arXiv subjects

Zhi-Xi Wu

Publications and source records attributed to Zhi-Xi Wu.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2015

Suppressing traffic-driven epidemic spreading by use of the efficient routing protocol

Despite extensive work on the interplay between traffic dynamics and epidemic spreading, the control of epidemic spreading by routing strategies has not received adequate attention. In this paper, we study the impact of efficient routing protocol on epidemic spreading. In the case of infinite node-delivery capacity, where the traffic is free of congestion, we find that that there exists optimal values of routing parameter, leading to the maximal epidemic threshold. This means that epidemic spreading can be effectively controlled by fine tuning the routing scheme. Moreover, we find that an increase in the average network connectivity and the emergence of traffic congestion can suppress the epidemic outbreak.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2015

Suppressing traffic-driven epidemic spreading by edge-removal strategies

The interplay between traffic dynamics and epidemic spreading on complex networks has received increasing attention in recent years. However, the control of traffic-driven epidemic spreading remains to be a challenging problem. In this Brief Report, we propose a method to suppress traffic-driven epidemic outbreak by properly removing some edges in a network. We find that the epidemic threshold can be enhanced by the targeted cutting of links among large-degree nodes or edges with the largest algorithmic betweeness. In contrast, the epidemic threshold will be reduced by the random edge removal. These findings are robust with respect to traffic-flow conditions, network structures and routing strategies. Moreover, we find that the shutdown of targeted edges can effectively release traffic load passing through large-degree nodes, rendering a relatively low probability of infection to these nodes.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2014

Message spreading in networks with stickiness and persistence: Large clustering does not always facilitate large-scale diffusion

Recent empirical studies have confirmed the key roles of complex contagion mechanisms such as memory, social reinforcement, and decay effects in information diffusion and behaviour spreading. Inspired by this fact, we here propose a new agent--based model to capture the whole picture of the joint action of the three mechanisms in information spreading, by quantifying the complex contagion mechanisms as stickiness and persistence, and carry out extensive simulations of the model on various networks. By numerical simulations as well as theoretical analysis, we find that the stickiness of the message determines the critical dynamics of message diffusion on tree-like networks, whereas the persistence plays a decisive role on dense regular lattices. In either network, the greater persistence can effectively make the message more invasive. Of particular interest is that our research results renew our previous knowledge that messages can spread broader in networks with large clustering, which turns out to be only true when they can inform a non-zero fraction of the population in the limit of large system size.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2014

Community structure benefits the fixation of cooperation under strong selection

Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [Muchnik, \emph{et al.}, Sci. Rep. \textbf{3}, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in biological and social networks [M.~E.~J. Newman, Nat. Phys. \textbf{8}, 25 (2012)]. Motivated by these facts, we here consider the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game taking place on top of a real social network to investigate how the community structure and the heterogeneity in activity of individuals affect the evolution of cooperation. In particular, we account for a variation of the birth-death process (which can also be regarded as a proportional imitation rule from social point of view) for the strategy updating under both weak- and strong-selection (meaning the payoffs harvested from games contribute either slightly or heavily to the individuals' performance). By implementing comparative studies, where the players are selected either randomly or in terms of their actual activities to playing games with their immediate neighbors, we figure out that heterogeneous activity benefits the emergence of collective cooperation in harsh environment (the action for cooperation is costly) under strong selection, while it impairs the formation of altruism under weak selection. Moreover, we find that the abundance of communities in the social network can evidently foster the fixation of cooperation under strong-selection, in contrast to the games evolving on the randomized counterparts. Our results are therefore helpful for us to better understand the evolution of cooperation in real social systems.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2014

Selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate both first-order and second-order social dilemma

Punishment, especially selfish punishment, has recently been identified as a potent promoter in sustaining or even enhancing the cooperation among unrelated individuals. However, without other key mechanisms, the first-order social dilemma and second-order social dilemma are still two enduring conundrums in biology and the social sciences even with the presence of punishment. In the present study, we investigate a spatial evolutionary four-strategy prisoner's dilemma game model with avoiding mechanism, where the four strategies are cooperation, defection, altruistic and selfish punishment. By introducing the low level of random mutation of strategies, we demonstrate that the presence of selfish punishment with avoiding mechanism can alleviate the two kinds of social dilemmas for various parametrizations. In addition, we propose an extended pair approximation method, whose solutions can essentially estimate the dynamical behaviors and final evolutionary frequencies of the four strategies. At last, considering the analogy between our model and the classical Lotka-Volterra system, we introduce interaction webs based on the spatial replicator dynamics and the transformed payoff matrix to qualitatively characterize the emergent co-exist strategy phases, and its validity are supported by extensive simulations.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2014

Boosting cooperation by involving extortion in spatial Prisoner's dilemma

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoner's dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or asynchronous) and also the introduction of extortion strategy affect the collective outcome of the games. By means of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations as well as dynamical cluster techniques, we find that the involvement of extortioners facilitates the boom of cooperators in the population (and whom can always dominate the population if the temptation to defect is not too large) for both synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating, in stark contrast to the otherwise case, where cooperation is promoted for intermediate aspiration level with synchronous strategy updating, but is remarkably inhibited if the strategy updating is implemented asynchronously. We explain the results by configurational analysis and find that the presence of extortion leads to the checkerboard-like ordering of cooperators and extortioners, which enable cooperators to prevail in the population with both strategy updating manners. Moreover, extortion itself is evolutionary stable, and therefore acts as the incubator for the evolution of cooperation.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2014

Social dilemma alleviated by sharing the gains with immediate neighbors

We study the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) and snowdrift game (SG), within which a fraction $α$ of the payoffs of each player gained from direct game interactions is shared equally by the immediate neighbors. The magnitude of the parameter $α$ therefore characterizes the degree of the relatedness among the neighboring players. By means of extensive Monte Carlo simulations as well as an extended mean-field approximation method, we trace the frequency of cooperation in the stationary state. We find that plugging into relatedness can significantly promote the evolution of cooperation in the context of both studied games. Unexpectedly, cooperation can be more readily established in the spatial PDG than that in the spatial SG, given that the degree of relatedness and the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation are properly formulated. The relevance of our model with the stakeholder theory is also briefly discussed.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2013

Braess's Paradox in Epidemic Game: Better Condition Results in Less Payoff

Facing the threats of infectious diseases, we take various actions to protect ourselves, but few studies considered an evolving system with competing strategies. In view of that, we propose an evolutionary epidemic model coupled with human behaviors, where individuals have three strategies: vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire, and could adjust their strategies according to their neighbors' strategies and payoffs at the beginning of each new season of epidemic spreading. We found a counter-intuitive phenomenon analogous to the well-known \emph{Braess's Paradox}, namely a better condition may lead to worse performance. Specifically speaking, increasing the successful rate of self-protection does not necessarily reduce the epidemic size or improve the system payoff. This phenomenon is insensitive to the network topologies, and can be well explained by a mean-field approximation. Our study demonstrates an important fact that a better condition for individuals may yield a worse outcome for the society.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2012

The Impacts of Subsidy Policies on Vaccination Decisions in Contact Networks

Often, vaccination programs are carried out based on self-interest rather than being mandatory. Owing to the perceptions about risks associated with vaccines and the `herd immunity' effect, it may provide suboptimal vaccination coverage for the population as a whole. In this case, some subsidy policies may be offered by the government to promote vaccination coverage. But, not all subsidy policies are effective in controlling the transmission of infectious diseases. We address the question of which subsidy policy is best, and how to appropriately distribute the limited subsidies to maximize vaccine coverage. To answer these questions, we establish a model based on evolutionary game theory, where individuals try to maximize their personal payoffs when considering the voluntary vaccination mechanism. Our model shows that voluntary vaccination alone is insufficient to control an epidemic. Hence, two subsidy policies are systematically studied: (1) in the free subsidy policy the total amount of subsidies is distributed to some individuals and all the donees may vaccinate at no cost, and (2) in the part-offset subsidy policy each vaccinated person is offset by a certain proportion of the vaccination cost. Simulations suggest that, since the part-offset subsidy policy can encourage more individuals to be vaccinated, the performance of this policy is significantly better than that of the free subsidy policy.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2011

Cooperation, structure and hierarchy in multiadaptive games

Game-theoretical models where the rules of the game and the interaction structure both coevolves with the game dynamics -- multiadaptive games -- capture very flexible situations where cooperation among selfish agents can emerge. In this work, we will discuss a multiadaptive model presented in a recent Letter [Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 028702 (2011)], and generalizations of it. The model captures a non-equilibrium situation where social unrest increases the incentive to cooperate and, simultaneously, agents are partly free to influence with whom they interact. First, we investigate the details of how the feedback from the behavior of agents determines the emergence of cooperation and hierarchical contact structures. We also study the stability of the system to different types of noise, and find that different regions of parameter space show very different response. Some types of noise can destroy an all-cooperator state. If, on the other hand, hubs are stable, then so is the all-C state. Finally, we investigate the dependence of the ratio between the timescales of strategy updates and the evolution of the interaction structure. We find that a comparatively fast strategy dynamics is a prerequisite for the emergence of cooperation.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2011

Role of aspiration-induced migration in cooperation

Both cooperation and migration are ubiquitous in human society and animal world. In this Rapid Communication, we propose an aspiration-induced migration in which individuals will migrate to new sites provided that their payoffs are below some aspiration level. It is found that moderate aspiration level can best favor cooperative behavior. In particular, moderate aspiration level enables cooperator clusters to maintain and expand whereas induces defector clusters to disintegrate, thus promoting the diffusion of cooperation among population. Our results provide insights into understanding the role played by migration in the emergence of cooperative behavior.

physics.bio-ph↗

arXiv2011

Traffic dynamics in scale-free networks with limited packet-delivering capacity

We propose a limited packet-delivering capacity model for traffic dynamics in scale-free networks. In this model, the total node's packet-delivering capacity is fixed, and the allocation of packet-delivering capacity on node $i$ is proportional to $k_{i}^ϕ$, where $k_{i}$ is the degree of node $i$ and $ϕ$ is a adjustable parameter. We have applied this model on the shortest path routing strategy as well as the local routing strategy, and found that there exists an optimal value of parameter $ϕ$ leading to the maximal network capacity under both routing strategies. We provide some explanations for the emergence of optimal $ϕ$.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2011

Onion structure and network robustness

In a recent work [Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 3838 (2011)], Schneider et al. proposed a new measure for network robustness and investigated optimal networks with respect to this quantity. For networks with a power-law degree distribution, the optimized networks have an onion structure-high-degree vertices forming a core with radially decreasing degrees and an over-representation of edges within the same radial layer. In this paper we relate the onion structure to graphs with good expander properties (another characterization of robust network) and argue that networks of skewed degree distributions with large spectral gaps (and thus good expander properties) are typically onion structured. Furthermore, we propose a generative algorithm producing synthetic scale-free networks with onion structure, circumventing the optimization procedure of Schneider et al. We validate the robustness of our generated networks against malicious attacks and random removals.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2011

Emergent Hierarchical Structures in Multiadaptive Games

We investigate a game-theoretic model of a social system where both the rules of the game and the interaction structure are shaped by the behavior of the agents. We call this type of model, with several types of feedback couplings from the behavior of the agents to their environment, a multiadaptive game. Our model has a complex behavior with several regimes of different dynamic behavior accompanied by different network topological properties. Some of these regimes are characterized by heterogeneous, hierarchical interaction networks, where cooperation and network topology coemerge from the dynamics.

q-bio.PE↗

arXiv2010

Local interaction scale controls the existence of a non-trivial optimal critical mass in opinion spreading

We study a model of opinion formation where the collective decision of group is said to happen if the fraction of agents having the most common opinion exceeds a threshold value, a \textit{critical mass}. We find that there exists a unique, non-trivial critical mass giving the most efficient convergence to consensus. In addition, we observe that for small critical masses, the characteristic time scale for the relaxation to consensus splits into two. The shorter time scale corresponds to a direct relaxation and the longer can be explained by the existence of intermediate, metastable states similar to those found in [P.\ Chen and S.\ Redner, Phys.\ Rev.\ E \textbf{71}, 036101 (2005)]. This longer time-scale is dependent on the precise condition for consensus---with a modification of the condition it can go away.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2009

Majority-vote model on hyperbolic lattices

We study the critical properties of a non-equilibrium statistical model, the majority-vote model, on heptagonal and dual heptagonal lattices. Such lattices have the special feature that they only can be embedded in negatively curved surfaces. We find, by using Monte Carlo simulations and finite-size analysis, that the critical exponents $1/ν$, $β/ν$ and $γ/ν$ are different from those of the majority-vote model on regular lattices with periodic boundary condition, which belongs to the same universality class as the equilibrium Ising model. The exponents are also from those of the Ising model on a hyperbolic lattice. We argue that the disagreement is caused by the effective dimensionality of the hyperbolic lattices. By comparative studies, we find that the critical exponents of the majority-vote model on hyperbolic lattices satisfy the hyperscaling relation $2β/ν+γ/ν=D_{\mathrm{eff}}$, where $D_{\mathrm{eff}}$ is an effective dimension of the lattice. We also investigate the effect of boundary nodes on the ordering process of the model.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

arXiv2009

Modeling scientific-citation patterns and other triangle-rich acyclic networks

We propose a model of the evolution of the networks of scientific citations. The model takes an out-degree distribution (distribution of number of citations) and two parameters as input. The parameters capture the two main ingredients of the model, the aging of the relevance of papers and the formation of triangles when new papers cite old. We compare our model with three network structural quantities of an empirical citation network. We find that an unique point in parameter space optimizing the match between the real and model data for all quantities. The optimal parameter values suggest that the impact of scientific papers, at least in the empirical data set we model is proportional to the inverse of the number of papers since they were published.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2009

Diversity of reproduction time scale promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower than the interaction timescale. This is done by implementing probabilistic reproduction on an individual level. We observe that both too fast and too slow reproduction rates hamper the emergence of cooperation. In other words, there exists an intermediate selection timescale that maximizes cooperation. Another factor we find to promote cooperation is a diversity of reproduction timescales.

physics.soc-ph↗