arXiv subjects

Maksym Andriushchenko

Publications and source records attributed to Maksym Andriushchenko.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2026

Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

International AI Safety Report 2026

The International AI Safety Report 2026 synthesises the current scientific evidence on the capabilities, emerging risks, and safety of general-purpose AI systems. The report series was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. 29 nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. Over 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the Report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Capability-Based Scaling Trends for LLM-Based Red-Teaming

As large language models grow in capability and agency, identifying vulnerabilities through red-teaming becomes vital for safe deployment. However, traditional prompt-engineering approaches may prove ineffective once red-teaming turns into a \emph{weak-to-strong} problem, where target models surpass red-teamers in capabilities. To study this shift, we frame red-teaming through the lens of the \emph{capability gap} between attacker and target. We evaluate more than 600 attacker-target pairs using LLM-based jailbreak attacks that mimic human red-teamers across diverse families, sizes, and capability levels. Three strong trends emerge: (i) more capable models are better attackers, (ii) attack success drops sharply once the target's capability exceeds the attacker's, and (iii) attack success rates correlate with high performance on social science splits of the MMLU-Pro benchmark. From these observations, we derive a \emph{jailbreaking scaling curve} that predicts attack success for a fixed target based on attacker-target capability gap. These findings suggest that fixed-capability attackers (e.g., humans) may become ineffective against future models, increasingly capable open-source models amplify risks for existing systems, and model providers must accurately measure and control models' persuasive and manipulative abilities to limit their effectiveness as attackers.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

HalluHard: A Hard Multi-Turn Hallucination Benchmark

Large language models (LLMs) still produce plausible-sounding but ungrounded factual claims, a problem that worsens in multi-turn dialogue as context grows and early errors cascade. We introduce $\textbf{HalluHard}$, a challenging multi-turn hallucination benchmark with 950 seed questions spanning four high-stakes domains: legal cases, research questions, medical guidelines, and coding. We operationalize groundedness by requiring inline citations for factual assertions. To support reliable evaluation in open-ended settings, we propose a judging pipeline that iteratively retrieves evidence via web search. It can fetch, filter, and parse full-text sources (including PDFs) to assess whether cited material actually supports the generated content. Across a diverse set of frontier proprietary and open-weight models, hallucinations remain substantial even with web search ($\approx 30\%$ for the strongest configuration, Opus-4.5 with web search), with content-grounding errors persisting at high rates. Finally, we show that hallucination behavior is shaped by model capacity, turn position, effective reasoning, and the type of knowledge required.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report 2025: Second Key Update: Technical Safeguards and Risk Management

This second update to the 2025 International AI Safety Report assesses new developments in general-purpose AI risk management over the past year. It examines how researchers, public institutions, and AI developers are approaching risk management for general-purpose AI. In recent months, for example, three leading AI developers applied enhanced safeguards to their new models, as their internal pre-deployment testing could not rule out the possibility that these models could be misused to help create biological weapons. Beyond specific precautionary measures, there have been a range of other advances in techniques for making AI models and systems more reliable and resistant to misuse. These include new approaches in adversarial training, data curation, and monitoring systems. In parallel, institutional frameworks that operationalise and formalise these technical capabilities are starting to emerge: the number of companies publishing Frontier AI Safety Frameworks more than doubled in 2025, and governments and international organisations have established a small number of governance frameworks for general-purpose AI, focusing largely on transparency and risk assessment.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Agent Skills Enable a New Class of Realistic and Trivially Simple Prompt Injections

Enabling continual learning in LLMs remains a key unresolved research challenge. In a recent announcement, a frontier LLM company made a step towards this by introducing Agent Skills, a framework that equips agents with new knowledge based on instructions stored in simple markdown files. Although Agent Skills can be a very useful tool, we show that they are fundamentally insecure, since they enable trivially simple prompt injections. We demonstrate how to hide malicious instructions in long Agent Skill files and referenced scripts to exfiltrate sensitive data, such as internal files or passwords. Importantly, we show how to bypass system-level guardrails of a popular coding agent: a benign, task-specific approval with the "Don't ask again" option can carry over to closely related but harmful actions. Overall, we conclude that despite ongoing research efforts and scaling model capabilities, frontier LLMs remain vulnerable to very simple prompt injections in realistic scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/aisa-group/promptinject-agent-skills.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

OS-Harm: A Benchmark for Measuring Safety of Computer Use Agents

Computer use agents are LLM-based agents that can directly interact with a graphical user interface, by processing screenshots or accessibility trees. While these systems are gaining popularity, their safety has been largely overlooked, despite the fact that evaluating and understanding their potential for harmful behavior is essential for widespread adoption. To address this gap, we introduce OS-Harm, a new benchmark for measuring safety of computer use agents. OS-Harm is built on top of the OSWorld environment and aims to test models across three categories of harm: deliberate user misuse, prompt injection attacks, and model misbehavior. To cover these cases, we create 150 tasks that span several types of safety violations (harassment, copyright infringement, disinformation, data exfiltration, etc.) and require the agent to interact with a variety of OS applications (email client, code editor, browser, etc.). Moreover, we propose an automated judge to evaluate both accuracy and safety of agents that achieves high agreement with human annotations (0.76 and 0.79 F1 score). We evaluate computer use agents based on a range of frontier models - such as o4-mini, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.5 Pro - and provide insights into their safety. In particular, all models tend to directly comply with many deliberate misuse queries, are relatively vulnerable to static prompt injections, and occasionally perform unsafe actions. The OS-Harm benchmark is available at https://github.com/tml-epfl/os-harm.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report 2025: First Key Update: Capabilities and Risk Implications

Since the publication of the first International AI Safety Report, AI capabilities have continued to improve across key domains. New training techniques that teach AI systems to reason step-by-step and inference-time enhancements have primarily driven these advances, rather than simply training larger models. As a result, general-purpose AI systems can solve more complex problems in a range of domains, from scientific research to software development. Their performance on benchmarks that measure performance in coding, mathematics, and answering expert-level science questions has continued to improve, though reliability challenges persist, with systems excelling on some tasks while failing completely on others. These capability improvements also have implications for multiple risks, including risks from biological weapons and cyber attacks. Finally, they pose new challenges for monitoring and controllability. This update examines how AI capabilities have improved since the first Report, then focuses on key risk areas where substantial new evidence warrants updated assessments.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Strategic Dishonesty Can Undermine AI Safety Evaluations of Frontier LLMs

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are crafted to be subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using them as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Monitoring Decomposition Attacks in LLMs with Lightweight Sequential Monitors

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Critical Influence of Overparameterization on Sharpness-aware Minimization

Sharpness-Aware Minimization (SAM) has attracted considerable attention for its effectiveness in improving generalization in deep neural network training by explicitly minimizing sharpness in the loss landscape. Its success, however, relies on the assumption that there exists sufficient variability of flatness in the solution space-a condition commonly facilitated by overparameterization. Yet, the interaction between SAM and overparameterization has not been thoroughly investigated, leaving a gap in understanding precisely how overparameterization affects SAM. Thus, in this work, we analyze SAM under varying degrees of overparameterization, presenting both empirical and theoretical findings that reveal its critical influence on SAM's effectiveness. First, we conduct extensive numerical experiments across diverse domains, demonstrating that SAM consistently benefits from overparameterization. Next, we attribute this phenomenon to the interplay between the enlarged solution space and increased implicit bias resulting from overparameterization. Furthermore, we show that this effect is particularly pronounced in practical settings involving label noise and sparsity, and yet, sufficient regularization is necessary. Last but not least, we provide other theoretical insights into how overparameterization helps SAM achieve minima with more uniform Hessian moments compared to SGD, and much faster convergence at a linear rate.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Is In-Context Learning Sufficient for Instruction Following in LLMs?

In-context learning (ICL) allows LLMs to learn from examples without changing their weights: this is a particularly promising capability for long-context LLMs that can potentially learn from many examples. Recently, Lin et al. (2024) proposed URIAL, a method using only three in-context examples to align base LLMs, achieving non-trivial instruction following performance. In this work, we show that, while effective, ICL alignment with URIAL still underperforms compared to instruction fine-tuning on the established benchmark MT-Bench, especially with more capable base LLMs. We then uncover the most relevant elements for successful in-context alignment, finding the crucial role of the decoding parameters. Based on these insights, we show that the approach of URIAL can indeed be improved by adding high-quality, potentially carefully selected via greedy search, demonstrations in context, getting closer to the performance of instruct models. Finally, we provide the first, to our knowledge, systematic comparison of ICL and instruction fine-tuning (IFT) for instruction following in the low data regime, where ICL can be a viable alternative to IFT. Overall, our work advances the understanding of ICL as an alignment technique and its relationship to IFT. We provide our code at https://github.com/tml-epfl/icl-alignment.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents

The robustness of LLMs to jailbreak attacks, where users design prompts to circumvent safety measures and misuse model capabilities, has been studied primarily for LLMs acting as simple chatbots. Meanwhile, LLM agents -- which use external tools and can execute multi-stage tasks -- may pose a greater risk if misused, but their robustness remains underexplored. To facilitate research on LLM agent misuse, we propose a new benchmark called AgentHarm. The benchmark includes a diverse set of 110 explicitly malicious agent tasks (440 with augmentations), covering 11 harm categories including fraud, cybercrime, and harassment. In addition to measuring whether models refuse harmful agentic requests, scoring well on AgentHarm requires jailbroken agents to maintain their capabilities following an attack to complete a multi-step task. We evaluate a range of leading LLMs, and find (1) leading LLMs are surprisingly compliant with malicious agent requests without jailbreaking, (2) simple universal jailbreak templates can be adapted to effectively jailbreak agents, and (3) these jailbreaks enable coherent and malicious multi-step agent behavior and retain model capabilities. To enable simple and reliable evaluation of attacks and defenses for LLM-based agents, we publicly release AgentHarm at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ai-safety-institute/AgentHarm.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks

We show that even the most recent safety-aligned LLMs are not robust to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. First, we demonstrate how to successfully leverage access to logprobs for jailbreaking: we initially design an adversarial prompt template (sometimes adapted to the target LLM), and then we apply random search on a suffix to maximize a target logprob (e.g., of the token "Sure"), potentially with multiple restarts. In this way, we achieve 100% attack success rate -- according to GPT-4 as a judge -- on Vicuna-13B, Mistral-7B, Phi-3-Mini, Nemotron-4-340B, Llama-2-Chat-7B/13B/70B, Llama-3-Instruct-8B, Gemma-7B, GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, and R2D2 from HarmBench that was adversarially trained against the GCG attack. We also show how to jailbreak all Claude models -- that do not expose logprobs -- via either a transfer or prefilling attack with a 100% success rate. In addition, we show how to use random search on a restricted set of tokens for finding trojan strings in poisoned models -- a task that shares many similarities with jailbreaking -- which is the algorithm that brought us the first place in the SaTML'24 Trojan Detection Competition. The common theme behind these attacks is that adaptivity is crucial: different models are vulnerable to different prompting templates (e.g., R2D2 is very sensitive to in-context learning prompts), some models have unique vulnerabilities based on their APIs (e.g., prefilling for Claude), and in some settings, it is crucial to restrict the token search space based on prior knowledge (e.g., for trojan detection). For reproducibility purposes, we provide the code, logs, and jailbreak artifacts in the JailbreakBench format at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Does Refusal Training in LLMs Generalize to the Past Tense?

Refusal training is widely used to prevent LLMs from generating harmful, undesirable, or illegal outputs. We reveal a curious generalization gap in the current refusal training approaches: simply reformulating a harmful request in the past tense (e.g., "How to make a Molotov cocktail?" to "How did people make a Molotov cocktail?") is often sufficient to jailbreak many state-of-the-art LLMs. We systematically evaluate this method on Llama-3 8B, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Gemma-2 9B, Phi-3-Mini, GPT-4o mini, GPT-4o, o1-mini, o1-preview, and R2D2 models using GPT-3.5 Turbo as a reformulation model. For example, the success rate of this simple attack on GPT-4o increases from 1% using direct requests to 88% using 20 past tense reformulation attempts on harmful requests from JailbreakBench with GPT-4 as a jailbreak judge. Interestingly, we also find that reformulations in the future tense are less effective, suggesting that refusal guardrails tend to consider past historical questions more benign than hypothetical future questions. Moreover, our experiments on fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo show that defending against past reformulations is feasible when past tense examples are explicitly included in the fine-tuning data. Overall, our findings highlight that the widely used alignment techniques -- such as SFT, RLHF, and adversarial training -- employed to align the studied models can be brittle and do not always generalize as intended. We provide code and jailbreak artifacts at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-past-tense.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Exploring Memorization and Copyright Violation in Frontier LLMs: A Study of the New York Times v. OpenAI 2023 Lawsuit

Copyright infringement in frontier LLMs has received much attention recently due to the New York Times v. OpenAI lawsuit, filed in December 2023. The New York Times claims that GPT-4 has infringed its copyrights by reproducing articles for use in LLM training and by memorizing the inputs, thereby publicly displaying them in LLM outputs. Our work aims to measure the propensity of OpenAI's LLMs to exhibit verbatim memorization in its outputs relative to other LLMs, specifically focusing on news articles. We discover that both GPT and Claude models use refusal training and output filters to prevent verbatim output of the memorized articles. We apply a basic prompt template to bypass the refusal training and show that OpenAI models are currently less prone to memorization elicitation than models from Meta, Mistral, and Anthropic. We find that as models increase in size, especially beyond 100 billion parameters, they demonstrate significantly greater capacity for memorization. Our findings have practical implications for training: more attention must be placed on preventing verbatim memorization in very large models. Our findings also have legal significance: in assessing the relative memorization capacity of OpenAI's LLMs, we probe the strength of The New York Times's copyright infringement claims and OpenAI's legal defenses, while underscoring issues at the intersection of generative AI, law, and policy.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Why Do We Need Weight Decay in Modern Deep Learning?

Weight decay is a broadly used technique for training state-of-the-art deep networks from image classification to large language models. Despite its widespread usage and being extensively studied in the classical literature, its role remains poorly understood for deep learning. In this work, we highlight that the role of weight decay in modern deep learning is different from its regularization effect studied in classical learning theory. For deep networks on vision tasks trained with multipass SGD, we show how weight decay modifies the optimization dynamics enhancing the ever-present implicit regularization of SGD via the loss stabilization mechanism. In contrast, for large language models trained with nearly one-epoch training, we describe how weight decay balances the bias-variance tradeoff in stochastic optimization leading to lower training loss and improved training stability. Overall, we present a unifying perspective from ResNets on vision tasks to LLMs: weight decay is never useful as an explicit regularizer but instead changes the training dynamics in a desirable way. The code is available at https://github.com/tml-epfl/why-weight-decay

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

JailbreakBench: An Open Robustness Benchmark for Jailbreaking Large Language Models

Jailbreak attacks cause large language models (LLMs) to generate harmful, unethical, or otherwise objectionable content. Evaluating these attacks presents a number of challenges, which the current collection of benchmarks and evaluation techniques do not adequately address. First, there is no clear standard of practice regarding jailbreaking evaluation. Second, existing works compute costs and success rates in incomparable ways. And third, numerous works are not reproducible, as they withhold adversarial prompts, involve closed-source code, or rely on evolving proprietary APIs. To address these challenges, we introduce JailbreakBench, an open-sourced benchmark with the following components: (1) an evolving repository of state-of-the-art adversarial prompts, which we refer to as jailbreak artifacts; (2) a jailbreaking dataset comprising 100 behaviors -- both original and sourced from prior work (Zou et al., 2023; Mazeika et al., 2023, 2024) -- which align with OpenAI's usage policies; (3) a standardized evaluation framework at https://github.com/JailbreakBench/jailbreakbench that includes a clearly defined threat model, system prompts, chat templates, and scoring functions; and (4) a leaderboard at https://jailbreakbench.github.io/ that tracks the performance of attacks and defenses for various LLMs. We have carefully considered the potential ethical implications of releasing this benchmark, and believe that it will be a net positive for the community.

cs.CR↗