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Ramesh Johari

Publications and source records attributed to Ramesh Johari.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Online Learning for Traffic Routing under Unknown Preferences

In transportation networks, users typically choose routes in a decentralized and self-interested manner to minimize their individual travel costs, which, in practice, often results in inefficient overall outcomes for society. As a result, there has been a growing interest in designing road tolling schemes to cope with these efficiency losses and steer users toward a system-efficient traffic pattern. However, the efficacy of road tolling schemes often relies on having access to complete information on users' trip attributes, such as their origin-destination (O-D) travel information and their values of time, which may not be available in practice. Motivated by this practical consideration, we propose an online learning approach to set tolls in a traffic network to drive heterogeneous users with different values of time toward a system-efficient traffic pattern. In particular, we develop a simple yet effective algorithm that adjusts tolls at each time period solely based on the observed aggregate flows on the roads of the network without relying on any additional trip attributes of users, thereby preserving user privacy. In the setting where the O-D pairs and values of time of users are drawn i.i.d. at each period, we show that our approach obtains an expected regret and road capacity violation of $O(\sqrt{T})$, where $T$ is the number of periods over which tolls are updated. Our regret guarantee is relative to an offline oracle that has complete information on users' trip attributes. We further establish a $Ω(\sqrt{T})$ lower bound on the regret of any algorithm, which establishes that our algorithm is optimal up to constants. Finally, we demonstrate the superior performance of our approach relative to several benchmarks on a real-world transportation network, thereby highlighting its practical applicability.

cs.LG↗

Unbiased Experiments in Congested Networks

When developing a new networking algorithm, it is established practice to run a randomized experiment, or A/B test, to evaluate its performance. In an A/B test, traffic is randomly allocated between a treatment group, which uses the new algorithm, and a control group, which uses the existing algorithm. However, because networks are congested, both treatment and control traffic compete against each other for resources in a way that biases the outcome of these tests. This bias can have a surprisingly large effect; for example, in lab A/B tests with two widely used congestion control algorithms, the treatment appeared to deliver 150% higher throughput when used by a few flows, and 75% lower throughput when used by most flows-despite the fact that the two algorithms have identical throughput when used by all traffic. Beyond the lab, we show that A/B tests can also be biased at scale. In an experiment run in cooperation with Netflix, estimates from A/B tests mistake the direction of change of some metrics, miss changes in other metrics, and overestimate the size of effects. We propose alternative experiment designs, previously used in online platforms, to more accurately evaluate new algorithms and allow experimenters to better understand the impact of congestion on their tests.

cs.NI↗

Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias

We develop an analytical framework to study experimental design in two-sided marketplaces. Many of these experiments exhibit interference, where an intervention applied to one market participant influences the behavior of another participant. This interference leads to biased estimates of the treatment effect of the intervention. We develop a stochastic market model and associated mean field limit to capture dynamics in such experiments, and use our model to investigate how the performance of different designs and estimators is affected by marketplace interference effects. Platforms typically use two common experimental designs: demand-side ("customer") randomization (CR) and supply-side ("listing") randomization (LR), along with their associated estimators. We show that good experimental design depends on market balance: in highly demand-constrained markets, CR is unbiased, while LR is biased; conversely, in highly supply-constrained markets, LR is unbiased, while CR is biased. We also introduce and study a novel experimental design based on two-sided randomization (TSR) where both customers and listings are randomized to treatment and control. We show that appropriate choices of TSR designs can be unbiased in both extremes of market balance, while yielding relatively low bias in intermediate regimes of market balance.

stat.ME↗

Cloud Storage for Multi-Service Battery Operation (Extended Version)

We study a cloud storage operator who provides shared storage service for electricity end-users using the residual part of a multi-service grid-scale battery primarily used for high priority grid services. We design an optimal product offering, pricing and customer portfolio. A framework and solution approach for assessing and operating such multi-service battery operations with stochastic services and different priority levels is an open problem is proposed. The methodology consists in modelling the problem as a two-stage stochastic optimization between high priority stochastic grid services and low priority cloud storage for stochastic end users. We also propose the operational metrics of multiplexing gain and probability of blocking to assess the operation of multi-service multi-user battery. To address the computational challenge of solving the stochastic optimization with a large number of end-users, we propose effective capacity as a convex approximation that allows an analytical solution. We then provide an empirical analysis based on real grid congestion data from RTE France, and a large dataset of end-users' electricity consumption in California. Our empirical analysis shows (i) our proposed effective capacity is a close approximation, (ii) battery operation and profit are sensitive to the cost of external resources, number of end-users, and RTE's leasing price of the battery, and (iii) with only a slight discount of the leasing price, the profit of the third party from a stochastic residual battery can be the same as that of a deterministic one. Cloud storage as a low priority service can profitably exist alongside other high priority battery services, making integration of more storage in the grid economically viable, and allowing larger intermittent renewables, a key path towards reduced carbon emissions.

eess.SP↗

Interference, Bias, and Variance in Two-Sided Marketplace Experimentation: Guidance for Platforms

Two-sided marketplace platforms often run experiments to test the effect of an intervention before launching it platform-wide. A typical approach is to randomize individuals into the treatment group, which receives the intervention, and the control group, which does not. The platform then compares the performance in the two groups to estimate the effect if the intervention were launched to everyone. We focus on two common experiment types, where the platform randomizes individuals either on the supply side or on the demand side. The resulting estimates of the treatment effect in these experiments are typically biased: because individuals in the market compete with each other, individuals in the treatment group affect those in the control group and vice versa, creating interference. We develop a simple tractable market model to study bias and variance in these experiments with interference. We focus on two choices available to the platform: (1) Which side of the platform should it randomize on (supply or demand)? (2) What proportion of individuals should be allocated to treatment? We find that both choices affect the bias and variance of the resulting estimators but in different ways. The bias-optimal choice of experiment type depends on the relative amounts of supply and demand in the market, and we discuss how a platform can use market data to select the experiment type. Importantly, we find in many circumstances, choosing the bias-optimal experiment type has little effect on variance. On the other hand, the choice of treatment proportion can induce a bias-variance tradeoff, where the bias-minimizing proportion increases variance. We discuss how a platform can navigate this tradeoff and best choose the treatment proportion, using a combination of modeling as well as contextual knowledge about the market, the risk of the intervention, and reasonable effect sizes of the intervention.

stat.ME↗

Matching while Learning

We consider the problem faced by a service platform that needs to match limited supply with demand but also to learn the attributes of new users in order to match them better in the future. We introduce a benchmark model with heterogeneous "workers" (demand) and a limited supply of "jobs" that arrive over time. Job types are known to the platform, but worker types are unknown and must be learned by observing match outcomes. Workers depart after performing a certain number of jobs. The expected payoff from a match depends on the pair of types and the goal is to maximize the steady-state rate of accumulation of payoff. Though we use terminology inspired by labor markets, our framework applies more broadly to platforms where a limited supply of heterogeneous products is matched to users over time. Our main contribution is a complete characterization of the structure of the optimal policy in the limit that each worker performs many jobs. The platform faces a trade-off for each worker between myopically maximizing payoffs (exploitation) and learning the type of the worker (exploration). This creates a multitude of multi-armed bandit problems, one for each worker, coupled together by the constraint on availability of jobs of different types (capacity constraints). We find that the platform should estimate a shadow price for each job type, and use the payoffs adjusted by these prices, first, to determine its learning goals and then, for each worker, (i) to balance learning with payoffs during the "exploration phase," and (ii) to myopically match after it has achieved its learning goals during the "exploitation phase."

cs.LG↗

Learning Unknown Service Rates in Queues: A Multi-Armed Bandit Approach

Consider a queueing system consisting of multiple servers. Jobs arrive over time and enter a queue for service; the goal is to minimize the size of this queue. At each opportunity for service, at most one server can be chosen, and at most one job can be served. Service is successful with a probability (the service probability) that is a priori unknown for each server. An algorithm that knows the service probabilities (the "genie") can always choose the server of highest service probability. We study algorithms that learn the unknown service probabilities. Our goal is to minimize queue-regret: the (expected) difference between the queue-lengths obtained by the algorithm, and those obtained by the "genie." Since queue-regret cannot be larger than classical regret, results for the standard multi-armed bandit problem give algorithms for which queue-regret increases no more than logarithmically in time. Our paper shows surprisingly more complex behavior. In particular, as long as the bandit algorithm's queues have relatively long regenerative cycles, queue-regret is similar to cumulative regret, and scales (essentially) logarithmically. However, we show that this "early stage" of the queueing bandit eventually gives way to a "late stage", where the optimal queue-regret scaling is $O(1/t)$. We demonstrate an algorithm that (order-wise) achieves this asymptotic queue-regret in the late stage. Our results are developed in a more general model that allows for multiple job classes as well.

eess.SY↗

Semi-parametric dynamic contextual pricing

Motivated by the application of real-time pricing in e-commerce platforms, we consider the problem of revenue-maximization in a setting where the seller can leverage contextual information describing the customer's history and the product's type to predict her valuation of the product. However, her true valuation is unobservable to the seller, only binary outcome in the form of success-failure of a transaction is observed. Unlike in usual contextual bandit settings, the optimal price/arm given a covariate in our setting is sensitive to the detailed characteristics of the residual uncertainty distribution. We develop a semi-parametric model in which the residual distribution is non-parametric and provide the first algorithm which learns both regression parameters and residual distribution with $\tilde O(\sqrt{n})$ regret. We empirically test a scalable implementation of our algorithm and observe good performance.

cs.LG↗

Designing Informative Rating Systems: Evidence from an Online Labor Market

Platforms critically rely on rating systems to learn the quality of market participants. In practice, however, these ratings are often highly inflated, and therefore not very informative. In this paper, we first investigate whether the platform can obtain less inflated, more informative ratings by altering the meaning and relative importance of the levels in the rating system. Second, we seek a principled approach for the platform to make these choices in the design of the rating system. First, we analyze the results of a randomized controlled trial on an online labor market in which an additional question was added to the feedback form. Between treatment conditions, we vary the question phrasing and answer choices; in particular, the treatment conditions include several positive-skewed verbal rating scales with descriptive phrases or adjectives providing specific interpretation for each rating level. The online labor market test reveals that current inflationary norms can in fact be countered by re-anchoring the meaning of the levels of the rating system. In particular, the positive-skewed verbal rating scales yield rating distributions that significantly reduce rating inflation and are much more informative about seller quality. Second, we develop a model-based framework to compare and select among rating system designs, and apply this framework to the data obtained from the online labor market test. Our simulations demonstrate that our model-based framework for scale design and optimization can identify the most informative rating system and substantially improve the quality of information obtained over baseline designs. Overall, our study illustrates that rating systems that are informative in practice can be designed, and demonstrates how to design them in a principled manner.

cs.HC↗

Always Valid Inference: Bringing Sequential Analysis to A/B Testing

A/B tests are typically analyzed via frequentist p-values and confidence intervals; but these inferences are wholly unreliable if users endogenously choose samples sizes by *continuously monitoring* their tests. We define *always valid* p-values and confidence intervals that let users try to take advantage of data as fast as it becomes available, providing valid statistical inference whenever they make their decision. Always valid inference can be interpreted as a natural interface for a sequential hypothesis test, which empowers users to implement a modified test tailored to them. In particular, we show in an appropriate sense that the measures we develop tradeoff sample size and power efficiently, despite a lack of prior knowledge of the user's relative preference between these two goals. We also use always valid p-values to obtain multiple hypothesis testing control in the sequential context. Our methodology has been implemented in a large scale commercial A/B testing platform to analyze hundreds of thousands of experiments to date.

math.ST↗

Designing Optimal Binary Rating Systems

Modern online platforms rely on effective rating systems to learn about items. We consider the optimal design of rating systems that collect binary feedback after transactions. We make three contributions. First, we formalize the performance of a rating system as the speed with which it recovers the true underlying ranking on items (in a large deviations sense), accounting for both items' underlying match rates and the platform's preferences. Second, we provide an efficient algorithm to compute the binary feedback system that yields the highest such performance. Finally, we show how this theoretical perspective can be used to empirically design an implementable, approximately optimal rating system, and validate our approach using real-world experimental data collected on Amazon Mechanical Turk.

cs.LG↗

Bandit Learning with Positive Externalities

In many platforms, user arrivals exhibit a self-reinforcing behavior: future user arrivals are likely to have preferences similar to users who were satisfied in the past. In other words, arrivals exhibit positive externalities. We study multiarmed bandit (MAB) problems with positive externalities. We show that the self-reinforcing preferences may lead standard benchmark algorithms such as UCB to exhibit linear regret. We develop a new algorithm, Balanced Exploration (BE), which explores arms carefully to avoid suboptimal convergence of arrivals before sufficient evidence is gathered. We also introduce an adaptive variant of BE which successively eliminates suboptimal arms. We analyze their asymptotic regret, and establish optimality by showing that no algorithm can perform better.

cs.LG↗

Exploration vs. Exploitation in Team Formation

An online labor platform faces an online learning problem in matching workers with jobs and using the performance on these jobs to create better future matches. This learning problem is complicated by the rise of complex tasks on these platforms, such as web development and product design, that require a team of workers to complete. The success of a job is now a function of the skills and contributions of all workers involved, which may be unknown to both the platform and the client who posted the job. These team matchings result in a structured correlation between what is known about the individuals and this information can be utilized to create better future matches. We analyze two natural settings where the performance of a team is dictated by its strongest and its weakest member, respectively. We find that both problems pose an exploration-exploitation tradeoff between learning the performance of untested teams and repeating previously tested teams that resulted in a good performance. We establish fundamental regret bounds and design near-optimal algorithms that uncover several insights into these tradeoffs.

cs.LG↗

On Learning the $cμ$ Rule in Single and Parallel Server Networks

We consider learning-based variants of the $c μ$ rule for scheduling in single and parallel server settings of multi-class queueing systems. In the single server setting, the $c μ$ rule is known to minimize the expected holding-cost (weighted queue-lengths summed over classes and a fixed time horizon). We focus on the problem where the service rates $μ$ are unknown with the holding-cost regret (regret against the $c μ$ rule with known $μ$) as our objective. We show that the greedy algorithm that uses empirically learned service rates results in a constant holding-cost regret (the regret is independent of the time horizon). This free exploration can be explained in the single server setting by the fact that any work-conserving policy obtains the same number of samples in a busy cycle. In the parallel server setting, we show that the $c μ$ rule may result in unstable queues, even for arrival rates within the capacity region. We then present sufficient conditions for geometric ergodicity under the $c μ$ rule. Using these results, we propose an almost greedy algorithm that explores only when the number of samples falls below a threshold. We show that this algorithm delivers constant holding-cost regret because a free exploration condition is eventually satisfied.

cs.PF↗

Optimal Testing in the Experiment-rich Regime

Motivated by the widespread adoption of large-scale A/B testing in industry, we propose a new experimentation framework for the setting where potential experiments are abundant (i.e., many hypotheses are available to test), and observations are costly; we refer to this as the experiment-rich regime. Such scenarios require the experimenter to internalize the opportunity cost of assigning a sample to a particular experiment. We fully characterize the optimal policy and give an algorithm to compute it. Furthermore, we develop a simple heuristic that also provides intuition for the optimal policy. We use simulations based on real data to compare both the optimal algorithm and the heuristic to other natural alternative experimental design frameworks. In particular, we discuss the paradox of power: high-powered classical tests can lead to highly inefficient sampling in the experiment-rich regime.

stat.ML↗

Learning with Abandonment

Consider a platform that wants to learn a personalized policy for each user, but the platform faces the risk of a user abandoning the platform if she is dissatisfied with the actions of the platform. For example, a platform is interested in personalizing the number of newsletters it sends, but faces the risk that the user unsubscribes forever. We propose a general thresholded learning model for scenarios like this, and discuss the structure of optimal policies. We describe salient features of optimal personalization algorithms and how feedback the platform receives impacts the results. Furthermore, we investigate how the platform can efficiently learn the heterogeneity across users by interacting with a population and provide performance guarantees.

stat.ML↗

Competition and Efficiency of Coalitions in Cournot Games with Uncertainty

We investigate the impact of coalition formation on the efficiency of Cournot games where producers face uncertainties. In particular, we study a market model where firms must determine their output before an uncertain production capacity is realized. In contrast to standard Cournot models, we show that the game is not efficient when there are many small firms. Instead, producers tend to act conservatively to hedge against their risks. We show that in the presence of uncertainty, the game becomes efficient when firms are allowed to take advantage of diversity to form groups of certain sizes. We characterize the tradeoff between market power and uncertainty reduction as a function of group size. In particular, we compare the welfare and output obtained with coalitional competition, with the same benchmarks when output is controlled by a single system operator. We show when there are $N$ firms present, competition between groups of size $Ω(\sqrt{N})$ results in equilibria that are socially optimal in terms of welfare and groups of size $Ω(N^{2/3})$ are socially optimal in terms of production. We also extend our results to the case of uncertain demand by establishing an equivalency between Cournot oligopoly and Cournot Oligopsony. We demonstrate our results with real data from electricity markets with significant wind power penetration.

cs.GT↗

Pricing and Referrals in Diffusion on Networks

When a new product or technology is introduced, potential consumers can learn its quality by trying the product, at a risk, or by letting others try it and free-riding on the information that they generate. We propose a dynamic game to study the adoption of technologies of uncertain value, when agents are connected by a network and a monopolist seller chooses a policy to maximize profits. Consumers with low degree (few friends) have incentives to adopt early, while consumers with high degree have incentives to free ride. The seller can induce high-degree consumers to adopt early by offering referral incentives - rewards to early adopters whose friends buy in the second period. Referral incentives thus lead to a `double-threshold strategy' by which low and high-degree agents adopt the product early while middle-degree agents wait. We show that referral incentives are optimal on certain networks while inter-temporal price discrimination (i.e., a first-period price discount) is optimal on others, and discuss welfare implications.

econ.GN↗