arXiv subjects

Tatsuya Sasaki

Publications and source records attributed to Tatsuya Sasaki.

24 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2013

Effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity

Stern-judging is one of the best-known assessment rules in indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity is a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. It relies on mutual monitoring and assessments, i.e., individuals judge, following their own assessment rules, whether other individuals are "good" or "bad" according to information on their past behaviors. Among many assessment rules, stern-judging is known to provide stable cooperation in a population, as observed when all members in the population know all about others' behaviors (public information case) and when the members never commit an assessment error. In this paper, the effect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging is investigated. By analyzing the image matrix, which describes who is good in the eyes of whom in the population, we analytically show that private information and assessment error cause the collapse of stern-judging: all individuals assess other individuals as "good" at random with a probability of 1/2.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2013

Exciton-phonon Bound Complex in Single-walled Carbon Nanotubes Revealed by High-field Magneto-optical Spectroscopy

High-field magneto-optical spectroscopy was conducted on highly-selected chiral (6,5) specific single-walled carbon nanotubes. Spectra of phonon sidebands in both 1st and 2nd sub-bands were observed to be unchanged by the application of an external magnetic field up to 52 T. Our analyses led to the conclusion that both phonon sidebands in respective sub-band originate from the dark K-momentum singlet (D-K-S) excitons. Moreover, while the relative ordering between the bandedge bright exciton and its zero-momentum anti-bonding counterpart was found to be opposite for the 1st and 2nd sub-bands, the relative ordering between the D-K-S exciton and the band-edge bright exciton was clarified to be the same for both sub-bands. Energy of these D-K-S excitons was estimated to be ~ 21.5 and ~ 37.3 meV above the band-edge bright exciton for the 1st and 2nd sub-bands, respectively.

cond-mat.mes-hall↗

arXiv2013

Band-edge Exciton States in a Single-walled Carbon Nanotube Revealed by Magneto-optical Spectroscopy in Ultra-high Magnetic Field

We report high field magneto-optical study on the first and second sub-band transitions of single-chirality single-walled carbon nanotubes. The ordering and relative energy splitting between bright and dark excitonic states were found to be inverse between the first and second subbands. We verified that the zero-momentum dark singlet exciton lies below the bright exciton for the first subband transitions, while for the second sub-band transitions, it was found to have higher energy than the bright excitonic state. Effect of this peculiar excitonic structure was found to manifest itself in distinctive Aharonov-Bohm splitting in ultra-high magnetic fields up to 190 T.

cond-mat.mes-hall↗

arXiv2013

Survey of Exciton-Phonon Sidebands by Magneto-optical Spectroscopy Using Highly Purified (6,5) Single-walled Carbon Nanotubes

We report the first high-field magneto-optical study on the exciton-phonon sideband of single-walled carbon nanotubes (SWNTs) consisting only of (6,5) species. Both energy and intensity of the observed phonon sideband were found to be independent of the external magnetic field. Comparing with theoretical calculations, we confirmed that these sidebands originate from the optically forbidden K-momentum singlet excitons. Energy of these K-momentum dark excitons was extracted to be ~ 21.5 meV above the bright zero-momentum singlet excitons, in close agreement with recent theoretical predictions and experimentally determined values.

cond-mat.mes-hall↗

arXiv2013

The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated, mostly by using compulsory public good games. Recently, Sasaki et al. (2012, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 109:1165-1169) considered optional participation as well as institutional incentives and described how the interplay between these mechanisms affects the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Here, we present a full classification of these evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, whenever penalties are large enough to cause the bi-stability of both cooperation and defection in cases in which participation in the public good game is compulsory, these penalties will ultimately result in cooperation if participation in the public good game is optional. The global stability of coercion-based cooperation in this optional case contrasts strikingly with the bi-stability that is observed in the compulsory case. We also argue that optional participation is not so effective at improving cooperation under rewards.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2012

The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion

The exclusion of freeriders from common privileges or public acceptance is widely found in the real world. Current models on the evolution of cooperation with incentives mostly assume peer sanctioning, whereby a punisher imposes penalties on freeriders at a cost to itself. It is well known that such costly punishment has two substantial difficulties. First, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society of freeriders, and second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of non-punishing cooperators (namely, "second-order" freeriders). We present a game-theoretical model of social exclusion in which a punishing cooperator can exclude freeriders from benefit sharing. We show that such social exclusion can overcome the above-mentioned difficulties even if it is costly and stochastic. The results do not require a genetic relationship, repeated interaction, reputation, or group selection. Instead, only a limited number of freeriders are required to prevent the second-order freeriders from eroding the social immune system.

physics.soc-ph↗