Candy Crush is NP-hard
We prove that playing Candy Crush to achieve a given score in a fixed number of swaps is NP-hard.
cs.CC↗
arXiv subjects
Toby Walsh
Publications and source records attributed to Toby Walsh.
Strategic aspects of the probabilistic serial rule for the allocation of goods
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the agents. We examine computational and non-computational aspects of strategising under the PS rule. Firstly, we study the computational complexity of an agent manipulating the PS rule. We present polynomial-time algorithms for optimal manipulation. Secondly, we show that expected utility best responses can cycle. Thirdly, we examine the existence and computation of Nash equilibrium profiles under the PS rule. We show that a pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist under the PS rule. For two agents, we identify two different types of preference profiles that are not only in Nash equilibrium but can also be computed in linear time. Finally, we conduct experiments to check the frequency of manipulability of the PS rule under different combinations of the number of agents, objects, and utility functions.
cs.GT↗
Efficient Approximation of Well-Founded Justification and Well-Founded Domination (Corrected and Extended Version)
Many native ASP solvers exploit unfounded sets to compute consequences of a logic program via some form of well-founded negation, but disregard its contrapositive, well-founded justification (WFJ), due to computational cost. However, we demonstrate that this can hinder propagation of many relevant conditions such as reachability. In order to perform WFJ with low computational cost, we devise a method that approximates its consequences by computing dominators in a flowgraph, a problem for which linear-time algorithms exist. Furthermore, our method allows for additional unfounded set inference, called well-founded domination (WFD). We show that the effect of WFJ and WFD can be simulated for a important classes of logic programs that include reachability. This paper is a corrected and extended version of a paper published at the 12th International Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning (LPNMR 2013). It has been adapted to exclude Theorem 10 and its consequences, but provides all missing proofs.
cs.LO↗
Breaking Symmetry with Different Orderings
We can break symmetry by eliminating solutions within each symmetry class. For instance, the Lex-Leader method eliminates all but the smallest solution in the lexicographical ordering. Unfortunately, the Lex-Leader method is intractable in general. We prove that, under modest assumptions, we cannot reduce the worst case complexity of breaking symmetry by using other orderings on solutions. We also prove that a common type of symmetry, where rows and columns in a matrix of decision variables are interchangeable, is intractable to break when we use two promising alternatives to the lexicographical ordering: the Gray code ordering (which uses a different ordering on solutions), and the Snake-Lex ordering (which is a variant of the lexicographical ordering that re-orders the variables). Nevertheless, we show experimentally that using other orderings like the Gray code to break symmetry can be beneficial in practice as they may better align with the objective function and branching heuristic.
cs.AI↗
A Social Welfare Optimal Sequential Allocation Procedure
We consider a simple sequential allocation procedure for sharing indivisible items between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. Supposing additive utilities and independence between the agents, we show that the expected utility of each agent is computable in polynomial time. Using this result, we prove that the expected utilitarian social welfare is maximized when agents take alternate turns. We also argue that this mechanism remains optimal when agents behave strategically
cs.AI↗
Three Generalizations of the FOCUS Constraint
The FOCUS constraint expresses the notion that solutions are concentrated. In practice, this constraint suffers from the rigidity of its semantics. To tackle this issue, we propose three generalizations of the FOCUS constraint. We provide for each one a complete filtering algorithm as well as discussing decompositions.
cs.AI↗
Coalitional Manipulation for Schulze's Rule
Schulze's rule is used in the elections of a large number of organizations including Wikimedia and Debian. Part of the reason for its popularity is the large number of axiomatic properties, like monotonicity and Condorcet consistency, which it satisfies. We identify a potential shortcoming of Schulze's rule: it is computationally vulnerable to manipulation. In particular, we prove that computing an unweighted coalitional manipulation (UCM) is polynomial for any number of manipulators. This result holds for both the unique winner and the co-winner versions of UCM. This resolves an open question stated by Parkes and Xia (2012). We also prove that computing a weighted coalitional manipulation (WCM) is polynomial for a bounded number of candidates. Finally, we discuss the relation between the unique winner UCM problem and the co-winner UCM problem and argue that they have substantially different necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a successful manipulation.
cs.AI↗
Global SPACING Constraint (Technical Report)
We propose a new global SPACING constraint that is useful in modeling events that are distributed over time, like learning units scheduled over a study program or repeated patterns in music compositions. First, we investigate theoretical properties of the constraint and identify tractable special cases. We propose efficient DC filtering algorithms for these cases. Then, we experimentally evaluate performance of the proposed algorithms on a music composition problem and demonstrate that our filtering algorithms outperform the state-of-the-art approach for solving this problem.
cs.LO↗
Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Convergence and Condorcet Efficiency
In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative behavior to be avoided, or at least to be made computationally difficult for the agents to perform. However, there are scenarios in which a restricted form of manipulation can instead be beneficial. In this paper we consider the iterative version of several voting rules, where at each step one agent is allowed to manipulate by modifying his ballot according to a set of restricted manipulation moves which are computationally easy and require little information to be performed. We prove convergence of iterative voting rules when restricted manipulation is allowed, and we present experiments showing that most iterative voting rules have a higher Condorcet efficiency than their non-iterative version.
cs.AI↗
Possible and Necessary Winner Problem in Social Polls
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose that an agent's vote is influenced by the votes of their friends who have already voted. Despite its simplicity, this model provides useful insights into a number of areas including social polling, sequential voting, and manipulation. We prove that the number of candidates and the network structure affect the computational complexity of computing which candidate necessarily or possibly can win in such a social poll. For social networks with bounded treewidth and a bounded number of candidates, we provide polynomial algorithms for both problems. In other cases, we prove that computing which candidates necessarily or possibly win are computationally intractable.
cs.GT↗
The SeqBin Constraint Revisited
We revisit the SeqBin constraint. This meta-constraint subsumes a number of important global constraints like Change, Smooth and IncreasingNValue. We show that the previously proposed filtering algorithm for SeqBin has two drawbacks even under strong restrictions: it does not detect bounds disentailment and it is not idempotent. We identify the cause for these problems, and propose a new propagator that overcomes both issues. Our algorithm is based on a connection to the problem of finding a path of a given cost in a restricted $n$-partite graph. Our propagator enforces domain consistency in O(nd^2) and, for special cases of SeqBin that include Change, Smooth and IncreasingNValue, in O(nd) time.
cs.AI↗
Eliminating the Weakest Link: Making Manipulation Intractable?
Successive elimination of candidates is often a route to making manipulation intractable to compute. We prove that eliminating candidates does not necessarily increase the computational complexity of manipulation. However, for many voting rules used in practice, the computational complexity increases. For example, it is already known that it is NP-hard to compute how a single voter can manipulate the result of single transferable voting (the elimination version of plurality voting). We show here that it is NP-hard to compute how a single voter can manipulate the result of the elimination version of veto voting, of the closely related Coombs' rule, and of the elimination versions of a general class of scoring rules.
cs.AI↗
Symmetry Breaking Constraints: Recent Results
Symmetry is an important problem in many combinatorial problems. One way of dealing with symmetry is to add constraints that eliminate symmetric solutions. We survey recent results in this area, focusing especially on two common and useful cases: symmetry breaking constraints for row and column symmetry, and symmetry breaking constraints for eliminating value symmetry
cs.AI↗
Combining Voting Rules Together
We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties. For instance, even if just one of the base voting rules has a desirable property like Condorcet consistency, the combination inherits this property. In addition, we prove that combining voting rules together in this way can make finding a manipulation more computationally difficult. Finally, we study the impact of this combinator on approximation methods that find close to optimal manipulations.
cs.AI↗
The RegularGcc Matrix Constraint
We study propagation of the RegularGcc global constraint. This ensures that each row of a matrix of decision variables satisfies a Regular constraint, and each column satisfies a Gcc constraint. On the negative side, we prove that propagation is NP-hard even under some strong restrictions (e.g. just 3 values, just 4 states in the automaton, or just 5 columns to the matrix). On the positive side, we identify two cases where propagation is fixed parameter tractable. In addition, we show how to improve propagation over a simple decomposition into separate Regular and Gcc constraints by identifying some necessary but insufficient conditions for a solution. We enforce these conditions with some additional weighted row automata. Experimental results demonstrate the potential of these methods on some standard benchmark problems.
cs.AI↗
A Comparison of Lex Bounds for Multiset Variables in Constraint Programming
Set and multiset variables in constraint programming have typically been represented using subset bounds. However, this is a weak representation that neglects potentially useful information about a set such as its cardinality. For set variables, the length-lex (LL) representation successfully provides information about the length (cardinality) and position in the lexicographic ordering. For multiset variables, where elements can be repeated, we consider richer representations that take into account additional information. We study eight different representations in which we maintain bounds according to one of the eight different orderings: length-(co)lex (LL/LC), variety-(co)lex (VL/VC), length-variety-(co)lex (LVL/LVC), and variety-length-(co)lex (VLL/VLC) orderings. These representations integrate together information about the cardinality, variety (number of distinct elements in the multiset), and position in some total ordering. Theoretical and empirical comparisons of expressiveness and compactness of the eight representations suggest that length-variety-(co)lex (LVL/LVC) and variety-length-(co)lex (VLL/VLC) usually give tighter bounds after constraint propagation. We implement the eight representations and evaluate them against the subset bounds representation with cardinality and variety reasoning. Results demonstrate that they offer significantly better pruning and runtime.
cs.AI↗
Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules
Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules select a winner by successively eliminating candidates with low Borda scores. We show that these rules have a number of desirable computational properties. In particular, with unweighted votes, it is NP-hard to manipulate either rule with one manipulator, whilst with weighted votes, it is NP-hard to manipulate either rule with a small number of candidates and a coalition of manipulators. As only a couple of other voting rules are known to be NP-hard to manipulate with a single manipulator, Nanson's and Baldwin's rules appear to be particularly resistant to manipulation from a theoretical perspective. We also propose a number of approximation methods for manipulating these two rules. Experiments demonstrate that both rules are often difficult to manipulate in practice. These results suggest that elimination style voting rules deserve further study.
cs.AI↗
Online Cake Cutting (published version)
We propose an online form of the cake cutting problem. This models situations where agents arrive and depart during the process of dividing a resource. We show that well known fair division procedures like cut-and-choose and the Dubins-Spanier moving knife procedure can be adapted to apply to such online problems. We propose some fairness properties that online cake cutting procedures can possess like online forms of proportionality and envy-freeness. We also consider the impact of collusion between agents. Finally, we study theoretically and empirically the competitive ratio of these online cake cutting procedures. Based on its resistance to collusion, and its good performance in practice, our results favour the online version of the cut-and-choose procedure over the online version of the moving knife procedure.
cs.AI↗