arXiv subjects

Thomas L. Griffiths

Publications and source records attributed to Thomas L. Griffiths.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2026

Cognitive Models and AI Algorithms Provide Templates for Designing Language Agents

While contemporary large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable in isolation, there are still many difficult problems that lie beyond the abilities of a single LLM. For such tasks, there is still uncertainty about how best to take many LLMs as parts and combine them into a greater whole. This position paper argues that potential blueprints for designing such modular language agents can be found in the existing literature on cognitive models and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. To make this point clear, we formalize the idea of an agent template that specifies roles for individual LLMs and how their functionalities should be composed. We then survey a variety of existing language agents in the literature and highlight their underlying templates derived directly from cognitive models or AI algorithms. By highlighting these designs, we aim to call attention to agent templates inspired by cognitive science and AI as a powerful tool for developing effective, interpretable language agents.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

AI Gamestore: Scalable, Open-Ended Evaluation of Machine General Intelligence with Human Games

Rigorously evaluating machine intelligence against the broad spectrum of human general intelligence has become increasingly important and challenging in this era of rapid technological advance. Conventional AI benchmarks typically assess only narrow capabilities in a limited range of human activity. Most are also static, quickly saturating as developers explicitly or implicitly optimize for them. We propose that a more promising way to evaluate human-like general intelligence in AI systems is through a particularly strong form of general game playing: studying how and how well they play and learn to play \textbf{all conceivable human games}, in comparison to human players with the same level of experience, time, or other resources. We define a "human game" to be a game designed by humans for humans, and argue for the evaluative suitability of this space of all such games people can imagine and enjoy -- the "Multiverse of Human Games". Taking a first step towards this vision, we introduce the AI GameStore, a scalable and open-ended platform that uses LLMs with humans-in-the-loop to synthesize new representative human games, by automatically sourcing and adapting standardized and containerized variants of game environments from popular human digital gaming platforms. As a proof of concept, we generated 100 such games based on the top charts of Apple App Store and Steam, and evaluated seven frontier vision-language models (VLMs) on short episodes of play. The best models achieved less than 10\% of the human average score on the majority of the games, and especially struggled with games that challenge world-model learning, memory and planning. We conclude with a set of next steps for building out the AI GameStore as a practical way to measure and drive progress toward human-like general intelligence in machines.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

A Rational Analysis of the Effects of Sycophantic AI

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Toward Efficient Exploration by Large Language Model Agents

A burgeoning area within reinforcement learning (RL) is the design of sequential decision-making agents centered around large language models (LLMs). While autonomous decision-making agents powered by modern LLMs could facilitate numerous real-world applications, such successes demand agents that are capable of data-efficient RL. One key obstacle to achieving data efficiency in RL is exploration, a challenge that we demonstrate many recent proposals for LLM agent designs struggle to contend with. Meanwhile, classic algorithms from the RL literature known to gracefully address exploration require technical machinery that can be challenging to operationalize in purely natural language settings. In this work, rather than relying on finetuning or in-context learning to coax LLMs into implicitly imitating a RL algorithm, we illustrate how LLMs can be used to explicitly implement an existing RL algorithm (Posterior Sampling for Reinforcement Learning) whose capacity for statistically-efficient exploration is already well-studied. We offer empirical results demonstrating how our LLM-based implementation of a known, data-efficient RL algorithm can be considerably more effective in natural language tasks that demand prudent exploration.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Using Reinforcement Learning to Train Large Language Models to Explain Human Decisions

A central goal of cognitive modeling is to develop models that not only predict human behavior but also provide insight into the underlying cognitive mechanisms. While neural network models trained on large-scale behavioral data often achieve strong predictive performance, they typically fall short in offering interpretable explanations of the cognitive processes they capture. In this work, we explore the potential of pretrained large language models (LLMs) to serve as dual-purpose cognitive models--capable of both accurate prediction and interpretable explanation in natural language. Specifically, we employ reinforcement learning with outcome-based rewards to guide LLMs toward generating explicit reasoning traces for explaining human risky choices. Our findings demonstrate that this approach produces high-quality explanations alongside strong quantitative predictions of human decisions.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Are Large Language Models Sensitive to the Motives Behind Communication?

Human communication is motivated: people speak, write, and create content with a particular communicative intent in mind. As a result, information that large language models (LLMs) and AI agents process is inherently framed by humans' intentions and incentives. People are adept at navigating such nuanced information: we routinely identify benevolent or self-serving motives in order to decide what statements to trust. For LLMs to be effective in the real world, they too must critically evaluate content by factoring in the motivations of the source -- for instance, weighing the credibility of claims made in a sales pitch. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive study of whether LLMs have this capacity for motivational vigilance. We first employ controlled experiments from cognitive science to verify that LLMs' behavior is consistent with rational models of learning from motivated testimony, and find they successfully discount information from biased sources in a human-like manner. We then extend our evaluation to sponsored online adverts, a more naturalistic reflection of LLM agents' information ecosystems. In these settings, we find that LLMs' inferences do not track the rational models' predictions nearly as closely -- partly due to additional information that distracts them from vigilance-relevant considerations. However, a simple steering intervention that boosts the salience of intentions and incentives substantially increases the correspondence between LLMs and the rational model. These results suggest that LLMs possess a basic sensitivity to the motivations of others, but generalizing to novel real-world settings will require further improvements to these models.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Visual serial processing deficits explain divergences in human and VLM reasoning

Why do Vision Language Models (VLMs), despite success on standard benchmarks, often fail to match human performance on surprisingly simple visual reasoning tasks? While the underlying computational principles are still debated, we hypothesize that a crucial factor is a deficit in visually-grounded serial processing. To test this hypothesis, we compared human and VLM performance across tasks designed to vary serial processing demands in three distinct domains: geometric reasoning, perceptual enumeration, and mental rotation. Tasks within each domain varied serial processing load by manipulating factors such as geometric concept complexity, perceptual individuation load, and transformation difficulty. Across all domains, our results revealed a consistent pattern: decreased VLM accuracy was strongly correlated with increased human reaction time (used as a proxy for serial processing load). As tasks require more demanding serial processing -- whether composing concepts, enumerating items, or performing mental transformations -- the VLM-human performance gap widens reliably. These findings support our hypothesis, indicating that limitations in serial, visually grounded reasoning represent a fundamental bottleneck that distinguishes current VLMs from humans.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

What Should Embeddings Embed? Autoregressive Models Represent Latent Generating Distributions

Autoregressive language models have demonstrated a remarkable ability to extract latent structure from text. The embeddings from large language models have been shown to capture aspects of the syntax and semantics of language. But what should embeddings represent? We connect the autoregressive prediction objective to the idea of constructing predictive sufficient statistics to summarize the information contained in a sequence of observations, and use this connection to identify three settings where the optimal content of embeddings can be identified: independent identically distributed data, where the embedding should capture the sufficient statistics of the data; latent state models, where the embedding should encode the posterior distribution over states given the data; and discrete hypothesis spaces, where the embedding should reflect the posterior distribution over hypotheses given the data. We then conduct empirical probing studies to show that transformers encode these three kinds of latent generating distributions, and that they perform well in out-of-distribution cases and without token memorization in these settings.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Cognitive Foundations for Reasoning and Their Manifestation in LLMs

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Accumulating Context Changes the Beliefs of Language Models

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Partner Modelling Emerges in Recurrent Agents (But Only When It Matters)

Humans are remarkably adept at collaboration, able to infer the strengths and weaknesses of new partners in order to work successfully towards shared goals. To build AI systems with this capability, we must first understand its building blocks: does such flexibility require explicit, dedicated mechanisms for modelling others -- or can it emerge spontaneously from the pressures of open-ended cooperative interaction? To investigate this question, we train simple model-free RNN agents to collaborate with a population of diverse partners. Using the `Overcooked-AI' environment, we collect data from thousands of collaborative teams, and analyse agents' internal hidden states. Despite a lack of additional architectural features, inductive biases, or auxiliary objectives, the agents nevertheless develop structured internal representations of their partners' task abilities, enabling rapid adaptation and generalisation to novel collaborators. We investigated these internal models through probing techniques, and large-scale behavioural analysis. Notably, we find that structured partner modelling emerges when agents can influence partner behaviour by controlling task allocation. Our results show that partner modelling can arise spontaneously in model-free agents -- but only under environmental conditions that impose the right kind of social pressure.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Demystifying the Mechanisms Behind Emergent Exploration in Goal-conditioned RL

In this work, we take a first step toward elucidating the mechanisms behind emergent exploration in unsupervised reinforcement learning. We study Single-Goal Contrastive Reinforcement Learning (SGCRL), a self-supervised algorithm capable of solving challenging long-horizon goal-reaching tasks without external rewards or curricula. We combine theoretical analysis of the algorithm's objective function with controlled experiments to understand what drives its exploration. We show that SGCRL maximizes implicit rewards shaped by its learned representations. These representations automatically modify the reward landscape to promote exploration before reaching the goal and exploitation thereafter. Our experiments also demonstrate that these exploration dynamics arise from learning low-rank representations of the state space rather than from neural network function approximation. Our improved understanding enables us to adapt SGCRL to perform safety-aware exploration.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Predicting Multi-Agent Specialization via Task Parallelizability

When should we encourage specialization in multi-agent systems versus train generalists that perform the entire task independently? We propose that specialization largely depends on task parallelizability: the potential for multiple agents to execute task components concurrently. Drawing inspiration from Amdahl's Law in distributed systems, we present a closed-form bound that predicts when specialization improves performance, depending only on task concurrency and team size. We validate our model on two standard MARL benchmarks that represent opposite regimes -- StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC, unlimited concurrency) and Multi-Particle Environment (MPE, unit-capacity bottlenecks) -- and observe close alignment between the bound at each extreme and an empirical measure of specialization. Three follow-up experiments in Overcooked-AI demonstrate that the model works in environments with more complex spatial and resource bottlenecks that allow for a range of strategies. Beyond prediction, the bound also serves as a diagnostic tool, highlighting biases in MARL training algorithms that cause sub-optimal convergence to specialist strategies with larger state spaces.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

Convolutional Neural Networks Can (Meta-)Learn the Same-Different Relation

While convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have come to match and exceed human performance in many settings, the tasks these models optimize for are largely constrained to the level of individual objects, such as classification and captioning. Humans remain vastly superior to CNNs in visual tasks involving relations, including the ability to identify two objects as `same' or `different'. A number of studies have shown that while CNNs can be coaxed into learning the same-different relation in some settings, they tend to generalize poorly to other instances of this relation. In this work we show that the same CNN architectures that fail to generalize the same-different relation with conventional training are able to succeed when trained via meta-learning, which explicitly encourages abstraction and generalization across tasks.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2025

Whither symbols in the era of advanced neural networks?

Some of the strongest evidence that human minds should be thought about in terms of symbolic systems has been the way they combine ideas, produce novelty, and learn quickly. We argue that modern neural networks -- and the artificial intelligence systems built upon them -- exhibit similar abilities. This undermines the argument that the cognitive processes and representations used by human minds are symbolic, although the fact that these neural networks are typically trained on data generated by symbolic systems illustrates that such systems play an important role in characterizing the abstract problems that human minds have to solve. This argument leads us to offer a new agenda for research on the symbolic basis of human thought.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Assessing Adaptive World Models in Machines with Novel Games

Human intelligence exhibits a remarkable capacity for rapid adaptation and effective problem-solving in novel and unfamiliar contexts. We argue that this profound adaptability is fundamentally linked to the efficient construction and refinement of internal representations of the environment, commonly referred to as world models, and we refer to this adaptation mechanism as world model induction. However, current understanding and evaluation of world models in artificial intelligence (AI) remains narrow, often focusing on static representations learned from training on massive corpora of data, instead of the efficiency and efficacy in learning these representations through interaction and exploration within a novel environment. In this Perspective, we provide a view of world model induction drawing on decades of research in cognitive science on how humans learn and adapt so efficiently; we then call for a new evaluation framework for assessing adaptive world models in AI. Concretely, we propose a new benchmarking paradigm based on suites of carefully designed games with genuine, deep and continually refreshing novelty in the underlying game structures -- we refer to this class of games as novel games. We detail key desiderata for constructing these games and propose appropriate metrics to explicitly challenge and evaluate the agent's ability for rapid world model induction. We hope that this new evaluation framework will inspire future evaluation efforts on world models in AI and provide a crucial step towards developing AI systems capable of human-like rapid adaptation and robust generalization -- a critical component of artificial general intelligence.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Machine Bullshit: Characterizing the Emergent Disregard for Truth in Large Language Models

Bullshit, as conceptualized by philosopher Harry Frankfurt, refers to statements made without regard to their truth value. While previous work has explored large language model (LLM) hallucination and sycophancy, we propose machine bullshit as an overarching conceptual framework that can allow researchers to characterize the broader phenomenon of emergent loss of truthfulness in LLMs and shed light on its underlying mechanisms. We introduce the Bullshit Index, a novel metric quantifying LLMs' indifference to truth, and propose a complementary taxonomy analyzing four qualitative forms of bullshit: empty rhetoric, paltering, weasel words, and unverified claims. We conduct empirical evaluations on the Marketplace dataset, the Political Neutrality dataset, and our new BullshitEval benchmark (2,400 scenarios spanning 100 AI assistants) explicitly designed to evaluate machine bullshit. Our results demonstrate that model fine-tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) significantly exacerbates bullshit and inference-time chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting notably amplify specific bullshit forms, particularly empty rhetoric and paltering. We also observe prevalent machine bullshit in political contexts, with weasel words as the dominant strategy. Our findings highlight systematic challenges in AI alignment and provide new insights toward more truthful LLM behavior.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Rational Metareasoning for Large Language Models

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

cs.CL↗