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Jamie Tucker-Foltz

Publications and source records attributed to Jamie Tucker-Foltz.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources
arXiv2026

Sampling Balanced Forests of Grids in Polynomial Time

We prove that a polynomial fraction of the set of $k$-component forests in the $m \times n$ grid graph have equal numbers of vertices in each component, for any constant $k$. This resolves a conjecture of Charikar, Liu, Liu, and Vuong, and establishes the first provably polynomial-time algorithm for (exactly or approximately) sampling balanced grid graph partitions according to the spanning tree distribution, which weights each $k$-partition according to the product, across its $k$ pieces, of the number of spanning trees of each piece. Our result follows from a careful analysis of the probability a uniformly random spanning tree of the grid can be cut into balanced pieces. Beyond grids, we show that for a broad family of lattice-like graphs, we achieve balance up to any multiplicative $(1 \pm \varepsilon)$ constant with constant probability, and up to an additive constant with polynomial probability. More generally, we show that, with constant probability, components derived from uniform spanning trees can approximate any given partition of a planar region specified by Jordan curves. These results imply polynomial time algorithms for sampling approximately balanced tree-weighted partitions for lattice-like graphs. Our results have applications to understanding political districtings, where there is an underlying graph of indivisible geographic units that must be partitioned into $k$ population-balanced connected subgraphs. In this setting, tree-weighted partitions have interesting geometric properties, and this has stimulated significant effort to develop methods to sample them.

cs.DM↗
arXiv2026

Structural Tractability Frontiers for Metric Repair

Given a graph $G$ labeled with positive distances on each edge, what is the fewest number of edge distances that must be modified for $G$ to become a metric? It is known that this metric repair problem is $\mathrm{NP}$-hard on general graphs, with prior work focusing on approximations and fixed-parameter tractability with respect to properties of the input distance function. In this paper, we ask what structural properties of the graph itself make metric repair tractable. On the positive side, we give pseudo-polynomial time algorithms for series-parallel graphs, and by generalization, graphs of bounded treewidth. An immediate consequence of this result is a new algorithm for the length-bounded multicut problem, with a parameterized runtime bound in terms of the treewidth of a modestly augmented graph. Surprisingly, pseudo-polynomial time turns out to be the best one can hope for: We complement our algorithm with a proof that metric repair is weakly $\mathrm{NP}$-hard even on graphs of pathwidth at most six. We also prove that planarity does not help either, as the problem remains strongly $\mathrm{NP}$-hard even on grid graphs.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2026

Adaptive Contracts for Cost-Effective AI Delegation

When organizations delegate text generation tasks to AI providers via pay-for-performance contracts, expected payments rise when evaluation is noisy. As evaluation methods become more elaborate, the economic benefits of decreased noise are often overshadowed by increased evaluation costs. In this work, we introduce adaptive contracts for AI delegation, which allow detailed evaluation to be performed selectively after observing an initial coarse signal in order to conserve resources. We make three sets of contributions: First, we provide efficient algorithms for computing optimal adaptive contracts under natural assumptions or when core problem dimensions are small, and prove hardness of approximation in the general unstructured case. We then formulate alternative models of randomized adaptive contracts and discuss their benefits and limitations. Finally, we empirically demonstrate the benefits of adaptivity over non-adaptive baselines using question-answering and code-generation datasets.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Explainable Information Design

Optimal signaling schemes in information design (Bayesian persuasion) often involve randomization or disconnected partitions of state space, which might be too intricate to be audited or communicated. We propose explainable information design in the context of linear information design with a continuous state space. In the case of single-dimensional state, we restrict the information designer to use interval-partitional signaling schemes defined by deterministic and monotone partitions of the state space, where a unique signal is sent for all states in each part. We prove that the price of explainability (PoE) -- the ratio between the performances of the optimal explainable signaling scheme and unrestricted signaling scheme -- is exactly $1/2$ in the worst case, meaning that partitional signaling schemes are never worse than arbitrary signaling schemes by a factor of $2$. For a uniform prior, this PoE can be improved to a tight $2/3$. We then extend the analysis to multi-dimensional state spaces by studying two notions of explainability: convex-partitional policies and axis-aligned rectangular policies. We prove a tight PoE of $1/(m+1)$ for convex-partitional policies, while for rectangular policies we establish a PoE guarantee under uniform prior that is independent of the number of signals but unavoidably exponential in the dimension $m$. We also study the computational complexity of explainable information design, proving that the exactly optimal explainable policy is NP-hard to compute, but an explainable policy with $1/2$ approximation guarantee can be computed in polynomial time for piecewise Lipschitz utility functions.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Cheap Talk in Bilateral Trade

A single seller offers one or more goods to a single buyer. The buyer's values and the seller's costs are private information. Each player has a commonly known prior over the other player's value or cost, supported on a finite set. What is the optimal selling mechanism? We argue that, despite this question's importance and apparent simplicity, prior work offers no satisfactory answer. If the seller simply chooses an optimal menu given her realized costs, she fails to exploit her informational advantage. At the other extreme, the optimal trade mechanism that satisfies IC/IR constraints for both parties fails in practice, as it conditions prices on the seller's unknown costs in an unenforceable way. The seller's realistic capabilities lie somewhere in between: she may leverage private information but lacks unlimited commitment power. To bridge this gap, we consider a solution concept built on the realistic assumption that the seller can commit to prices but nothing more. Similar -- albeit technically distinct -- solution concepts have been studied in the context of auctions with multiple buyers. Our concept proves surprisingly rich even with a single buyer. In our model, the buyer and seller engage in multiple rounds of cheap talk before the seller posts a menu of priced bundles. The buyer then purchases. We measure value as profit for the seller and consumer surplus for the buyer. We prove that with a single good cheap talk cannot help either party, but show that it creates value in any extension of this canonical setting: multiple goods, multiple units, interdependent values, or repeated play. We also show that multiple rounds of communication can yield strictly higher expected profit than a single round. Finally, we discuss how realistic factors beyond our stripped-down model combine with cheap talk to enhance this value even further.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2026

Sampling Tree-Weighted Partitions Without Sampling Trees

This paper gives a new algorithm for sampling tree-weighted partitions of a large class of planar graphs. Formally, the tree-weighted distribution on $k$-partitions of a graph weights $k$-partitions proportional to the product of the number of spanning trees of each partition class. Recent work on computational redistricting analysis has driven special interest in the conditional distribution where all partition classes have the same size (balanced partitions). One class of Markov chains in wide use aims to sample from balanced tree-weighted $k$-partitions using a sampler for balanced tree-weighted 2-partitions. Previous implementations of this 2-partition sampler would draw a random spanning tree and check whether it contains an edge whose removal produces a balanced 2-component forest, rejecting if not. In practice, this is a significant computational bottleneck. We show that in fact it is possible to sample from the balanced tree-weighted 2-partition distribution directly, without first sampling a spanning tree; the acceptance and rejection rates are the same as in previous samplers. We prove that on a wide class of planar graphs encompassing network structures typically arising from the geographic data used in computational redistricting, our algorithm takes expected linear time $O(n)$. Notably, this is asymptotically faster than the best known method to generate random trees, which is $O(n \log^2 n)$ for approximate sampling and $O(n^{1 + \log \log \log n / \log \log n})$ for exact sampling. Additionally, we show that a variant of our algorithm also gives a speedup to $O(n \log n)$ for exact sampling of uniformly random trees on these families of graphs, improving the bounds for both exact and approximate sampling. We implement our algorithm and benchmark it on grid graphs, finding that it outperforms the standard bipartitioning method in the widely-used GerryChain library.

cs.DS↗
arXiv2026

Models of random spanning trees

There are numerous randomized algorithms to generate spanning trees in a given ambient graph; several target the uniform distribution on trees (UST), while in practice the fastest and most frequently used draw random weights on the edges and then employ a greedy algorithm to choose the minimum-weight spanning tree (MST). Though MST is a workhorse in applications, the mathematical properties of random MST are far less explored than those of UST. In this paper we develop tools for the quantitative study of random MST. We consider the standard case that the weights are drawn i.i.d. from a single distribution on the real numbers, as well as successive generalizations that lead to \emph{product measures}, where the weights are independently drawn from arbitrary distributions.

cs.DM↗
arXiv2026

The Balanced Up-Down Walk

Markov chains based on spanning trees have been hugely influential in algorithms for assessing fairness in political redistricting. The input graph represents the geographic building blocks of a jurisdiction. The goal is to output a large ensemble of random graph partitions, which is done by drawing and splitting random spanning trees. Crucially, these subtrees must be balanced, since political districts are required to have equal population. The Up-Down walk (on trees or forests) repeatedly adds a random edge then deletes a random edge to produce a new tree or forest; it can be used to efficiently generate a large ensemble, but the rejection rate to maintain balance grows exponentially with the number of parts. ReCom, the most widely-used class of Markov chains, circumvents this complexity barrier by merging and splitting pairs of districts at a time. This runs fast in practice but can have trouble exploring the state space. To overcome these efficiency and mixing barriers, we propose a new Markov chain called the Balanced Up-Down (BUD) walk. The main idea is to run the Up-Down walk on the space of trees, but require all steps to preserve the property that the tree is splittable into balanced subtrees. The BUD walk samples from a known invariant measure under exact balance. We prove that the BUD walk is irreducible in several cases, including a regime where ReCom is not irreducible. Running the BUD walk efficiently presents algorithmic challenges, especially when parts are allowed to deviate from their ideal size. A key subroutine is determining whether a tree is splittable into approximately-balanced subtrees. We give an improved analysis of an existing algorithm for this problem and prove that the associated counting problem is #P-complete. We empirically validate the usefulness of the BUD walk by comparing its performance to that of other existing methods for sampling partitions.

cs.DM↗
arXiv2024

Locked Polyomino Tilings

A locked $t$-omino tiling is a grid tiling by $t$-ominoes such that, if you remove any pair of tiles, the only way to fill in the remaining $2t$ grid cells with $t$-ominoes is to use the same two tiles in the exact same configuration as before. We exclude degenerate cases where there is only one tiling overall due to small dimensions. It is a classic (and straightforward) result that finite grids do not admit locked 2-omino tilings. In this paper, we construct explicit locked $t$-omino tilings for $t \geq 3$ on grids of various dimensions. Most notably, we show that locked 3- and 4-omino tilings exist on finite square grids of arbitrarily large size, and locked $t$-omino tilings of the infinite grid exist for arbitrarily large $t$. The result for 4-omino tilings in particular is remarkable because they are so rare and difficult to construct: Only a single tiling is known to exist on any grid up to size $40 \times 40$. In a weighted version of the problem where vertices of the grid may have weights from the set $\{1, 2\}$ that count toward the total tile size, we demonstrate the existence of locked tilings on arbitrarily large square weighted grids with only 6 tiles. Locked $t$-omino tilings arise as obstructions to widely used political redistricting algorithms in a model of redistricting where the underlying census geography is a grid graph. Most prominent is the ReCom Markov chain, which takes a random walk on the space of redistricting plans by iteratively merging and splitting pairs of districts (tiles) at a time. Locked $t$-omino tilings are isolated states in the state space of ReCom. The constructions in this paper are counterexamples to the meta-conjecture that ReCom is irreducible on graphs of practical interest.

math.CO↗
arXiv2024

Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain Preferences

We study the classic divide-and-choose method for equitably allocating divisible goods between two players who are rational, self-interested Bayesian agents. The players have additive values for the goods. The prior distributions on those values are common knowledge. We consider both the cases of independent values and values that are correlated across players (as occurs when there is a common-value component). We describe the structure of optimal divisions in the divide-and-choose game and identify several cases where it is possible to efficiently compute equilibria. An approximation algorithm is presented for the case when the distribution over the chooser's value for each good follows a normal distribution, along with a randomized approximation algorithm for the case of uniform distributions over intervals. A mixture of analytic results and computational simulations illuminates several striking differences between optimal strategies in the cases of known versus unknown preferences. Most notably, given unknown preferences, the divider has a compelling "diversification" incentive in creating the chooser's two options. This incentive leads to multiple goods being divided at equilibrium, quite contrary to the divider's optimal strategy when preferences are known. In many contexts, such as buy-and-sell provisions between partners, or in judging fairness, it is important to assess the relative expected utilities of the divider and chooser. Those utilities, we show, depend on the players' levels of knowledge about each other's values, the correlations between the players' values, and the number of goods being divided. Under fairly mild assumptions, we show that the chooser is strictly better off for a small number of goods, while the divider is strictly better off for a large number of goods.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2024

Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes

Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of $m$ candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m$ candidates. Generalizing prior works that focused on specific instances of this problem, our paper fully characterizes the set of positional scoring rules that can be computed for any $1 \leq t < m$, which, notably, does not include plurality. We then extend this to show a similar impossibility result for single transferable vote (elimination voting). These negative results are information-theoretic and agnostic to the number of queries. Finally, for scoring rules that are computable with limited-sized queries, we give parameterized upper and lower bounds on the number of such queries a deterministic or randomized algorithm must make to determine the score-maximizing candidate. While there is no gap between our bounds for deterministic algorithms, identifying the exact query complexity for randomized algorithms is a challenging open problem, of which we solve one special case.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2024

Monotone Randomized Apportionment

Apportionment is the act of distributing the seats of a legislature among political parties (or states) in proportion to their vote shares (or populations). A famous impossibility by Balinski and Young (2001) shows that no apportionment method can be proportional up to one seat (quota) while also responding monotonically to changes in the votes (population monotonicity). Grimmett (2004) proposed to overcome this impossibility by randomizing the apportionment, which can achieve quota as well as perfect proportionality and monotonicity -- at least in terms of the expected number of seats awarded to each party. Still, the correlations between the seats awarded to different parties may exhibit bizarre non-monotonicities. When parties or voters care about joint events, such as whether a coalition of parties reaches a majority, these non-monotonicities can cause paradoxes, including incentives for strategic voting. In this paper, we propose monotonicity axioms ruling out these paradoxes, and study which of them can be satisfied jointly with Grimmett's axioms. Essentially, we require that, if a set of parties all receive more votes, the probability of those parties jointly receiving more seats should increase. Our work draws on a rich literature on unequal probability sampling in statistics (studied as dependent randomized rounding in computer science). Our main result shows that a sampling scheme due to Sampford (1967) satisfies Grimmett's axioms and a notion of higher-order correlation monotonicity.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2024

Inapproximability of Unique Games in Fixed-Point Logic with Counting

We study the extent to which it is possible to approximate the optimal value of a Unique Games instance in Fixed-Point Logic with Counting (FPC). Formally, we prove lower bounds against the accuracy of FPC-interpretations that map Unique Games instances (encoded as relational structures) to rational numbers giving the approximate fraction of constraints that can be satisfied. We prove two new FPC-inexpressibility results for Unique Games: the existence of a $(1/2, 1/3 + δ)$-inapproximability gap, and inapproximability to within any constant factor. Previous recent work has established similar FPC-inapproximability results for a small handful of other problems. Our construction builds upon some of these ideas, but contains a novel technique. While most FPC-inexpressibility results are based on variants of the CFI-construction, ours is significantly different. We start with a graph of very large girth and label the edges with random affine vector spaces over $\mathbb{F}_2$ that determine the constraints in the two structures. Duplicator's strategy involves maintaining a partial isomorphism over a minimal tree that spans the pebbled vertices of the graph.

cs.LO↗
arXiv2023

Representation with Incomplete Votes

Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with them. These methods should guarantee fair representation of the participants, as their outcomes may affect the health of the conversation and inform impactful downstream decisions. To that end, we draw on the literature on approval-based committee elections. Our setting is novel in that the approval votes are incomplete since participants will typically not vote on all comments. We prove that this complication renders non-adaptive algorithms impractical in terms of the amount of information they must gather. Therefore, we develop an adaptive algorithm that uses information more efficiently by presenting incoming participants with statements that appear promising based on votes by previous participants. We prove that this method satisfies commonly used notions of fair representation, even when participants only vote on a small fraction of comments. Finally, an empirical evaluation using real data shows that the proposed algorithm provides representative outcomes in practice.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

Topological Universality of the Art Gallery Problem

We prove that any compact semi-algebraic set is homeomorphic to the solution space of some art gallery problem. Previous works have established similar universality theorems, but holding only up to homotopy equivalence, rather than homeomorphism, and prior to this work, the existence of art galleries even for simple spaces such as the Möbius strip or the three-holed torus were unknown. Our construction relies on an elegant and versatile gadget to copy guard positions with minimal overhead. It is simpler than previous constructions, consisting of a single rectangular room with convex slits cut out from the edges. We show that both the orientable and non-orientable surfaces of genus $n$ admit galleries with only $O(n)$ vertices.

cs.CG↗
arXiv2023

You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too

The design of algorithms for political redistricting generally takes one of two approaches: optimize an objective such as compactness or, drawing on fair division, construct a protocol whose outcomes guarantee partisan fairness. We aim to have the best of both worlds by optimizing an objective subject to a binary fairness constraint. As the fairness constraint we adopt the geometric target, which requires the number of seats won by each party to be at least the average (rounded down) of its outcomes under the worst and best partitions of the state. To study the feasibility of this approach, we introduce a new model of redistricting that closely mirrors the classic model of cake-cutting. This model has two innovative features. First, in any part of the state there is an underlying 'density' of voters with political leanings toward any given party, making it impossible to finely separate voters for different parties into different districts. This captures a realistic constraint that previously existing theoretical models of redistricting tend to ignore. Second, parties may disagree on the distribution of voters - whether by genuine disagreement or attempted strategic behavior. In the absence of a 'ground truth' distribution, a redistricting algorithm must therefore aim to simultaneously be fair to each party with respect to its own reported data. Our main theoretical result is that, surprisingly, the geometric target is always feasible with respect to arbitrarily diverging data sets on how voters are distributed. Any standard for fairness is only useful if it can be readily satisfied in practice. Our empirical results, which use real election data and maps of six US states, demonstrate that the geometric target is always feasible, and that imposing it as a fairness constraint comes at almost no cost to three well-studied optimization objectives.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2023

Pseudorandom Finite Models

We study pseudorandomness and pseudorandom generators from the perspective of logical definability. Building on results from ordinary derandomization and finite model theory, we show that it is possible to deterministically construct, in polynomial time, graphs and relational structures that are statistically indistinguishable from random structures by any sentence of first order or least fixed point logics. This raises the question of whether such constructions can be implemented via logical transductions from simpler structures with less entropy. In other words, can logical formulas be pseudorandom generators? We provide a complete classification of when this is possible for first order logic, fixed point logic, and fixed point logic with parity, and provide partial results and conjectures for first order logic with parity.

cs.LO↗
arXiv2022

Thou Shalt Covet The Average Of Thy Neighbors' Cakes

We prove an $Ω(n^2)$ lower bound on the query complexity of local proportionality in the Robertson-Webb cake-cutting model. Local proportionality requires that each agent prefer their allocation to the average of their neighbors' allocations in some undirected social network. It is a weaker fairness notion than envy-freeness, which also has query complexity $Ω(n^2)$, and generally incomparable to proportionality, which has query complexity $Θ(n \log n)$. This result separates the complexity of local proportionality from that of ordinary proportionality, confirming the intuition that finding a locally proportional allocation is a more difficult computational problem.

cs.CC↗