arXiv subjects

Yifeng Teng

Publications and source records attributed to Yifeng Teng.

26 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2020

Pandora's Box with Correlations: Learning and Approximation

The Pandora's Box problem and its extensions capture optimization problems with stochastic input where the algorithm can obtain instantiations of input random variables at some cost. To our knowledge, all previous work on this class of problems assumes that different random variables in the input are distributed independently. As such it does not capture many real-world settings. In this paper, we provide the first approximation algorithms for Pandora's Box-type problems with correlations. We assume that the algorithm has access to samples drawn from the joint distribution on input. Algorithms for these problems must determine an order in which to probe random variables, as well as when to stop and return the best solution found so far. In general, an optimal algorithm may make both decisions adaptively based on instantiations observed previously. Such fully adaptive (FA) strategies cannot be efficiently approximated to within any sublinear factor with sample access. We therefore focus on the simpler objective of approximating partially adaptive (PA) strategies that probe random variables in a fixed predetermined order but decide when to stop based on the instantiations observed. We consider a number of different feasibility constraints and provide simple PA strategies that are approximately optimal with respect to the best PA strategy for each case. All of our algorithms have polynomial sample complexity. We further show that our results are tight within constant factors: better factors cannot be achieved even using the full power of FA strategies.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2020

Menu-size Complexity and Revenue Continuity of Buy-many Mechanisms

We study the multi-item mechanism design problem where a monopolist sells $n$ heterogeneous items to a single buyer. We focus on buy-many mechanisms, a natural class of mechanisms frequently used in practice. The buy-many property allows the buyer to interact with the mechanism multiple times instead of once as in the more commonly studied buy-one mechanisms. This imposes additional incentive constraints and thus restricts the space of mechanisms that the seller can use. In this paper, we explore the qualitative differences between buy-one and buy-many mechanisms focusing on two important properties: revenue continuity and menu-size complexity. Our first main result is that when the value function of the buyer is perturbed multiplicatively by a factor of $1\pmε$, the optimal revenue obtained by buy-many mechanisms only changes by a factor of $1 \pm \textrm{poly}(n,ε)$. In contrast, for buy-one mechanisms, the revenue of the resulting optimal mechanism after such a perturbation can change arbitrarily. Our second main result shows that under any distribution of arbitrary valuations, finite menu size suffices to achieve a $(1-ε)$-approximation to the optimal buy-many mechanism. We give tight upper and lower bounds on the number of menu entries as a function of $n$ and $ε$. On the other hand, such a result fails to hold for buy-one mechanisms as even for two items and a buyer with either unit-demand or additive valuations, the menu-size complexity of approximately optimal mechanisms is unbounded.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Why Do Competitive Markets Converge to First-Price Auctions?

We consider a setting in which bidders participate in multiple auctions run by different sellers, and optimize their bids for the \emph{aggregate} auction. We analyze this setting by formulating a game between sellers, where a seller's strategy is to pick an auction to run. Our analysis aims to shed light on the recent change in the Display Ads market landscape: here, ad exchanges (sellers) were mostly running second-price auctions earlier and over time they switched to variants of the first-price auction, culminating in Google's Ad Exchange moving to a first-price auction in 2019. Our model and results offer an explanation for why the first-price auction occurs as a natural equilibrium in such competitive markets.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Revenue Maximization for Query Pricing

Buying and selling of data online has increased substantially over the last few years. Several frameworks have already been proposed that study query pricing in theory and practice. The key guiding principle in these works is the notion of {\em arbitrage-freeness} where the broker can set different prices for different queries made to the dataset, but must ensure that the pricing function does not provide the buyers with opportunities for arbitrage. However, little is known about revenue maximization aspect of query pricing. In this paper, we study the problem faced by a broker selling access to data with the goal of maximizing her revenue. We show that this problem can be formulated as a revenue maximization problem with single-minded buyers and unlimited supply, for which several approximation algorithms are known. We perform an extensive empirical evaluation of the performance of several pricing algorithms for the query pricing problem on real-world instances. In addition to previously known approximation algorithms, we propose several new heuristics and analyze them both theoretically and experimentally. Our experiments show that algorithms with the best theoretical bounds are not necessarily the best empirically. We identify algorithms and heuristics that are both fast and also provide consistently good performance when valuations are drawn from a variety of distributions.

cs.DB↗

arXiv2019

Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing

Multi-item mechanisms can be very complex offering many different bundles to the buyer that could even be randomized. Such complexity is thought to be necessary as the revenue gaps between randomized and deterministic mechanisms, or deterministic and simple mechanisms are huge even for additive valuations. We challenge this conventional belief by showing that these large gaps can only happen in restricted situations. These are situations where the mechanism overcharges a buyer for a bundle while selling individual items at much lower prices. Arguably this is impractical in many settings because the buyer can break his order into smaller pieces paying a much lower price overall. Our main result is that if the buyer is allowed to purchase as many (randomized) bundles as he pleases, the revenue of any multi-item mechanism is at most O(logn) times the revenue achievable by item pricing, where n is the number of items. This holds in the most general setting possible, with an arbitrarily correlated distribution of buyer types and arbitrary valuations. We also show that this result is tight in a very strong sense. Any family of mechanisms of subexponential description complexity cannot achieve better than logarithmic approximation even against the best deterministic mechanism and even for additive valuations. In contrast, item pricing that has linear description complexity matches this bound against randomized mechanisms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Pricing for Online Resource Allocation: Intervals and Paths

We present pricing mechanisms for several online resource allocation problems which obtain tight or nearly tight approximations to social welfare. In our settings, buyers arrive online and purchase bundles of items; buyers' values for the bundles are drawn from known distributions. This problem is closely related to the so-called prophet-inequality of Krengel and Sucheston and its extensions in recent literature. Motivated by applications to cloud economics, we consider two kinds of buyer preferences. In the first, items correspond to different units of time at which a resource is available; the items are arranged in a total order and buyers desire intervals of items. The second corresponds to bandwidth allocation over a tree network; the items are edges in the network and buyers desire paths. Because buyers' preferences have complementarities in the settings we consider, recent constant-factor approximations via item prices do not apply, and indeed strong negative results are known. We develop static, anonymous bundle pricing mechanisms. For the interval preferences setting, we show that static, anonymous bundle pricings achieve a sublogarithmic competitive ratio, which is optimal (within constant factors) over the class of all online allocation algorithms, truthful or not. For the path preferences setting, we obtain a nearly-tight logarithmic competitive ratio. Both of these results exhibit an exponential improvement over item pricings for these settings. Our results extend to settings where the seller has multiple copies of each item, with the competitive ratio decreasing linearly with supply. Such a gradual tradeoff between supply and the competitive ratio for welfare was previously known only for the single item prophet inequality.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Tight Bound on Randomness for Violating the CHSH Inequality

Free will (or randomness) has been studied to achieve loophole-free Bell's inequality test and to provide device-independent quantum key distribution security proofs. The required randomness such that a local hidden variable model (LHVM) can violate the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality has been studied, but a tight bound has not been proved for a practical case that i) the device settings of the two parties in the Bell test are independent; and ii) the device settings of each party can be correlated or biased across different runs. Using some information theoretic techniques, we prove in this paper a tight bound on the required randomness for this case such that the CHSH inequality can be violated by certain LHVM. Our proof has a clear achievability and converse style. The achievability part is proved using type counting. To prove the converse part, we introduce a concept called profile for a set of binary sequences and study the properties of profiles. Our profile-based converse technique is also of independent interest.

quant-ph↗

arXiv2015

Computational issues in time-inconsistent planning

Time-inconsistency refers to a paradox in decision making where agents exhibit inconsistent behaviors over time. Examples are procrastination where agents tends to costly postpone easy tasks, and abandonments where agents start a plan and quit in the middle. These behaviors are undesirable in the sense that agents make clearly suboptimal decisions over optimal ones. To capture such behaviors and more importantly, to quantify inefficiency caused by such behaviors, [Kleinberg & Oren 2014] propose a graph model which is essentially same as the standard planning model except for the cost structure. Using this model, they initiate the study of several interesting problems: 1) cost ratio: the worst ratio between the actual cost of the agent and the optimal cost, over all graph instances; 2) motivating subgraph: how to motivate the agent to reach the goal by deleting nodes and edges; 3) Intermediate rewards: how to motivate agents to reach the goal by placing intermediate rewards. Kleinberg and Oren give partial answers to these questions, but the main problems are still open. In fact, they raise these problems explicitly as open problems in their paper. In this paper, we give answers to all three open problems in [Kleinberg & Oren 2014]. First, we show a tight upper bound of cost ratio for graphs without Akerlof's structure, thus confirm the conjecture by Kleinberg and Oren that Akerlof's structure is indeed the worst case for cost ratio. Second, we prove that finding a motivating subgraph is NP-hard, showing that it is generally inefficient to motivate agents by deleting nodes and edges in the graph. Last but not least, we show that computing a strategy to place minimum amount of total reward is also NP-hard. Therefore, it is computational inefficient to motivate agents by placing intermediate rewards. The techniques we use to prove these results are nontrivial and of independent interests.

cs.GT↗