Regret Minimization for Piecewise Linear Rewards: Contracts, Auctions, and Beyond

Abstract

Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function. These include contract design in hidden-action principal-agent problems, selling an item in posted-price auctions, and bidding in first-price auctions. When the relevant model parameters are unknown and determined by some (unknown) probability distributions, the problem becomes learning how to optimize an unknown and stochastic piecewise linear reward function. Such a problem is usually framed within an online learning framework, where the decision-maker (learner) seeks to minimize the regret of not knowing an optimal decision in hindsight. This paper introduces a general online learning framework that offers a unified approach to tackle regret minimization for piecewise linear rewards, under a suitable monotonicity assumption commonly satisfied by microeconomic models. We design a learning algorithm that attains a regret of $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{nT})$, where $n$ is the number of ``pieces'' of the reward function and $T$ is the number of rounds. This result is tight when $n$ is \emph{small} relative to $T$, specifically when $n \leq T^{1/3}$. Our algorithm solves two open problems in the literature on learning in microeconomic settings. First, it shows that the $\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret bound obtained by Zhu et al. [Zhu+23] for learning optimal linear contracts in hidden-action principal-agent problems is not tight when the number of agent's actions is small relative to $T$. Second, our algorithm demonstrates that, in the problem of learning to set prices in posted-price auctions, it is possible to attain suitable (and desirable) instance-independent regret bounds, addressing an open problem posed by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [CBCP19].