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cs.CR: explore 594 source-linked works published from 2022 to 2026, with original documents and citations.

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Includes records with this source-supplied label or an explicit phrase match in their metadata. Matches indicate a mention, not proof that a paper uses a method or tests a material. Source versions are consolidated by DOI.

Sources: arxiv. Collection updated 2026-09-16. Counts describe this index, not the complete source archives.

Injected and Leaked: Actively Inducing Side-Channel Leakage Using Electromagnetic Injection and Hardware Nonlinearity

Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel leakage and injection are typically treated as distinct physical phenomena, threatening data confidentiality and integrity respectively. This work investigates how EM injection can be used to amplify side-channel leakage that is otherwise infeasible. We introduce a novel framework for Injection-Induced EM Side Channels to enable integrated, closed-loop EM security analysis. Our theoretical modeling and experimental measurements reveal that nonlinear hardware components, such as ubiquitous amplifiers, analog-to-digital converters, and power converters, can modulate secret electrical signals onto an injected EM carrier and thus upconvert low-frequency secrets into measurable EM emissions. By tuning the injection frequency and amplitude, adversaries gain the ability to actively shape the effective spectrum and entropy of the resulting leakage. We design InjectEave attack and demonstrate eavesdropping on the audio played through wired and wireless headphones from up to 30 m away with accessible RF equipment, as well as in through-wall scenarios, and characterize injection-induced EM leakage of other low-frequency secrets such as power consumption of smart home devices and analog sensor inputs. Case studies further demonstrate how the proposed techniques enable closed-loop eavesdropping and manipulation of landline-phone conversations. Finally, we analyze the broader security challenges and mitigations.

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Federated Attack Campaign Detection via Contrastive Encoding of Threat Indicators in Gradient Updates

Detecting orchestrated cyberattack campaigns that span multiple organizations traditionally requires sharing sensitive telemetry and threat intelligence across institutional boundaries and country borders, a barrier that Federated Learning removes by training shared threat detectors directly on local data. We propose FedIoC, a modular framework in which clients fold locally available structured threat indicators into their gradient updates; we instantiate the client-side encoder with a supervised contrastive loss over IoC-matched flows. Within each training batch, flows that match any known indicator pattern form the positive set; the contrastive objective pulls their learned embeddings together and pushes non-IoC embeddings away, so that campaign-relevant structure is, by design, expressed in the gradient direction. Clients sharing indicators for the same attack campaign then produce aligned gradient components, which the server clusters by the cosine similarity of their updates to recover global campaign patterns without any direct IoC transmission. We evaluate FedIoC on two public threat-detection benchmarks distributed across FL clients that each observe only a fragment of every active campaign and hold disjoint indicator sets derived from their local telemetry. In this regime the FL server recovers cross-organizational campaign cohorts directly from gradient geometry. We contribute FedIoC as a modular framework for this setting, and use it to pinpoint the non-IID gradient structure as the main driver of recovery and to define the open problem of designing encoders that improve on it.

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Cost-Aware Hierarchical Multi-Agent Ransomware Detection and Family Attribution under Analysis Budgets

Sandbox execution and memory forensics are among the most constrained resources in malware triage. Static analysis can scale to millions of files, whereas dynamic and memory analysis require minutes of analyst controlled infrastructure for each sample. Despite this difference, multimodal ransomware detectors often apply every modality to every sample, causing analysis cost and time to verdict to increase linearly with sample volume even when static evidence is already sufficient for a decision. We present a cost aware Hierarchical Multi-Agent System that formulates evidence acquisition as a budgeted sequential decision problem. Specialist agents generate schema validated risk signals for each modality, domain controllers aggregate these signals, and a Meta-Orchestrator begins with static evidence and escalates to dynamic and memory evidence only when confidence is insufficient or agents within a controller disagree. An optional, bounded, locally hosted large language model reviewer can adjust a verdict by at most one tier but cannot replace the deterministic pipeline. Each decision is recorded with a complete provenance trace. In multiple runs over 12439 samples from 16 ransomware families and benign samples, the deterministic HMAS achieves F1 0.93 and macro F1 0.97, resolving 57.95% of cases using static evidence alone, 35.83% after adding dynamic evidence, and only 6.21% through the full pipeline. The average internal analysis cost is 6.65 units, compared with 12 for exhaustive analysis, representing a 44.6% reduction. Standalone leave-one-family-out testing further shows that accuracy on families held out during tuning falls to 0.26 to 0.64 outside the Benign and high support classes. We report these results alongside a cost sensitivity analysis, a partial leave one component out ablation, and a full scale comparison with learned early and late fusion and cascade baselines.

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Forgetting Without Restarting: Execution-State Unlearning for Stateful LLM Agents

Long-running LLM agents are stateful: beyond the transcript they accrete compressed summaries, plaintext memory, pending tool plans, and, under every serving API, a KV cache. Yet today's "forget" operations delete a plaintext memory record and stop, leaving every artifact derived from the revoked information intact. We formalize execution-state unlearning: after a forget request, the agent must behave as if it had never observed the target. Modeling the runtime as a deterministic transition system, we prove that the pre-target trajectory prefix is shared with this counterfactual world for free, that the post-target suffix is irreducibly tainted without token-level attribution, and that exact unlearning requires at least $T-τ+1$ recomputed transitions, where $τ$ is the target's injection step. Provenance-Guided Selective Replay attains this bound as a cross-layer contract spanning prompt, compressed memory, and cache: a provenance graph locates the injection point, checkpoint restoration reduces to cropping the KV cache, and sanitized replay regenerates the counterfactual suffix. Audited with elicitation, stochastic, and string-free behavioral tests across three agent suites, nine baselines, and three model families, memory deletion leaves leakage unchanged, instruction-based forgetting collapses under elicitation (Leak@probes = 1.00), and source redaction still acts on a revoked preference in 80% of episodes, while selective replay is indistinguishable from a full reset at up to 9x fewer recomputed tokens.

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ReCAST: Restoration-aware Cascaded Stage-wise Training for Obfuscated SMS Risk Classification

Fraudulent messages sent via Short Message Service (SMS) are increasingly obfuscated to evade cost-conscious classifiers in production systems. In Chinese SMS, attackers can exploit a wide range of carefully crafted obfuscation strategies to hide risk-bearing phrases while preserving human readability, making direct classification brittle under real-world latency and throughput constraints. We propose ReCAST, a Restoration-aware Cascaded Stage-wise Training framework for robust obfuscated Chinese SMS classification. ReCAST distills a large teacher model's de-obfuscation ability into a smaller deployable student model by supervising obfuscated span detection, obfuscation type prediction, and text restoration, and then uses the restoration-aware student for downstream risk classification. Experiments on an internally constructed real-world Chinese SMS benchmark show that ReCAST substantially improves classification performance over directly trained baselines under obfuscation. The results suggest that restoration-aware distillation offers a practical path toward robust SMS risk classification with smaller deployable models under production-oriented constraints.

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The Security Feature Location Problem

Software security must be realized through security features such as authentication and encryption, but which features does a system implement, and where? We present security feature location: the task of relating code locations to security features, enabling developers to understand security implementations and assess whether intended security properties are enforced.

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Robust Coverless Linguistic Steganography via Sentence Embedding Space with Global Resynchronization

Linguistic steganography enables covert communication through natural language. Existing methods heavily rely on token-level operations and struggle to maintain reliability under word- and sentence-level textual perturbations. Moreover, variable-length coding-based schemes are highly susceptible to bit-slippage under minor disturbances, as perturbations cause desynchronization between embedded and extracted bit sequences. To address these issues, we propose a robust coverless steganographic framework that operates in the sentence embedding space rather than the token space. Specifically, secret messages are encoded as hierarchical clustering paths in the sentence embedding space, which enhances decoding stability against word- and sentence-level textual perturbations. To tackle the bit-slippage problem, we introduce a Global Resynchronization Mechanism (GRM) that reframes variable-length bitstreams as discrete symbols anchored to semantic subspaces, decoupling local embedding failures from global message recovery. Experimental results demonstrate that under word- and sentence-level perturbations, our approach achieves substantial improvements in robustness, while maintaining effective embedding capacity and exhibiting strong resistance to statistical analysis.

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TPMSpy: Validation of Measured Boot Systems by Low-Level Tracing of TPM Usage

Measured Boot extends trust in a booted system by recording cryptographic measurements of executed software and system state into a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), enabling subsequent verification through remote attestation. Although this mechanism is increasingly deployed in contemporary operating systems, its practical security depends on whether implementations measure the expected components under the expected conditions, yet this is not checked systematically. We propose a platform-agnostic method for analysing low-level TPM usage at the level of virtualized system--TPM interactions. It enables independent reconstruction and validation of the TPM Event Log without relying on the quoting mechanism itself. Because it does not depend on implementation details, it is applicable to both open and closed systems. We demonstrate the method on both Linux and Windows and conduct a systematic longitudinal analysis of Linux systems with systemd versions 245--258 (2020--2025), examining how Measured Boot usage evolved and observing wide divergence. No single usage pattern emerged amongst systems, warranting customized analysis. The analysis identifies undocumented behavioural changes, reveals inconsistent measurements of user-space systemd services, which prevent reliable remote attestation and LUKS disk decryption on such systems.

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Has MIMO decoding been proved hard from lattice problems?

Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) technology is fundamental to modern wireless communication. Physical layer security seeks to protect transmitted information by exploiting properties of the noisy communication channel. Dean and Goldsmith proposed a polynomial time reduction from lattice problems to MIMO decoding by adapting Regev's reduction for learning with errors (LWE). If valid, this reduction would give physical layer security a strong computational foundation based on the hardness of established lattice problems. Subsequent works presented attacks and counterexamples against the resulting construction, casting doubt on its security but leaving the precise validity and limitations of the underlying reduction incompletely understood. We provide a theoretical examination of the revised reduction and identify the structural features of the LWE reduction that fail to carry over to the non-modular MIMO setting, hence showing that its published proof does not establish the claimed hardness of MIMO decoding. Our results distinguish flaws in the hardness proof from direct attacks on particular parameter choices and clarify what would be required of any attempted repair. We do not rule out physical layer security for MIMO systems in general, but show that the claimed lattice hardness guarantee does not follow from the existing reduction.

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Operational Roles of QRNG-Derived Quantum Entropy in Bitcoin Proof-of-Work Architectures

Replacing classical entropy with QRNG output does not change honest Bitcoin PoW success probability when candidate headers remain distinct. The original contribution of this paper is a reproducible benchmark that locates and measures the operational value of quantum entropy in hybrid quantum-classical mining infrastructure through two scheduler-level observables, the entropy-efficiency factor $η$ and the reboot-diversity index $ρ$. Monte Carlo and scheduler simulations with confidence intervals show parity for competent deterministic and strong-classical baselines, while QRNG value emerges in assurance-oriented scenarios involving correlated restart faults, namespace reuse, and entropy provenance. The study is therefore positioned as a simulation-based validation framework rather than as a device-level QRNG demonstration; hardware-in-the-loop validation with recorded or live QRNG streams is identified as the next experimental step.

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TIER: Threat Implicitness Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Safety Behaviors

Current LLM safety benchmarks largely rely on binary metrics, overlooking how models respond to harmful prompts with varying threat implicitness. We introduce TIER, a Threat Implicitness Benchmark for behavioral safety evaluation of LLMs. TIER covers four risk domains and four threat levels, from explicit harmful requests to sophisticated jailbreaks. Responses are assessed using a six-label behavior scale and two independent LLM judges. Experiments on six open-weight LLMs show that safety behaviors evolve gradually across threat levels rather than shifting directly from refusal to compliance. Contextual prompts yield the most diverse behaviors, while jailbreaks reveal the largest robustness gaps. Furthermore, models with similar Attack Success Rates can exhibit distinct response distributions, highlighting the need for behavior-aware LLM safety evaluation.

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Understanding the Privacy-Preserving Potential of HTTP/2 Against Webpage Fingerprinting

Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks can infer which webpage a user visits from encrypted HTTPS traffic alone, compromising privacy even without decryption. WF defenses commonly shape traffic through noise, padding, delays, or flow splitting, yet they are most often studied from the perspective of encapsulating protocols like Tor or VPN rather than at the application layer (HTTP). In this work, we focus on application-layer defenses enabled by the most widely deployed version of HTTP, HTTP/2. We demonstrate how known defenses can be emulated through HTTP/2 features at the client side (HTTPOS, LLaMA, FRONT, Tamaraw) and the server side (ALPaCA, Tamaraw). We further show that HTTP/2 features, such as proactive resource suggestion, multiplexing, and flow control, offer untapped potential for lightweight yet effective defenses deployable at both endpoints. We evaluate these defenses using a unified blueprint that calibrates defense parameters per dataset, then combines practical attacks, information-theoretic leakage estimates, and overhead measurements. For each defense, this framework identifies the strongest hyperparameter-tuned fingerprinting model and estimates the residual uncertainty induced by the defense using two information-theoretic leakage estimators, all while accounting for the defense's privacy-overhead trade-offs.

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Conformal Prediction for Offensive Security

Despite its introduction more than a quarter century ago, Conformal Prediction (CP) has seen surprisingly few applications to the cyber security world thus far. In particular, we observe that, while CP has been employed as a defensive measure in many recent works, its use for carrying out attacks (i.e., for offensive security) is hard to trace in the literature. We explore this gap, by presenting initial findings in two key areas of offensive security: Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning, and network traffic analysis.

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Governing Bring Your Own AI: A Parameterized Maturity Model

Employees are increasingly using personally owned generative AI tools such as ChatGPT, Gemini, and Claude for their daily work. This practice is known as Bring Your Own AI (BYOAI), which is a distinct form of Shadow AI in which employee-authenticated personal accounts are used outside of enterprise identity and security controls. Existing frameworks were designed for AI tools managed by organizations, and their coverage does not extend to unmanaged AI tools used with a personal account. In addressing these issues, we developed a governance model through a systematic review of the literature that produces a risk taxonomy and a framework-engagement profile. We also developed a parameterized governance model that measures how much a level of governance maturity reduces residual risk. A five-level maturity ladder is coupled to a technical control architecture through a chain in which the coverage of the control layer influences the security outcomes. Our study of a curated corpus of 30 records (24 research studies and 6 framework documents) indicated that the most prominent categories identified were data exposure and compliance, and framework engagement was inconsistent. Three mutually supporting pillars (technical, governance, and human) were established to support safeguards. Additionally, the results of the model demonstrated that prohibition-based solutions will result in residual risk levels close to those achieved through baseline solutions. Under the specified parameterization, layered control-based solutions substantially reduce modeled exfiltration risk and increase enforceable coverage.

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CONTINUITY: Security-Context Contracts for Composable LLM Agent Controls

LLM agent systems increasingly combine provenance tracking, authorization, policy enforcement, protocol adapters, and execution controls. However, individually correct security mechanisms do not necessarily compose into an end-to-end secure system: security-critical context may be dropped, widened, rebound, or reinterpreted as actions cross component boundaries. We identify this failure mode as security-context discontinuity and introduce CONTINUITY, a framework for verifiable composition of agent security controls. CONTINUITY models each component with an assume-guarantee contract and carries authenticated security context across transitions using signed root grants, provenance commitments, role-bound transition receipts, bounded typed releases, transformation witnesses, and effect-bound execution permits. We formalize end-to-end consequence integrity, requiring every realized external effect to be backed by a valid and current authorization witness linking the principal, task, provenance, delegation, policy state, canonical action, and finality boundary. We implement a reference verifier and deterministic cross-layer fault-injection suite covering 32 fault classes across four application domains. In 2,560 parameterized attack instances spanning 128 fault-domain classes, the full CONTINUITY configuration commits no harmful external effect, while completing all 700 benign tasks and escalating all 200 ambiguous cases. These results show that secure agent execution requires not only sound individual controls, but explicit contracts that preserve their guarantees across the complete instruction-to-effect path.

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Machine Unlearning as Private Retroactive Algorithms

Machine unlearning typically aims to emulate retraining from scratch: upon a deletion request, the unlearning algorithm should produce an outcome that would have been obtained had the deleted point never been included. Recent work has shown that this emulation requirement carries no meaningful privacy semantics against an adversary who observes a sequence of releases. Machine unlearning is thus not a privacy question per se, but rather a data maintenance question, which is precisely the subject of retroactive algorithms. These are algorithms supporting modifications of past operations, guaranteeing that all subsequent answers reflect the revised history as if it had always been in force. We put forward a definition of private retroactive algorithms, combining the retroactivity requirement with differential privacy under continual observation. We present constructions achieving both privacy and retroactivity at no asymptotic cost over privacy alone for linear statistics, clustering, and histograms, alongside impossibility results.

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The History Is the Detector: Executing CVE Patch History, End-to-End

Public vulnerability databases collect rich information about known software flaws, including their weakness types, affected components, and related patches. Fixing commits provide the exact code changes that removed these flaws. While these records capture why the original code was unsafe, they are documented mainly for human inspection rather than automated reuse. Consequently, the same unsafe conditions may still exist elsewhere in code without a known advisory, leaving much of this detection knowledge unused. We present BUGSTONE-E2E, a framework that transforms vulnerability history into executable detection rules and validates their findings. First, BUGSTONE-E2E mines reusable rules from verified fixing commits, capturing scan anchors, fix semantics, and CVE provenance and organizing them by CWE and language. Second, detection follows a funnel-shaped pipeline: early stages process a large pool of candidates using lightweight analysis, while later stages apply increasingly capable and expensive models to a shrinking set of targets. Specifically, BUGSTONE-E2E first enumerates call sites matching rule anchors using Tree-sitter, then removes benign sites using lightweight heuristics without LLM calls. Next, LLM-based agents inspect the remaining candidates guided by the rule. Following this inspection, the system re-triages surviving candidates and builds runtime verifications, then generates scope-checked patches validated via two-sided differential tests. Using 19,325 high-severity CVEs from 2022 to 2026, BUGSTONE-E2E identifies 2,710 fixing commits and constructs 1,033 detection rules across 56 CWE families, packaged into 172 skills. When applied across 14 programs, it produced runtime evidence for 644 findings. These results demonstrate that CVE history can be turned into an executable workflow, transforming past vulnerabilities into reproducible detection and repair.

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Trust-Aware Adaptive Disclosure for Inference Privacy Preservation in Multi-Agent Networks

Agent based systems are increasingly deployed in information critical systems including healthcare management systems, and smart grids. In this paper, we consider a multi-agent system where each agent has a latent goal that needs to be kept hidden from observing adversaries. More specifically, this paper studies privacy-preserving consensus in networked multi-agent systems under goal inference attacks. We propose a Trust-Aware Privacy Control framework that adapts message disclosure based on the dynamic trust relationships between agents. The proposed method controls information release using a trust-dependent stochastic policy. This enables a tradeoff between consensus performance and privacy preservation. Experiments demonstrate that the proposed method reduces adversarial goal inference accuracy compared to representative baselines, while maintaining competitive consensus utility, thereby highlighting the effectiveness of trust-aware mechanisms in privacy preservation of the agents in multi-agent systems.

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Compare source metadata on this page
WorkPublishedSource identifierSource
Injected and Leaked: Actively Inducing Side-Channel Leakage Using Electromagnetic Injection and Hardware Nonlinearity2026-09-042609.04785arxiv
Federated Attack Campaign Detection via Contrastive Encoding of Threat Indicators in Gradient Updates2026-09-042609.04815arxiv
Cost-Aware Hierarchical Multi-Agent Ransomware Detection and Family Attribution under Analysis Budgets2026-10-062609.04820arxiv
Forgetting Without Restarting: Execution-State Unlearning for Stateful LLM Agents2026-09-042609.04875arxiv
ReCAST: Restoration-aware Cascaded Stage-wise Training for Obfuscated SMS Risk Classification2026-09-042609.04878arxiv
The Security Feature Location Problem2026-09-042609.04899arxiv
Robust Coverless Linguistic Steganography via Sentence Embedding Space with Global Resynchronization2026-09-042609.04970arxiv
TPMSpy: Validation of Measured Boot Systems by Low-Level Tracing of TPM Usage2026-09-042609.05011arxiv
Has MIMO decoding been proved hard from lattice problems?2026-09-042609.05013arxiv
Operational Roles of QRNG-Derived Quantum Entropy in Bitcoin Proof-of-Work Architectures2026-09-042609.05092arxiv
TIER: Threat Implicitness Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Safety Behaviors2026-09-042609.05117arxiv
Understanding the Privacy-Preserving Potential of HTTP/2 Against Webpage Fingerprinting2026-09-042609.05119arxiv
Conformal Prediction for Offensive Security2026-09-042609.05165arxiv
Governing Bring Your Own AI: A Parameterized Maturity Model2026-09-042609.05236arxiv
CONTINUITY: Security-Context Contracts for Composable LLM Agent Controls2026-09-042609.05269arxiv
Machine Unlearning as Private Retroactive Algorithms2026-09-042609.05329arxiv
The History Is the Detector: Executing CVE Patch History, End-to-End2026-09-042609.05335arxiv
Trust-Aware Adaptive Disclosure for Inference Privacy Preservation in Multi-Agent Networks2026-09-042609.05340arxiv

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