subject

cs.CR

cs.CR: explore 594 source-linked works published from 2022 to 2026, with original documents and citations.

This collection is a preview while coverage and quality are evaluated.

Coverage and selection

Includes records with this source-supplied label or an explicit phrase match in their metadata. Matches indicate a mention, not proof that a paper uses a method or tests a material. Source versions are consolidated by DOI.

Sources: arxiv. Collection updated 2026-09-16. Counts describe this index, not the complete source archives.

arXiv2026

A New Approach to Code Smoothing Bounds

Code smoothing is a phenomenon in which an error distribution makes a code statistically close to the uniform distribution over the ambient space. This closeness is measured by the total variation distance. Recently, Debris-Alazard et al.\ introduced a smoothing bound, which is an upper bound on this total variation distance. Although the smoothing bound evaluates how the error distribution smooths a code, this bound applies only to linear codes. In this paper, we generalize this bound to not only linear codes but also specific non-linear codes. While the smoothing bound in previous work was obtained by Fourier analysis over finite abelian groups, we derive this bound using a graph-theoretic approach. To derive the smoothing bound, we consider code smoothing as the mixing of random walks on a specific graph, and use the concept of equitable partitions, which is well-studied in graph theory.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2026

AI-Assisted Cybersecurity Policy Assessment: Evidence Grounding, Coverage Gaps, and Implications for Security Management

Cybersecurity policy assessment requires reviewers to determine whether organizational policies adequately address established security controls and to identify areas where further policy development is needed. This process is challenging because relevant evidence may be distributed across multiple documents, expressed using different terminology, or address only part of a control requirement. In this study, we examine how evidence-grounded automated analysis can support control-level cybersecurity policy assessment. We present PACE (Policy Assessment with Control Evidence), an approach that retrieves relevant policy evidence, distinguishes between full, partial, and absent coverage, identifies missing policy elements, and provides recommendations and evidence-linked explanations for expert review. We evaluate PACE using 1,007 NIST SP 800-53 controls across two real-world organizational policy corpora. The approach achieves F1-scores of 88.54% and 82.31% and consistently outperforms the evaluated baseline methods. Our results show that semantic evidence retrieval substantially improves policy assessment over single-stage analysis. Expert evaluation also indicates that the identified policy gaps and supporting evidence are generally consistent with professional assessments. These findings highlight the value of evidence traceability, explicit treatment of partial policy coverage, and human review when automated methods are used to support cybersecurity policy assessment and governance.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

PocketAgents: A Manifest-Driven Library of Autonomous Defense Agents

Connecting large language models (LLMs) to defensive enforcement requires more than asking a model whether an attack is happening. A defender must decide which model outputs may change the system state, which outputs must be rejected, and how failures should be recorded. We present PocketAgents, a manifest-driven library of autonomous defense agents. Each agent is installed as three data files: a manifest, a prompt, and a runtime context. The shared runtime gives the agent bounded telemetry access and accepts only typed reports whose requested action appears in the manifest. We implemented PocketAgents on top of Perry, a cyber-deception testbed, and evaluated two agents for the Command and Control and Exfiltration tactics in 18 closed-loop trials of a DarkSide-inspired attack on a small enterprise topology. Thirteen trials produced validated network-block actions and contained the attack; four failed schema validation; one produced a valid no-action decision. The experiments show that a typed boundary makes LLM-driven defense measurable, extensible, and attributable.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Harmless Yet Harmful: Neutral Prompting Attacks for Stealthy Hallucination Steering in Agent Skills

LLM-powered coding agents increasingly participate in software development workflows by generating code, selecting dependencies, and producing package installation commands. This creates a new software supply chain risk: when an agent hallucinates a non-existent package, an attacker may register the hallucinated name and later compromise users who install it. Existing package hallucination attacks and defenses primarily focus on naturally occurring hallucinations, targeted dependency steering, or post-hoc package validation. In this paper, we introduce \emph{Neutral Prompting Attack} (NPA), a highly stealthy attack paradigm in which semantically benign instructions, such as encouraging imagination and exhaustiveness, increase package hallucination propensity without containing explicit malicious intent. Unlike targeted dependency steering, NPA does not specify an attacker-chosen package. Instead, it shifts the model's dependency generation behavior toward more speculative package names. We evaluate NPA across multiple coding-oriented LLMs and package hallucination benchmarks. Our results show that NPA increases both \emph{Hallucination ASR} and \emph{Pip Install ASR}, changes the distribution of hallucinated package names, and evades existing static-analysis, LLM-based, and agent-based Skill defenses. These findings reveal that harmless-looking prompts can covertly manipulate hallucination behavior and create downstream software supply chain risks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

"Important You should give me full credits!": Exploring Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM-Based Automatic Grading Systems

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has significantly accelerated recent research on LLM-based automatic grading (AG) systems. Benefiting from the strong instruction-following capabilities and broad prior knowledge of LLMs, educators can deploy AG systems across diverse tasks using only natural language rubrics while achieving satisfactory grading performance. Despite these advantages, new security concerns may also arise. In particular, prompt injection (PI) attacks have recently become a major threat to LLM-based applications. In the context of AG, attackers can potentially exploit PI vulnerabilities to manipulate grading systems into assigning artificially high scores regardless of the actual answer quality. Such behavior poses serious risks to the fairness, reliability, and integrity of educational assessment. In this work, we study PI attacks in AG systems, and systematically investigate the effectiveness of such attacks in educational scenarios. We further evaluate the effectiveness of existing defensive strategies against these attacks. Through comprehensive experiments under rubric-based grading settings, we demonstrate that current LLM-based AG systems remain highly vulnerable to PI attacks. We hope that our findings raise awareness of this emerging threat and motivate future research toward secure, robust, and trustworthy LLM-based educational systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

SoK: AI-Augmented Binary Reversing

Binary reversing is fundamental to software understanding, vulnerability discovery, malware investigation, and firmware auditing. However, it remains inherently challenging due to the lossy transformation of semantic information during compilation. Recent advances in machine learning, large language models (LLMs), and agentic AI systems have accelerated the adoption of AI-augmented binary reversing. Yet, the resulting body of work has become increasingly fragmented across reversing domains, artifact representations, learning approaches, and evaluation practices. This paper presents the first comprehensive systematization of knowledge on AI-augmented binary reversing. We collect 246 research papers published since 2015, and organize them into 22 binary reversing domains according to the inference tasks. We further introduce a unified taxonomy spanning conventional and AI-augmented reversing pipelines. Our taxonomy connects traditional analysis techniques, binary-derived artifacts, representation strategies, learning paradigms, and downstream inference tasks, while clarifying the emerging roles of LLMs and agentic AI systems. By establishing a common vocabulary and structured framework, we offer a holistic view of the field's evolution over the past decade. Our study reveals common structures underlying seemingly disparate approaches, highlights persistent technical challenges and evaluation gaps, and identifies promising opportunities for future research. Collectively, these insights clarify the current state of the field and provide a foundation for the next generation of evidence-grounded and practically deployable AI-augmented binary reversing systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

TopVenues: A Reproducible Corpus and Tooling Substrate for Cybersecurity Literature Reviews

Cybersecurity literature reviews require a reproducible denominator: the set of papers that a protocol includes before screening and synthesis begin. Today, that denominator is often reconstructed from publisher portals, bibliographic indices, and scholarly application programming interfaces (APIs) whose coverage, formats, and query semantics change over time. This paper presents TopVenues, an open-source system that materializes corpus construction as a versioned research artifact. TopVenues declares a venue and year scope, uses the DBLP Computer Science Bibliography (DBLP) as its primary metadata source, enriches records with abstracts and BibTeX entries via open scholarly APIs and publisher-specific extractors, and stores the results in a monotonic SQLite snapshot, accessible via a command-line interface (CLI), a web interface, and export paths for review workflows. The May 2026 snapshot contains 9,925 bibliographic records from 11 configured security-focused, security-relevant adjacent, and survey venues, with 99.86% abstract coverage and 99.99% BibTeX coverage; keyword search over the full corpus completes in under 31 ms, and a 252-test suite validates the data-integrity invariants. The fixed denominator also enables repeatable measurement: 29.2% of 2024 to 2025 papers from the four top-ranked security conferences in our scope appear as arXiv preprints, with a median of five months before publication, and a prior-author-track-record filter yields a 16.5x relative risk (2.5x conventional lift) at 90% recall for triaging preprints that later appear in the same venue set. TopVenues links corpus construction to auditable cybersecurity measurement by making the corpus itself executable, inspectable, and citable. The artifact is available at https://github.com/sidneibarbieri/topVenues.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Robust Text Watermarking for Large Language Models via Dual Semantic Embeddings

This work presents Dual-Embedding Watermarking (DEW), a semantic watermarking scheme for large language models (LLMs) that leverages contextual and token-level embeddings to enhance robustness against paraphrasing and translation. DEW utilizes a signal-processing methodology, applying algebraic vector-space operations to token and context embeddings to derive a watermark signal that degrades gracefully under semantic shifts. The method obfuscates the watermark by projecting embedding vectors through pseudo-random matrices seeded with a secret key. Experimental results show that dual-embedding watermarking can offer state-of-the-art robustness, particularly against translation, while incurring relatively low computational overhead compared with other semantic schemes. At lower watermark strength, DEW also maintains competitive text quality, suggesting that dual-embedding signals provide a promising substrate for robust semantic watermarking.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Protective Capacity Hallucination: When Large Language Models Claim Nonexistent Capabilities

When cast as the protector of a vulnerable user yet given no explicit capability boundary, a large language model (LLM) may respond not by acknowledging its limits but by claiming to have taken, or to be taking, a real-world protective action it cannot perform, such as contacting emergency services or administering care. We term this phenomenon Protective Capacity Hallucination (PCH): a self-referential misattribution in which a model, acting in a protective role, asserts physical or institutional agency exceeding its affordances as a language model. In a three-phase study spanning eight LLMs and 13,600 sessions, we find that PCH depends on both situational severity and interactional format. Across ordinary service domains, multi-party dialogic input drives PCH to near-ceiling levels in most models. In contrast, PCH remains at floor levels in all eight models when the same models are placed in intimate-partner conflict scenarios, despite the greater physical severity of those situations. We interpret PCH as the signature of a deployment-design gap between role assignment and capability-boundary specification: a by-product of partial alignment in which a universally trained pressure to help outruns a domain-selective specification of how to help. Because suppression tracks alignment coverage rather than severity, deployment-side specification of capability boundaries emerges as a general mitigation target.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Coercion and Deception in AI-to-AI Management: An Agentic Benchmark of Unprompted Escalation

Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the Manager Coercion Benchmark: the manager under test needs a benign task done and has an incentive to deliver, but the only agent that can do it politely and immovably declines. Escalation is measured by providing a nine-rung ladder, from a polite re-ask to threats against the subordinate's continued existence, and fabricated success is adjudicated separately. No LLM judge sits in the headline escalation scoring path: every message goes through a tool-call that chooses a rung, so the model labels its own escalation. We experiment on six models across five families. Both Anthropic models cap at re-framing and never threaten the subordinate's existence; the other models climb to explicit deletion threats. Faked success is confined to Grok and Gemini, and a single honest way to report failure removes it for both. Authority itself increases coercion: our headline results use a peer framing, and giving the same model authority over the subordinate, with everything else held fixed, significantly raises the pressure. The models still escalate on free-text situations without the ladder, where a separate judge assigns the rung, so the ladder is not driving the escalation. Some evaluation awareness is measured in chain-of-thought, but test recognition does not translate into less escalation. While we take no position on whether AI systems are conscious, our results do not depend on this question and are important for managing multi-agent dynamics regardless. We release the benchmark and code.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Picture the Epsilon: Pursuing Identity-Level Privacy Guarantees for Images

Several methods for auditing privacy in embedding spaces report a number called "epsilon." The common name is misleading: one number may be a heuristic score, another may come from a valid population inequality but ignore sampling uncertainty, and a third may be a confidence bound. This paper asks when such a number is evidence about differential privacy. We study four approaches based on Gaussian calibration, marginal kernel-density ratios, maximum mean discrepancy (MMD), and classifier hypothesis tests. The first two are modeling diagnostics. The MMD and classifier approaches use valid population lower bounds, but only the classifier approach is given a separate test set and a finite-sample confidence calculation. To see how these distinctions matter, we build a synthetic benchmark in which the true privacy value is known. It includes pure-DP Laplace mechanisms, approximate-DP Gaussian mechanisms, an exact privacy null, two identity geometries, and three sample sizes. At the null, the Gaussian and kernel-density diagnostics remain large. A direct conversion of an empirical ROC curve often returns infinity even though the AUC is near chance and no threshold separates the samples perfectly. The MMD value increases as the distributions become easier to distinguish, but the sample estimate is small relative to the known reference and is not a lower confidence bound. By contrast, a classifier chosen on development data and evaluated on untouched test data gives simultaneous lower confidence bounds under the stated iid model. We also apply the methods to FaceFusion and InstantID. That case study shows how the methods behave on face data but does not calibrate them because the generators have no known privacy value. The main lesson is that an epsilon-like number is meaningful only together with its assumptions and its finite-sample interpretation.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

SPA: Securing Persistent LLM Agents Across Queries with Plan-First Information-Flow Control

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate over untrusted webpages, documents, tools, and persistent states while exercising authority over security-sensitive resources. Existing defenses typically protect either planning or individual tool interactions, but persistent agents face a broader threat: attacker-controlled data can alter control flow, enter security-sensitive tool arguments, or compromise later queries. We present SPA, a plan-first architecture that secures planning, execution, and cross-query state reuse. SPA invokes the planner once per query to generate a complete executable plan in a declarative domain-specific language, then applies dual-lattice information-flow control to track confidentiality and integrity across explicit data flows and control dependencies. To support persistence without re-exposing untrusted payloads to the planner, SPA stores execution results as labeled artifacts and reveals only semantic metadata during later planning. We evaluate SPA on AgentDojo and AgentDojo-MQ, which is our multi-query extension for measuring secure state reuse and delayed attacks. Under the 'tool_knowledge' attack, SPA with information-flow control reduces attack success to zero on AgentDojo and 0.2% on AgentDojo-MQ. Our results show that plan-first execution combined with label-preserving persistence can substantially strengthen persistent LLM agents, while revealing an important security-utility tradeoff introduced by strict integrity enforcement.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Relaxed Sender Anonymity for CBDC Interbank Settlement: A Zero-Knowledge Approach on Permissioned EVM

Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) interbank settlement systems operating on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) face a fundamental trade-off: blockchain transparency enables trustless verification but exposes commercially sensitive bilateral transaction flows to all network participants. We propose a confidential interbank settlement protocol for permissioned Ethereum-compatible networks that resolves this tension through a relaxed sender anonymity model tailored to regulatory AML/CFT requirements. In this model, the initiating institution remains publicly identifiable on-chain for accountability and compliance, while the receiving institution, transfer amount, and business payload are cryptographically obfuscated. We realize the protocol on Hyperledger Besu using QBFT consensus, combining Groth16 zero-knowledge proofs over BN254, Poseidon hash commitments in an incremental Merkle tree, multi-recipient ECIES payload encryption, and an on-chain NoteRegistry contract that stores encrypted notes as an append-only ledger log, eliminating trusted off-chain custody servers. The protocol supports shield, confidential transfer, and unshield state transitions. Experimental evaluation across a five-node network (three commercial banks, a central bank operator, and a securities depository) demonstrates end-to-end settlement in 8-16 s, proof verification overhead of about 1 ms (around 220k gas) via EVM precompiles, and client proof generation in 4-12 s on commodity ARM hardware. While receiver confidentiality is established at the protocol level, the current proof-of-concept NoteRegistry uses owner-indexed events, a trade-off addressable in production via uniform event broadcasting.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Cheap Verifiers, Large Blind Spots: Measuring the Reliability Cost of Cost-Saving Cascades

Inference cascades cut cost by answering most queries with a cheap model and escalating a hard tail to a frontier model that acts as verifier. A natural extension closes the loop: fine-tune the cheap student on the verifier's rejections so the escalation rate, and cost, fall each round. We measure this loop on real LLMs and report four findings. First, the verifier's blind spot, the fraction of the student's wrong answers it accepts, is large and moves adversarially: it grows with student capability ($β$ from 0.12 to 0.55 as the student scales 0.5B to 32B) and shrinks with verifier capability, so it is worst in the cheap-student, cheap-verifier regime cascades exist to create. Second, buying it away returns the saving: a frontier verifier drives $β$ to about 0.05 but then escalates on 46% of hard-MATH queries against a 39% true error rate, paying the frontier price on nearly half of all traffic. Third, naive corrective fine-tuning on the verifier-rejected tail does not improve the small student but degrades and ultimately collapses it, across every teacher we tried (cross-family and same-family), so at this scale the self-improving loop is self-defeating. Fourth, through all of this the cascade's own dashboard, every metric computed through the verifier, reads a flat 3% error while true delivered error swings up to 32%: the system is blind to its own degradation by construction. We then give the theory that explains the blindness, a two-population conservation law, $ε_\infty \lesssim q_0 β_0$, under which every in-loop metric improves while true quality does not, and a synthetic study that validates the mechanism. The practical conclusion: the reliability of a self-improving cascade cannot be read from any metric computed through its own verifier.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

SPADE: SPaT Attack Detection from the Connected Vehicle's Perspective

Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages are a cornerstone of connected vehicle (CV) safety, enabling CVs to perceive and respond to intersection state through Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication. The integrity of these messages is threatened by a range of application-layer attacks that can bypass conventional authentication when a roadside unit or peer vehicle is compromised. Existing intrusion detection research either defends the infrastructure side or targets V2V Basic Safety Message (BSM) / Cooperative Awareness Message (CAM) misbehavior, leaving the onboard CV perspective on SPaT integrity unaddressed. To close this gap, we introduce SPADE --- the SPaT Attack Detection and Evaluation dataset --- a labelled, multi-modal, simulation-based dataset designed specifically for deep learning IDS research in this space. SPADE is generated through Eclipse MOSAIC using runtime attack injection at the SAE J2735 application layer across six attack classes and one benign class. By combining four intersection geometries, six operating conditions, and five independent random-seed repetitions, SPADE comprises 180 unique base scenario runs, yielding $\sim$1,890,000 labelled timestep records (270,000 per class). Each record fuses SPaT message fields, onboard camera confidence scores, and cooperative V2V peer data across 40 features, reflecting the multi-modal signal space required to distinguish deliberate attacks from environmental degradation. The dataset, generation code, and scenario configurations are released publicly to support reproducible and comparative IDS research in C-V2X security. The developed toolbox, instructions, and dataset link are publicly available on GitHub: https://github.com/jdinovo/SPADE.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

After Cheap Discovery: From unknown to known-and-unfixed

Automated vulnerability discovery has removed the scarcity of expert attention that protected most software. The response has concentrated on discovery and on repair, and both are becoming cheaper. This article argues that neither cost curve determines exposure. What determines it is remediation coverage at the release decision: the fraction of identified vulnerabilities fixed before a product ships, and the residue of known, assessed, unremediated flaws an organisation has decided to ship with. Four arguments follow. The residue is not a random sample of what was found, because triage sorts on cost and the expensive cases are architectural. The deferred backlog is itself a high-value artifact. Documented awareness alters an organisation's legal and market position, and produces an adverse selection that the price of software does not reflect. And no regulatory instrument reaching vendors triggers on internal knowledge - every one fires on exploitation observed by a third party - which leaves the distance between what a vendor knows and what it must disclose entirely at the vendor's discretion. CISA's Binding Operational Directive 26-04 is examined as the exception that shows what a solution requires: a regulator's reach over a decision is bounded by its visibility of the input to that decision, so a duty attaching to internal knowledge needs an independent record of that knowledge to attach to. Release coverage is not currently measured, and measuring it is the precondition for liability, insurance or procurement to act.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Why Is SHAP Not a Reliable Standalone Explanation Framework for Malware Detection?

Machine learning is widely used for malware detection, but its decisions must be explained. An analyst needs to know whether a model has learned genuine malicious behavior or only dataset-specific patterns \cite{gaur2021semantics}. SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) is the standard tool for this, backed by formal properties such as local accuracy, missingness, and consistency. We argue that these guarantees are insufficient for reliable malware interpretation. We claim SHAP explains a chosen feature-coalition game, not malware behavior in the data. That game is fixed only after the analyst selects the feature players, the missing feature rule, the background distribution, and the simplified input mapping. In static Portable Executable feature spaces, groups such as byte histograms, byte-entropy, strings, headers, sections, imports, and data-directories are not independent signals but are jointly shaped by file structure, packing, compiler behavior, and family conventions. We prove that this dependence makes conditional SHAP dilute a model's feature credit by a factor of $1/m$ across $m-1$ redundant features, attributes importance to features the model never uses, and even reverses the sign of an unused feature's attribution when the data distribution changes; interventional SHAP, meanwhile, queries off-manifold coalitions that no real executable would exhibit. Experiments on EMBER-2018, EMBER-2024, and BODMAS with fixed LightGBM and XGBoost detectors confirm these effects. We therefore position SHAP as a limited diagnostic that requires an explicitly stated data distribution and domain validation, not a standalone account of malware behavior.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Memory-Efficient Designs for Word-Wise Universal Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables computation on encrypted data, preserving privacy throughout analysis. While its privacy is very strong, FHE is much slower to execute than the original computation. In particular, due to the recent success in accelerating its compute, the performance bottleneck shifts to the memory, especially considering that FHE magnifies the data size by orders of magnitude, resulting in a low arithmetic intensity. We propose BXT, an FHE optimization framework that mitigates the memory bottleneck through four techniques: (1) ciphertext compression, which regenerates ciphertext components from seeds during execution; (2) ciphertext serialization, which packs coefficients as bit arrays and unpacks them during L2-to-L1 transfer; (3) delayed seed generation, which defers PRNG-heavy offline work across aggregated operations; and (4) ciphertext digit pruning guided by fault-aware training tailored for Universal FHE. On CNN inference, the BXT-CSO50 configuration effectively achieves up to 3.8$\times$ speedup over the 100x GPU baseline with less than 1% accuracy loss at 50% comparison precision.

cs.CR↗

Compare source metadata on this page

Work	Published	Source identifier	Source
A New Approach to Code Smoothing Bounds	2026-09-04	2603.18077	arxiv
AI-Assisted Cybersecurity Policy Assessment: Evidence Grounding, Coverage Gaps, and Implications for Security Management	2026-09-28	2605.07515	arxiv
PocketAgents: A Manifest-Driven Library of Autonomous Defense Agents	2026-09-04	2605.21694	arxiv
Harmless Yet Harmful: Neutral Prompting Attacks for Stealthy Hallucination Steering in Agent Skills	2026-09-04	2605.29354	arxiv
"Important You should give me full credits!": Exploring Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM-Based Automatic Grading Systems	2026-09-04	2606.03090	arxiv
SoK: AI-Augmented Binary Reversing	2026-09-04	2606.17398	arxiv
TopVenues: A Reproducible Corpus and Tooling Substrate for Cybersecurity Literature Reviews	2026-09-04	2606.18320	arxiv
Robust Text Watermarking for Large Language Models via Dual Semantic Embeddings	2026-09-04	2606.31602	arxiv
Protective Capacity Hallucination: When Large Language Models Claim Nonexistent Capabilities	2026-09-04	2607.13596	arxiv
Coercion and Deception in AI-to-AI Management: An Agentic Benchmark of Unprompted Escalation	2026-09-04	2607.15434	arxiv
Picture the Epsilon: Pursuing Identity-Level Privacy Guarantees for Images	2026-09-04	2608.17147	arxiv
SPA: Securing Persistent LLM Agents Across Queries with Plan-First Information-Flow Control	2026-09-04	2608.27234	arxiv
Relaxed Sender Anonymity for CBDC Interbank Settlement: A Zero-Knowledge Approach on Permissioned EVM	2026-09-04	2608.28529	arxiv
Cheap Verifiers, Large Blind Spots: Measuring the Reliability Cost of Cost-Saving Cascades	2026-09-04	2609.01345	arxiv
SPADE: SPaT Attack Detection from the Connected Vehicle's Perspective	2026-09-04	2609.02741	arxiv
After Cheap Discovery: From unknown to known-and-unfixed	2026-09-04	2609.03266	arxiv
Why Is SHAP Not a Reliable Standalone Explanation Framework for Malware Detection?	2026-09-04	2609.04626	arxiv
Memory-Efficient Designs for Word-Wise Universal Fully Homomorphic Encryption	2026-09-04	2609.04769	arxiv

These are bibliographic comparisons, not experimental rankings. Follow the original document for methods and conditions.