arXiv subjects

Yasushi Kawase

Publications and source records attributed to Yasushi Kawase.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2024

Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints

We investigate the problem of random assignment of indivisible goods, in which each agent has an ordinal preference and a constraint. Our goal is to characterize the conditions under which there always exists a random assignment that simultaneously satisfies efficiency and envy-freeness. The probabilistic serial mechanism ensures the existence of such an assignment for the unconstrained setting. In this paper, we consider a more general setting in which each agent can consume a set of items only if the set satisfies her feasibility constraint. Such constraints must be taken into account in student course placements, employee shift assignments, and so on. We demonstrate that an efficient and envy-free assignment may not exist even for the simple case of partition matroid constraints, where the items are categorized, and each agent demands one item from each category. We then identify special cases in which an efficient and envy-free assignment always exists. For these cases, the probabilistic serial cannot be naturally extended; therefore, we provide mechanisms to find the desired assignment using various approaches.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Fair Division with Two-Sided Preferences

We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have preferences over the teams. We focus on guaranteeing envy-freeness up to one participant (EF1) for the teams together with a stability condition for both sides. We show that an allocation satisfying EF1, swap stability, and individual stability always exists and can be computed in polynomial time, even when teams may have positive or negative values for participants. When teams have nonnegative values for participants, we prove that an EF1 and Pareto optimal allocation exists and, if the valuations are binary, can be found in polynomial time. We also show that an EF1 and justified envy-free allocation does not necessarily exist, and deciding whether such an allocation exists is computationally difficult.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Online Matching with Delays and Size-based Costs

In this paper, we introduce the problem of Online Matching with Delays and Size-based Costs (OMDSC). The OMDSC problem involves $m$ requests arriving online. At any time, a group can be formed by matching any number of these requests that have been received but are still unmatched. The cost associated with each group is determined by the waiting time for each request within the group and a size-dependent cost. Our goal is to partition all incoming requests into multiple groups while minimizing the total associated cost. The problem extends the TCP acknowledgment problem proposed by Dooly et al. (JACM 2001). It generalizes the cost model for sending acknowledgments. This paper reveals the competitive ratios for a fundamental case where the range of the penalty function is limited to $0$ and $1$. We classify such penalty functions into three distinct cases: (i) a fixed penalty of $1$ regardless of group size, (ii) a penalty of $0$ if and only if the group size is a multiple of a specific integer $k$, and (iii) other situations. The problem of case (i) is equivalent to the TCP acknowledgment problem, for which Dooly et al. proposed a $2$-competitive algorithm. For case (ii), we first show that natural algorithms that match all the remaining requests are $Ω(\sqrt{k})$-competitive. We then propose an $O(\log k / \log \log k)$-competitive deterministic algorithm by carefully managing match size and timing, and we also prove its optimality. For case (iii), we demonstrate the non-existence of a competitive online algorithm. Additionally, we discuss competitive ratios for other typical penalty functions.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

The Last Success Problem with Samples

The last success problem is an optimal stopping problem that aims to maximize the probability of stopping on the last success in a sequence of independent $n$ Bernoulli trials. In the classical setting where complete information about the distributions is available, Bruss~\cite{B00} provided an optimal stopping policy that ensures a winning probability of $1/e$. However, assuming complete knowledge of the distributions is unrealistic in many practical applications. This paper investigates a variant of the last success problem where samples from each distribution are available instead of complete knowledge of them. When a single sample from each distribution is allowed, we provide a deterministic policy that guarantees a winning probability of $1/4$. This is best possible by the upper bound provided by Nuti and Vondrák~\cite{NV23}. Furthermore, for any positive constant $ε$, we show that a constant number of samples from each distribution is sufficient to guarantee a winning probability of $1/e-ε$.

math.PR↗

arXiv2023

Fair Allocation with Binary Valuations for Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods

The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric strictly convex function. This fairness criterion includes standard ones such as maximum egalitarian social welfare and maximum Nash social welfare. We address the problem of minimizing a given symmetric strictly convex function when agents have binary valuations. If only divisible goods or only indivisible goods exist, the problem is known to be solvable in polynomial time. In this paper, firstly, we demonstrate that the problem is NP-hard even when all indivisible goods are identical. This NP-hardness is established even for maximizing egalitarian social welfare or Nash social welfare. Secondly, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem when all divisible goods are identical. To accomplish these, we exploit the proximity structure inherent in the problem. This provides theoretically important insights into the hybrid domain of convex optimization that incorporates both discrete and continuous aspects.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Size-stochastic Knapsack Online Contention Resolution Schemes

Online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs) are effective rounding techniques for online stochastic combinatorial optimization problems. These schemes randomly and sequentially round a fractional solution to a relaxed problem that can be formulated in advance. In this study, we propose OCRSs for online stochastic generalized assignment problems. In the problem of our OCRSs, sequentially arriving items are packed into a single knapsack, and their sizes are revealed only after insertion. The goal of the problem is to maximize the acceptance probability, which is the smallest probability among the items being placed in the knapsack. Since the item sizes are unknown beforehand, a capacity overflow may occur. We consider two distinct settings: the hard constraint, where items that cause overflow are rejected, and the soft constraint setting, where such items are accepted. Under the hard constraint setting, we present an algorithm with an acceptance probability of $1/3$ and prove that no algorithm can achieve an acceptance probability greater than $3/7$. Under the soft constraint setting, we propose an algorithm with an acceptance probability of $1/2$ and demonstrate that this is best possible.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Towards Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Envy-freeable Allocations

We study the fair division of indivisible items with subsidies among $n$ agents, where the absolute marginal valuation of each item is at most one. Under monotone valuations (where each item is a good), Brustle et al. (2020) demonstrated that a maximum subsidy of $2(n-1)$ and a total subsidy of $2(n-1)^2$ are sufficient to guarantee the existence of an envy-freeable allocation. In this paper, we improve upon these bounds, even in a wider model. Namely, we show that, given an EF1 allocation, we can compute in polynomial time an envy-free allocation with a subsidy of at most $n-1$ per agent and a total subsidy of at most $n(n-1)/2$. Moreover, we present further improved bounds for monotone valuations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Stochastic Solutions for Dense Subgraph Discovery in Multilayer Networks

Network analysis has played a key role in knowledge discovery and data mining. In many real-world applications in recent years, we are interested in mining multilayer networks, where we have a number of edge sets called layers, which encode different types of connections and/or time-dependent connections over the same set of vertices. Among many network analysis techniques, dense subgraph discovery, aiming to find a dense component in a network, is an essential primitive with a variety of applications in diverse domains. In this paper, we introduce a novel optimization model for dense subgraph discovery in multilayer networks. Our model aims to find a stochastic solution, i.e., a probability distribution over the family of vertex subsets, rather than a single vertex subset, whereas it can also be used for obtaining a single vertex subset. For our model, we design an LP-based polynomial-time exact algorithm. Moreover, to handle large-scale networks, we also devise a simple, scalable preprocessing algorithm, which often reduces the size of the input networks significantly and results in a substantial speed-up. Computational experiments demonstrate the validity of our model and the effectiveness of our algorithms.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2021

Online Max-min Fair Allocation

We study an online version of the max-min fair allocation problem for indivisible items. In this problem, items arrive one by one, and each item must be allocated irrevocably on arrival to one of $n$ agents, who have additive valuations for the items. Our goal is to make the least happy agent as happy as possible. In research on the topic of online allocation, this is a fundamental and natural problem. Our main result is to reveal the asymptotic competitive ratios of the problem for both the adversarial and i.i.d. input models. We design a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm that is asymptotically $1/n$-competitive for the adversarial model, and we show that this guarantee is optimal. To this end, we present a randomized algorithm with the same competitive ratio first and then derandomize it. A natural derandomization fails to achieve the competitive ratio of $1/n$. We instead build the algorithm by introducing a novel technique. When the items are drawn from an unknown identical and independent distribution, we construct a simple polynomial-time deterministic algorithm that outputs a nearly optimal allocation. We analyze the strict competitive ratio and show almost tight bounds for the solution. We further mention some implications of our results on variants of the problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Fair Ride Allocation on a Line

The airport game is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This paper extends it to the so-called assignment setting, that is, for multiple facilities and agents, each agent chooses a facility to use and shares the cost with the other agents. Such a situation can be often seen in sharing economy, such as sharing fees for office desks among workers, taxis among customers of possibly different destinations on a line, and so on. Our model is regarded as a coalition formation game based on the fair cost-sharing of the airport game; we call our model \emph{a fair ride allocation on a line}. As criteria of solution concepts, we incorporate Nash stability and envy-freeness into our setting. We show that a Nash-stable feasible allocation that minimizes the social cost of agents can be computed efficiently if a feasible allocation exists. For envy-freeness, we provide several structural properties of envy-free allocations. Based on these, we design efficient algorithms for finding an envy-free allocation when at least one of (1) the number of facilities, (2) the capacity of facilities, and (3) the number of agent types, is small. Moreover, we show that a consecutive envy-free allocation can be computed in polynomial time. On the negative front, we show the NP-hardness of determining the existence of an allocation under two relaxed envy-free concepts.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Fair and Truthful Mechanism with Limited Subsidy

The notion of \emph{envy-freeness} is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by introducing an additional divisible resource, i.e., money, to subsidize envious agents. In this paper, we aim to design a truthful allocation mechanism of indivisible goods to achieve both fairness and efficiency criteria with a limited amount of subsidy. Following the work of Halpern and Shah, our central question is as follows: to what extent do we need to rely on the power of money to accomplish these objectives? For general valuations, the impossibility theorem of combinatorial auction translates to our setting: even if an arbitrarily large amount of money is available for use, no mechanism can achieve truthfulness, envy-freeness, and utilitarian optimality simultaneously when agents have general monotone submodular valuations. By contrast, we show that, when agents have matroidal valuations, there is a truthful allocation mechanism that achieves envy-freeness and utilitarian optimality by subsidizing each agent with at most $1$, the maximum marginal contribution of each item for each agent. The design of the mechanism rests crucially on the underlying matroidal M-convexity of the Lorenz dominating allocations.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Tight Approximation for Unconstrained XOS Maximization

A set function is called XOS if it can be represented by the maximum of additive functions. When such a representation is fixed, the number of additive functions required to define the XOS function is called the width. In this paper, we study the problem of maximizing XOS functions in the value oracle model. The problem is trivial for the XOS functions of width $1$ because they are just additive, but it is already nontrivial even when the width is restricted to $2$. We show two types of tight bounds on the polynomial-time approximability for this problem. First, in general, the approximation bound is between $O(n)$ and $Ω(n / \log n)$, and exactly $Θ(n / \log n)$ if randomization is allowed, where $n$ is the ground set size. Second, when the width of the input XOS functions is bounded by a constant $k \geq 2$, the approximation bound is between $k - 1$ and $k - 1 - ε$ for any $ε> 0$. In particular, we give a linear-time algorithm to find an exact maximizer of a given XOS function of width $2$, while we show that any exact algorithm requires an exponential number of value oracle calls even when the width is restricted to $3$.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching Games

We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her job at the firm, but it may also eliminate chances of better offers from other firms in the future. We formulate this market as a perfect-information extensive-form game played by the workers. Each instance of this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which does not necessarily lead to a stable matching and has some perplexing properties. We show a dichotomy result that characterizes the complexity of computing the SPE. The computation is tractable if each firm makes offers to at most two workers or each worker receives offers from at most two firms. In contrast, it is PSPACE-hard even if both firms and workers are related to at most three offers. We also study engineering aspects of this matching market. It is shown that, for any preference profile, we can design an offering schedule of firms so that the worker-optimal stable matching is realized in the SPE.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Budget Constraints

We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom when one side (a firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor). In a standard model, monetary transfers are not restricted. However, we assume that each hospital has a fixed budget; that is, the total amount of wages allocated by each hospital to the doctors is constrained. With this constraint, stable matchings may fail to exist and checking for the existence is hard. To deal with the nonexistence, we focus on near-feasible matchings that can exceed each hospital budget by a certain amount, and We introduce a new concept of compatibility. We show that the compatibility condition is a sufficient condition for the existence of a near-feasible stable matching in the matching with contracts framework. Under a slight restriction on hospitals' preferences, we provide mechanisms that efficiently return a near-feasible stable matching with respect to the actual amount of wages allocated by each hospital. By sacrificing strategy-proofness, the best possible bound of budget excess is achieved.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Online Knapsack Problems with a Resource Buffer

In this paper, we introduce online knapsack problems with a resource buffer. In the problems, we are given a knapsack with capacity $1$, a buffer with capacity $R\ge 1$, and items that arrive one by one. Each arriving item has to be taken into the buffer or discarded on its arrival irrevocably. When every item has arrived, we transfer a subset of items in the current buffer into the knapsack. Our goal is to maximize the total value of the items in the knapsack. We consider four variants depending on whether items in the buffer are removable (i.e., we can remove items in the buffer) or non-removable, and proportional (i.e., the value of each item is proportional to its size) or general. For the general&non-removable case, we observe that no constant competitive algorithm exists for any $R\ge 1$. For the proportional&non-removable case, we show that a simple greedy algorithm is optimal for every $R\ge 1$. For the general&removable and the proportional&removable cases, we present optimal algorithms for small $R$ and give asymptotically nearly optimal algorithms for general $R$.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

Approximately Stable Matchings with General Constraints

This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though multiple doctors can be matched to a single hospital, a hospital has a responsive preference and a maximum quota. However, in practical applications, a hospital has some complicated cardinal preference and constraints. With such preferences (e.g., submodular) and constraints (e.g., knapsack or matroid intersection), stable matchings may fail to exist. This paper first determines the complexity of checking and computing stable matchings based on preference class and constraint class. Second, we establish a framework to analyze this problem on packing problems and the framework enables us to access the wealth of online packing algorithms so that we construct approximately stable algorithms as a variant of generalized deferred acceptance algorithm. We further provide some inapproximability results.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Non-zero-sum Stackelberg Budget Allocation Game for Computational Advertising

Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strategies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new customers as well as the retention of her loyal customers because there often exists a competitor (a follower) who tries to attract customers away from the market leader. In this paper, we formalize a new model called the Stackelberg budget allocation game with a bipartite influence model by extending a budget allocation problem over a bipartite graph to a Stackelberg game. To find a strong Stackelberg equilibrium, a standard solution concept of the Stackelberg game, we propose two algorithms: an approximation algorithm with provable guarantees and an efficient heuristic algorithm. In addition, for a special case where customers are disjoint, we propose an exact algorithm based on linear programming. Our experiments using real-world datasets demonstrate that our algorithms outperform a baseline algorithm even when the follower is a powerful competitor.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Graph Mining Meets Crowdsourcing: Extracting Experts for Answer Aggregation

Aggregating responses from crowd workers is a fundamental task in the process of crowdsourcing. In cases where a few experts are overwhelmed by a large number of non-experts, most answer aggregation algorithms such as the majority voting fail to identify the correct answers. Therefore, it is crucial to extract reliable experts from the crowd workers. In this study, we introduce the notion of "expert core", which is a set of workers that is very unlikely to contain a non-expert. We design a graph-mining-based efficient algorithm that exactly computes the expert core. To answer the aggregation task, we propose two types of algorithms. The first one incorporates the expert core into existing answer aggregation algorithms such as the majority voting, whereas the second one utilizes information provided by the expert core extraction algorithm pertaining to the reliability of workers. We then give a theoretical justification for the first type of algorithm. Computational experiments using synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate that our proposed answer aggregation algorithms outperform state-of-the-art algorithms.

cs.SI↗