arXiv subjects

Yukun Cheng

Publications and source records attributed to Yukun Cheng.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Incentivizing Data Trading via Profit Reallocation

Data trading is a central approach to data circulation, yet data markets remain far less active than expected. A primary bottleneck is the lack of effective economic incentives. Existing approaches often treat data as traditional goods, overlooking its inherent replicability and resale potential: buyers can replicate and resell data products, thereby forming transaction chains. Upstream sellers do not benefit from downstream resales and thus have limited incentives to sell. However, the impact of data resale on market performance remains insufficiently understood. To address this gap, we propose a sequential, chain-based data trading model that explicitly captures data resale. The model reflects data flows in settings such as LLM training and strategic decision-making. We integrate this model with a profit reallocation mechanism. By reallocating profits along the transaction chain, this mechanism ensures upstream sellers benefit from downstream resales. We next develop efficient algorithms, including a polynomial-time exact algorithm for the discrete model and an FPTAS for the continuous model, to compute its sequential equilibria. We theoretically show that profit reallocation expands trade and improves social welfare under certain conditions, and empirical results demonstrate that our mechanism increases transaction volume by 120.0\% and social welfare by 50.4\% in synthetic environments, compared with the baseline mechanism that does not reallocate profits.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Capacitive Touchscreens at Risk: A Practical Side-Channel Attack on Smartphones via Electromagnetic Emanations

Capacitive touchscreens in modern smartphones introduce severe side-channel vulnerabilities. However, existing attacks often require restrictive conditions or invasive measurements. This paper presents TESLA, a novel, contactless electromagnetic (EM) side-channel attack that exploits inherent EM emanations during touchscreen scanning. We demonstrate that these emanations encode the spatiotemporal evolution of touch interactions, forming a unified leakage basis. By secretly placing an EM probe near the victim's device, TESLA enables attackers to extract highly sensitive information, including screen-unlocking PIN codes, keyboard inputs, interacting application categories, and continuous handwriting trajectories. Compared to existing attacks, TESLA offers a broader range of attack targets, more efficient sample acquisition, and operations in practical attack scenarios. Extensive evaluations on popular commercial smartphones, specifically the iPhone X, Xiaomi 10 Pro, Samsung S10, and Huawei Mate 30 Pro, validate the effectiveness of TESLA. It achieves remarkable inference accuracy in diverse settings such as private meeting rooms and public libraries, with success rates of 99.3% for PIN code recognition, 97.6% for keyboard input reconstruction, and 95.0% for application inference, respectively. Simultaneously, it attains a 76.8% character recognition accuracy and a high geometric similarity (Jaccard index of 0.74) for 2D handwriting trajectory reconstruction.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Capacitive Touchscreens at Risk: Recovering Handwritten Trajectory on Smartphone via Electromagnetic Emanations

This paper reveals and exploits a critical security vulnerability: the electromagnetic (EM) side channel of capacitive touchscreens leaks sufficient information to recover fine-grained, continuous handwriting trajectories. We present Touchscreen Electromagnetic Side-channel Leakage Attack (TESLA), a non-contact attack framework that captures EM signals generated during on-screen writing and regresses them into two-dimensional (2D) handwriting trajectories in real time. Extensive evaluations across a variety of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) smartphones show that TESLA achieves 77% character recognition accuracy and a Jaccard index of 0.74, demonstrating its capability to recover highly recognizable motion trajectories that closely resemble the original handwriting under realistic attack conditions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Learning Truthful Mechanisms without Discretization

This paper introduces TEDI (Truthful, Expressive, and Dimension-Insensitive approach), a discretization-free algorithm to learn truthful and utility-maximizing mechanisms. Existing learning-based approaches often rely on discretization of outcome spaces to ensure truthfulness, which leads to inefficiency with increasing problem size. To address this limitation, we formalize the concept of pricing rules, defined as functions that map outcomes to prices. Based on this concept, we propose a novel menu mechanism, which can be equivalent to a truthful direct mechanism under specific conditions. The core idea of TEDI lies in its parameterization of pricing rules using Partial GroupMax Network, a new network architecture designed to universally approximate partial convex functions. To learn optimal pricing rules, we develop novel training techniques, including covariance trick and continuous sampling, to derive unbiased gradient estimators compatible with first-order optimization. Theoretical analysis establishes that TEDI guarantees truthfulness, full expressiveness, and dimension-insensitivity. Experimental evaluation in the studied auction setting demonstrates that TEDI achieves strong performance, competitive with or exceeding state-of-the-art methods. This work presents the first approaches to learn truthful mechanisms without outcome discretization, thereby enhancing algorithmic efficiency. The proposed concepts, network architecture, and learning techniques might offer potential value and provide new insights for automated mechanism design and differentiable economics.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities on Budgets

This paper studies mechanism design for auctions with externalities on budgets, a novel setting where the budgets that bidders commit are adjusted due to the externality of the competitors' allocation outcomes-a departure from traditional auctions with fixed budgets. This setting is motivated by real-world scenarios, for example, participants may increase their budgets in response to competitors' obtained items. We initially propose a general framework with homogeneous externalities to capture the interdependence between budget updates and allocation, formalized through a budget response function that links each bidder's effective budget to the amount of items won by others. The main contribution of this paper is to propose a truthful and individual rational auction mechanism for this novel auction setting, which achieves an approximation ratio of $1/3$ with respect to the liquid welfare. This mechanism is inspired by the uniform-price auction, in which an appropriate uniform price is selected to allocate items, ensuring the monotonicity of the allocation rule while accounting for budget adjustments. Additionally, this mechanism guarantees a constant approximation ratio by setting a purchase limit. Complementing this result, we establish an upper bound: no truthful mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than $1/2$. This work offers a new perspective to study the impact of externalities on auctions, providing an approach to handle budget externalities in multi-agent systems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Game Theory Meets Large Language Models: A Systematic Survey with Taxonomy and New Frontiers

Game theory is a foundational framework for analyzing strategic interactions, and its intersection with large language models (LLMs) is a rapidly growing field. However, existing surveys mainly focus narrowly on using game theory to evaluate LLM behavior. This paper provides the first comprehensive survey of the bidirectional relationship between Game Theory and LLMs. We propose a novel taxonomy that categorizes the research in this intersection into four distinct perspectives: (1) evaluating LLMs in game-based scenarios; (2) improving LLMs using game-theoretic concepts for better interpretability and alignment; (3) modeling the competitive landscape of LLM development and its societal impact; and (4) leveraging LLMs to advance game models and to solve corresponding game theory problems. Furthermore, we identify key challenges and outline future research directions. By systematically investigating this interdisciplinary landscape, our survey highlights the mutual influence of game theory and LLMs, fostering progress at the intersection of these fields.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Networked Digital Public Goods Games with Heterogeneous Players and Convex Costs

In the digital age, resources such as open-source software and publicly accessible databases form a crucial category of digital public goods, providing extensive benefits for Internet. This paper investigates networked public goods games involving heterogeneous players and convex costs, focusing on the characterization of Nash Equilibrium (NE). In these games, each player can choose her effort level, representing her contributions to public goods. Network structures are employed to model the interactions among participants. Each player's utility consists of a concave value component, influenced by the collective efforts of all players, and a convex cost component, determined solely by the individual's own effort. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to explore the networked public goods game with convex costs. Our research begins by examining welfare solutions aimed at maximizing social welfare and ensuring the convergence of pseudo-gradient ascent dynamics. We establish the presence of NE in this model and provide an in-depth analysis of the conditions under which NE is unique. We also delve into comparative statics, an essential tool in economics, to evaluate how slight modifications in the model--interpreted as monetary redistribution--affect player utilities. In addition, we analyze a particular scenario with a predefined game structure, illustrating the practical relevance of our theoretical insights. Overall, our research enhances the broader understanding of strategic interactions and structural dynamics in networked public goods games, with significant implications for policy design in internet economic and social networks.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Learning Rate-Compatible Linear Block Codes: An Auto-Encoder Based Approach

Artificial intelligence (AI) provides an alternative way to design channel coding with affordable complexity. However, most existing studies can only learn codes for a given size and rate, typically defined by a fixed network architecture and a set of parameters. The support of multiple code rates is essential for conserving bandwidth under varying channel conditions while it is costly to store multiple AI models or parameter sets. In this article, we propose an auto-encoder (AE) based rate-compatible linear block codes (RC-LBCs). The coding process associated with AI or non-AI decoders and multiple puncturing patterns is optimized in a data-driven manner. The superior performance of the proposed AI-based RC-LBC is demonstrated through our numerical experiments.

eess.SP↗

arXiv2024

Mechanism Design for Exchange Markets

Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of completely free competition. However, the orderly operation of markets also relies on effective economic regulatory mechanisms. This paper initiates the study of the mechanism design problem in exchange markets, exploring the potential to establish truthful market rules and mechanisms. This task poses a significant challenge as unlike auctioneers in auction design, the mechanism designer in exchange markets lacks centralized authority to fully control the allocation of resources. In this paper, the mechanism design problem is formalized as a two-stage game. In stage 1, agents submit their private information to the manager, who then formulates market trading rules based on the submitted information. In stage 2, agents are free to engage in transactions within these rules, ultimately reaching an equilibrium. We generalize the concept of liquid welfare from classical budget-feasible auctions and use market liquid welfare as a measure to evaluate the performance of the designed mechanism. Moreover, an extra concept called profitability is introduced to assess whether the market is money-making (profitable) or money-losing (unprofitable). Our goal is to design a truthful mechanism that achieves an (approximate) optimal welfare while minimizing unprofitability as much as possible. Two mechanisms for the problem are proposed. The first one guarantees truthfulness and profitability while approaching an approximation ratio of 1/2 in large markets. The second one is also truthful and achieves 1/2 approximation in general markets but incurs bounded unprofitability. Our aim is for both mechanisms to provide valuable insights into the truthful market design problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Equilibrium Strategies of Carbon Emission Reduction in Agricultural Product Supply Chain under Carbon Sink Trading

As global climate change and environmental issues escalate, carbon reduction has emerged as a paramount global concern. Agriculture accounts for approximately 30% of global greenhouse gas emissions, making carbon reduction in this sector crucial for attaining global emission targets. Carbon sink trading serves as a supplementary mechanism to achieve carbon peaking and neutrality, helping to lower the rate ofcarbon emissions. However, practical projects and research in the field of carbon sink trading are not enough currently. This work aims to thoroughly explore the cooperative models between farmers and retailers within the context of agricultural carbon sink trading, as well as the optimal decisions on the efforts to reduce carbon emission for both parties under different cooperative models. To this end, we delve into three distinct cooperative frameworks: the decentralized, the Stackelberg, and the centralized models, each accompanied by a corresponding differentialgame model. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is utilized to investigate the equilibrium strategies of each participant under these three cooperative models, respectively. Furthermore, we conducte numerical simulations to analyze the carbon emission reduction efforts of farmers and retailers, the carbon emission reduction level of the agricultural supply chain, and the overall profits of the supply chain. We also compare scenarios with and without carbon sink trading to provide a comprehensive assessment. The numerical results indicate that the centralized modelexcels in all aspects, followed by the Stackelberg model, with the decentralized model showing the weakest performance. Additionally, carbon sink trading can significantly increase the profits of the participants under each cooperative model.

math.OC↗

arXiv2024

Building Semantic Communication System via Molecules: An End-to-End Training Approach

The concept of semantic communication provides a novel approach for applications in scenarios with limited communication resources. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end (E2E) semantic molecular communication system, aiming to enhance the efficiency of molecular communication systems by reducing the transmitted information. Specifically, following the joint source channel coding paradigm, the network is designed to encode the task-relevant information into the concentration of the information molecules, which is robust to the degradation of the molecular communication channel. Furthermore, we propose a channel network to enable the E2E learning over the non-differentiable molecular channel. Experimental results demonstrate the superior performance of the semantic molecular communication system over the conventional methods in classification tasks.

eess.SP↗

arXiv2023

Rate Compatible LDPC Neural Decoding Network: A Multi-Task Learning Approach

Deep learning based decoding networks have shown significant improvement in decoding LDPC codes, but the neural decoders are limited by rate-matching operations such as puncturing or extending, thus needing to train multiple decoders with different code rates for a variety of channel conditions. In this correspondence, we propose a Multi-Task Learning based rate-compatible LDPC ecoding network, which utilizes the structure of raptor-like LDPC codes and can deal with multiple code rates. In the proposed network, different portions of parameters are activated to deal with distinct code rates, which leads to parameter sharing among tasks. Numerical experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. Training the specially designed network under multiple code rates makes the decoder compatible with multiple code rates without sacrificing frame error rate performance.

eess.SP↗

arXiv2023

Differential Game Analysis for Cooperation Models in Automotive Supply Chain under Low-Carbon Emission Reduction Policies

In the context of reducing carbon emissions in the automotive supply chain, collaboration between vehicle manufacturers and retailers has proven to be an effective measure for enhancing carbon emission reduction within the enterprise. This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of such collaboration by constructing a differential game model that incorporates carbon trading and consumer preferences for low-carbon products. The model examines the decision-making process of an automotive supply chain comprising a vehicle manufacturer and multiple retailers. By utilizing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, we analyze the equilibrium strategies of the participants under both a decentralized model and a Stackelberg leader-follower game model. In the decentralized model, the vehicle manufacturer optimizes its carbon emission reduction efforts, while each retailer independently determines its low-carbon promotion efforts and vehicle retail price. In the Stackelberg leader-follower game model, the vehicle manufacturer cooperates with the retailers by offering them a subsidy. Consequently, the manufacturer plays as the leader, making decisions on carbon emission reduction efforts and the subsidy rate, while the retailers, as followers, compute their promotion efforts and retail prices accordingly. Through theoretical analysis and numerical experiments considering the manufacturer's and retailers' efforts, the low-carbon reputation of vehicles, and the overall system profits under both models, we conclude that compared to the decentralized model, where each party pursues individual profits, the collaboration in the Stackelberg game yields greater benefits for both parties. Furthermore, this collaborative approach promotes the long-term development of the automotive supply chain.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

ABSNFT: Securitization and Repurchase Scheme for Non-Fungible Tokens Based on Game Theoretical Analysis

The Non-Fungible Token (NFT) is viewed as one of the important applications of blockchain technology. Although NFT has a large market scale and multiple practical standards, several limitations of the existing mechanism in NFT markets exist. This work proposes a novel securitization and repurchase scheme for NFT to overcome these limitations. We first provide an Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) solution to settle the limitations of non-fungibility of NFT. Our securitization design aims to enhance the liquidity of NFTs and enable Oracles and Automatic Market Makers (AMMs) for NFTs. Then we propose a novel repurchase protocol for a participant owing a portion of NFT to repurchase other shares to obtain the complete ownership. As participants may strategically bid during the acquisition process, our repurchase process is formulated as a Stackelberg game to explore the equilibrium prices. We also provide solutions to handle difficulties at market such as budget constraints and lazy bidders.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

FileInsurer: A Scalable and Reliable Protocol for Decentralized File Storage in Blockchain

With the development of blockchain applications, the requirements for file storage in blockchain are increasing rapidly. Many protocols, including Filecoin, Arweave, and Sia, have been proposed to provide scalable decentralized file storage for blockchain applications. However, the reliability is not well promised by existing protocols. Inspired by the idea of insurance, we innovatively propose a decentralized file storage protocol in blockchain, named as FileInsurer, to achieve both scalability and reliability. While ensuring scalability by distributed storage, FileInsurer guarantees reliability by enhancing robustness and fully compensating for the file loss. Specifically, under mild conditions, we prove that no more than 0.1\% value of all files should be compensated even if half of the storage collapses. Therefore, only a relatively small deposit needs to be pledged by storage providers to cover the potential file loss. Because of lower burdens of deposit, storage providers have more incentives to participate in the storage network. FileInsurer can run in the top layer of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), and thus it can be directly applied in Web 3.0, Non-Fungible Tokens, and Metaverse.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Parallel algorithms for maximizing one-sided $σ$-smooth function

In this paper, we study the problem of maximizing a monotone normalized one-sided $σ$-smooth ($OSS$ for short) function $F(x)$, subject to a convex polytope. This problem was first introduced by Mehrdad et al. \cite{GSS2021} to characterize the multilinear extension of some set functions. Different with the serial algorithm with name Jump-Start Continuous Greedy Algorithm by Mehrdad et al. \cite{GSS2021}, we propose Jump-Start Parallel Greedy (JSPG for short) algorithm, the first parallel algorithm, for this problem. The approximation ratio of JSPG algorithm is proved to be $((1-e^{-\left(\fracα{α+1}\right)^{2σ}}) ε)$ for any any number $α\in(0,1]$ and $ε>0$. We also prove that our JSPG algorithm runs in $(O(\log n/ε^{2}))$ adaptive rounds and consumes $O(n \log n/ε^{2})$ queries. In addition, we study the stochastic version of maximizing monotone normalized $OSS$ function, in which the objective function $F(x)$ is defined as $F(x)=\mathbb{E}_{y\sim T}f(x,y)$. Here $f$ is a stochastic function with respect to the random variable $Y$, and $y$ is the realization of $Y$ drawn from a probability distribution $T$. For this stochastic version, we design Stochastic Parallel-Greedy (SPG) algorithm, which achieves a result of $F(x)\geq(1 -e^{-\left(\fracα{α+1}\right)^{2σ}}-ε)OPT-O(κ^{1/2})$, with the same time complexity of JSPG algorithm. Here $κ=\frac{\max \{5\|\nabla F(x_{0})-d_{o}\|^{2}, 16σ^{2}+2L^{2}D^{2}\}}{(t+9)^{2/3}}$ is related to the preset parameters $σ, L, D$ and time $t$.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Evolutionary Equilibrium Analysis for Decision on Block Size in Blockchain Systems

In a PoW-based blockchain network, mining pools (the solo miner could be regarded as a mining pool containing one miner) compete to successfully mine blocks to pursue rewards. Generally, the rewards include the fixed block subsidies and time-varying transaction fees. The transaction fees are offered by the senders whose transactions are packaged into blocks and is increasing with the block size. However, the larger size of a block brings the longer latency, resulting in a smaller probability of successfully mining. Therefore, finding the optimal block size to trade off these two factors is a complex and crucial problem for the mining pools. In this paper, we model a repeated mining competition dynamics in blockchain system as an evolutionary game to study the interactions among mining pools. In this game, each pool has two strategies: to follow the default size $\bar{B}$, i.e., the upper bound of a block size, or not follow. Because of the bounded rationality, each mining pool pursues its evolutionary stable block size (ESS) according to the mining pools' computing power and other factors by continuous learning and adjustments during the whole mining process. A study framework is built for the general evolutionary game, based on which we then theoretically explore the existence and stability of the ESSs for a case of two mining pools. Numerical experiments with real Bitcoin data are conducted to show the evolutionary decisions of mining pools and to demonstrate the theoretical findings in this paper.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

A Fast-Detection and Fault-Correction Algorithm against Persistent Fault Attack

Persistent Fault Attack (PFA) is a recently proposed Fault Attack (FA) method in CHES 2018. It is able to recover full AES secret key in the Single-Byte-Fault scenario. It is demonstrated that classical FA countermeasures, such as Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) and mask protection, are unable to thwart PFA. In this paper, we propose a fast-detection and faultcorrection algorithm to prevent PFA. We construct a fixed input and output pair to detect faults rapidly. Then we build two extra redundant tables to store the relationship between the adjacent elements in the S-box, by which the algorithm can correct the faulty elements in the S-box. Our experimental results show that our algorithm can effectively prevent PFA in both Single-ByteFault and Multiple-Bytes-Faults scenarios. Compared with the classical FA countermeasures, our algorithm has a much better effect against PFA. Further, the time cost of our algorithm is 40% lower than the classical FA countermeasures.

cs.CR↗