arXiv subjects

Yasushi Kawase

Publications and source records attributed to Yasushi Kawase.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Fractional Assignment with $\ell_1$ Preferences

We study a fractional assignment setting where $n$ objects are to be assigned to $n$ agents with unit capacity, and each agent specifies an ideal distribution over the objects. Unlike in classic random assignment, these ideal distributions are not necessarily degenerate, as agents may prefer a mixture of objects rather than any single object. We assume that agents seek to minimize the $\ell_1$ distance between their ideal distribution and the distribution they receive, which is equivalent to maximizing the overlap between the two distributions. We propose two mechanisms, one based on water filling (WF) and the other on quadratic programming (QP), and show that both mechanisms are utilitarian-optimal (and hence Pareto efficient), envy-free, strategyproof, and satisfy equal treatment of equals. Moreover, we highlight a distinct advantage of each mechanism: while the WF mechanism satisfies the stronger property of group-strategyproofness, the QP mechanism is more robust in terms of egalitarian overlap welfare.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Simultaneously Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions

Many allocation problems are intrinsically multidimensional, since an item may contribute differently to several criteria, and optimizing a single aggregate objective can hide severe losses in other dimensions. We study how much efficiency can be guaranteed simultaneously when indivisible items have multiple attributes. To this end, we introduce the \emph{multidimensional efficient allocation} (MDEA) model, where each agent has an additive valuation in each dimension, and investigate simultaneous efficiency under utilitarian social welfare (USW) and egalitarian social welfare (ESW). Our results reveal a sharp worst-case frontier. For exact efficiency, maximizing the number of dimensions attaining the USW optimum admits a $c/\ell$-approximation for every fixed constant $c$, and this dependence on the number $\ell$ of dimensions is essentially unavoidable; for ESW, even deciding whether two dimensions can be optimized simultaneously is NP-hard with binary valuations. For approximate simultaneous efficiency in every dimension, we identify a tight threshold of order $1/\ell$, showing that such guarantees always exist for both USW and ESW, while any asymptotically better dependence on $\ell$ is impossible, even for binary valuations. Finally, we introduce three natural multidimensional Pareto notions and characterize both their relationships and their computational complexity.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Stable and Fair Random Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market

Random allocations are widely used to handle ties and indifferences in two-sided environments. In such environments, commonly used procedures such as random tie-breaking may fail to ensure stability and fairness from an ex ante perspective. We show that when agents have discrete concave (M$^\natural$-concave) valuations, there exists an ex ante stable and fair allocation. To establish this result, we relate our framework to the model of stability introduced by Alkan and Gale. In particular, we show that ex ante stable and fair fractional allocations are exactly characterized as Alkan--Gale stable outcomes under choice functions induced from concave closures together with a symmetric strictly convex tie-breaking rule. We further prove that any ex ante stable fractional allocation can be decomposed into a lottery over stable deterministic allocations, using a generalization of the Birkhoff--von Neumann theorem. Finally, we study a setting that does not rely on cardinal valuations and instead assumes ordinal preferences. Within this ordinal framework, we establish the existence of an ex ante stable and fair fractional allocation. This setting is formulated within the matching-with-contracts framework under matroid constraints. The resulting class includes existing models, such as one-to-many random allocation with responsive choice correspondences, and captures a wide range of applications, including controlled school choice with lotteries.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Optimal design of lottery with cumulative prospect theory

Lotteries are a prevalent form of gambling between a seller and buyers. Designing a lottery requires a model of how buyers make decisions when confronted with uncertain outcomes. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) is a descriptive model that captures people's propensity to overestimate extreme events and their different attitudes toward gains and losses. In this study, we design a lottery that maximizes the seller's profit when the buyers' decision-making adheres to the CPT framework. The main difficulty is the nonconvexity of the CPT framework, which we overcome by reformulating the problem as a three-level optimization problem and characterizing its optimal solution. Based on the analysis, we propose a linear-time algorithm that computes the optimal lottery. Furthermore, we present an efficient algorithm applicable to a broader setting with a ticket price constraint. This is the first study to employ the CPT framework in designing an optimal lottery with more than two outcomes.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Online Algorithms for Repeated Optimal Stopping: Balancing Baseline Guarantees and Regret

We study the repeated optimal stopping problem, in which the same optimal stopping instance with an unknown distribution is solved repeatedly over $T$ rounds. We aim to simultaneously achieve strong per-round performance guarantees relative to a given baseline and sublinear regret across all rounds. Our primary contribution is a comprehensive theoretical characterization of whether and when these two objectives are compatible. First, under standard semi-bandit feedback, we prove that maintaining the per-round guarantee forces regret of $Ω(T / \log T)$. Second, even under full feedback, we show that requiring almost-sure satisfaction of the per-round guarantee in every round is incompatible with sublinear regret. Third, under full feedback, we propose a general algorithmic framework that achieves both sublinear regret and the per-round guarantee with high probability. Our framework applies to canonical problems, including the prophet inequality, the secretary problem, and their variants under adversarial, random, and i.i.d. input models. For example, in the repeated prophet inequality problem, our method guarantees that, with high probability in each round, its expected reward is at least that of the classical single-sample algorithm, which achieves a $1/2$ competitive ratio, while simultaneously ensuring $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret. Furthermore, we establish a regret lower bound of $Ω(\sqrt{T})$ even in the i.i.d. model, which is nearly tight with respect to the number of rounds.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2026

Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment

In random assignment, fairness is often captured by stochastic-dominance envy-freeness (SD-EF). We observe that assignments satisfying SD-EF may admit decompositions that result in each agent envying another agent with high probability. To address this, we introduce decomposition envy-freeness (Dec-EF), which is a property of a decomposition rather than of an assignment matrix. We show that an SD-EF assignment matrix always admits a Dec-EF decomposition when there are at most three agents or the agents have at most two distinct preferences.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Fair and Efficient Balanced Allocation for Indivisible Goods

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions to achieve both fairness and efficiency under the constraint that each agent receives exactly the same number of goods (the \emph{balanced constraint}). While this constraint is common in real-world scenarios such as team drafts or asset division, it significantly complicates the search for allocations that are both fair and efficient. Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-established fairness notion for indivisible goods. Pareto optimality (PO) and its stronger variant, fractional Pareto optimality (fPO), are widely accepted efficiency criteria. Our main contribution establishes both the existence and polynomial-time computability of allocations that are simultaneously EF1 and fPO under balanced constraints in two fundamental cases: (1) when each agent has a personalized bivalued valuation, and (2) when agents have at most two distinct valuation types,. Our algorithms leverage novel applications of maximum-weight matching in bipartite graphs and duality theory, providing the first polynomial-time solutions for these cases and offering new insights for constrained fair division problems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Analyzing the effect of prediction accuracy on the distributionally-robust competitive ratio

The field of algorithms with predictions aims to improve algorithm performance by integrating machine learning predictions into algorithm design. A central question in this area is how predictions can improve performance, and a key aspect of this analysis is the role of prediction accuracy. In this context, prediction accuracy is defined as a guaranteed probability that an instance drawn from the distribution belongs to the predicted set. As a performance measure that incorporates prediction accuracy, we focus on the distributionally-robust competitive ratio (DRCR), introduced by Sun et al.~(ICML 2024). The DRCR is defined as the expected ratio between the algorithm's cost and the optimal cost, where the expectation is taken over the worst-case instance distribution that satisfies the given prediction and accuracy requirement. A known structural property is that, for any fixed algorithm, the DRCR decreases linearly as prediction accuracy increases. Building on this result, we establish that the optimal DRCR value (i.e., the infimum over all algorithms) is a monotone and concave function of prediction accuracy. We further generalize the DRCR framework to a multiple-prediction setting and show that monotonicity and concavity are preserved in this setting. Finally, we apply our results to the ski rental problem, a benchmark problem in online optimization, to identify the conditions on prediction accuracies required for the optimal DRCR to attain a target value. Moreover, we provide a method for computing the critical accuracy, defined as the minimum accuracy required for the optimal DRCR to strictly improve upon the performance attainable without any accuracy guarantee.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Two-Sided Fairness in Many-to-One Matching

We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature, we aim to provide fairness not only to participants, but also to teams using concepts from the literature of fair division. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that computes an allocation satisfying team-justified envy-freeness up to one participant, participant-justified envy-freeness, balancedness, Pareto optimality, and group-strategyproofness for participants, even in the possible presence of ties. Our algorithm generalizes both the Gale-Shapley algorithm from two-sided matching as well as the round-robin algorithm from fair division. We also discuss how our algorithm can be extended to accommodate quotas and incomplete preferences.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Scheduling on Identical Machines with Setup Time and Unknown Execution Time

In this study, we investigate a scheduling problem on identical machines in which jobs require initial setup before execution. We assume that an algorithm can dynamically form a batch (i.e., a collection of jobs to be processed together) from the remaining jobs. The setup time is modeled as a known monotone function of the set of jobs within a batch, while the execution time of each job remains unknown until completion. This uncertainty poses significant challenges for minimizing the makespan. We address these challenges by considering two scenarios: each job batch must be assigned to a single machine, or a batch may be distributed across multiple machines. For both scenarios, we analyze settings with and without preemption. Across these four settings, we design online algorithms that achieve asymptotically optimal competitive ratios with respect to both the number of jobs and the number of machines.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

Simultaneously Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items Across Multiple Dimensions

This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional settings are not merely of theoretical interest but are central to many real-world applications. For example, cloud computing resources are evaluated based on multiple criteria such as CPU cores, memory, and network bandwidth. In such cases, traditional one dimensional fairness notions fail to capture fairness across multiple attributes. To address these challenges, we study two relaxed variants of envy-freeness: weak simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (weak sEFc) and strong simultaneously envy-free up to c goods (strong sEFc), which accommodate the multidimensionality of agents' preferences. Under the weak notion, for every pair of agents and for each dimension, any perceived envy can be eliminated by removing, if necessary, a different set of goods from the envied agent's allocation. In contrast, the strong version requires selecting a single set of goods whose removal from the envied bundle simultaneously eliminates envy in every dimension. We provide upper and lower bounds on the relaxation parameter c that guarantee the existence of weak or strong sEFc allocations, where these bounds are independent of the total number of items. In addition, we present algorithms for checking whether a weak or strong sEFc allocation exists. Moreover, we establish NP-hardness results for checking the existence of weak sEF1 and strong sEF1 allocations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Properties of Path-Independent Choice Correspondences and Their Applications to Efficient and Stable Matchings

Choice correspondences are crucial in decision-making, especially when faced with indifferences or ties. While tie-breaking can transform a choice correspondence into a choice function, it often introduces inefficiencies. This paper introduces a novel notion of path-independence (PI) for choice correspondences, extending the existing concept of PI for choice functions. Intuitively, a choice correspondence is PI if any consistent tie-breaking produces a PI choice function. This new notion yields several important properties. First, PI choice correspondences are rationalizabile, meaning they can be represented as the maximization of a utility function. This extends a core feature of PI in choice functions. Second, we demonstrate that the set of choices selected by a PI choice correspondence for any subset forms a generalized matroid. This property reveals that PI choice correspondences exhibit a nice structural property. Third, we establish that choice correspondences rationalized by ordinally concave functions inherently satisfy the PI condition. This aligns with recent findings that a choice function satisfies PI if and only if it can be rationalized by an ordinally concave function. Building on these theoretical foundations, we explore stable and efficient matchings under PI choice correspondences. Specifically, we investigate constrained efficient matchings, which are efficient (for one side of the market) within the set of stable matchings. Under responsive choice correspondences, such matchings are characterized by cycles. However, this cycle-based characterization fails in more general settings. We demonstrate that when the choice correspondence of each school satisfies both PI and monotonicity conditions, a similar cycle-based characterization is restored. These findings provide new insights into the matching theory and its practical applications.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Contiguous Allocation of Indivisible Items on a Path

We study the problem of allocating indivisible items on a path among agents. The objective is to find a fair and efficient allocation in which each agent's bundle forms a contiguous block on the line. We say that an instance is \emph{$(a, b)$-sparse} if each agent values at most $a$ items positively and each item is valued positively by at most $b$ agents. We demonstrate that, even when the valuations are binary additive, deciding whether every item can be allocated to an agent who wants it is NP-complete for the $(4,3)$-sparse instances. Consequently, we provide two fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithms for maximizing utilitarian social welfare, with respect to the number of agents and the number of items. Additionally, we present a $2$-approximation algorithm for the special case when the valuations are binary additive, and the maximum utility is equal to the number of items. Also, we provide a $1/a$-approximation algorithm for the $(a,b)$-sparse instances. Furthermore, we establish that deciding whether the maximum egalitarian social welfare is at least $2$ or at most $1$ is NP-complete for the $(6,3)$-sparse instances, even when the valuations are binary additive. We present a $1/a$-approximation algorithm for maximizing egalitarian social welfare for the $(a,b)$-sparse instances. Besides, we give two FPT algorithms for maximizing egalitarian social welfare in terms of the number of agents and the number of items. We also explore the case where the order of the blocks of items allocated to the agents is predetermined. In this case, we show that both maximum utilitarian social welfare and egalitarian social welfare can be computed in polynomial time. However, we determine that checking the existence of an EF1 allocation is NP-complete, even when the valuations are binary additive.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Resource Allocation under the Latin Square Constraint

A Latin square is an $n \times n$ matrix filled with $n$ distinct symbols, each of which appears exactly once in each row and exactly once in each column. We introduce a problem of allocating $n$ indivisible items among $n$ agents over $n$ rounds while satisfying the Latin square constraint. This constraint ensures that each agent receives no more than one item per round and receives each item at most once. Each agent has an additive valuation on the item--round pairs. Real-world applications like scheduling, resource management, and experimental design require the Latin square constraint to satisfy fairness or balancedness in allocation. Our goal is to find a partial or complete allocation that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations (utilitarian social welfare) or the minimum of the agents' valuations (egalitarian social welfare). For the problem of maximizing utilitarian social welfare, we prove NP-hardness even when the valuations are binary additive. We then provide $(1-1/e)$ and $(1-1/e)/4$-approximation algorithms for partial and complete settings, respectively. Additionally, we present fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithms with respect to the order of Latin square and the optimum value for both partial and complete settings. For the problem of maximizing egalitarian social welfare, we establish that deciding whether the optimum value is at most $1$ or at least $2$ is NP-hard for both the partial and complete settings, even when the valuations are binary. Furthermore, we demonstrate that checking the existence of a complete allocation that satisfies each of envy-free, proportional, equitable, envy-free up to any good, proportional up to any good, or equitable up to any good is NP-hard, even when the valuations are identical.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints

We investigate the problem of random assignment of indivisible goods, in which each agent has an ordinal preference and a constraint. Our goal is to characterize the conditions under which there always exists a random assignment that simultaneously satisfies efficiency and envy-freeness. The probabilistic serial mechanism ensures the existence of such an assignment for the unconstrained setting. In this paper, we consider a more general setting in which each agent can consume a set of items only if the set satisfies her feasibility constraint. Such constraints must be taken into account in student course placements, employee shift assignments, and so on. We demonstrate that an efficient and envy-free assignment may not exist even for the simple case of partition matroid constraints, where the items are categorized, and each agent demands one item from each category. We then identify special cases in which an efficient and envy-free assignment always exists. For these cases, the probabilistic serial cannot be naturally extended; therefore, we provide mechanisms to find the desired assignment using various approaches.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences

We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have preferences over the teams. We focus on guaranteeing envy-freeness up to one participant (EF1) for the teams together with a stability condition for both sides. We show that an allocation satisfying EF1, swap stability, and individual stability always exists and can be computed in polynomial time, even when teams may have positive or negative values for participants. When teams have nonnegative values for participants, we prove that an EF1 and Pareto optimal allocation exists and, if the valuations are binary, can be found in polynomial time. We also show that an EF1 and justified envy-free allocation does not necessarily exist, and deciding whether such an allocation exists is computationally difficult.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Online Matching with Delays and Size-based Costs

In this paper, we introduce the problem of Online Matching with Delays and Size-based Costs (OMDSC). The OMDSC problem involves $m$ requests arriving online. At any time, a group can be formed by matching any number of these requests that have been received but are still unmatched. The cost associated with each group is determined by the waiting time for each request within the group and a size-dependent cost. Our goal is to partition all incoming requests into multiple groups while minimizing the total associated cost. The problem extends the TCP acknowledgment problem proposed by Dooly et al. (JACM 2001). It generalizes the cost model for sending acknowledgments. This paper reveals the competitive ratios for a fundamental case where the range of the penalty function is limited to $0$ and $1$. We classify such penalty functions into three distinct cases: (i) a fixed penalty of $1$ regardless of group size, (ii) a penalty of $0$ if and only if the group size is a multiple of a specific integer $k$, and (iii) other situations. The problem of case (i) is equivalent to the TCP acknowledgment problem, for which Dooly et al. proposed a $2$-competitive algorithm. For case (ii), we first show that natural algorithms that match all the remaining requests are $Ω(\sqrt{k})$-competitive. We then propose an $O(\log k / \log \log k)$-competitive deterministic algorithm by carefully managing match size and timing, and we also prove its optimality. For case (iii), we demonstrate the non-existence of a competitive online algorithm. Additionally, we discuss competitive ratios for other typical penalty functions.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

The Last Success Problem with Samples

The last success problem is an optimal stopping problem that aims to maximize the probability of stopping on the last success in a sequence of independent $n$ Bernoulli trials. In the classical setting where complete information about the distributions is available, Bruss~\cite{B00} provided an optimal stopping policy that ensures a winning probability of $1/e$. However, assuming complete knowledge of the distributions is unrealistic in many practical applications. This paper investigates a variant of the last success problem where samples from each distribution are available instead of complete knowledge of them. When a single sample from each distribution is allowed, we provide a deterministic policy that guarantees a winning probability of $1/4$. This is best possible by the upper bound provided by Nuti and Vondrák~\cite{NV23}. Furthermore, for any positive constant $ε$, we show that a constant number of samples from each distribution is sufficient to guarantee a winning probability of $1/e-ε$.

math.PR↗