arXiv · cond-mat/0212358
Optimal strategies in collective Parrondo games
Abstract
We present a modification of the so-called Parrondo's paradox where one is allowed to choose in each turn the game that a large number of individuals play. It turns out that, by choosing the game which gives the highest average earnings at each step, one ends up with systematic loses, whereas a periodic or random sequence of choices yields a steadily increase of the capital. An explanation of this behavior is given by noting that the short-range maximization of the returns is "killing the goose that laid the golden eggs". A continuous model displaying similar features is analyzed using dynamic programming techniques from control theory.
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Luis Dinis, Juan M. R. Parrondo. 2014-10-02. Optimal strategies in collective Parrondo games. https://doi.org/10.1209/epl%2Fi2003-00461-5
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