evolve. Group structure affects the way people cooperate, and how they reciprocate each other's cooperative actions. Past work has shown that population structure and reciprocity can both promote the evolution of cooperation. Yet the impact of these mechanisms has been typically studied in isolation. In this work, we study how the two mechanisms interact. Using a game-theoretic model, we explore how people engage in reciprocal cooperation in group-structured populations, compared to well-mixed populations of equal size. To derive analytical results, we focus on two scenarios. In the first scenario, we assume a complete separation of time scales. Mutations are rare compared to between-group comparisons, which themselves are rare compared to within-group comparisons. In the second scenario, there is a partial separation of time scales, where mutations and between-group comparisons occur at a comparable rate. In both scenarios, we find that the effect of population structure depends on the benefit of cooperation. When this benefit is small, group-structured populations are more cooperative. But when the benefit is large, well-mixed populations result in more cooperation. Overall, our results reveal how group structure can sometimes enhance and sometimes suppress the evolution of cooperation.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2022

A second-order stability analysis for the continuous model of indirect reciprocity

Reputation is one of key mechanisms to maintain human cooperation, but its analysis gets complicated if we consider the possibility that reputation does not reach consensus because of erroneous assessment. The difficulty is alleviated if we assume that reputation and cooperation do not take binary values but have continuous spectra so that disagreement over reputation can be analysed in a perturbative way. In this work, we carry out the analysis by expanding the dynamics of reputation to the second order of perturbation under the assumption that everyone initially cooperates with good reputation. The second-order theory clarifies the difference between Image Scoring and Simple Standing in that punishment for defection against a well-reputed player should be regarded as good for maintaining cooperation. Moreover, comparison among the leading eight shows that the stabilizing effect of justified punishment weakens if cooperation between two ill-reputed players is regarded as bad. Our analysis thus explains how Simple Standing achieves a high level of stability by permitting justified punishment and also by disregarding irrelevant information in assessing cooperation. This observation suggests which factors affect the stability of a social norm when reputation can be perturbed by noise.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2022

Democracy and polarization in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea

The median-voter hypothesis predicts convergence of party platforms across a one-dimensional political spectrum during majoritarian elections. Assuming that the convergence is reflected in legislative activity, we study the time evolution of political polarization in the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea for the past 70 years. By projecting the correlation of lawmakers onto the first principal axis, we observe a high degree of polarization from the early 1960's to the late 1980's before democratization. As predicted by the hypothesis, it showed a sharp decrease when party politics were revived in 1987. Since then, the political landscape has become more and more multi-dimensional under the action of party politics, which invalidates the assumption behind the hypothesis. For comparison, we also analyze co-sponsorship in the United States House of Representatives from 1979 to 2020, whose correlation matrix has been constantly high-dimensional throughout the observation period. Our analysis suggests a pattern of polarization evolving with democratic development, from which we can argue the power and the limitation of the median-voter hypothesis as an explanation of real politics.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2022

Correlation between concurrence and mutual information

We investigate a two-qubit system to understand the relationship between concurrence and mutual information, where the former determines the amount of quantum entanglement, whereas the latter is its classical residue after performing local projective measurement. For a given ensemble of random pure states, in which the values of concurrence are uniformly distributed, we calculate the joint probability of concurrence and mutual information. Although zero mutual information is the most probable in the uniform ensemble, we find positive correlation between the classical information and concurrence. This result suggests that destructive measurement of classical information can be used to assess the amount of quantum information.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2022

Social norms in indirect reciprocity with ternary reputations

Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism that promotes cooperation in social dilemmas by means of reputation. Although it has been a common practice to represent reputations by binary values, either `good' or `bad', such a dichotomy is a crude approximation considering the complexity of reality. In this work, we studied norms with three different reputations, i.e., `good', `neutral', and `bad'. Through massive supercomputing for handling more than thirty billion possibilities, we fully identified which norms achieve cooperation and possess evolutionary stability against behavioural mutants. By systematically categorizing all these norms according to their behaviours, we found similarities and dissimilarities to their binary-reputation counterpart, the leading eight. We obtained four rules that should be satisfied by the successful norms, and the behaviour of the leading eight can be understood as a special case of these rules. A couple of norms that show counter-intuitive behaviours are also presented. We believe the findings are also useful for designing successful norms with more general reputation systems.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2021

Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity

Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation game by regarding each player's reputation and behaviour as continuous variables. Through perturbative calculation, we derive a condition that a social norm should satisfy to give penalties to its close variants, provided that everyone initially cooperates with a good reputation, and this result is supported by numerical simulation. A crucial factor of the condition is whether a well-reputed player's donation to an ill-reputed co-player is appreciated by other members of the society, and the condition can be reduced to a threshold for the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation which depends on the reputational sensitivity to a donor's behaviour as well as on the behavioural sensitivity to a recipient's reputation. Our continuum formulation suggests how indirect reciprocity can work beyond the dichotomy between good and bad even in the presence of inhomogeneity, noise, and incomplete information.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2021

Win-Stay-Lose-Shift as a self-confirming equilibrium in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the behaviour. In this work, we consider players with memory-one stochastic strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma, with an assumption that they cannot directly access each other's strategy but only observe the actual moves for a certain number of rounds. Based on the observation, the observer has to infer the resident strategy in a Bayesian way and chooses his or her own strategy accordingly. By examining the best-response relations, we argue that players can escape from full defection into a cooperative equilibrium supported by Win-Stay-Lose-Shift in a self-confirming manner, provided that the cost of cooperation is low and the observational learning supplies sufficiently large uncertainty.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2021

Assortative clustering in a one-dimensional population with replication strategies

In a geographically distributed population, assortative clustering plays an important role in evolution by modifying local environments. To examine its effects in a linear habitat, we consider a one-dimensional grid of cells, where each cell is either empty or occupied by an organism whose replication strategy is genetically inherited to offspring. The strategy determines whether to have offspring in surrounding cells, as a function of the neighborhood configuration. If more than one offspring compete for a cell, then they can be all exterminated due to the cost of conflict depending on environmental conditions. We find that the system is more densely populated in an unfavorable environment than in a favorable one because only the latter has to pay the cost of conflict. This observation agrees reasonably well with a mean-field analysis which takes assortative clustering of strategies into consideration. Our finding suggests a possibility of intrinsic nonlinearity between environmental conditions and population density when an evolutionary process is involved.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2021

Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated $n$-person public-goods game

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a `friendly-rivalry' strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated $n$-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous $m=2n-1$ rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for $n=2$ inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when $n= 2$ and $3$.

physics.soc-ph↗