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arXiv · 2611.12434

Frontier AI Safety and Governance 2026: Risk Understanding and Coordinated Governance

Abstract

Frontier AI Safety and Governance 2026: Risk Understanding and Coordinated Governance is a key outcome of the AI Safety and Governance Program of World Internet Conference Specialized Committee on AI in 2026. Drawing on the latest developments in frontier AI capabilities and applications, the report systematically examines the evolving risk landscape, analyzing key risk areas, their severity and response priorities. Building on a review of existing global governance practices and an assessment of frontier AI governance readiness, it identifies key governance gaps and weaknesses and proposes directions and practical mechanisms for coordinated responses. The report provides a reference for government departments, international organizations, businesses, research institutions and other stakeholders. It aims to strengthen the international community's understanding of and consensus on frontier AI risks, enhance preparedness and collective response capacity, and advance the safe, reliable and responsible development of frontier AI to better serve the common well-being of humanity.

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BibTeXRIS

Zeng Yi, Seán Ó hÉigeartaigh, Cao Gongce, Lu Enmeng, Chen Yu, Han Kaiyu, Li Kai, Wang Zhengqi, Chang Yao, Xie Jiawei, Peng Yuxuan, Wang Peining, Nirosha Ananda, Bao Chenfu, Chris Brown, Chang Jiang, Chen Huijie, Chen Jingjing, Cheng Kai, Cheng Ming, Charuka Senal Damunupola, Tom David, Duan Weiwen, Fu Chunhui, Luigi Gambardella, Gao Xuesong, Gong Ke, Gong Xinqi, Sebastian Sunday Grève, Guo Sumin, Dame Wendy Hall, John Higgins, Cyrus Hodes, Bernd Holznagel, Hu Naying, Hu Yongqi, Hu Zhuang, Jiang Chen, Danil Kerimi, Nada Laabidi, Liang Ye, Lin Lin, Lin Mingfeng, Lin Qiushi, Lin Xueyan, Liu Jiaqi, Liu Weichen, Ma Lan, Ma Lin, Helen Meng, Meng Wei, Nicolas Miailhe, Malcolm Murray, Niu Xiaoling, Didier Nkurikiyimfura, Pan Jianfeng, Pang Xiaogang, Henry Papadatos, Peng Tao, Edson Prestes, Qiao Qian, Qiao Yu, Shen Juncheng, Tan Zhixing, Tang Yinshan, Tao Feng, Jimena Sofia Viveros Alvarez, Wang Feng, Wang Fengqiong, Wang Jianbing, Wang Mengyin, Wang Qianyu, Wang Rong, Wang Shengjie, Wang Wei, Wang Xiaozhen, Wang Xin, Wang Xingguang, Wei Kai, Rob Wortham, Wu Shuyan, Wu Yinyu, Xia Hehua, Xia Wenhui, Xiao Jianwu, Xu Deliang, Xu Jiming, Xu Mengwen, Xue Lan, Yang Bo, Yang Lingling, Yang Mingchuan, Yang Shaobo, Yang Yaodong, Yang Zhongliang, Yao Xin, John Yeoh, Ammar Younas, Yuchi Xuebiao, Yue Qiaoli. 2026-11-09. Frontier AI Safety and Governance 2026: Risk Understanding and Coordinated Governance. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/2611.12434

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