SPA: Securing Persistent LLM Agents Across Queries with Plan-First Information-Flow Control
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate over untrusted webpages, documents, tools, and persistent states while exercising authority over security-sensitive resources. Existing defenses typically protect either planning or individual tool interactions, but persistent agents face a broader threat: attacker-controlled data can alter control flow, enter security-sensitive tool arguments, or compromise later queries. We present SPA, a plan-first architecture that secures planning, execution, and cross-query state reuse. SPA invokes the planner once per query to generate a complete executable plan in a declarative domain-specific language, then applies dual-lattice information-flow control to track confidentiality and integrity across explicit data flows and control dependencies. To support persistence without re-exposing untrusted payloads to the planner, SPA stores execution results as labeled artifacts and reveals only semantic metadata during later planning. We evaluate SPA on AgentDojo and AgentDojo-MQ, which is our multi-query extension for measuring secure state reuse and delayed attacks. Under the 'tool_knowledge' attack, SPA with information-flow control reduces attack success to zero on AgentDojo and 0.2% on AgentDojo-MQ. Our results show that plan-first execution combined with label-preserving persistence can substantially strengthen persistent LLM agents, while revealing an important security-utility tradeoff introduced by strict integrity enforcement.