arXiv subjects

Zhu Han

Publications and source records attributed to Zhu Han.

At least 505 records · Page 28Linked to original sources

arXiv2014

Wireless Networks with RF Energy Harvesting: A Contemporary Survey

Radio frequency (RF) energy transfer and harvesting techniques have recently become alternative methods to power the next generation wireless networks. As this emerging technology enables proactive energy replenishment of wireless devices, it is advantageous in supporting applications with quality of service (QoS) requirement. In this paper, we present an extensive literature review on the research progresses in wireless networks with RF energy harvesting capability, referred to as RF energy harvesting networks (RF-EHNs). First, we present an overview of the RF-EHNs including system architecture, RF energy harvesting techniques and existing applications. Then, we present the background in circuit design as well as the state-of-the-art circuitry implementations, and review the communication protocols specially designed for RF-EHNs. We also explore various key design issues in the development of RF-EHNs according to the network types, i.e., single-hop network, multi-antenna network, relay network and cognitive radio network. Finally, we envision some open research directions.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2014

Coalitional Graph Games for Popular Content Distribution in Cognitive Radio VANETs

Popular content distribution is one of the key services provided by vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), in which a popular file is broadcasted by roadside units (RSUs) to the on-board units (OBUs) driving through a particular area. Due to fast speed and deep fading, some file packets might be lost during the vehicle-to-roadside broadcasting stage. In this paper, we propose a peer-to-peer (P2P) approach to allow the OBUs to exchange data and complement the missing packets. Specifically, we introduce a coalitional graph game to model the cooperation among OBUs and propose a coalition formation algorithm to implement the P2P approach. Moreover, cognitive radio is utilized for vehicle-to-vehicle transmissions so that the P2P approach does not require additional bandwidth. Simulation results show that the proposed approach performs better in various conditions, relative to the non-cooperative approach, in which the OBUs share no information and simply response to any data request from other OBUs.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Distributed Cooperative Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks: An Overlapping Coalition Formation Approach

Cooperative spectrum sensing has been shown to yield a significant performance improvement in cognitive radio networks. In this paper, we consider distributed cooperative sensing (DCS) in which secondary users (SUs) exchange data with one another instead of reporting to a common fusion center. In most existing DCS algorithms, the SUs are grouped into disjoint cooperative groups or coalitions, and within each coalition the local sensing data is exchanged. However, these schemes do not account for the possibility that an SU can be involved in multiple cooperative coalitions thus forming overlapping coalitions. Here, we address this problem using novel techniques from a class of cooperative games, known as overlapping coalition formation games, and based on the game model, we propose a distributed DCS algorithm in which the SUs self-organize into a desirable network structure with overlapping coalitions. Simulation results show that the proposed overlapping algorithm yields significant performance improvements, decreasing the total error probability up to 25% in the Q_m+Q_f criterion, the missed detection probability up to 20% in the Q_m/Q_f criterion, the overhead up to 80%, and the total report number up to 10%, compared with the state-of-the-art non-overlapping algorithm.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2014

Listen-and-Talk: Full-duplex Cognitive Radio Networks

In traditional cognitive radio networks, secondary users (SUs) typically access the spectrum of primary users (PUs) by a two-stage "listen-before-talk" (LBT) protocol, i.e., SUs sense the spectrum holes in the first stage before transmit in the second stage. In this paper, we propose a novel "listen-and-talk" (LAT) protocol with the help of the full-duplex (FD) technique that allows SUs to simultaneously sense and access the vacant spectrum. Analysis of sensing performance and SU's throughput are given for the proposed LAT protocol. And we find that due to self-interference caused by FD, increasing transmitting power of SUs does not always benefit to SU's throughput, which implies the existence of a power-throughput tradeoff. Besides, though the LAT protocol suffers from self-interference, it allows longer transmission time, while the performance of the traditional LBT protocol is limited by channel spatial correction and relatively shorter transmission period. To this end, we also present an adaptive scheme to improve SUs' throughput by switching between the LAT and LBT protocols. Numerical results are provided to verify the proposed methods and the theoretical results.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2014

Resource Allocation in Wireless Networks with RF Energy Harvesting and Transfer

Radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting and transfer techniques have recently become alternative methods to power the next generation of wireless networks. As this emerging technology enables proactive replenishment of wireless devices, it is advantageous in supporting applications with quality-of-service (QoS) requirement. This article focuses on the resource allocation issues in wireless networks with RF energy harvesting capability, referred to as RF energy harvesting networks (RF-EHNs). First, we present an overview of the RF-EHNs, followed by a review of a variety of issues regarding resource allocation. Then, we present a case study of designing in the receiver operation policy, which is of paramount importance in the RF-EHNs. We focus on QoS support and service differentiation, which have not been addressed by previous literatures. Furthermore, we outline some open research directions.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2014

Game-theoretic Resource Allocation Methods for Device-to-Device (D2D) Communication

Device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying cellular networks allows mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets to use the licensed spectrum allocated to cellular services for direct peer-to-peer transmission. D2D communication can use either one-hop transmission (i.e., in D2D direct communication) or multi-hop cluster-based transmission (i.e., in D2D local area networks). The D2D devices can compete or cooperate with each other to reuse the radio resources in D2D networks. Therefore, resource allocation and access for D2D communication can be treated as games. The theories behind these games provide a variety of mathematical tools to effectively model and analyze the individual or group behaviors of D2D users. In addition, game models can provide distributed solutions to the resource allocation problems for D2D communication. The aim of this article is to demonstrate the applications of game-theoretic models to study the radio resource allocation issues in D2D communication. The article also outlines several key open research directions.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2014

Coalitional Games with Overlapping Coalitions for Interference Management in Small Cell Networks

In this paper, we study the problem of cooperative interference management in an OFDMA two-tier small cell network. In particular, we propose a novel approach for allowing the small cells to cooperate, so as to optimize their sum-rate, while cooperatively satisfying their maximum transmit power constraints. Unlike existing work which assumes that only disjoint groups of cooperative small cells can emerge, we formulate the small cells' cooperation problem as a coalition formation game with overlapping coalitions. In this game, each small cell base station can choose to participate in one or more cooperative groups (or coalitions) simultaneously, so as to optimize the tradeoff between the benefits and costs associated with cooperation. We study the properties of the proposed overlapping coalition formation game and we show that it exhibits negative externalities due to interference. Then, we propose a novel decentralized algorithm that allows the small cell base stations to interact and self-organize into a stable overlapping coalitional structure. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm results in a notable performance advantage in terms of the total system sum-rate, relative to the noncooperative case and the classical algorithms for coalitional games with non-overlapping coalitions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

A Cross-layer Perspective on Energy Harvesting Aided Green Communications over Fading Channels

We consider the power allocation of the physical layer and the buffer delay of the upper application layer in energy harvesting green networks. The total power required for reliable transmission includes the transmission power and the circuit power. The harvested power (which is stored in a battery) and the grid power constitute the power resource. The uncertainty of data generated from the upper layer, the intermittence of the harvested energy, and the variation of the fading channel are taken into account and described as independent Markov processes. In each transmission, the transmitter decides the transmission rate as well as the allocated power from the battery, and the rest of the required power will be supplied by the power grid. The objective is to find an allocation sequence of transmission rate and battery power to minimize the long-term average buffer delay under the average grid power constraint. A stochastic optimization problem is formulated accordingly to find such transmission rate and battery power sequence. Furthermore, the optimization problem is reformulated as a constrained MDP problem whose policy is a two-dimensional vector with the transmission rate and the power allocation of the battery as its elements. We prove that the optimal policy of the constrained MDP can be obtained by solving the unconstrained MDP. Then we focus on the analysis of the unconstrained average-cost MDP. The structural properties of the average optimal policy are derived. Moreover, we discuss the relations between elements of the two-dimensional policy. Next, based on the theoretical analysis, the algorithm to find the constrained optimal policy is presented for the finite state space scenario. In addition, heuristic policies with low-complexity are given for the general state space. Finally, simulations are performed under these policies to demonstrate the effectiveness.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2013

Resource Management for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication

Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is a technology component for LTE-A. The existing researches allow D2D as an underlay to the cellular network to increase the spectral efficiency. In this book, D2D communication underlaying cellular networks is studied. Some physical-layer techniques and cross-layer optimization methods on resource management and interference avoidance are proposed and discussed. WINNER II channel models is applied to be the signal and interference model and simulation results show that the performance of D2D link is closely related to the distance between D2D transmitter and receiver and that between interference source and the receiver. Besides, by power control, D2D SINR degrades, which will naturally contribute to low interference to cellular communication. A simple mode selection method of D2D communication is introduced. Based on path-loss (PL) mode selection criterion, D2D gives better performance than traditional cellular system. When D2D pair is farther away from the BS, a better results can be obtained. Game theory, which offers a wide variety of analytical tools to study the complex interactions of players and predict their choices, can be used for power and radio resource management in D2D communication. A reverse iterative combinatorial auction is formulated as a mechanism to allocate the spectrum resources for D2D communications with multiple user pairs sharing the same channel. In addition, a game theoretic approach is developed to implement joint scheduling, power control and channel allocation for D2D communication. Finally, joint power and spectrum resource allocation method is studied under consideration of battery lifetime, which is an important application of D2D communication on increasing user's energy efficiency. The simulation results show that all these methods have beneficial effects on improving the system performance.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Energy Trading in the Smart Grid

Electric storage units constitute a key element in the emerging smart grid system. In this paper, the interactions and energy trading decisions of a number of geographically distributed storage units are studied using a novel framework based on game theory. In particular, a noncooperative game is formulated between storage units, such as PHEVs, or an array of batteries that are trading their stored energy. Here, each storage unit's owner can decide on the maximum amount of energy to sell in a local market so as to maximize a utility that reflects the tradeoff between the revenues from energy trading and the accompanying costs. Then in this energy exchange market between the storage units and the smart grid elements, the price at which energy is traded is determined via an auction mechanism. The game is shown to admit at least one Nash equilibrium and a novel proposed algorithm that is guaranteed to reach such an equilibrium point is proposed. Simulation results show that the proposed approach yields significant performance improvements, in terms of the average utility per storage unit, reaching up to 130.2% compared to a conventional greedy approach.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Truthful Mechanisms for Secure Communication in Wireless Cooperative System

To ensure security in data transmission is one of the most important issues for wireless relay networks, and physical layer security is an attractive alternative solution to address this issue. In this paper, we consider a cooperative network, consisting of one source node, one destination node, one eavesdropper node, and a number of relay nodes. Specifically, the source may select several relays to help forward the signal to the corresponding destination to achieve the best security performance. However, the relays may have the incentive not to report their true private channel information in order to get more chances to be selected and gain more payoff from the source. We propose a Vickey-Clark-Grove (VCG) based mechanism and an Arrow-d'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet (AGV) based mechanism into the investigated relay network to solve this cheating problem. In these two different mechanisms, we design different "transfer payment" functions to the payoff of each selected relay and prove that each relay gets its maximum (expected) payoff when it truthfully reveals its private channel information to the source. And then, an optimal secrecy rate of the network can be achieved. After discussing and comparing the VCG and AGV mechanisms, we prove that the AGV mechanism can achieve all of the basic qualifications (incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget balance) for our system. Moreover, we discuss the optimal quantity of relays that the source node should select. Simulation results verify efficiency and fairness of the VCG and AGV mechanisms, and consolidate these conclusions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2013

Coalitional Game Theoretic Approach for Cooperative Transmission in Vehicular Networks

Cooperative transmission in vehicular networks is studied by using coalitional game and pricing in this paper. There are several vehicles and roadside units (RSUs) in the networks. Each vehicle has a desire to transmit with a certain probability, which represents its data burtiness. The RSUs can enhance the vehicles' transmissions by cooperatively relaying the vehicles' data. We consider two kinds of cooperations: cooperation among the vehicles and cooperation between the vehicle and RSU. First, vehicles cooperate to avoid interfering transmissions by scheduling the transmissions of the vehicles in each coalition. Second, a RSU can join some coalition to cooperate the transmissions of the vehicles in that coalition. Moreover, due to the mobility of the vehicles, we introduce the notion of encounter between the vehicle and RSU to indicate the availability of the relay in space. To stimulate the RSU's cooperative relaying for the vehicles, the pricing mechanism is applied. A non-transferable utility (NTU) game is developed to analyze the behaviors of the vehicles and RSUs. The stability of the formulated game is studied. Finally, we present and discuss the numerical results for the 2-vehicle and 2-RSU scenario, and the numerical results verify the theoretical analysis.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Charging Scheduling of Electric Vehicles with Local Renewable Energy under Uncertain Electric Vehicle Arrival and Grid Power Price

In the paper, we consider delay-optimal charging scheduling of the electric vehicles (EVs) at a charging station with multiple charge points. The charging station is equipped with renewable energy generation devices and can also buy energy from power grid. The uncertainty of the EV arrival, the intermittence of the renewable energy, and the variation of the grid power price are taken into account and described as independent Markov processes. Meanwhile, the charging energy for each EV is random. The goal is to minimize the mean waiting time of EVs under the long term constraint on the cost. We propose queue mapping to convert the EV queue to the charge demand queue and prove the equivalence between the minimization of the two queues' average length. Then we focus on the minimization for the average length of the charge demand queue under long term cost constraint. We propose a framework of Markov decision process (MDP) to investigate this scheduling problem. The system state includes the charge demand queue length, the charge demand arrival, the energy level in the storage battery of the renewable energy, the renewable energy arrival, and the grid power price. Additionally the number of charging demands and the allocated energy from the storage battery compose the two-dimensional policy. We derive two necessary conditions of the optimal policy. Moreover, we discuss the reduction of the two-dimensional policy to be the number of charging demands only. We give the sets of system states for which charging no demand and charging as many demands as possible are optimal, respectively. Finally we investigate the proposed radical policy and conservative policy numerically.

math.OC↗

arXiv2012

Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks

This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2012

Hierarchic Power Allocation for Spectrum Sharing in OFDM-Based Cognitive Radio Networks

In this paper, a Stackelberg game is built to model the hierarchic power allocation of primary user (PU) network and secondary user (SU) network in OFDM-based cognitive radio (CR) networks. We formulate the PU and the SUs as the leader and the followers, respectively. We consider two constraints: the total power constraint and the interference-to-signal ratio (ISR) constraint, in which the ratio between the accumulated interference and the received signal power at each PU should not exceed certain threshold. Firstly, we focus on the single-PU and multi-SU scenario. Based on the analysis of the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) for the proposed Stackelberg game, an analytical hierarchic power allocation method is proposed when the PU can acquire the additional information to anticipate SUs' reaction. The analytical algorithm has two steps: 1) The PU optimizes its power allocation with considering the reaction of SUs to its action. In the power optimization of the PU, there is a sub-game for power allocation of SUs given fixed transmit power of the PU. The existence and uniqueness for the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the sub-game are investigated. We also propose an iterative algorithm to obtain the NE, and derive the closed-form solutions of NE for the perfectly symmetric channel. 2) The SUs allocate the power according to the NE of the sub-game given PU's optimal power allocation. Furthermore, we design two distributed iterative algorithms for the general channel even when private information of the SUs is unavailable at the PU. The first iterative algorithm has a guaranteed convergence performance, and the second iterative algorithm employs asynchronous power update to improve time efficiency. Finally, we extend to the multi-PU and multi-SU scenario, and a distributed iterative algorithm is presented.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Dynamic Popular Content Distribution in Vehicular Networks using Coalition Formation Games

Driven by both safety concerns and commercial interests, vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have recently received considerable attentions. In this paper, we address popular content distribution (PCD) in VANETs, in which one large popular file is downloaded from a stationary roadside unit (RSU), by a group of on-board units (OBUs) driving through an area of interest (AoI) along a highway. Due to high speeds of vehicles and deep fadings of vehicle-to-roadside (V2R) channels, some of the vehicles may not finish downloading the entire file but only possess several pieces of it. To successfully send a full copy to each OBU, we propose a cooperative approach based on the coalition formation games, in which OBUs exchange their possessed pieces by broadcasting to and receiving from their neighbors. Simulation results show that our proposed approach presents a considerable performance improvement relative to the non-cooperative approach, in which the OBUs broadcast randomly selected pieces to their neighbors as along as the spectrum is detected to be unoccupied.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Efficiency Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Underlay Communication Systems: A Reverse Iterative Combinatorial Auction Based Approach

Peer-to-peer communication has been recently considered as a popular issue for local area services. An innovative resource allocation scheme is proposed to improve the performance of mobile peer-to-peer, i.e., device-to-device (D2D), communications as an underlay in the downlink (DL) cellular networks. To optimize the system sum rate over the resource sharing of both D2D and cellular modes, we introduce a reverse iterative combinatorial auction as the allocation mechanism. In the auction, all the spectrum resources are considered as a set of resource units, which as bidders compete to obtain business while the packages of the D2D pairs are auctioned off as goods in each auction round. We first formulate the valuation of each resource unit, as a basis of the proposed auction. And then a detailed non-monotonic descending price auction algorithm is explained depending on the utility function that accounts for the channel gain from D2D and the costs for the system. Further, we prove that the proposed auction-based scheme is cheat-proof, and converges in a finite number of iteration rounds. We explain non-monotonicity in the price update process and show lower complexity compared to a traditional combinatorial allocation. The simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm efficiently leads to a good performance on the system sum rate.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Bad Data Injection Attack and Defense in Electricity Market using Game Theory Study

Applications of cyber technologies improve the quality of monitoring and decision making in smart grid. These cyber technologies are vulnerable to malicious attacks, and compromising them can have serious technical and economical problems. This paper specifies the effect of compromising each measurement on the price of electricity, so that the attacker is able to change the prices in the desired direction (increasing or decreasing). Attacking and defending all measurements are impossible for the attacker and defender, respectively. This situation is modeled as a zero sum game between the attacker and defender. The game defines the proportion of times that the attacker and defender like to attack and defend different measurements, respectively. From the simulation results based on the PJM 5 Bus test system, we can show the effectiveness and properties of the studied game.

cs.CR↗