arXiv subjects

Shiqing Ma

Publications and source records attributed to Shiqing Ma.

77 records · Page 5Linked to original sources

arXiv2021

Testing Deep Learning Models for Image Analysis Using Object-Relevant Metamorphic Relations

Deep learning models are widely used for image analysis. While they offer high performance in terms of accuracy, people are concerned about if these models inappropriately make inferences using irrelevant features that are not encoded from the target object in a given image. To address the concern, we propose a metamorphic testing approach that assesses if a given inference is made based on irrelevant features. Specifically, we propose two novel metamorphic relations to detect such inappropriate inferences. We applied our approach to 10 image classification models and 10 object detection models, with three large datasets, i.e., ImageNet, COCO, and Pascal VOC. Over 5.3% of the top-5 correct predictions made by the image classification models are subject to inappropriate inferences using irrelevant features. The corresponding rate for the object detection models is over 8.5%. Based on the findings, we further designed a new image generation strategy that can effectively attack existing models. Comparing with a baseline approach, our strategy can double the success rate of attacks.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

EX-RAY: Distinguishing Injected Backdoor from Natural Features in Neural Networks by Examining Differential Feature Symmetry

Backdoor attack injects malicious behavior to models such that inputs embedded with triggers are misclassified to a target label desired by the attacker. However, natural features may behave like triggers, causing misclassification once embedded. While they are inevitable, mis-recognizing them as injected triggers causes false warnings in backdoor scanning. A prominent challenge is hence to distinguish natural features and injected backdoors. We develop a novel symmetric feature differencing method that identifies a smallest set of features separating two classes. A backdoor is considered injected if the corresponding trigger consists of features different from the set of features distinguishing the victim and target classes. We evaluate the technique on thousands of models, including both clean and trojaned models, from the TrojAI rounds 2-4 competitions and a number of models on ImageNet. Existing backdoor scanning techniques may produce hundreds of false positives (i.e., clean models recognized as trojaned). Our technique removes 78-100% of the false positives (by a state-of-the-art scanner ABS) with a small increase of false negatives by 0-30%, achieving 17-41% overall accuracy improvement, and facilitates achieving top performance on the leaderboard. It also boosts performance of other scanners. It outperforms false positive removal methods using L2 distance and attribution techniques. We also demonstrate its potential in detecting a number of semantic backdoor attacks.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Deep Learning Backdoors

Intuitively, a backdoor attack against Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) is to inject hidden malicious behaviors into DNNs such that the backdoor model behaves legitimately for benign inputs, yet invokes a predefined malicious behavior when its input contains a malicious trigger. The trigger can take a plethora of forms, including a special object present in the image (e.g., a yellow pad), a shape filled with custom textures (e.g., logos with particular colors) or even image-wide stylizations with special filters (e.g., images altered by Nashville or Gotham filters). These filters can be applied to the original image by replacing or perturbing a set of image pixels.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Deep Feature Space Trojan Attack of Neural Networks by Controlled Detoxification

Trojan (backdoor) attack is a form of adversarial attack on deep neural networks where the attacker provides victims with a model trained/retrained on malicious data. The backdoor can be activated when a normal input is stamped with a certain pattern called trigger, causing misclassification. Many existing trojan attacks have their triggers being input space patches/objects (e.g., a polygon with solid color) or simple input transformations such as Instagram filters. These simple triggers are susceptible to recent backdoor detection algorithms. We propose a novel deep feature space trojan attack with five characteristics: effectiveness, stealthiness, controllability, robustness and reliance on deep features. We conduct extensive experiments on 9 image classifiers on various datasets including ImageNet to demonstrate these properties and show that our attack can evade state-of-the-art defense.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2018

Attacks Meet Interpretability: Attribute-steered Detection of Adversarial Samples

Adversarial sample attacks perturb benign inputs to induce DNN misbehaviors. Recent research has demonstrated the widespread presence and the devastating consequences of such attacks. Existing defense techniques either assume prior knowledge of specific attacks or may not work well on complex models due to their underlying assumptions. We argue that adversarial sample attacks are deeply entangled with interpretability of DNN models: while classification results on benign inputs can be reasoned based on the human perceptible features/attributes, results on adversarial samples can hardly be explained. Therefore, we propose a novel adversarial sample detection technique for face recognition models, based on interpretability. It features a novel bi-directional correspondence inference between attributes and internal neurons to identify neurons critical for individual attributes. The activation values of critical neurons are enhanced to amplify the reasoning part of the computation and the values of other neurons are weakened to suppress the uninterpretable part. The classification results after such transformation are compared with those of the original model to detect adversaries. Results show that our technique can achieve 94% detection accuracy for 7 different kinds of attacks with 9.91% false positives on benign inputs. In contrast, a state-of-the-art feature squeezing technique can only achieve 55% accuracy with 23.3% false positives.

cs.LG↗