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Mengxiao Zhang

Publications and source records attributed to Mengxiao Zhang.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Contextual Linear Bandits with Delay as Payoff

A recent work by Schlisselberg et al. (2024) studies a delay-as-payoff model for stochastic multi-armed bandits, where the payoff (either loss or reward) is delayed for a period that is proportional to the payoff itself. While this captures many real-world applications, the simple multi-armed bandit setting limits the practicality of their results. In this paper, we address this limitation by studying the delay-as-payoff model for contextual linear bandits. Specifically, we start from the case with a fixed action set and propose an efficient algorithm whose regret overhead compared to the standard no-delay case is at most $DΔ_{\max}\log T$, where $T$ is the total horizon, $D$ is the maximum delay, and $Δ_{\max}$ is the maximum suboptimality gap. When payoff is loss, we also show further improvement of the bound, demonstrating a separation between reward and loss similar to Schlisselberg et al. (2024). Contrary to standard linear bandit algorithms that construct least squares estimator and confidence ellipsoid, the main novelty of our algorithm is to apply a phased arm elimination procedure by only picking actions in a volumetric spanner of the action set, which addresses challenges arising from both payoff-dependent delays and large action sets. We further extend our results to the case with varying action sets by adopting the reduction from Hanna et al. (2023). Finally, we implement our algorithm and showcase its effectiveness and superior performance in experiments.

cs.LG↗

Data Pricing for Graph Neural Networks without Pre-purchased Inspection

Machine learning (ML) models have become essential tools in various scenarios. Their effectiveness, however, hinges on a substantial volume of data for satisfactory performance. Model marketplaces have thus emerged as crucial platforms bridging model consumers seeking ML solutions and data owners possessing valuable data. These marketplaces leverage model trading mechanisms to properly incentive data owners to contribute their data, and return a well performing ML model to the model consumers. However, existing model trading mechanisms often assume the data owners are willing to share their data before being paid, which is not reasonable in real world. Given that, we propose a novel mechanism, named Structural Importance based Model Trading (SIMT) mechanism, that assesses the data importance and compensates data owners accordingly without disclosing the data. Specifically, SIMT procures feature and label data from data owners according to their structural importance, and then trains a graph neural network for model consumers. Theoretically, SIMT ensures incentive compatible, individual rational and budget feasible. The experiments on five popular datasets validate that SIMT consistently outperforms vanilla baselines by up to $40\%$ in both MacroF1 and MicroF1.

cs.GT↗

Multi-source Multi-level Multi-token Ethereum Dataset and Benchmark Platform

This paper introduces 3MEthTaskforce (https://3meth.github.io), a multi-source, multi-level, and multi-token Ethereum dataset addressing the limitations of single-source datasets. Integrating over 300 million transaction records, 3,880 token profiles, global market indicators, and Reddit sentiment data from 2014-2024, it enables comprehensive studies on user behavior, market sentiment, and token performance. 3MEthTaskforce defines benchmarks for user behavior prediction and token price prediction tasks, using 6 dynamic graph networks and 19 time-series models to evaluate performance. Its multimodal design supports risk analysis and market fluctuation modeling, providing a valuable resource for advancing blockchain analytics and decentralized finance research.

cs.CE↗

WDD: Weighted Delta Debugging

Delta Debugging is a widely used family of algorithms (e.g., ddmin and ProbDD) to automatically minimize bug-triggering test inputs, thus to facilitate debugging. It takes a list of elements with each element representing a fragment of the test input, systematically partitions the list at different granularities, identifies and deletes bug-irrelevant partitions. Prior delta debugging algorithms assume there are no differences among the elements in the list, and thus treat them uniformly during partitioning. However, in practice, this assumption usually does not hold, because the size (referred to as weight) of the fragment represented by each element can vary significantly. For example, a single element representing 50% of the test input is much more likely to be bug-relevant than elements representing only 1%. This assumption inevitably impairs the efficiency or even effectiveness of these delta debugging algorithms. This paper proposes Weighted Delta Debugging (WDD), a novel concept to help prior delta debugging algorithms overcome the limitation mentioned above. The key insight of WDD is to assign each element in the list a weight according to its size, and distinguish different elements based on their weights during partitioning. We designed two new minimization algorithms, Wddmin and WProbDD, by applying WDD to ddmin and ProbDD respectively. We extensively evaluated Wddmin and WProbDD in two representative applications, HDD and Perses, on 62 benchmarks across two languages. The results strongly demonstrate the value of WDD. We firmly believe that WDD opens up a new dimension to improve test input minimization techniques.

cs.SE↗

Autobidders with Budget and ROI Constraints: Efficiency, Regret, and Pacing Dynamics

We study a game between autobidding algorithms that compete in an online advertising platform. Each autobidder is tasked with maximizing its advertiser's total value over multiple rounds of a repeated auction, subject to budget and return-on-investment constraints. We propose a gradient-based learning algorithm that is guaranteed to satisfy all constraints and achieves vanishing individual regret. Our algorithm uses only bandit feedback and can be used with the first- or second-price auction, as well as with any "intermediate" auction format. Our main result is that when these autobidders play against each other, the resulting expected liquid welfare over all rounds is at least half of the expected optimal liquid welfare achieved by any allocation. This holds whether or not the bidding dynamics converges to an equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

New results on the local-nonglobal minimizers of the generalized trust-region subproblem

In this paper, we study the local-nonglobal minimizers of the Generalized Trust-Region subproblem $(GTR)$ and its Equality-constrained version $(GTRE)$. Firstly, the equivalence is established between the local-nonglobal minimizers of both $(GTR)$ and $(GTRE)$ under assumption of the joint definiteness. By the way, a counterexample is presented to disprove a conjecture of Song-Wang-Liu-Xia [SIAM J. Optim., 33(2023), pp.267-293]. Secondly, if the Hessian matrix pair is jointly positive definite, it is proved that each of $(GTR)$ and $(GTRE)$ has at most two local-nonglobal minimizers. This result first confirms the correctness of another conjecture of Song-Wang-Liu-Xia [SIAM J. Optim., 33(2023), pp.267-293]. Thirdly, if the Hessian matrix pair is jointly negative definite, it is verified that each of $(GTR)$ and $(GTRE)$ has at most one local-nonglobal minimizer. In special, if the constraint is reduced to be a ball or a sphere, the above result is just the classical Martínez's. Finally, an algorithm is proposed to find all the local-nonglobal minimizers of $(GTR)$ and $(GTRE)$ or confirm their nonexistence in a tolerance. Preliminary numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm.

math.OC↗

Balancing Efficiency with Equality: Auction Design with Group Fairness Concerns

The issue of fairness in AI arises from discriminatory practices in applications like job recommendations and risk assessments, emphasising the need for algorithms that do not discriminate based on group characteristics. This concern is also pertinent to auctions, commonly used for resource allocation, which necessitate fairness considerations. Our study examines auctions with groups distinguished by specific attributes, seeking to (1) define a fairness notion that ensures equitable treatment for all, (2) identify mechanisms that adhere to this fairness while preserving incentive compatibility, and (3) explore the balance between fairness and seller's revenue. We introduce two fairness notions-group fairness and individual fairness-and propose two corresponding auction mechanisms: the Group Probability Mechanism, which meets group fairness and incentive criteria, and the Group Score Mechanism, which also encompasses individual fairness. Through experiments, we validate these mechanisms' effectiveness in promoting fairness and examine their implications for seller revenue.

cs.GT↗

Meta-mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions over Social Networks

Recently there has been a large amount of research designing mechanisms for auction scenarios where the bidders are connected in a social network. Different from the existing studies in this field that focus on specific auction scenarios e.g. single-unit auction and multi-unit auction, this paper considers the following question: is it possible to design a scheme that, given a classical auction scenario and a mechanism $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$ suited for it, produces a mechanism in the network setting that preserves the key properties of $\tilde{\mathcal{M}}$? To answer this question, we design meta-mechanisms that provide a uniform way of transforming mechanisms from classical models to mechanisms over networks and prove that the desirable properties are preserved by our meta-mechanisms. Our meta-mechanisms provide solutions to combinatorial auction scenarios in the network setting: (1) combinatorial auction with single-minded buyers and (2) combinatorial auction with general monotone valuation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that designs combinatorial auctions over a social network.

cs.GT↗

From Optimal Transport to Efficient Mechanisms for the $m$-Capacitated Facilities Location Problem with Bayesian Agent

In this paper, we study of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on the line from a Bayesian Mechanism Design perspective and propose a novel class of mechanisms: the \textit{Extended Ranking Mechanisms} (ERMs). We first show that an ERM is truthful if and only if it satisfies a system of inequalities that depends on the capacities of the facilities we need to place. We then establish a connection between the $m$-CFLP and a norm minimization problem in the Wasserstein space, which enables us to show that if the number of agent goes to infinity the limit of the ratio between the expected Social Cost of an ERM and the expected optimal Social Cost is finite and characterize its value. Noticeably, our method generalizes to encompass other truthful mechanisms and other metrics, such as the $l_p$ and Maximum costs. We conclude our theoretical analysis by characterizing the optimal ERM tailored to a $m$-CFLP and a distribution $μ$, that is the ERM whose limit Bayesian approximation ratio is the lowest compared to all other feasible ERMs. We consider mainly two frameworks: (i) in the first framework, the total facility capacity matches the number of agents, (ii) in the second framework, $m=2$. When we consider the Maximum Cost, we retrieve the optimal ERM for every $μ$, while for the Social Cost, we characterize the solution when the measure $μ$ is symmetric. Lastly, we numerically compare the performance of the ERMs against other truthful mechanisms and evaluate how quickly the Bayesian approximation ratio converges to its limit.

cs.GT↗

Provably Efficient Interactive-Grounded Learning with Personalized Reward

Interactive-Grounded Learning (IGL) [Xie et al., 2021] is a powerful framework in which a learner aims at maximizing unobservable rewards through interacting with an environment and observing reward-dependent feedback on the taken actions. To deal with personalized rewards that are ubiquitous in applications such as recommendation systems, Maghakian et al. [2022] study a version of IGL with context-dependent feedback, but their algorithm does not come with theoretical guarantees. In this work, we consider the same problem and provide the first provably efficient algorithms with sublinear regret under realizability. Our analysis reveals that the step-function estimator of prior work can deviate uncontrollably due to finite-sample effects. Our solution is a novel Lipschitz reward estimator which underestimates the true reward and enjoys favorable generalization performances. Building on this estimator, we propose two algorithms, one based on explore-then-exploit and the other based on inverse-gap weighting. We apply IGL to learning from image feedback and learning from text feedback, which are reward-free settings that arise in practice. Experimental results showcase the importance of using our Lipschitz reward estimator and the overall effectiveness of our algorithms.

cs.LG↗

No-Regret Learning for Fair Multi-Agent Social Welfare Optimization

We consider the problem of online multi-agent Nash social welfare (NSW) maximization. While previous works of Hossain et al. [2021], Jones et al. [2023] study similar problems in stochastic multi-agent multi-armed bandits and show that $\sqrt{T}$-regret is possible after $T$ rounds, their fairness measure is the product of all agents' rewards, instead of their NSW (that is, their geometric mean). Given the fundamental role of NSW in the fairness literature, it is more than natural to ask whether no-regret fair learning with NSW as the objective is possible. In this work, we provide a complete answer to this question in various settings. Specifically, in stochastic $N$-agent $K$-armed bandits, we develop an algorithm with $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(K^{\frac{2}{N}}T^{\frac{N-1}{N}}\right)$ regret and prove that the dependence on $T$ is tight, making it a sharp contrast to the $\sqrt{T}$-regret bounds of Hossain et al. [2021], Jones et al. [2023]. We then consider a more challenging version of the problem with adversarial rewards. Somewhat surprisingly, despite NSW being a concave function, we prove that no algorithm can achieve sublinear regret. To circumvent such negative results, we further consider a setting with full-information feedback and design two algorithms with $\sqrt{T}$-regret: the first one has no dependence on $N$ at all and is applicable to not just NSW but a broad class of welfare functions, while the second one has better dependence on $K$ and is preferable when $N$ is small. Finally, we also show that logarithmic regret is possible whenever there exists one agent who is indifferent about different arms.

cs.LG↗

LPR: Large Language Models-Aided Program Reduction

Program reduction is a prevalent technique to facilitate compilers' debugging by automatically minimizing bug-triggering programs. Existing program reduction techniques are either generic across languages (e.g., Perses and Vulcan) or specifically customized for one certain language by employing language-specific features, like C-Reduce. However, striking the balance between generality across multiple programming languages and specificity to individual languages in program reduction is yet to be explored. This paper proposes LPR, the first technique utilizing LLMs to perform language-specific program reduction for multiple languages. The core insight is to utilize both the language-generic syntax level program reduction (e.g., Perses) and the language-specific semantic level program transformations learned by LLMs. Alternately, language-generic program reducers efficiently reduce programs into 1-tree-minimality, which is small enough to be manageable for LLMs; LLMs effectively transform programs via the learned semantics to expose new reduction opportunities for the language-generic program reducers to further reduce the programs. Our extensive evaluation on 50 benchmarks across three languages (C, Rust, and JavaScript) has highlighted LPR's practicality and superiority over Vulcan, the state-of-the-art language-generic program reducer. For effectiveness, LPR surpasses Vulcan by producing 24.93%, 4.47%, and 11.71% smaller programs on benchmarks in C, Rust and JavaScript. Moreover, LPR and Vulcan have demonstrated their potential to complement each other. By using Vulcan on LPR's output for C programs, we achieve program sizes comparable to those reduced by C-Reduce. For efficiency, LPR takes 10.77%, 34.88%, 36.96% less time than Vulcan to finish all benchmarks in C, Rust and JavaScript, separately.

cs.PL↗

Contextual Multinomial Logit Bandits with General Value Functions

Contextual multinomial logit (MNL) bandits capture many real-world assortment recommendation problems such as online retailing/advertising. However, prior work has only considered (generalized) linear value functions, which greatly limits its applicability. Motivated by this fact, in this work, we consider contextual MNL bandits with a general value function class that contains the ground truth, borrowing ideas from a recent trend of studies on contextual bandits. Specifically, we consider both the stochastic and the adversarial settings, and propose a suite of algorithms, each with different computation-regret trade-off. When applied to the linear case, our results not only are the first ones with no dependence on a certain problem-dependent constant that can be exponentially large, but also enjoy other advantages such as computational efficiency, dimension-free regret bounds, or the ability to handle completely adversarial contexts and rewards.

cs.LG↗

Efficient Contextual Bandits with Uninformed Feedback Graphs

Bandits with feedback graphs are powerful online learning models that interpolate between the full information and classic bandit problems, capturing many real-life applications. A recent work by Zhang et al. (2023) studies the contextual version of this problem and proposes an efficient and optimal algorithm via a reduction to online regression. However, their algorithm crucially relies on seeing the feedback graph before making each decision, while in many applications, the feedback graph is uninformed, meaning that it is either only revealed after the learner makes her decision or even never fully revealed at all. This work develops the first contextual algorithm for such uninformed settings, via an efficient reduction to online regression over both the losses and the graphs. Importantly, we show that it is critical to learn the graphs using log loss instead of squared loss to obtain favorable regret guarantees. We also demonstrate the empirical effectiveness of our algorithm on a bidding application using both synthetic and real-world data.

cs.LG↗

Practical Contextual Bandits with Feedback Graphs

While contextual bandit has a mature theory, effectively leveraging different feedback patterns to enhance the pace of learning remains unclear. Bandits with feedback graphs, which interpolates between the full information and bandit regimes, provides a promising framework to mitigate the statistical complexity of learning. In this paper, we propose and analyze an approach to contextual bandits with feedback graphs based upon reduction to regression. The resulting algorithms are computationally practical and achieve established minimax rates, thereby reducing the statistical complexity in real-world applications.

cs.LG↗

No-Regret Learning in Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Unknown Demand Distribution

Supply chain management (SCM) has been recognized as an important discipline with applications to many industries, where the two-echelon stochastic inventory model, involving one downstream retailer and one upstream supplier, plays a fundamental role for developing firms' SCM strategies. In this work, we aim at designing online learning algorithms for this problem with an unknown demand distribution, which brings distinct features as compared to classic online optimization problems. Specifically, we consider the two-echelon supply chain model introduced in [Cachon and Zipkin, 1999] under two different settings: the centralized setting, where a planner decides both agents' strategy simultaneously, and the decentralized setting, where two agents decide their strategy independently and selfishly. We design algorithms that achieve favorable guarantees for both regret and convergence to the optimal inventory decision in both settings, and additionally for individual regret in the decentralized setting. Our algorithms are based on Online Gradient Descent and Online Newton Step, together with several new ingredients specifically designed for our problem. We also implement our algorithms and show their empirical effectiveness.

cs.LG↗

Online Learning in Contextual Second-Price Pay-Per-Click Auctions

We study online learning in contextual pay-per-click auctions where at each of the $T$ rounds, the learner receives some context along with a set of ads and needs to make an estimate on their click-through rate (CTR) in order to run a second-price pay-per-click auction. The learner's goal is to minimize her regret, defined as the gap between her total revenue and that of an oracle strategy that always makes perfect CTR predictions. We first show that $\sqrt{T}$-regret is obtainable via a computationally inefficient algorithm and that it is unavoidable since our algorithm is no easier than the classical multi-armed bandit problem. A by-product of our results is a $\sqrt{T}$-regret bound for the simpler non-contextual setting, improving upon a recent work of [Feng et al., 2023] by removing the inverse CTR dependency that could be arbitrarily large. Then, borrowing ideas from recent advances on efficient contextual bandit algorithms, we develop two practically efficient contextual auction algorithms: the first one uses the exponential weight scheme with optimistic square errors and maintains the same $\sqrt{T}$-regret bound, while the second one reduces the problem to online regression via a simple epsilon-greedy strategy, albeit with a worse regret bound. Finally, we conduct experiments on a synthetic dataset to showcase the effectiveness and superior performance of our algorithms.

cs.LG↗

Multi-unit Auction over a Social Network

Diffusion auction is an emerging business model where a seller aims to incentivise buyers in a social network to diffuse the auction information thereby attracting potential buyers. We focus on designing mechanisms for multi-unit diffusion auctions. Despite numerous attempts at this problem, existing mechanisms either fail to be incentive compatible (IC) or achieve only an unsatisfactory level of social welfare (SW). Here, we propose a novel graph exploration technique to realise multi-item diffusion auction. This technique ensures that potential competition among buyers stay ``localised'' so as to facilitate truthful bidding. Using this technique, we design multi-unit diffusion auction mechanisms MUDAN and MUDAN-$m$. Both mechanisms satisfy, among other properties, IC and $1/m$-weak efficiency. We also show that they achieve optimal social welfare for the class of rewardless diffusion auctions. While MUDAN addresses the bottleneck case when each buyer demands only a single item, MUDAN-$m$ handles the more general, multi-demand setting. We further demonstrate that these mechanisms achieve near-optimal social welfare through experiments.

cs.GT↗