arXiv subjects

Seung Ki Baek

Publications and source records attributed to Seung Ki Baek.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2020

Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas

In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently found for the iterated prisoner's dilemma and for the iterated three-person public-goods game: By a successful strategy, we mean that it constitutes a cooperative Nash equilibrium under implementation error, with assuring that the long-term payoff never becomes less than the co-players' regardless of their strategies, when the error rate is small. Although we have a list of actions prescribed by each successful strategy, the rationale behind them has not been fully understood for the iterated public-goods game because the list has hundreds of entries to deal with every relevant history of previous interactions. In this paper, we propose a method to convert such history-based representation into an automaton with a minimal number of states. Our main finding is that a successful strategy for the iterated three-person public-goods game can be represented as a $10$-state automaton by this method. In this automaton, each state can be interpreted as the player's internal judgement of the situation, such as trustworthiness of the co-players and the need to redeem oneself after defection. This result thus suggests a comprehensible way to choose an appropriate action at each step towards cooperation based on a situational judgement, which is mapped from the history of interactions.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2020

Five rules for friendly rivalry in direct reciprocity

Direct reciprocity is one of the key mechanisms accounting for cooperation in our social life. According to recent understanding, most of classical strategies for direct reciprocity fall into one of two classes, `partners' or `rivals'. A `partner' is a generous strategy achieving mutual cooperation, and a `rival' never lets the co-player become better off. They have different working conditions: For example, partners show good performance in a large population, whereas rivals do in head-to-head matches. By means of exhaustive enumeration, we demonstrate the existence of strategies that act as both partners and rivals. Among them, we focus on a human-interpretable strategy, named `CAPRI' after its five characteristic ingredients, i.e., cooperate, accept, punish, recover, and defect otherwise. Our evolutionary simulation shows excellent performance of CAPRI in a broad range of environmental conditions.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2020

Co-sponsorship analysis of party politics in the 20th National Assembly of Republic of Korea

We investigate co-sponsorship among lawmakers by applying the principal-component analysis to the bills introduced in the 20th National Assembly of Korea. The most relevant factor for co-sponsorship is their party membership, and we clearly observe a signal of a third-party system in action. To identify other factors than the party influence, we analyze how lawmakers are clustered inside each party, and the result shows significant similarity between their committee membership and co-sponsorship in case of the ruling party. In addition, by monitoring each lawmaker's similarity to the average behavior of his or her party, we have found that it begins to decrease approximately one month before the lawmaker actually changes the party membership.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2019

Agent-Based Simulation of the Two-Dimensional Patlak-Keller-Segel Model

The Patlak-Keller-Segel equation describes the chemotactic interactions of small organisms in the continuum limit, and a singular peak appears through spontaneous aggregation when the total mass of the organisms exceeds a critical value. To deal with this singular behavior numerically, we propose an agent-based simulation method in which both the organisms and the chemicals are represented as particles. Our numerical estimates for the threshold behavior are consistent with the analytic predictions.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2019

Discontinuous phase transition in chemotactic aggregation with density-dependent pressure

Many small organisms such as bacteria can attract each other by depositing chemical attractants. At the same time, they exert repulsive force on each other when crowded, which can be modeled by effective pressure as an increasing function of the organisms' density. As the chemical attraction becomes strong compared to the effective pressure, the system will undergo a phase transition from homogeneous distribution to aggregation. In this work, we describe the interplay of organisms and chemicals on a two-dimensional disk with a set of partial differential equations of the Patlak-Keller-Segel type. By analyzing its Lyapunov functional, we show that the aggregation transition occurs discontinuously, forming an aggregate near the boundary of the disk. The result can be interpreted within a thermodynamic framework by identifying the Lyapunov functional with free energy.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2019

Sex-ratio bias induced by mutation

A question in evolutionary biology is why the number of males is approximately equal to that of females in many species, and Fisher's theory of equal investment answers that it is the evolutionarily stable state. The Fisherian mechanism can be given a concrete form by a genetic model based on the following assumptions: (1) Males and females mate at random. (2) An allele acts on the father to determine the expected progeny sex ratio. (3) The offspring inherits the allele from either side of the parents with equal probability. The model is known to achieve the 1:1 sex ratio due to the invasion of mutant alleles with different progeny sex ratios. In this study, however, we argue that mutation plays a more subtle role in that fluctuations caused by mutation renormalize the sex ratio and thereby keep it away from 1:1 in general. This finding shows how the sex ratio is affected by mutation in a systematic way, whereby the effective mutation rate can be estimated from an observed sex ratio.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2018

Long-range prisoner's dilemma game on a cycle

We investigate evolutionary dynamics of altruism with long-range interaction on a cycle. The interaction between individuals is described by a simplified version of the prisoner's dilemma (PD) game in which the payoffs are parameterized by $c$, the cost of a cooperative action. In our model, the probabilities of the game interaction and competition decay algebraically with $r_{AB}$, the distance between two players $A$ and $B$, but with different exponents: That is, the probability to play the PD game is proportional to $r_{AB}^{-α}$. If player $A$ is chosen for death, on the other hand, the probability for $B$ to occupy the empty site is proportional to $r_{AB}^{-β}$. In a limiting case of $β\to\infty$, where the competition for an empty site occurs between its nearest neighbors only, we analytically find the condition for the proliferation of altruism in terms of $c_{th}$, a threshold of $c$ below which altruism prevails. For finite $β$, we conjecture a formula for $c_{th}$ as a function of $α$ and $β$. We also propose a numerical method to locate $c_{th}$, according to which we observe excellent agreement with the conjecture even when the selection strength is of considerable magnitude.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2018

Which part of a chain breaks

This work investigates the dynamics of a one-dimensional homogeneous harmonic chain on a horizontal table. One end is anchored to a wall, the other (free) end is pulled by external force. A Green's function is derived to calculate the response to a generic pulling force. As an example, I assume that the magnitude of the pulling force increases with time at a uniform rate $β$. If the number of beads and springs used to model the chain is large, the extension of each spring takes a simple closed form, which is a piecewise-linear function of time. Under an additional assumption that a spring breaks when its extension exceeds a certain threshold, results show that for large $β$ the spring breaks near the pulling end, whereas the breaking point can be located close to the wall by choosing small $β$. More precisely, the breaking point moves back and forth along the chain as $β$ decreases, which has been called "anomalous" breaking in the context of the pull-or-jerk experiment. Although the experiment has been explained in terms of inertia, its meaning can be fully captured by discussing the competition between intrinsic and extrinsic time scales of forced oscillation.

physics.class-ph↗

arXiv2018

Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons

Cooperation among self-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we study the repeated $n$-person public-goods game and search for a strategy that forms a cooperative Nash equilibrium in the presence of implementation error with a guarantee that the resulting payoff will be no less than any of the co-players'. By enumerating strategic possibilities for $n=3$, we show that such a strategy indeed exists when its memory length $m$ equals three. It means that a deterministic strategy can be publicly employed to stabilize cooperation against error with avoiding the risk of being exploited. We furthermore show that, for general $n$-person public-goods game, $m \geq n$ is necessary to satisfy the above criteria.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2017

Chaos and unpredictability in evolution of cooperation in continuous time

Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as $c$. In this work, we investigate the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma for various values of $c$ with four of the representative memory-one strategies, i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, tit-for-tat, and win-stay-lose-shift. We consider replicator dynamics which deterministically describes how the fraction of each strategy evolves over time in an infinite-sized well-mixed population in the presence of implementation error and mutation among the four strategies. Our finding is that this three-dimensional continuous-time dynamics exhibits chaos through a bifurcation sequence similar to that of a logistic map as $c$ varies. If mutation occurs with rate $μ\ll 1$, the position of the bifurcation sequence on the $c$ axis is numerically found to scale as $μ^{0.1}$, and such sensitivity to $μ$ suggests that mutation may have non-perturbative effects on evolutionary paths. It demonstrates how the microscopic randomness of the mutation process can be amplified to macroscopic unpredictability by evolutionary dynamics.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2017

Free energy of a chemotactic model with nonlinear diffusion

The Patlak-Keller-Segel equation is a canonical model of chemotaxis to describe self-organized aggregation of organisms interacting with chemical signals. We investigate a variant of this model, assuming that the organisms exert effective pressure proportional to the number density. From the resulting set of partial differential equations, we derive a Lyapunov functional that can also be regarded as the free energy of this model, and minimize it with a Monte Carlo method to detect the condition for self-organized aggregation. Focusing on radially symmetric solutions on a two-dimensional disc, we find that the chemical interaction competes with diffusion so that aggregation occurs when the relative interaction strength exceeds a certain threshold. Based on the analysis of the free-energy landscape, we argue that the transition from a homogeneous state to aggregation is abrupt yet continuous.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2017

Duality between cooperation and defection in the presence of tit-for-tat in replicator dynamics

The prisoner's dilemma describes a conflict between a pair of players, in which defection is a dominant strategy whereas cooperation is collectively optimal. The iterated version of the dilemma has been extensively studied to understand the emergence of cooperation. In the evolutionary context, the iterated prisoner's dilemma is often combined with population dynamics, in which a more successful strategy replicates itself with a higher growth rate. Here, we investigate the replicator dynamics of three representative strategies, i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and tit-for-tat, which prescribes reciprocal cooperation by mimicking the opponent's previous move. Our finding is that the dynamics is self-dual in the sense that it remains invariant when we apply time reversal and exchange the fractions of unconditional cooperators and defectors in the population. The duality implies that the fractions can be equalized by tit-for-tat players, although unconditional cooperation is still dominated by defection. Furthermore, we find that mutation among the strategies breaks the exact duality in such a way that cooperation is more favored than defection, as long as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is small.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2017

Meshfree Local Radial Basis Function Collocation Method with Image Nodes

We numerically solve two-dimensional heat diffusion problems by using a simple variant of the meshfree local radial-basis function (RBF) collocation method. The main idea is to include an additional set of sample nodes outside the problem domain, similarly to the method of images in electrostatics, to perform collocation on the domain boundaries. We can thereby take into account the temperature profile as well as its gradients specified by boundary conditions at the same time, which holds true even for a node where two or more boundaries meet with different boundary conditions. We argue that the image method is computationally efficient when combined with the local RBF collocation method, whereas the addition of image nodes becomes very costly in case of the global collocation. We apply our modified method to a benchmark test of a boundary value problem, and find that this simple modification reduces the maximum error from the analytic solution significantly. The reduction is small for an initial value problem with simpler boundary conditions. We observe increased numerical instability, which has to be compensated for by a sufficient number of sample nodes and/or more careful parameter choices for time integration.

physics.comp-ph↗

arXiv2016

Particle in a box with a time-dependent $δ$-function potential

In quantum information processing, one often considers inserting a barrier into a box containing a particle to generate one bit of Shannon entropy. We formulate this problem as a one-dimensional Schrödinger equation with a time-dependent $δ$-function potential. It is a natural generalization of the particle in a box, a canonical example of quantum mechanics, and we present analytic and numerical investigations on this problem. After deriving an exact Volterra-type integral equation, composed of an infinite sum of modes, we show that approximate formulas with the lowest-frequency modes correctly capture the qualitative behavior of the wave function. If we take into account hundreds of modes, our numerical calculation shows that the quantum adiabatic theorem actually gives a very good approximation even if the barrier height diverges within finite time, as long as it is sufficiently longer than the characteristic time scale of the particle. In particular, if the barrier is slowly inserted at an asymmetric position, the particle is localized by the insertion itself, in accordance with a prediction of the adiabatic theorem. On the other hand, when the barrier is inserted quickly, the wave function becomes rugged after the insertion because of the energy transfer to the particle. Regardless of the position of the barrier, the fast insertion leaves the particle unlocalized so that we can obtain meaningful information by a which-side measurement. Our numerical procedure provides a precise way to calculate the wave function throughout the process, from which one can estimate the amount of this information for an arbitrary insertion protocol.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2016

Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat

One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is prone to neutral drift to unconditional cooperation, which eventually invites defectors. We argue that a combination of TFT and anti-TFT (ATFT) overcomes these difficulties in a noisy environment, provided that ATFT is defined as choosing the opposite to the opponent's last move. According to this TFT-ATFT strategy, a player normally uses TFT; turns to ATFT upon recognizing his or her own error; returns to TFT either when mutual cooperation is recovered or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice in a row. The proposed strategy provides simple and deterministic behavioral rules for correcting implementation error in a way that cannot be exploited by the opponent, and suppresses the neutral drift to unconditional cooperation.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2016

Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot social dilemmas. Direct reciprocity requires that individuals keep track of their past interactions and find the right response. However, there are natural bounds on strategic complexity: Humans find it difficult to remember past interactions accurately, especially over long timespans. Given these limitations, it is natural to ask how complex strategies need to be for cooperation to evolve. Here, we study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations to systematically compare the evolutionary performance of reactive strategies, which only respond to the co-player's previous move, and memory-one strategies, which take into account the own and the co-player's previous move. In both cases, we compare deterministic strategy and stochastic strategy spaces. For reactive strategies and small costs, we find that stochasticity benefits cooperation, because it allows for generous-tit-for-tat. For memory one strategies and small costs, we find that stochasticity does not increase the propensity for cooperation, because the deterministic rule of win-stay, lose-shift works best. For memory one strategies and large costs, however, stochasticity can augment cooperation.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2015

Evolution of popularity in given names

An individual's identity in a human society is specified by his or her name. Differently from family names, usually inherited from fathers, a given name for a child is often chosen at the parents' disposal. However, their decision cannot be made in a vacuum but affected by social conventions and trends. Furthermore, such social pressure changes in time, as new names gain popularity while some other names are gradually forgotten. In this paper, we investigate how popularity of given names has evolved over the last century by using datasets collected in Korea, the province of Quebec in Canada, and the United States. In each of these countries, the average popularity of given names exhibits typical patterns of rise and fall with a time scale of about one generation. We also observe that notable changes of diversity in given names signal major social changes.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2015

Symmetry restoration by pricing in a duopoly of perishable goods

Competition is a main tenet of economics, and the reason is that a perfectly competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient in the absence of externalities and public goods. Whether a product is selected in a market crucially relates to its competitiveness, but the selection in turn affects the landscape of competition. Such a feedback mechanism has been illustrated in a duopoly model by Lambert et al., in which a buyer's satisfaction is updated depending on the {\em freshness} of a purchased product. The probability for buyer $n$ to select seller $i$ is assumed to be $p_{n,i} \propto e^{ S_{n,i}/T}$, where $S_{n,i}$ is the buyer's satisfaction and $T$ is an effective temperature to introduce stochasticity. If $T$ decreases below a critical point $T_c$, the system undergoes a transition from a symmetric phase to an asymmetric one, in which only one of the two sellers is selected. In this work, we extend the model by incorporating a simple price system. By considering a greed factor $g$ to control how the satisfaction depends on the price, we argue the existence of an oscillatory phase in addition to the symmetric and asymmetric ones in the $(T,g)$ plane, and estimate the phase boundaries through mean-field approximations. The analytic results show that the market preserves the inherent symmetry between the sellers for lower $T$ in the presence of the price system, which is confirmed by our numerical simulations.

econ.GN↗