arXiv subjects

Stefano V. Albrecht

Publications and source records attributed to Stefano V. Albrecht.

82 records · Page 5Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

On Convergence and Optimality of Best-Response Learning with Policy Types in Multiagent Systems

While many multiagent algorithms are designed for homogeneous systems (i.e. all agents are identical), there are important applications which require an agent to coordinate its actions without knowing a priori how the other agents behave. One method to make this problem feasible is to assume that the other agents draw their latent policy (or type) from a specific set, and that a domain expert could provide a specification of this set, albeit only a partially correct one. Algorithms have been proposed by several researchers to compute posterior beliefs over such policy libraries, which can then be used to determine optimal actions. In this paper, we provide theoretical guidance on two central design parameters of this method: Firstly, it is important that the user choose a posterior which can learn the true distribution of latent types, as otherwise suboptimal actions may be chosen. We analyse convergence properties of two existing posterior formulations and propose a new posterior which can learn correlated distributions. Secondly, since the types are provided by an expert, they may be inaccurate in the sense that they do not predict the agents' observed actions. We provide a novel characterisation of optimality which allows experts to use efficient model checking algorithms to verify optimality of types.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2019

An Empirical Study on the Practical Impact of Prior Beliefs over Policy Types

Many multiagent applications require an agent to learn quickly how to interact with previously unknown other agents. To address this problem, researchers have studied learning algorithms which compute posterior beliefs over a hypothesised set of policies, based on the observed actions of the other agents. The posterior belief is complemented by the prior belief, which specifies the subjective likelihood of policies before any actions are observed. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive empirical study on the practical impact of prior beliefs over policies in repeated interactions. We show that prior beliefs can have a significant impact on the long-term performance of such methods, and that the magnitude of the impact depends on the depth of the planning horizon. Moreover, our results demonstrate that automatic methods can be used to compute prior beliefs with consistent performance effects. This indicates that prior beliefs could be eliminated as a manual parameter and instead be computed automatically.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2019

Exploiting Causality for Selective Belief Filtering in Dynamic Bayesian Networks (Extended Abstract)

cs.AI↗

arXiv2019

Are You Doing What I Think You Are Doing? Criticising Uncertain Agent Models

The key for effective interaction in many multiagent applications is to reason explicitly about the behaviour of other agents, in the form of a hypothesised behaviour. While there exist several methods for the construction of a behavioural hypothesis, there is currently no universal theory which would allow an agent to contemplate the correctness of a hypothesis. In this work, we present a novel algorithm which decides this question in the form of a frequentist hypothesis test. The algorithm allows for multiple metrics in the construction of the test statistic and learns its distribution during the interaction process, with asymptotic correctness guarantees. We present results from a comprehensive set of experiments, demonstrating that the algorithm achieves high accuracy and scalability at low computational costs.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2019

Reasoning about Hypothetical Agent Behaviours and their Parameters

Agents can achieve effective interaction with previously unknown other agents by maintaining beliefs over a set of hypothetical behaviours, or types, that these agents may have. A current limitation in this method is that it does not recognise parameters within type specifications, because types are viewed as blackbox mappings from interaction histories to probability distributions over actions. In this work, we propose a general method which allows an agent to reason about both the relative likelihood of types and the values of any bounded continuous parameters within types. The method maintains individual parameter estimates for each type and selectively updates the estimates for some types after each observation. We propose different methods for the selection of types and the estimation of parameter values. The proposed methods are evaluated in detailed experiments, showing that updating the parameter estimates of a single type after each observation can be sufficient to achieve good performance.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2019

Dealing with Non-Stationarity in Multi-Agent Deep Reinforcement Learning

Recent developments in deep reinforcement learning are concerned with creating decision-making agents which can perform well in various complex domains. A particular approach which has received increasing attention is multi-agent reinforcement learning, in which multiple agents learn concurrently to coordinate their actions. In such multi-agent environments, additional learning problems arise due to the continually changing decision-making policies of agents. This paper surveys recent works that address the non-stationarity problem in multi-agent deep reinforcement learning. The surveyed methods range from modifications in the training procedure, such as centralized training, to learning representations of the opponent's policy, meta-learning, communication, and decentralized learning. The survey concludes with a list of open problems and possible lines of future research.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2018

Autonomous Agents Modelling Other Agents: A Comprehensive Survey and Open Problems

Much research in artificial intelligence is concerned with the development of autonomous agents that can interact effectively with other agents. An important aspect of such agents is the ability to reason about the behaviours of other agents, by constructing models which make predictions about various properties of interest (such as actions, goals, beliefs) of the modelled agents. A variety of modelling approaches now exist which vary widely in their methodology and underlying assumptions, catering to the needs of the different sub-communities within which they were developed and reflecting the different practical uses for which they are intended. The purpose of the present article is to provide a comprehensive survey of the salient modelling methods which can be found in the literature. The article concludes with a discussion of open problems which may form the basis for fruitful future research.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2016

Exploiting Causality for Selective Belief Filtering in Dynamic Bayesian Networks

Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs) are a general model for stochastic processes with partially observed states. Belief filtering in DBNs is the task of inferring the belief state (i.e. the probability distribution over process states) based on incomplete and noisy observations. This can be a hard problem in complex processes with large state spaces. In this article, we explore the idea of accelerating the filtering task by automatically exploiting causality in the process. We consider a specific type of causal relation, called passivity, which pertains to how state variables cause changes in other variables. We present the Passivity-based Selective Belief Filtering (PSBF) method, which maintains a factored belief representation and exploits passivity to perform selective updates over the belief factors. PSBF produces exact belief states under certain assumptions and approximate belief states otherwise, where the approximation error is bounded by the degree of uncertainty in the process. We show empirically, in synthetic processes with varying sizes and degrees of passivity, that PSBF is faster than several alternative methods while achieving competitive accuracy. Furthermore, we demonstrate how passivity occurs naturally in a complex system such as a multi-robot warehouse, and how PSBF can exploit this to accelerate the filtering task.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2016

Belief and Truth in Hypothesised Behaviours

There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest in the artificial intelligence (AI) community, where it is used as a method to control a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviours. The idea is to hypothesise a set of types, each specifying a possible behaviour for the other agents, and to plan our own actions with respect to those types which we believe are most likely, given the observed actions of the agents. The game theory literature studies this idea primarily in the context of equilibrium attainment. In contrast, many AI applications have a focus on task completion and payoff maximisation. With this perspective in mind, we identify and address a spectrum of questions pertaining to belief and truth in hypothesised types. We formulate three basic ways to incorporate evidence into posterior beliefs and show when the resulting beliefs are correct, and when they may fail to be correct. Moreover, we demonstrate that prior beliefs can have a significant impact on our ability to maximise payoffs in the long-term, and that they can be computed automatically with consistent performance effects. Furthermore, we analyse the conditions under which we are able complete our task optimally, despite inaccuracies in the hypothesised types. Finally, we show how the correctness of hypothesised types can be ascertained during the interaction via an automated statistical analysis.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2015

A Game-Theoretic Model and Best-Response Learning Method for Ad Hoc Coordination in Multiagent Systems

The ad hoc coordination problem is to design an autonomous agent which is able to achieve optimal flexibility and efficiency in a multiagent system with no mechanisms for prior coordination. We conceptualise this problem formally using a game-theoretic model, called the stochastic Bayesian game, in which the behaviour of a player is determined by its private information, or type. Based on this model, we derive a solution, called Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination (HBA), which utilises the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a planning procedure to find optimal actions in the sense of Bellman optimal control. We evaluate HBA in a multiagent logistics domain called level-based foraging, showing that it achieves higher flexibility and efficiency than several alternative algorithms. We also report on a human-machine experiment at a public science exhibition in which the human participants played repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Rock-Paper-Scissors against HBA and alternative algorithms, showing that HBA achieves equal efficiency and a significantly higher welfare and winning rate.

cs.GT↗