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arXiv · 2505.06378

Bi-LSTM based Multi-Agent DRL with Computation-aware Pruning for Agent Twins Migration in Vehicular Embodied AI Networks

Abstract

With the advancement of large language models and embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the intelligent transportation scenarios, the combination of them in intelligent transportation spawns the Vehicular Embodied AI Network (VEANs). In VEANs, Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are typical agents whose local advanced AI applications are defined as vehicular embodied AI agents, enabling capabilities such as environment perception and multi-agent collaboration. Due to computation latency and resource constraints, the local AI applications and services running on vehicular embodied AI agents need to be migrated, and subsequently referred to as vehicular embodied AI agent twins, which drive the advancement of vehicular embodied AI networks to offload intensive tasks to Roadside Units (RSUs), mitigating latency problems while maintaining service quality. Recognizing workload imbalance among RSUs in traditional approaches, we model AV-RSU interactions as a Stackelberg game to optimize bandwidth resource allocation for efficient migration. A Tiny Multi-Agent Bidirectional LSTM Proximal Policy Optimization (TMABLPPO) algorithm is designed to approximate the Stackelberg equilibrium through decentralized coordination. Furthermore, a personalized neural network pruning algorithm based on Path eXclusion (PX) dynamically adapts to heterogeneous AV computation capabilities by identifying task-critical parameters in trained models, reducing model complexity with less performance degradation. Experimental validation confirms the algorithm's effectiveness in balancing system load and minimizing delays, demonstrating significant improvements in vehicular embodied AI agent deployment.

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BibTeXRIS

Yuxiang Wei, Zhuoqi Zeng, Yue Zhong, Jiawen Kang, Ryan Wen Liu, M. Shamim Hossain. 2025-05-09. Bi-LSTM based Multi-Agent DRL with Computation-aware Pruning for Agent Twins Migration in Vehicular Embodied AI Networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.06378

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