arXiv subjects

Nimrod Talmon

Publications and source records attributed to Nimrod Talmon.

At least 73 records · Page 4Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain

We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules--SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin--Courant, and HarmonicBorda--for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial rules used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Complexity of Shift Bribery in Committee Elections

Given an election, a preferred candidate p, and a budget, the SHIFT BRIBERY problem asks whether p can win the election after shifting p higher in some voters' preference orders. Of course, shifting comes at a price (depending on the voter and on the extent of the shift) and one must not exceed the given budget. We study the (parameterized) computational complexity of S HIFT BRIBERY for multiwinner voting rules where winning the election means to be part of some winning committee. We focus on the well-established SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and Chamberlin-Courant rules, as well as on approximate variants of the Chamberlin-Courant rule, since the original rule is NP-hard to compute. We show that SHIFT BRIBERY tends to be harder in the multiwinner setting than in the single-winner one by showing settings where SHIFT BRIBERY is easy in the single-winner cases, but is hard (and hard to approximate) in the multiwinner ones. Moreover, we show that the non-monotonicity of those rules which are based on approximation algorithms for the Chamberlin-Courant rule sometimes affects the complexity of SHIFT BRIBERY.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2018

A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods

We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2018

A Participatory Democratic Budgeting Algorithm

The budget is the key means for effecting policy in democracies, yet its preparation is typically an excluding, opaque, and arcane process. We aim to rectify this by providing for the democratic creation of complete budgets --- for cooperatives, cities, or states. Such budgets are typically (i) prepared, discussed, and voted upon by comparing and contrasting with last-year's budget, (ii) quantitative, in that items appear in quantities with potentially varying costs, and (iii) hierarchical, reflecting the organization's structure. Our process can be used by a budget committee, the legislature or the electorate at large. We allow great flexibility in vote elicitation, from perturbing last-year's budget to a complete ranked budget proposal. We present a polynomial-time algorithm which takes such votes, last-year's budget, and a budget limit as input and produces a budget that is provably "democratically optimal" (Condorcet-consistent), in that no proposed change to it has majority support among the votes.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy

Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-$k$-counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules. We characterize SNTV, Bloc, and $k$-Approval Chamberlin--Courant as the only nontrivial rules in pairwise intersections of these classes. We provide some axiomatic characterizations for these classes, where monotonicity properties appear to be especially useful. The class of decomposable rules is new to the literature. We show that it strictly contains the class of OWA-based rules and describe some of the applications of decomposable rules.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms

Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grassroots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections. We observe a rich landscape with respect to the computational complexity of identifying proportional budgets and computing such, and present budgeting methods that satisfy these axioms by identifying budgets that are representative to the demands of vast segments of the voters.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Mixed Integer Programming with Convex/Concave Constraints: Fixed-Parameter Tractability and Applications to Multicovering and Voting

A classic result of Lenstra [Math.~Oper.~Res.~1983] says that an integer linear program can be solved in fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) time for the parameter being the number of variables. We extend this result by incorporating non-decreasing piecewise linear convex or concave functions to our (mixed) integer programs. This general technique allows us to establish parameterized complexity of a number of classic computational problems. In particular, we prove that Weighted Set Multicover is in FPT when parameterized by the number of elements to cover, and that there exists an FPT-time approximation scheme for Multiset Multicover for the same parameter. Further, we use our general technique to prove that a number of problems from computational social choice (e.g., problems related to bribery and control in elections) are in FPT when parameterized by the number of candidates. For bribery, this resolves a nearly 10-year old family of open problems, and for weighted electoral control of Approval voting, this improves some previously known XP-memberships to FPT-memberships.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2017

The Complexity of Multiwinner Voting Rules with Variable Number of Winners

We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning candidates are quite well studied, the study of elections with variable number of winners has only recently been initiated by Kilgour. This paper aims at achieving a better understanding of these rules, their computational complexity, and on scenarios for which they might be applicable.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Scheduling Two Agents on a Single Machine: A Parameterized Analysis of NP-hard Problems

Scheduling theory is an old and well-established area in combinatorial optimization, whereas the much younger area of parameterized complexity has only recently gained the attention of the community. Our aim is to bring these two areas closer together by studying the parameterized complexity of a class of single-machine two-agent scheduling problems. Our analysis focuses on the case where the number of jobs belonging to the second agent is considerably smaller than the number of jobs belonging to the first agent, and thus can be considered as a fixed parameter k. We study a variety of combinations of scheduling criteria for the two agents, and for each such combination we pinpoint its parameterized complexity with respect to the parameter k. The scheduling criteria that we analyze include the total weighted completion time, the total weighted number of tardy jobs, and the total weighted number of just-in-time jobs. Our analysis draws a borderline between tractable and intractable variants of these problems.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2017

On The Parameterized Tractability of the Just-In-Time Flow-Shop Scheduling Problem

Since its development in the early 90's, parameterized complexity has been widely used to analyze the tractability of many NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems with respect to various types of problem parameters. While the generic nature of the framework allows the analysis of any combinatorial problem, the main focus along the years was on analyzing graph problems. In this paper we diverge from this trend by studying the parameterized complexity of Just-In-Time (JIT) flow-shop scheduling problems. Our analysis focuses on the case where the number of due dates is considerably smaller than the number of jobs, and can thus be considered as a parameter. We prove that the two-machine problem is W[1]-hard with respect to this parameter, even if all processing times on the second machine are of unit length, while the problem is in XP even for a parameterized number of machines. We then move on to study the tractability of the problem when combining the different number of due dates with either the number of different weights or the number of different processing times on the first machine. We prove that in both cases the problem is fixed-parameter tractable for the two machine case, and is W[1]-hard for three or more machines.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2017

Balanced Facilities on Random Graphs

Given a graph G with n vertices and k players, each of which is placing a facility on one of the vertices of G, we define the score of the i'th player to be the number of vertices for which, among all players, the facility placed by the i'th player is the closest. A placement is balanced if all players get roughly the same score. A graph is balanced if all placements on it are balanced. Viewing balancedness as a desired property in various scenarios, in this paper we study balancedness properties of graphs, concentrating on random graphs and on expanders. We show that, while both random graphs and expanders tend to have good balancedness properties, random graphs are, in general, more balanced. In addition, we formulate and prove intractability of the combinatorial problem of deciding whether a given graph is balanced; then, building upon our analysis on random graphs and expanders, we devise two efficient algorithms which, with high probability, generate balancedness certificates. Our first algorithm is based on graph traversal, while the other relies on spectral properties.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2017

Multi-Player Diffusion Games on Graph Classes

We study competitive diffusion games on graphs introduced by Alon et al. [1] to model the spread of influence in social networks. Extending results of Roshanbin [8] for two players, we investigate the existence of pure Nash equilibria for at least three players on different classes of graphs including paths, cycles, grid graphs and hypercubes; as a main contribution, we answer an open question proving that there is no Nash equilibrium for three players on (m x n) grids with min(m, n) >= 5. Further, extending results of Etesami and Basar [3] for two players, we prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria for four players on every d-dimensional hypercube.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy

We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter. We consider both the standard scenario of adding and deleting candidates, where one asks whether a given candidate can become a winner (or, in the destructive case, can be precluded from winning) by adding or deleting few candidates, as well as a combinatorial scenario where adding/deleting a candidate automatically means adding or deleting a whole group of candidates. Considering several fundamental voting rules, our results show that the parameterized complexity of candidate control, with the number of voters as the parameter, is much more varied than in the setting with many voters.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2017

Proportional Representation in Vote Streams

We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting rules; specifically, we consider the Approval-based and the Borda-based variants of both the Chamberlin-- ourant rule and the Monroe rule. We complement our algorithms with lower bounds. Somewhat surprisingly, our results imply that, using space which does not depend on the number of voters it is possible to efficiently identify an approximate representative committee of fixed size over vote streams with huge number of voters.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

When can Graph Hyperbolicity be computed in Linear Time?

Hyperbolicity measures, in terms of (distance) metrics, how close a given graph is to being a tree. Due to its relevance in modeling real-world networks, hyperbolicity has seen intensive research over the last years. Unfortunately, the best known algorithms for computing the hyperbolicity number of a graph (the smaller, the more tree-like) have running time $O(n^4)$, where $n$ is the number of graph vertices. Exploiting the framework of parameterized complexity analysis, we explore possibilities for "linear-time FPT" algorithms to compute hyperbolicity. For instance, we show that hyperbolicity can be computed in time $O(2^{O(k)} + n +m)$ ($m$ being the number of graph edges) while at the same time, unless the SETH fails, there is no $2^{o(k)}n^2$-time algorithm.

cs.CC↗

arXiv2016

Teams in Online Scheduling Polls: Game-Theoretic Aspects

Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken during the meeting, therefore each team would like to maximize its relative attendance in the meeting (i.e., the proportional number of its participating team members). We introduce a corresponding game, where each team can declare (in the scheduling poll) a lower total availability, in order to improve its relative attendance---the pay-off. We are especially interested in situations where teams can form coalitions. We provide an efficient algorithm that, given a coalition, finds an optimal way for each team in a coalition to improve its pay-off. In contrast, we show that deciding whether such a coalition exists is NP-hard. We also study the existence of Nash equilibria: Finding Nash equilibria for various small sizes of teams and coalitions can be done in polynomial time while it is coNP-hard if the coalition size is unbounded.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Breaching the Privacy of Israel's Paper Ballot Voting System

An election is a process through which citizens in liberal democracies select their governing bodies, usually through voting. For elections to be truly honest, people must be able to vote freely without being subject to coercion; that is why voting is usually done in a private manner. In this paper we analyze the security offered by a paper-ballot voting system that is used in Israel, as well as in several other countries around the world. we provide an algorithm which, based on publicly available information, breaks the privacy of the voters participating in such elections. Simulations based on real data collected in Israel show that our algorithm performs well, and can correctly recover the vote of up to 96% of the voters.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2016

Precedence-constrained scheduling problems parameterized by partial order width

Negatively answering a question posed by Mnich and Wiese (Math. Program. 154(1-2):533-562), we show that P2|prec,$p_j{\in}\{1,2\}$|$C_{\max}$, the problem of finding a non-preemptive minimum-makespan schedule for precedence-constrained jobs of lengths 1 and 2 on two parallel identical machines, is W[2]-hard parameterized by the width of the partial order giving the precedence constraints. To this end, we show that Shuffle Product, the problem of deciding whether a given word can be obtained by interleaving the letters of $k$ other given words, is W[2]-hard parameterized by $k$, thus additionally answering a question posed by Rizzi and Vialette (CSR 2013). Finally, refining a geometric algorithm due to Servakh (Diskretn. Anal. Issled. Oper. 7(1):75-82), we show that the more general Resource-Constrained Project Scheduling problem is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the partial order width combined with the maximum allowed difference between the earliest possible and factual starting time of a job.

math.OC↗