SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Telikepalli Kavitha

Publications and source records attributed to Telikepalli Kavitha.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Low-Cost Arborescence Under Edge Faults

Our input is a directed graph $G = (V,E)$ on $n$ vertices and $m$ edges with a designated root vertex $r$ and a function $cost: E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$. The problem is to maintain a min-cost arborescence in $G$ in the presence of edge faults (a single fault at a time). Edge faults are transient and once the faulty edge is repaired, the original min-cost arborescence $\mathcal{T}$ is restored. Whenever an edge fault happens, we need to update $\mathcal{T}$ to a min-cost arborescence in $G-f$, where $f$ is the faulty edge. Since computing a min-cost arborescence in $G - f$ takes $O(m + n\log n)$ time, we seek to construct a sparse subgraph $H$ in a preprocessing step such that in the event of any edge $f$ failing, it suffices to compute a min-cost arborescence in $H - f$ in order to find a low-cost arborescence in $G - f$. In the unweighted setting, this is the fault-tolerant subgraph problem for single-source {\em reachability}. Baswana, Choudhary, and Roditty (SICOMP, 2018) showed a $k$-fault tolerant reachability subgraph of size $O(2^kn)$, where $k$ is the number of edge faults. We show a simple polynomial-time algorithm to construct a subgraph $H$ of size $O(n^{3/2})$ such that, for any $f \in E$, a min-cost arborescence in $H-f$ is a 2-approximation of a min-cost arborescence in $G-f$. Thus whenever an edge fault happens, we can find a 2-approximate min-cost arborescence in $G-f$ in $O(n^{3/2})$ time. Our second problem is in the matroid setting. The input is a matroid $M = (E, {\cal I})$ with a function $cost: E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. The problem is to compute a sparse $S \subseteq E$ (called a $k$-fault tolerant preserver) such that for any $F \subseteq E$ with $|F| \le k$, the matroid $M|(S\setminus F)$ contains a min-cost basis of $M|(E\setminus F)$. We show a tight bound of $k.rank(E)$ on the size of a $k$-fault tolerant preserver.

cs.DS

Condorcet Dimension and Pareto Optimality for Matchings and Beyond

We study matching problems in which agents form one side of a bipartite graph and have preferences over objects on the other side. A central solution concept in this setting is popularity: a matching is popular if it is a (weak) Condorcet winner, meaning that no other matching is preferred by a strict majority of agents. It is well known, however, that Condorcet winners need not exist. We therefore turn to a natural and prominent relaxation. A set of matchings is a Condorcet-winning set if, for every competing matching, a majority of agents prefers their favorite matching in the set over the competitor. The Condorcet dimension is the smallest cardinality of a Condorcet-winning set. Our main results reveal a connection between Condorcet-winning sets and Pareto optimality. We show that any Pareto-optimal set of two matchings is, in particular, a Condorcet-winning set. This implication continues to hold when we impose matroid constraints on the set of matched objects, and even when agents' valuations are given as partial orders. The existence picture, however, changes sharply with partial orders. While for weak orders a Pareto-optimal set of two matchings always exists, this is -- surprisingly -- not the case under partial orders. Consequently, although the Condorcet dimension for matchings is 2 under weak orders (even under matroid constraints), this guarantee fails for partial orders: we prove that the Condorcet dimension is $\Theta(\sqrt{n})$, and rises further to $\Theta(n)$ when matroid constraints are added. On the computational side, we show that, under partial orders, deciding whether there exists a Condorcet -- winning set of a given fixed size is NP-hard. The same holds for deciding the existence of a Pareto-optimal matching, which we believe to be of independent interest. Finally, we also show that the Condorcet dimension for a related problem on arborescences is also 2.

cs.GT

Fault-Tolerant Approximate Distance Oracles with a Source Set

Our input is an undirected weighted graph $G = (V,E)$ on $n$ vertices along with a source set $S\subseteq V$. The problem is to preprocess $G$ and build a compact data structure such that upon query $Qu(s,v,f)$ where $(s,v) \in S\times V$ and $f$ is any faulty edge, we can quickly find a good estimate (i.e., within a small multiplicative stretch) of the $s$-$v$ distance in $G-f$. The work of Bil{\`{o}} et al. (Algorithmica 2022) on multiple-edge fault-tolerant approximate shortest path trees implies a compact oracle for the above problem with a stretch of at most 3 and with query answering time $O(\log^2 n)$. We show a very simple construction of an $S\times V$ approximate distance oracle with $O(1)$ query answering time; its size is $\widetilde{O}(|S|n + n^{3/2})$ and multiplicative stretch is at most 5. A single-edge fault-tolerant $ST$-distance oracle from the work of Bil{\`{o}} et al. (STACS 2018) plays a key role in our construction. We also give a construction of a fault-tolerant $S \times V$ approximate distance oracle of size $\widetilde{O}(|S|n + n^{4/3})$ with multiplicative stretch at most 13 and as before, with $O(1)$ query answering time.

cs.DS

Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees with Fairer Endings

Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem at the interface of economics and computer science. Traditional approaches focus either on randomized allocations that are fair in expectation or deterministic allocations that are approximately fair. Recent work reconciles both these approaches via best-of-both-worlds guarantees, wherein one seeks randomized allocations that are fair in expectation (ex-ante fair) while being supported on approximately fair allocations (ex-post fair). Prior work has shown that under additive valuations, there always exists a randomized allocation that is ex-ante stochastic-dominance envy-free (sd-EF) and ex-post envy-free up to one good (EF1). Our work is motivated by the goal of achieving stronger ex-post fairness guarantees such as envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) along with meaningful ex-ante guarantees. We make the following contributions: 1) We first consider lexicographic preferences, a subdomain of additive valuations where ex-post EFX allocations always exist and can be computed efficiently. On the negative side, we show that ex-ante sd-EF is fundamentally incompatible with ex-post EFX, prompting a relaxation of the ex-ante benchmark. We then present a poly. time algorithm that achieves ex-post EFX and PO together with ex-ante 9/10-EF. Our algorithm uses dependent rounding and leverages structural properties of EFX and PO allocations. 2)For monotone valuations, we study EFX-with-charity: a relaxation of EFX where some goods remain unallocated, with no agent envying the unallocated pool. We show that ex-post EFX-with-charity can be achieved alongside ex-ante 0.5-EF. 3)Finally, for subadditive valuations, we strengthen our previous ex-post guarantee to EFX-with-bounded-charity, where at most n-1 goods (n= no. of agents) remain unallocated, at the price of weakening the ex-ante guarantee to 0.5-proportionality.

cs.GT

Perfect Matchings and Popularity in the Many-to-Many Setting

We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G$ where every vertex has a capacity and a strict preference order on its neighbors. Furthermore, there is a cost function on the edge set. We assume $G$ admits a perfect matching, i.e., one that fully matches all vertices. It is only perfect matchings that are feasible for us and we are interested in those perfect matchings that are popular within the set of perfect matchings. It is known that such matchings (called popular perfect matchings) always exist and can be efficiently computed. What we seek here is not any popular perfect matching, but a min-cost one. We show a polynomial-time algorithm for finding such a matching; this is via a characterization of popular perfect matchings in $G$ in terms of stable matchings in a colorful auxiliary instance. This is a generalization of such a characterization that was known in the one-to-one setting.

cs.DS

Arborescences, Colorful Forests, and Popularity

Our input is a directed, rooted graph $G = (V \cup \{r\},E)$ where each vertex in $V$ has a partial order preference over its incoming edges. The preferences of a vertex extend naturally to preferences over arborescences rooted at $r$. We seek a popular arborescence in $G$, i.e., one for which there is no "more popular" arborescence. Popular arborescences have applications in liquid democracy or collective decision making; however, they need not exist in every input instance. The popular arborescence problem is to decide if a given input instance admits a popular arborescence or not. We show a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem, whose computational complexity was not known previously. Our algorithm is combinatorial, and can be regarded as a primal-dual algorithm. It searches for an arborescence along with its dual certificate, a chain of subsets of $E$, witnessing its popularity. In fact, our algorithm solves the more general popular common base problem in the intersection of two matroids, where one matroid is the partition matroid defined by any partition $E = \bigcup_{v\in V} δ(v)$ and the other is an arbitrary matroid on $E$ of rank $|V|$, with each $v \in V$ having a partial order over elements in $δ(v)$. We extend our algorithm to the case with forced or forbidden edges. We also study the related popular colorful forest (or more generally, the popular common independent set) problem where edges are partitioned into color classes, and the task is to find a colorful forest that is popular within the set of all colorful forests. For the case with weak rankings, we formulate the popular colorful forest polytope, and thus show that a minimum-cost popular colorful forest can be computed efficiently. By contrast, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute a minimum-cost popular arborescence, even when rankings are strict.

cs.DS

The popular assignment problem: when cardinality is more important than popularity

We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G=(A\cup B,E)$ where nodes in $A$ are agents having preferences in partial order over their neighbors, while nodes in $B$ are objects without preferences. We propose a polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm based on LP duality that finds a maximum matching or assignment in $G$ that is popular among all maximum matchings, if there exists one. Our algorithm can also be used to achieve a trade-off between popularity and cardinality by imposing a penalty on unmatched nodes in $A$. We also provide an $O^*(|E|^k)$ algorithm that finds an assignment whose unpopularity margin is at most $k$; this algorithm is essentially optimal, since the problem is $\mathsf{NP}$-complete and $\mathsf{W}_l[1]$-hard with parameter $k$. We also prove that finding a popular assignment of minimum cost when each edge has an associated binary cost is $\mathsf{NP}$-hard, even if agents have strict preferences. By contrast, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the variant of the popular assignment problem with forced/forbidden edges. Finally, we present an application in the context of housing markets.

cs.DS

Semi-Popular Matchings and Copeland Winners

Given a graph $G = (V,E)$ where every vertex has a weak ranking over its neighbors, we consider the problem of computing an optimal matching as per agent preferences. Classical notions of optimality such as stability and its relaxation popularity could fail to exist when $G$ is non-bipartite. In light of the non-existence of a popular matching, we consider its relaxations that satisfy universal existence. We find a positive answer in the form of semi-popularity. A matching $M$ is semi-popular if for a majority of the matchings $N$ in $G$, $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against $N$. We show that a semi-popular matching always exists in any graph $G$ and complement this existence result with a fully polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS). A special subclass of semi-popular matchings is the set of Copeland winners -- the notion of Copeland winner is classical in social choice theory and a Copeland winner always exists in any voting instance. We study the complexity of computing a matching that is a Copeland winner and show there is no polynomial-time algorithm for this problem unless $\mathsf{P} = \mathsf{NP}$.

cs.GT

Popular Matchings with One-Sided Bias

Let $G = (A \cup B,E)$ be a bipartite graph where the set $A$ consists of agents or main players and the set $B$ consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching $M$ is popular if for any matching $N$, the number of vertices that prefer $M$ to $N$ is at least the number that prefer $N$ to $M$. Popular matchings always exist in $G$ since every stable matching is popular. A matching $M$ is $A$-popular if for any matching $N$, the number of agents (i.e., vertices in $A$) that prefer $M$ to $N$ is at least the number of agents that prefer $N$ to $M$. Unlike popular matchings, $A$-popular matchings need not exist in a given instance $G$ and there is a simple linear time algorithm to decide if $G$ admits an $A$-popular matching and compute one, if so. We consider the problem of deciding if $G$ admits a matching that is both popular and $A$-popular and finding one, if so. We call such matchings fully popular. A fully popular matching is useful when $A$ is the more important side -- so along with overall popularity, we would like to maintain ``popularity within the set $A$''. A fully popular matching is not necessarily a min-size/max-size popular matching and all known polynomial-time algorithms for popular matching problems compute either min-size or max-size popular matchings. Here we show a linear time algorithm for the fully popular matching problem, thus our result shows a new tractable subclass of popular matchings.

cs.DS

Understanding popular matchings via stable matchings

Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching; another subclass of popular matchings that always exist and can be easily computed is the set of dominant matchings. A popular matching $M$ is dominant if $M$ wins the head-to-head election against any larger matching. Thus every dominant matching is a max-size popular matching and it is known that the set of dominant matchings is the linear image of the set of stable matchings in an auxiliary graph. Results from the literature seem to suggest that stable and dominant matchings behave, from a complexity theory point of view, in a very similar manner within the class of popular matchings. The goal of this paper is to show that indeed there are differences in the tractability of stable and dominant matchings, and to investigate further their importance for popular matchings. First, we show that it is easy to check if all popular matchings are also stable, however it is co-NP hard to check if all popular matchings are also dominant. Second, we show how some new and recent hardness results on popular matching problems can be deduced from the NP-hardness of certain problems on stable matchings, also studied in this paper, thus showing that stable matchings can be employed not only to show positive results on popular matching (as is known), but also most negative ones. Problems for which we show new hardness results include finding a min-size (resp. max-size) popular matching that is not stable (resp. dominant). A known result for which we give a new and simple proof is the NP-hardness of finding a popular matching when $G$ is non-bipartite.

cs.DM

Popular Matchings in Complete Graphs

Our input is a complete graph $G = (V,E)$ on $n$ vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in $G$. Our goal is to construct a matching in $G$ that is popular. A matching $M$ is popular if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching $M'$, where each vertex casts a vote for the matching in $\{M,M'\}$ where it gets assigned a better partner. The popular matching problem is to decide whether a popular matching exists or not. The popular matching problem in $G$ is easy to solve for odd $n$. Surprisingly, the problem becomes NP-hard for even $n$, as we show here.

cs.DM

Maximum Matchings and Popularity

Let $G$ be a bipartite graph where every node has a strict ranking of its neighbors. For every node, its preferences over neighbors extend naturally to preferences over matchings. Matching $N$ is more popular than matching $M$ if the number of nodes that prefer $N$ to $M$ is more than the number that prefer $M$ to $N$. A maximum matching $M$ in $G$ is a "popular max-matching" if there is no maximum matching in $G$ that is more popular than $M$. Such matchings are relevant in applications where the set of admissible solutions is the set of maximum matchings and we wish to find a best maximum matching as per node preferences. It is known that a popular max-matching always exists in $G$. Here we show a compact extended formulation for the popular max-matching polytope. So when there are edge costs, a min-cost popular max-matching in $G$ can be computed in polynomial time. This is in contrast to the min-cost popular matching problem which is known to be NP-hard. We also consider Pareto-optimality, which is a relaxation of popularity, and show that computing a min-cost Pareto-optimal matching/max-matching is NP-hard.

cs.DS

Envy-free Relaxations for Goods, Chores, and Mixed Items

In fair division problems, we are given a set $S$ of $m$ items and a set $N$ of $n$ agents with individual preferences, and the goal is to find an allocation of items among agents so that each agent finds the allocation fair. There are several established fairness concepts and envy-freeness is one of the most extensively studied ones. However envy-free allocations do not always exist when items are indivisible and this has motivated relaxations of envy-freeness: envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) are two well-studied relaxations. We consider the problem of finding EF1 and EFX allocations for utility functions that are not necessarily monotone, and propose four possible extensions of different strength to this setting. In particular, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an EF1 allocation for two agents with arbitrary utility functions. An example is given showing that EFX allocations need not exist for two agents with non-monotone, non-additive, identical utility functions. However, when all agents have monotone (not necessarily additive) identical utility functions, we prove that an EFX allocation of chores always exists. As a step toward understanding the general case, we discuss two subclasses of utility functions: Boolean utilities that are $\{0,+1\}$-valued functions, and negative Boolean utilities that are $\{0,-1\}$-valued functions. For the latter, we give a polynomial time algorithm that finds an EFX allocation when the utility functions are identical.

econ.TH

Quasi-popular Matchings, Optimality, and Extended Formulations

Let G = ((A,B),E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching. Popular matchings are a well-studied generalization of stable matchings, introduced with the goal of enlarging the set of admissible solutions, while maintaining a certain level of fairness. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. Unfortunately, when there are edge costs, it is NP-hard to find a popular matching of minimum cost -- even worse, the min-cost popular matching problem is hard to approximate up to any factor. Let opt be the cost of a min-cost popular matching. Our goal is to efficiently compute a matching of cost at most opt by paying the price of mildly relaxing popularity. Our main positive results are two bi-criteria algorithms that find in polynomial time a near-popular or quasi-popular matching of cost at most opt. Moreover, one of the algorithms finds a quasi-popular matching of cost at most that of a min-cost popular fractional matching, which could be much smaller than opt. Key to the other algorithm is a polynomial-size extended formulation for an integral polytope sandwiched between the popular and quasi-popular matching polytopes. We complement these results by showing that it is NP-hard to find a quasi-popular matching of minimum cost, and that both the popular and quasi-popular matching polytopes have near-exponential extension complexity. This version of the paper goes beyond the conference version [12] in the following two points: (i) the algorithm for finding a quasi-popular matching of cost at most that of a min-cost popular fractional matching is new; (ii) the proofs from Section 6.1 and Section 7.3 are now self-contained (the conference version used constructions from [10] to show these lower bounds).

cs.DS

Popular Branchings and Their Dual Certificates

Let $G$ be a digraph where every node has preferences over its incoming edges. The preferences of a node extend naturally to preferences over branchings, i.e., directed forests; a branching $B$ is popular if $B$ does not lose a head-to-head election (where nodes cast votes) against any branching. Such popular branchings have a natural application in liquid democracy. The popular branching problem is to decide if $G$ admits a popular branching or not. We give a characterization of popular branchings in terms of dual certificates and use this characterization to design an efficient combinatorial algorithm for the popular branching problem. When preferences are weak rankings, we use our characterization to formulate the popular branching polytope in the original space and also show that our algorithm can be modified to compute a branching with least unpopularity margin. When preferences are strict rankings, we show that "approximately popular" branchings always exist.

cs.DS

Popular Matchings and Limits to Tractability

We consider popular matching problems in both bipartite and non-bipartite graphs with strict preference lists. It is known that every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. A subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings has been well-studied in bipartite graphs: they always exist and there is a simple linear time algorithm to find one. We show that stable and dominant matchings are the only two tractable subclasses of popular matchings in bipartite graphs; more precisely, we show that it is NP-complete to decide if $G$ admits a popular matching that is neither stable nor dominant. We also show a number of related hardness results, such as (tight) inapproximability of the maximum weight popular matching problem. In non-bipartite graphs, we show a strong negative result: it is NP-hard to decide whether a popular matching exists or not, and the same result holds if we replace popular with dominant. On the positive side, we show the following results in any graph: - we identify a subclass of dominant matchings called strongly dominant matchings and show a linear time algorithm to decide if a strongly dominant matching exists or not; - we show an efficient algorithm to compute a popular matching of minimum cost in a graph with edge costs and bounded treewidth.

cs.DM

The Popular Roommates problem

We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching problem in a roommates instance has been an open problem for several years and here we show it is NP-hard. A sub-class of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings has been well-studied in bipartite graphs. We show that the dominant matching problem in a roommates instance is also NP-hard and this is the case even when the instance admits a stable matching.

cs.DS

Max-size popular matchings and extensions

We consider the max-size popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' in G such that the vertices that prefer M' to M outnumber those that prefer M to M'. We show it is NP-hard to compute a max-size popular matching in G. This is in contrast to the tractability of this problem in bipartite graphs where a max-size popular matching can be computed in linear time. We define a subclass of max-size popular matchings called strongly dominant matchings and show a linear time algorithm to solve the strongly dominant matching problem in a roommates instance. We consider a generalization of the max-size popular matching problem in bipartite graphs: this is the max-weight popular matching problem where there is also an edge weight function w and we seek a popular matching of largest weight. We show this is an NP-hard problem and this is so even when w(e) is either 1 or 2 for every edge e. We also show an algorithm with running time O*(2^{n/4}) to find a max-weight popular matching matching in G = (A U B,E)$ on n vertices.

cs.DS